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Abstract
This study employs recently developed techniques in time series econometrics to
estimate linear models of equilibrium price determination in a competitive market for
durable assets. Motivating this study is the unstructured approach employed in
previous land price research, where the theoretical model of agent behaviour is
invariably mis-specified or left undeveloped and the empirical model prone to the
problems of spurious regression. The joint issues of theoretical and statistical
congruence play important roles here. Specifically, a theoretical model is developed in
which market participants are assumed to price land using present value methods. At
the market level this yields a reduced form expression of equilibrium price
determination which can be estimated empirically using aggregate data for England and
Wales. The concepts of error correction and cointegration are then investigated and
applied to the land price model. A unique long run relationship is identified between
real agricultural land prices, inflation and real agricultural rents. Taking account of
inflation-hedging as a motivation for acquiring farmland, land prices are shown to be
principally determined by the returns to land, as embodied by market rents. The
empirical model is also congruent with theoretical predictions regarding the unit
elasticity between asset prices and returns. The error correction representation of the
cointegrating set indicates that the short run response of land prices to rent and inflation
is larger than the long run response. Consequently, land prices initially overshoot their
equilibrium values following changes in rents or inflation. The period of adjustment to
long run equilibrium lasts around three or fours years. The long run real rate of
discount on agricultural land is estimated at 3.6% confirming the widely held belief that
real rates of return on farmland are low. Present value models incorporating naive,
adaptive and rational expectations are also estimated and the adaptive model is favoured
by the data.
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Chapter I
Introduction
1.1
There are few topics in agricultural economics that have generated the level of interest to
parallel the volume of land market research. It is research that has a fine pedigree,
dating back to the Classical analyses of Adam Smith and David Ricardo in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. At the heart of these influential writings and more
recent theoretical and empirical studies is the price of land and the factors that determine
land price. Of all the questions that land market research has sought to answer there can
be little doubt that the most common one concerns whether agricultural land prices are
justified on the basis of agricultural earning potential. Previous responses to this
question have been largely unsatisfactory, since until recently there has been no
objective means available to evaluate this problem empirically, and as a result it has
remained an untestable hypothesis. Deficiencies in past research motivate this present
study which offers a re-examination of this interesting and elusive subject. Using new
techniques developed in the field of theoretical econometrics, this thesis attempts to
throw new light on this question and resolve many of the issues that have featured in
the literature on land price modelling and the determinants of land prices.
The specific aim of this thesis is to develop parsimonious models of land price
determination that are theoretically consistent and statistically congruent. Despite the
considerable research input in to the land market, the number of econometric models of
land prices in the United Kingdom has been surprisingly few. Indeed, there exists only
one published econometric model of land prices, that being the model developed by
Bruce Traill in the late 1970s. The theoretical foundations and empirical specification of
this model epitomizes many of the land price models published in the United States at
that time, all of which have failed to capture the underlying behavioural relationships at
work in the land market. The mis-specification of the Traill model arises from a
misunderstanding of the theory of price determination in capital asset markets and is
exacerbated by a number of other methodological errors and expedients, that were
employed in the model's development. The methodological deficiencies of the model
and its poor performance in tracking trends in real land prices point to the development
of land price equations that arise directly from economic theory.
The empirical models estimated here are derived directly from the present value
hypothesis of capital asset pricing. Present value methods are attractive for the purpose
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of modelling, not least because they yield simple reduced form representations of
equilibrium price determination. In addition the present value framework is sufficiently
tractable to allow a number of issues to be investigated within it, such as the mechanism
by which participants in the land market form expectations, and the long run rate of
discount used in land acquisition.
It is also apparent that in general, agricultural economists have been slow to recognise
the recent advances in econometric methodology that have inspired considerable activity
in other branches of applied economics. At the heart of this new methodology is an
awareness of the ease with which orthodox techniques of estimation and testing may be
mis-used and the consequences this can have on statistical inference. This mis-use of
convention techniques typically manifests itself as the acceptance of false hypotheses
based on spurious regression. The so-called 'modem econometrics' attempts to remedy
this illegitimate use of econometrics by ensuring that empirical data satisfy the
assumptions on which estimation and testing are based; assumptions to which few
analysts have traditionally paid much attention, despite the crucial role they play in
statistical inference, and by implication, policy prescription.
To suggest however that the new methodology merely seeks to remedy bad practise
would be to miss its most significant contribution to applied econometrics, that being
the concept of cointegration. Whilst the technique of cointegration embodies the
elements of good-practice econometrics, it also attempts to 'put the economics back into
econometrics' via the direct incorporation of equilibrium relationships in the statistical
analysis. As such, cointegration is often interpreted as the empirical counterpart of the
equilibrium relationships posited by economic theory. In essence, the aim of this new
methodology is to endow econometric models with a statistical credibility and an
economic relevance frequently lacking in many of the models that have come to occupy
so many of the pages in a typical journal of economics.
There are a number of specific issues that arise from this brief discussion that will be
addressed in the Chapters that follow. These may be summarised as,
(i) What can economic theory say about the process of land price determination?
(ii) Are existing models of land price determination congruent with economic theory
and do they satisfactorily explain observed behaviour in a statistically valid
manner?
(iii) Are there alternative specifications that may be logically deduced from theory
which satisfy the statistical requirements of the estimation process?
Introduction 1.3
(iv) Can land prices be justified from their agricultural earning potential? and if not,
what other factors play important roles in land price determination?
(v) What is the rate of discount on land purchase? and,
(vi) What is the nature of expectations formation in the land market?
The remainder of this introduction comprises a route-map of the way these issues are
tackled. Chapter II sets the scene with a description of the historical events that have
shaped the land market, giving special emphasis to the role of government policy, to
which much of the changes in the land market may be attributed. It is suggested that
legislation has affected the market on two fronts. First, there is the legislation that has
been enacted with the specific intention of altering the ownership and operating
structure of farmland. The introduction of capital taxation, planning law and numerous
Agricultural Holdings Acts have been instrumental in the distribution of ownership and
control of farmland, which in tum has affected the price structure of farmland. Second,
there is the influence of policies designed to maintain the prosperity of the farm sector
through product price support, grant and subsidy. Given that the price of land reflects
the economic state and financial security of the industry as a whole, this arm of
government policy has been a most potent tool in affecting the level of land prices. The
Chapter also seeks to convey the complexity of the land market and the disparate
motivations of the different agents involved in the market's operation.
In Chapter III attention focuses on a theoretical model of land price determination
developed within a neoclassical framework. The model examines the concepts of stock
and flow analysis in the demand and supply of a durable asset, building on the existing
literature. The model demonstrates the property of equilibrium price convergence in a
market for homogenous units of land and the independence of transactions and price in
durable asset markets. The latter is of particular importance since the (spurious)
correlation between price and the number of transactions forms the basis of many
empirical models of land price determination. Arising from this theoretical model is a
reduced form representation of equilibrium price determination which can be estimated
econometrically using time series data.
The examination of price determination in Chapter III motivates a closer scrutiny of
present value methods of capital asset valuation in Chapter IV. There, simple present
value models are shown to have a number of desirable properties, such as, flexibility,
the ability to mimic observed land price series and the fact that they allow rates of
discount to be derived. The theoretical definition and empirical measures of the returns
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to land are discussed critically with a view to the estimation of present value models of
land price determination in England and Wales. The discussion then proceeds to the
issue of expectations formation within the present value framework. Theoretical models
of land price determination are derived under naive, adaptive and rational expectations
and then estimated empirically using data for England and Wales. Issues such as
disequilibrium pricing, variable discount rates and simultaneous estimation are also
investigated.
In Chapter V a critique of empirical land price models is presented which focuses on the
Traill (1979) model of UK agricultural land prices. This model is shown to be lacking
in a number of areas. Specifically, the model adopts a demand orientated specification
in which transactions are used as a determinant of price. It is suggested that the model
is mis-specified on a number of counts and its explanatory power may be attributed to a
spurious correlation between price and transactions and the trending effect of inflation
over time. Re-estimation of the model over an extended sample supports these
criticisms and suggests that more theoretically coherent and statistically valid models
should be developed.
The disquieting statistical performance of the Traill model implies that greater attention
ought to be paid to the time series properties of economic variables, and this is the
focus of Chapter VI. The discussion begins from the premise that standard techniques
of estimation and statistical inference are not applicable to the series one typically
encounters in economics. In order to use conventional statistical techniques
legitimately, all data must be pre-tested to obtain its time series properties. The mis-use
of conventional techniques has serious implications since it violates the assumptions on
which estimation is based and thus invalidates statistical inference. A discussion of the
techniques developed recently in time series econometrics to overcome this problem
forms the basis of Chapter VI, where the concept of stationarity, and a framework for
testing are reviewed. The empirical series used in this thesis are then tested using these
techniques and appropriate transformations employed so that they may be used in
further analysis. Details of the sources and construction of the series used in the
empirical analysis are reported in the Data Appendix at the end of the thesis.
Chapter VII focuses on the concept of cointegration and its relationship to the time
series properties of economic variables and error correction mechanisms. Since
cointegration represents a general specification test for the validity of certain variables in
an econometric model, it is applied here to test whether agricultural land values are
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determined by the land's agricultural earning potential, as measured by cash rents. It
also provides a framework in which the predictions of present value model may be
tested empirically and this is investigated using two of the most commonly used
techniques of cointegration, developed by Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen
(1988). The techniques are described in some detail due to their relative youth in the
literature and an evaluation of the pitfalls and opportunities of cointegration is offered.
Chapter VIII departs from the analysis of structural economic models to develop
statistical forecasting models of cash rents and land prices. This change of direction
stems from the fact that structural models are generally impotent for the purposes of
forecasting. The models developed here belong to the autoregressive, integrated,
moving average (ARIMA) class, initially developed by Box and Jenkins (1970). These
models are complementary to the structural economic models developed in earlier
Chapters and provide a basis for future econometric modelling.
The conclusion is presented in Chapter IX where a summary of the results is initially
outlined. These results seek to answer the questions that have been posed in this
introduction concerning the theoretical specification of land price models and empirical
issues such as discount rates and expectations formation. There are however a number
of limitations to the analysis and these are discussed in the present context and also with
an eye to future research. Indeed, as with most research, in attempting to answer one
question the analysis throws up another, perhaps more interesting question, and this
thesis is no exception. Consequently, the conclusion ends with some suggestions for
future research that have arisen from this study that merit further attention. Whilst this
study attempts to offer answers to a number of questions, it also provides a framework
for future research on a topic that has important policy implications, particularly so in
an era of agricultural policy reform.
A Historical Overview
Chapter II : A Historical Overview of the Land Market
11.1
II.(i) Introduction
The land market in England and Wales has a long and rich history that has evolved over
many centuries, reflecting not only the institutional arrangements imposed on it, but the
changing state of agriculture. Indeed, the price of land has traditionally been regarded
as a barometer of the industry as a whole and a quick glance at a time series of land
prices (illustrated in Figure II. 1) acknowledges this view. The troughs and peaks
observed in the land price series all neatly coincide with historical events that have
affected the prosperity of the industry generally. Whilst the strength of the 'market
fundamentals' explanation is undeniable, its simplicity belies a rather more complex
reality that has been shaped by the cumulative effect whole host of influences, such as
the pattern of ownership and occupancy of the land. This chapter offers a glimpse at
these processes and events and focusses on the role of government policy - a factor
that has been instrumental in the evolution of the land market The importance of policy
is two-fold, since, in addition to the legislation that has been enacted to deal specifically
with the manner in which land is held, traded and taxed, measures taken to affect the
industry's prosperity on which agriculture is now reliant, also affect the market for and
the price of land
The overview of events presented here is purely descriptive and merely serves as a
backdrop to the largely abstract and statistical developments presented later in which
assumption and simplification play important roles for obvious reasons. No attempt is
made to quantify the effects of specific legislation on land prices since it is generally fair
to say that legislation has more of a cumulative effect on the actions of participants
involved in the market, and thus change is of a more evolutionary nature. Thus, whilst
a historical time series of land price is presented only occasional reference is made to it,
although the reader may prefer more frequent consultation of the series.
This overview concentrates on developments in the land market over the last 150 years
since the legislation enacted in this period is pertinent to the characteristics of the market
today. Whilst the modem farming landscape owes much to the political and economic
considerations that have motivated decision-making more recently in the post war
period, there are many artefacts, still evident today, that predate parliamentary
involvement. The overview begins at the dawn of the transition from feudalism to
capitalism.
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II.(ii) The Origins of the Land Market
(a) Enclosing the Open Fields of England
Prior to the Norman Conquest in 1066, feudal agriculture predominated in most of
England. In feudal society farmland was cultivated by peasants according to the open
field system. In this mode of agriculture the cultivatable land typically comprised three
large fields - the open fields - in which peasants would grow crops on strips of land in
each. Few hedges or walls existed, and those that did merely marked out one field from
another or were erected to contain the livestock that grazed on the common land on
which peasants could rear livestock and cut hay. The Norman Conquest heralded the
end of feudalism and sowed the seed of capitalism that has prevailed to the present.
Among the changes initiated in the transition from feudalism was the restructuring of
agricultural land and emergence of the tenant farmer. The open fields were gradually
fragmented into individual farmsteads by the process known as 'enclosure'. On each
farm stone walls and hedges were erected to mark boundaries and contain the
increasing numbers of livestock, primarily sheep, which were reared in large numbers
in this era due to the high price that wool commanded. The peasants of feudalism
became the labourers and tenant farmers of the new farmsteads under capitalism.
The enclosure process was a gradual one up to 1750, (at which time approximately half
of the arable land in England had been enclosed) and often resulted in evictions and
bitter disputes over rights to common land. However, in the following century over
3000 parishes were enclosed by Acts of Parliament. Enclosure Commissioners were
assigned to each region to settle any disputes, and generally aimed to produce squarish
fields from 2 to 24 hectares in size and build new roads. In northern England, Wales
and Scotland enclosure was not as common, primarily because feudalism and the
associated open field system was not as prevalent in these districts. The characteristic
form of the English Countryside, which was created by the enclosure process, was
further maintained by landlords (and the small number of owner-occupiers) because of
the custom of primogeniture, whereby the entire estate was passed onto the eldest son
as opposed to being split up among all the relatives. Thus,
I ••• by the middle of the nineteenth century the more productive lands of Great
Britain were owned by large landlords and farmed by their tenants in units almost
always large enough to permit efficient management.' Tracy (1982) p.41
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(b) The Corn Laws and the Landed Interest
Whilst agricultural trade protection had been in operation in England since the Middle
Ages, the Corn Laws had become an important protective measure by the early
nineteenth century, reflecting the economic and political power of the farming interest.
Although Britain was the largest manufacturer of industrial products in western Europe
by the 1850s with a predominantly urban population, agriculture still accounted for
20% of the workforce, (Orwin and Whetham 1964) and more importantly, the industry
was well represented in parliament. Buttressing the economic significance of
agriculture were the social and political hierarchies that evolved from the ownership of
land. Landownership not only conferred social esteem but political power which was
exploited successfully until it could no longer withstand the shifting balance of power
that industrialisation brought.
Fearing a flood of imports after the Napoleonic War, imports of wheat were effectively
prohibited in 1815, under new legislation. A subsequent relaxation of prohibition in
1828 and use of a sliding scale of import duties did little to remedy the problem and by
the 1840s it was apparent that the protectionist legislation had failed to secure anything
like the prosperity that its advocates had once promised. The deprivation of the urban
poor in the manufacturing centres of Manchester, Glasgow and Birmingham led to a
constitutional crisis and the repeal of the Com Laws in 1846, ending nearly 135 years
of agricultural protectionism, and centuries of political dominance by the landed
interest.
II. (iii) The Momentum for Change 1875 - 1938
(a) The Great Depression of Agriculture and The Land Laws
During the first thirty years of free-trade agriculture prospered due to the combined
effect of buoyant demand for food from a rapidly growing urban population and
ironically, a number of foreign wars that restricted international trade. This period also
coincided with the adoption of agricultural technology that symbolises the high farming
of the Golden Age in the 1860s and as a result agricultural prosperity and land prices
grew. By the onset of the Great Depression of agriculture in the mid1870s the dismal
prophecies and acrimony that had accompanied the advent of free trade had largely been
forgotten. Three Parliamentary Inquiries were undertaken during the depression years
(1875-1895) to investigate the causes and possible remedies yet the free trade doctrine
had been enshrined into the political ethos of both Liberal and Conservative parties to
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such an extent that even at the nadir of the depression few sought protectionist
measures to alleviate it. Although some doubt has been cast on the severity of the
depression in many northern regions of England (see Fletcher 1961, Saul 1972) the
effect on farming in the arable counties of south-east England was catastrophic and land
prices fell to a third of its value in twenty years, as depicted in Figure 11.1.
Recommendations made by the inquiries focussed on the antiquated relationship
between tenant and landlord which was seen as hampering the process of structural
adjustment and thus prolonging the depression that beset the industry. Whilst being
inadequate to revive agriculture from the depression the recommendations that were
written into law represented the birth of the tenurial laws that govern the tenanted sector
to the present day.
The first such legislation was the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1875 which embodied
many of the first enquiries recommendations concerning the arrangement between
landlord and tenant. Prior to the Act, the only restrictions over the landlords' treatment
of tenants, were those contained in the general civil and criminal laws of the land. A
landlord could evict tenants without justification or compensation, dictate what was to
be farmed and by what means, and furthermore set rents at levels he deemed
appropriate. Generally however, landlords were not unsympathetic to tenants, yet in
the absence of statutory control governing conduct there was not any protection for
tenant fanners, (of which over 90% of all farmers were), against a despotic landlord.
Moreover, as a result of having no control over the land he farmed a tenant had little
incentive to work and innovate.
Although the 1875 Act sought to reduce the potential for abuse and provide guidelines,
its main provision, the compensation to outgoing tenants for certain improvements to
the land infrastructure, such as drainage, was largely ineffective. A loophole enabled
landowners to evade this payment and in the austerity of the depression it appears that
most of them did. Despite this 'false-start' to tenurial legislation, a series of
Agricultural Holdings Acts subsequently strengthened the tenants position viz a viz the
landlord: of note was the more stringent Agricultural Holdings Act of 1883, which
closed the loopholes via which most landlords evaded compensation to their tenants
and strengthened the tenants position regarding notices to quit, (eviction orders).
12000 Figure 11.1 : The Price per Hectare of Agricultural Land in England an
Wales at 1990 Prices, (GDP Deflator).
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
199019801970196019501940193019201910
19001890188018701860
o I iii I iii I iii I iii iii
• I • • i
J ~ 5 5
Source: Oxford Institutt Seriex
A Historical Overview 11.6
Another problem highlighted in the first parliamentary enquiry concerned the cost and
difficulty involved in selling land. Given that rents were reduced or remitted entirely
over long periods during the depression the sale of farmland was frequently the only
means of liquidating sufficient capital to maintain a large agricultural estate. In an
attempt to ease this problem the Conveyance and Law of Property Act was introduced
in 1881, the aim of which was to simplify the procedure through which land
transactions were made. Previously, this had been immensely complicated, solicitors
having to investigate back many generations the origins of the title deeds being
transferred. Furthermore, because the legal fees were related to the actual physical
length of the deed that the solicitor drew up, the documents were not known for their
simplicity or brevity (Orwin and Whetham, 1964 p.308). In complicated cases the cost
of legal fees could exceed the value of the property being sold. Hence, in the same year
the Solicitors Renumeration Act was passed, and as a result legal fees were based on
the price of property sold.
In the following year provisions in the 1882 Settled Land Act removed the obligations
of a 'limited' owner to maintain the Family estate. Traditionally, the inheritor of an
estate was entrusted to maintain the land and buildings for future generations, and
hence was little more than a steward of the land during his lifetime. Although this
sought to preserve the continuity of family estates it frequently inhibited their ability to
adjust to changing circumstances, particularly agricultural depression. The 1882 Act
reflected this view and allowed the 'limited owner' to sell off any part of the family
estate as if he were an owner in fee simple, with the caveat that the Family mansion
could not be sold without the permission of the successor to the estate. In a similar vein
the Improvement of Land Act (1899) attempted to increase the rate of structural
adjustment by providing facilities for landlords requiring finance for capital
improvement on their farms.
Towards the end of the depression it became clear to the newly elected Liberal
government that the large agricultural landlords were incapable of reacting to economic
change and a widely held belief maintained that landlords and the antiquated system of
tenure were responsible for prolonging the depression. As a result a series of laws were
passed towards the end of the nineteenth century to erode the accumulated wealth and
diminish the economic and political power of the landed interest. Among these were the
Tithe Rent Charge Recovery Act of 1891, which transferred the liability of the tithes
from tenant to landlord and Stamp Duty also introduced in 1891 as a tax on all
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transactions of land. However, in its final year of Office the Liberals cast a far more
serious blow to the landed aristocracy than any of the previous legislation with the
introduction of Estate Duty in 1894. This new tax was payable at death on property
owned by an individual and to the extreme annoyance of large landowners it included
agricultural property. It's 'graduated' or progressive nature gave little comfort to the
landed gentry, for although the tax ranged between only 1 and 8%, it's significance to
the owners of the vast estates was daunting and entailed a significant upturn in
transactions as large estates became fragmented in order to pay the new tax with
significant repercussions on the land market and ownership of land in Britain in the
following years.
The 1900 Agricultural Holdings Act introduced arbitration machinery to resolve
disputes between landlord and tenant and widened the list of improvements on which
tenants could claim compensation, at the termination of a tenancy. Nevertheless, tenants
still did not have the freedom to crop or to sell the products that they wished. However,
when the Liberal party were returned to Office in 1906 they did so on a wave of public
opinion opposed to the traditional class-based structures prevailing in society - of which
the traditional system of tenure epitomised. The antiquated cropping restrictions were
lifted in provisions of the 1906 Agricultural Holdings Act, providing that soil fertility
was not depleted by the chosen rotation. The Act also extended the grounds for
compensation to include;
(i) Any repairs not undertaken by the landlord during the lease, a provision reflecting
the neglect of many farms during the austerity of the Great Depression, and
(ii) 'disturbance'. This entitled tenants to claim compensation for the termination of a
tenancy if the notice to quit was inconsistent with good estate management. Prior to the
Act, tenants could be ordered off their farms for any reason (providing one years'
notice was given) without any compensation for the upheaval. 1 These legislative
changes were subsequently incorporated into the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1908,
the first of the modem consolidating Acts.
On the undercurrent of radical tenurial reform in Ireland and Scotland, Lloyd George
launched his mandate of extensive social reforms for Britain. The budget of 1909
proposed to raise the additional revenue necessary for the provision of Old Age
Pensions and Health Insurance by increasing the death duties and introducing a land tax
However, as Orwin and Whctham (1964) note, many tenants were unable to benefit and left their
farms without this compensation because of the imprecise way this part of the Act was worded.
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on capital gains. The furore that met these proposals provoked a constitutional crisis
similar to that which ushered in the repeal of the Com Laws and resulted in two general
elections and severe curtailment of the legislative powers of the Upper House. The
proposals never received the Royal Assent but the controversy initiated a Committee of
Land Enquiry in 1913 to investigate the rapid sale of agricultural land and its affects on
tenant farmers. The recommendations of the Land Enquiry Committee were far
reaching and included the improvement of working conditions, security of tenure and
the establishment of Land Courts to fix rents. Had they been implemented landlords
would have been divested of much of their control, however, the outbreak of the First
World War in 1914 diverted the attention of the legislature to the more pressing
problems of war.
(b) World War I and Sales of Farmland
By the onset of war Britain imported nearly two-thirds of its food requirements.
Although import dependency had a lot to commend it on economic grounds, it left the
industry ill-prepared for the demands that war would place upon it. So committed was
the UK to laissez fa ire doctrine that even the outbreak of war did not affect the British
position regarding free-trade. Astonishingly, Britain entered the First World War
without any formal plan of ensuring food supplies to its population during the conflict
although by the end of 1916 farmers were called upon to reverse the drift from arable to
pasture that had taken place over the preceding forty years with the passing of the
Defence of the Realm Act and the Cultivation of Lands Act in 1917 which compelled
landowners and farmers to increase arable acreages.
Nearing the close of war the Defence of the Realm Act was superceded by a major piece
of war-time legislation, the Com Production Act (1917). The Act gave the Board of
Agriculture powers for a six year period to enforce the 'plough policy' - the continued
expansion and improvement of the cultivatable area. In return, farmers were guaranteed
high prices for oats and wheat for the 1917-22 harvests, despite the fact that free market
prices were far above the guaranteed prices due to war-time scarcity.
There was also considerable alarm at the high rate of land sales that had taken place
during and immediately after the war. Writing in 1919, the editor of the Estates
Exchange Year Book noted, '... the property market [has] experienced phenomenal
activity ...' and' ... all England seems to be changing hands'. High product prices
and government guarantees effectively underwrote the prosperity of the industry
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particularly so since in 1920 it appeared as if the government had decided to seal the
war-time union of state and industry by passing the Agriculture Act of that year.
Provisions in the Act substituted the fixed guarantees of the Com Production Act with a
new scale based on war time scarcity and as a result land prices soared.
A number of other reasons however account for the apparent willingness of landowners
to sell, since between 1918 and 1922 an area equivalent to one-quarter of the
cultivatable land in England changed hands. In the first instance, there had been little
respite in agricultural fortunes since the Golden age in the 1860s and thus when the
short-lived agricultural boom surfaced at the close of the war landowners were only too
keen to sell, particularly so since provisions in the 1917 Com Production Act
prohibited landlords from increasing their rents on account of the high cereal prices
guaranteed in the Act. Stimulating sales of land was the burden of Estate Duty, the
diminution of landlord control, and the comparative ease with which land could now be
sold owing to the legislative changes in the 1880s. Although the vast majority of farms
were sold to the sitting tenants, many were reticent to take on large mortgages, but did
so because it was the only way in which they could continue to farm the land, (Ward
1959)2. Parliamentary concern at the time focused on the unwarranted eviction of
tenants who could not afford to buy the land they farmed on estates which were being
sold off to realise capital gains. To address this issue the Land Sales (Restriction of
Notices to Quit) Act of 1919 invalidated any notices to quit that had been served if it
could be proved that the landlord had sold the holding for capital gain. This broad
principle was incorporated into the Agriculture Act of 1920 which tightened the rules
governing compensation to an outgoing tenant. In essence, where no breach of tenancy
agreement had occurred a tenant was entitled to compensation if evicted. This so-called
'compensation for disturbance' was fixed at a sum equivalent to one year's rent,
although if the tenant could prove greater loss and expense arising from the upheaval,
up to two year's rent could be awarded.
The general theme of tenant rights was consolidated into the 1923 Agricultural
Holdings Act which extended the tenant's freedom to produce and market any farm
product without the consent of the landlord, and gave him the right to rent arbitration in
cases where the rent was disputed. However, an important loophole remained in the
2 However, Stunney (1955) argues that sitting tenants had a fiscal motive for acquiring land since
the basis for income tax assessment had been changed in 1918 from the annual rent or rental value
to twice that figure, and thus any increases in rent would have resulted in increased tax liability.
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1923 legislation pertaining to arbitration. Since landlords were not bound to go to
arbitration by law, then should the landlord refuse arbitration the only recourse
available to the tenant was of leaving the farm and claiming compensation for
disturbance.
In addition, agricultural land was granted preferential rates of estate duty under
provisions of the 1919 Finance Act on the grounds that capital values were high relative
to the net earning capacity of farmland and that the duty payable would be unduly heavy
for such an asset.
While the turbulence of the market was short-lived it left a longlasting legacy on the
ownership structure of farmland since this period marks the birth of owner-occupation
in the UK, a mode of virtually unheard of before the war. Whereas in 1914 some 89%
of holdings in Britain were rented or mainly rented, by 1927 the proportion had fallen
to 67%, (Hill 1985, p.190) and has fallen ever since.
(c) The Inter-War Depression 1921-1938
The sudden burst of agricultural prosperity at the close of the First World War was
arrested abruptly in 1921 by the first of two sharp falls in agricultural product prices of
this inter-war period. The second collapse in prices in 1929 marked the onset of the
Great Depression from which agriculture and the economy at large did not fully recover
until the outbreak of the Second World War. However, the response of the government
to each of these shocks was quite different; whereas the first 'crash' prompted a
controversial return to laissez faire, the latter induced a more protectionist orientation
of policy.
Although the 1917 Com Production Act was ostensibly a product of war-time
emergency many farmers perceived the strengthening of government support, implicit
in the 1920 Agriculture Act, as confirmation of the beginning of the 'partnership'
between state and the farm'. In reality, the partnership was fragile and contentious.
The first collapse in prices in 1921 - just the sort of emergency that the Agriculture Act
was intended to counter - placed an [unacceptable] burden on the Exchequer. At a time
when demands for economy were widespread, the government passed the Com
Production (Repeal) Act in August 1921, terminating the financial promises of both the
3 For the 1920 Act not only raised the guaranteed prices for wheat and oats but, more importantly,
pledged to continue this assistance indefinately.
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1917 and 1920 Acts. The abrupt reversal of policy left the farming community
resentful and indignant: the 1921 Repeal Act became known as the 'great betrayal' of
agriculture, and etched deep suspicions of any future partnership for over a generation.
(Kirk 1979).
As a palliative to the industry in the wake of the great betrayal the government
introduced the Agricultural Rates Act of 1923, which granted a 75% exemption for
agricultural land and buildings from local rates. The farming community had argued
fervently that the tax was unjust because of the high rateable value of farms in relation
to their turnover and that the burden became acute in periods low product prices. As the
depression worsened agricultural property, (with the exception of the farm house) was
granted total exemption from rates as part of the major reforms of local authority
finances in 1929.
A number of other small social measures were implemented in this period, most notably
in 1926 when the Labour government made provisions in the Smallholdings and
Allotment Act of that year which allowed the county councils to extend provision of
smallholdings, initiated under the Land Settlement (Facilities) Act of 1919. The 1919
Act provided £20 million to set up small farms for ex-servicemen returning from the
war. County Councils were given the responsibility to purchase land and furnish it with
the necessary buildings, drainage and so on, on the proviso that all schemes must be
self-financing, i.e. rents from the farms that were created must be able to repay the
government loan. However, the 1926 legislation allowed the County Councils to
embark upon resettlement projects that may incur a financial loss. The justification for
these schemes was social; their primary aim was to relieve unemployment and not to
change the structure of British agriculture. All the farms created were under 50 acres
and thus were primarily suited to market gardening and other specialist enterprises.
During the 1920s the government also ventured into the provision of agricultural credit.
The Agricultural Credit Act of 1923 established credit co-operatives, designed primarily
to assist tenant farmers who had bought their farms at the high prices that prevailed
during 1918-21 and who were subsequently experiencing difficulties repaying their
mortgages in the collapse of product prices. The absence of farm credit was a notable
difference between Britain and other western European countries and the failure of the
1923 Act to achieve its objective prompted the government to establish the Agricultural
Mortgage Corporation in England and Wales (with an equivalent organisation in
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Scotland), in a further Agricultural Credit Act of 1928. Using the fanners' land as
collateral the Corporation provided secured loans, on favourable terms, from the
Treasury for the improvement and purchase of agricultural land.
(d) The Preparation for War
Throughout the 1920s the historical precedent of free-trade in Britain was never
breached to any significant degree. In this respect, Britain virtually stood alone: whilst
Britain was adhering to free-trade, almost all other European countries were adopting
increasingly protectionist trade policies and consequently world import demand was
rapidly contracting. The second sharp break in prices in 1929 marked the onset of the
Great Depression which remained in its most acute phase until 1933. The inability of
the laissez faire policies to redeem the economy from depression instigated a departure
in agricultural policy which resulted in the Agricultural Marketing Acts of 1931 and
1933 and the Wheat Act of 1932. Nevertheless, even in the nadir of depression a
deliberate policy of agricultural subsidization and protection was not a viable option,
due most notably to the trade links with the Commonwealth.f
As the government's attention focussed on the imminence of war, legislation
concerning land ownership gave way to the imperative of food production. In contrast
to 1914 Britain entered the Second World War with a prepared plan for maintaining
food supplies, which built upon and strengthened the pre-1939 ad-hoc intervention.
Agricultural policy was orientated to achieve this goal through the authoritarian control
of the Ministries of Agriculture and Food, which jointly co-ordinated production,
distribution and rationing.
In exchange for direct State control, fanners accepted guaranteed prices for their output,
all of which had to be sold to the Ministry of Food. These fixed high prices relieved
farmers of price instability and induced the required output response. General subsidies
on prices were incorporated into the 1939 Agricultural Development Act for oats, barley
and fatsheep while per capita subsidies were introduced for hill sheep (1940) and hill
cattle (1943). The object of the hill subsidies was to increase the production from
upland farms so thereby releasing lowland areas for arable production. With the added
incentive of ploughing grants (as part of the 'ploughing-up' campaign) introduced in
the 1939 Agricultural Development Act some 3.2 million hectares of permanent
4 This reticence reflected the responsiblities to the Commonwealth rather than a breach of ideology
since tariffs on manufactured goods had been used extensively from 1931.
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grassland had been converted to arable production by 1944, most of which was
diverted into barley, wheat and potato production.
Government also employed various grants to promote higher yields, particularly when
further expansion of arable area was no longer feasible. Incentives included production
grants to encourage drainage and provision of water supplies (1940), a subsidy on
fertilizer (1941) and grant aid to accelerate investment in upland areas under the Hill
Farming Act of 1946. The only legislation passed that dealt specifically with the land
market were the provisions against speculation that were incorporated into the Defence
Regulations of 1941. Nevertheless, provisions in the Act represented a landmark in
tenurial law, for it became virtually impossible for a landlord to obtain vacant
possession of his land without death or voluntary withdrawal of the tenant. In effect,
the 1941 legislation gave the tenant full security of tenure, a feature that was
subsequently incorporated into the 1948 Agricultural Holdings Act. The 1948 Act also
closed the loophole of the 1923 legislation concerning rent arbitration. Consequently,
landlords could not refuse to go to arbitration if it had been requested by the tenant.5
The Act also instructed arbitrators to allow rent increases in respect of improvements to
the farm (such as new buildings, drainage and new capital equipment) that the landlord
had paid for with the consent of the tenant. The Act stipulated that once fixed by
arbitration the rent could not be increased for another three years. It is interesting to
note that although few rents have ever been settled at arbitration this ruling set the
standard by which rent reviews were conducted in the market as a whole and the
triannual rent review is a feature that persists to the present day.
Not surprisingly, there was a marked resurgence in the land market during the war, not
only from farmers wishing to cash in on the guaranteed prices offered, but also from
private and corporate investors who sought a safe haven for their accumulated wealth.
As Sturmey (1955) so theatrically puts it,
I ••• the history of English Farming over the lifetime of those living in 1900-39
suggested that, even if it was the Cinderella among industries in peace, in war-time
pumpkins turned into carriages of gold and glass slippers were made to fit its feet, so
that any farming venture commenced in the early war years was likely to show
substantial returns before the prince Charming tired of his bride and sent her back to
the hearth. For the investor this meant largely the chance of capital profits on the
5 As a safeguard against abusing the market this ruling did not apply in the first three years of a new
tenancy.
A Historical Overview
realisation of properties when the war might end.' p.23
11.14
By the onset of war there was a marked revival in land ownership and by 1941 a sellers
market was fmnly in place and did not stabilise until the early 1950s by which time land
had appreciated by some 50% over its pre-war level in real terms, (see Figure 11.1).
Demand was strongest in the vacant possession market than the tenanted sector
implying that the demand emanated primarily from within the industry. Ward (1953)
attributes this asymmetry to the difficulty in obtaining vacant possession under the 1941
legislation and the resistance of rents to sudden changes in market conditions and a
widening of the vacant possession premium from around one-third at the beginning of
the war to two-thirds towards the close.
II.(iv) The Consolidation of Trends 1939 - 1970
(a) The Peace-time Partnership between Farm and State
The decade following the restoration of peace witnessed a major reinforcement of state
commitment toward agriculture. Although government policy was largely similar to that
which had operated during the war, the active encouragement of domestic agricultural
production on such a scale, through the 1947 Agriculture Act, was unprecedented in
peace-time. The 1947 Act provided a landmark and precedent for all subsequent
agricultural policy. The driving force behind government policy was the urgent
requirement to increase food supplies, an imperative that could not be immediately
satisfied from the world market due to the the neglect caused by six years of world war
and Britain's impoverished reserves of foreign currency. Food rationing was not
completely removed until 1955 and in 1947 rations increased in severity to the point
where each ration was significantly smaller than at any stage during the war. Against
this backround, the government set a broad production target in 1947 of a 20% increase
in net agricultural output, (in addition to the 30% increase achieved since the outbreak
of war), to be attained by 1952 which was itself revised upwards to a level 60 % above
pre-war production, however this was the last of such 'industry wide' production
targets.
The 1947 Act formalized the 'twin pillars' of agricultural policy - stability and
efficiency. Part 1 of the Act set out the guaranteed price mechanism via deficiency
payments system that would be implemented to ensure stability. This system operated
for the 12 review commodities, (which accounted for approximately 80% of farm
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output) until Britain's accession to the European Community in 1973. Measures that
were to be used to improve efficiency formed the provisions in Part II of the Act.6
The guarantees offered in the Act gave renewed confidence to the land market which
had faltered temporarily at the close of war due to uncertainty surrounding the
continuation of support and land prices rose well above the rate of general inflation
throughout the Act's operation as is illustrated in Figure II.l.
During the mid-1950s there was a discernible shift of agricultural policy away from the
general expansion (characteristic of the immediate post-war period) towards a policy of
'selective expansion'. Underlying this new orientation was the growing burden of
agricultural support and the realisation that although all the industry wide production
targets had been achieved, the product composition of these totals were neither expected
nor wanted. While expansion of those products which had an import saving role was
encouraged (due to a persistent balance of payments problem), direct measures were
adopted to constrain support expenditure. The policy of 'selective expansion' involved
reductions to guaranteed prices, limiting the supply on which price support was
eligible and import controls, all of which were implemented during the 1950s and
1960s in an attempt to curb support costs and more latterly to facilitate a harmonisation
of policies operated by the European Community.
Allied to selective expansion was the increasing emphasis put on measures to promote
greater efficiency, which from the mid-1950s became an increasingly dominant feature
of policy, reflecting the cost of deficiency payments and the tendency for price support
to inhibit structural adjustment. In addition to a number of capital grants that were made
available to farmers wishing to adopt new production techniques, financial assistance
for farm amalgamation was also initiated in provisions of the 1957 Agriculture Act and
subsequently expanded to form the Farm Amalgamation and Boundary Adjustment
Scheme introduced under provisions of the 1967 Agriculture Act. However, the
schemes were largely unsuccessful since although grants were made available to
existing farmers to purchase 'uncommercial' units of land (defined as those of < 100
Standard Man Days) to form a commercial holding ( > 600 Standard Man Days) the
grants offered applied only to the ancillary cost of amalgamation and thus excluded the
purchase cost of the land Itselt.? Thus although the rate of grant appeared quite
6 In fact. the distinction between Part I and II of the Act is blurred by the fact that the guaranteed
prices were set at a level high enough to encourage capital investment ; in essence, they
incorporated an allowance for capital.
7 The 1967 Act also provided lump-sum payments or pensions to farmers selling unviable holdings
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attractive, (30% under the 1957 legislation raised to 50% in the 1967 Act) it was of little
practical benefit and the amalgamation of farms proceeded unaffected by the legislation.
Nevertheless, the adoption of machinery and other labour saving technologies generally
favoured larger holdings and as a result the rate of amalgamation was believed to be
high during the prosperity of the post-war period. Evidence from Scotland reported by
Peters (1966) revealed that over one-third of all land sold was purchased by
neighbouring farmers and this seems to bear out the anecdotal evidence of land agents
in England and Wales, where amalgamation demand was frequently cited as a major
factor contributing to the 'over-valuation' of land. Since additional land typically leads
to a more efficient utilisation of fixed capital, farmers are generally prepared to pay a
high price, far in excess of it's agricultural earning potential - to obtain the land, which
in any case may not come up for sale again for thirty years or more.
(b) The Development of Planning Controls
Prior to 1947 there was little effective control over the use to which owners could put
their land. Although a string of planning legislation had been enacted since the turn of
the century, the first specific planning legislation concerning the use to which land may
be put was the Town and Country Planning Act of 1932 which authorized local
authorities to prepare a zoning scheme for permitted land-use, defining specific zones
for residential, industrial and agricultural use. Planning consent would be given
providing that developers did not attempt to introduce non-eonforming uses of land in
the specified zones of the schemes. However, refusal to grant planning permission
required compensation to landowners for the loss of their right to use their land in the
way they desired. As compensation was frequently expensive and appropriated from
Local Authority coffers the schemes were largely ineffective in controlling development
on agricultural land and consequently, a sprawl of urban development occurred
between the wars and land lost from agriculture peaked in 1930s at some 25,000 ha per
year, (Vale 1985).
The public outcry over urban sprawl and growing momentum of the 'green belt'
movement spearheaded by the Garden Cities and Town and Country Planning
Association spurred the desire for more stringent legislation, which manifested as the
1947 Town and Country Planning Act. This Act consolidated all previous planning law
under the Farm Amalgamation scheme above. (Grants to encourage retirement were first introduced
in 1963).
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and marked a distinct change of emphasis in planning law that has been upheld to the
present day: prior to the Act an owner could use land for whatever purpose he saw fit,
yet due to the requirement of planning permission that was stipulated in the Act, a
landowner has no option but to retain land in its present use unless specific permission
is granted for a change in land use. The Act established green belts around major urban
centres and within four years of the Act 6% of the total land area in England and Wales
was designated as green belt land (Vale 1985). As a result of the legislation annual
losses of farmland fell from the peak in the 1930s to about 15,000 ha. throughout the
1950-1980 period.
Because the Act defined uses to which land could be put, but did not compensate
landowners for planning refusal, it increased the wedge between the prices obtained for
land sold for agricultural purposes and that sold for development. The premium paid
for planning permission varies but is occasionally 100 times the agricultural value
should the land be sold for residential or retail development, however changes of land
use that necessitate compulsory purchase to build roads and motorways yield modest
development multipliers between 5 and 10, Commission of the European Communities
(1980). Provisions in the 1947 Act established a Development Gains Tax to prevent
vast windfall gains accruing to owners of land that were granted planning permission,
This was replaced in 1976 with Development Land Tax, itself abolished in 1985, where
all liability became subject to Capital Gains Tax although the effect of tax relief given to
farmers reinvesting in land has been significant, particularly so during general property
booms.
(c) Tenurial Legislation of 1958
Despite the continuing improvement of agricultural prosperity afforded by the
Agriculture Act of 1947 farm rents remained artificially low due to provisions in the
1948 Agriculture Act concerning the criteria that arbitrators should take into account
when assessing a disputed rent claim. The legislation prescribed that rents should be
fixed at 'that rent properly payable' although because there was no explanation as to
what constituted a 'proper' rent there was considerable confusion and uncertainty as to
how arbitrators would interpret this phrase. As a result landlords generally acted
conservatively in rent negotiations with their sitting tenants, wishing to avoid the cost
and inconvenience of arbitration, since the procedure was generally viewed as
favouring the tenant. Consequently rents for existing tenancies barely kept pace with
inflation despite rising product prices, yet rents for new tenancies negotiated on the
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open market reflected the general prosperity of the period since only rent changes on
existing tenancies could seek arbitration. The restraint on rents continued until 1958
when provisions in the Agricultural Holdings Act of that year changed the instructions
to rent arbitrators. Thereafter, arbitrators had to assess increases in rents in relation to
open market values, i.e. those rents tendered for new tenancies, and a marked increase
in rents for established tenancies followed.
Hill (1985) argues that the restraint on rents played an important role in establishing the
premium for vacant possession land during this period. The premium rose rapidly after
the war and stood at around 100% until changes introduced in the 1958 Agriculture Act
took effect in the 1960s. This high premium reflected that the two classes of property in
this era yielded very different returns. Whereas the purchaser of a farm with vacant
possession could either farm the land himself or install a tenant at a market rent, the
purchaser of land with a sitting tenant could only expect to receive rents well below the
market level, and in many cases below that which made landowning profitable. The
distinction was of little importance before the war since tenants could be evicted with
one year's notice yet the provisions against land speculation introduced by Defence
Regulation in 1941 and consolidated in the 1948 Agricultural Holdings Act, made it
virtually impossible to evict a tenant and hence gain vacant possession. Faced with
increased responsibilities and low returns a steady stream of farms were sold to sitting
tenants, who
, ...were in the enviable position of being able to secure 'vacant possession' at a
minimum premium, just sufficient to outbid investors for farms sold subject to
tenancies' Ward (1953) p.151
Despite these obvious pecuniary advantages Ward (1953) claims that the trend toward
owner occupation was due more to the desire of landlords to liquidate assets rather than
a demand for ownership by tenants. Furthermore, financial institutions such as the
Agricultural Mortgage Corporation were more than willing to provide the necessary
finance since the sitting tenant could secure the purchase of the land they farmed at little
more than without-possession prices, but then own an asset that could be sold for the
significantly higher vacant possession price. In this manner the move towards owner
occupation was intensified, although slowed down noticeably during the 1960s.
(d) Post War Fiscal Incentives on Land
In addition to state protection, relatively high rates of general inflation in the post war
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era combined to make land attractive to investors from outside agriculture mainly
because farmland was regarded as a sound hedge against inflationary pressures. This
compounded the introduction of a cheap-money policy in 1947 which resulted in a fall
in the yield of more typical investments such as gilt-edged securities and equities, and
as a result land prices rose sharply in that year. Consequently, not only were the
traditional large landowning organisations investing heavily in land but this period also
attracted a new breed of investor, the financial institutions and private businessmen.
For these investors, landownership was a good hedge against inflation and carried with
it considerable fiscal advantages. Of note was the maintenance claim and the capital
expenditure claim incorporated into the Income Tax Act of 1945, which, at the time,
was heralded as the 'most far reaching income tax and surtax relief ever granted to
landlords' (Read 1951). In acknowledgement of the repairing liability of the owner, an
allowance of 12.5% and 25% on the gross assessment for income tax was granted in
respect of maintenance on farmhouses and cottages respectively - further refunds could
be claimed for maintainence above these amounts. More importantly, refunds on tax
could be claimed on that proportion of gross income spent on improving the quality of
the land. Moreover, should the improved land subsequently be sold the capital profit is
not taxed and thus the tax relief acts as a double incentive to purchase agricuIturalland
as an investment. As Ward (1953), states,
"The result of 'ploughing back' capital into the land in this manner is an increase in
capital values which is not subject to taxation and therefore provides a strong
investment incentive to the landlord or owner occupier paying a high rate of income
tax or surtax" p.153
Although farmland had been granted abatement from estate duty since 1919, on the
basis that capital values were high relative to to net earning capacity, this relief was
fixed at 45% of the normal duty payable by provisions in the 1949 Finance Act since as
Sturmey (1955) states,
'The biggest factor bringing land into the market is death duties , and sales for this
reason would seem to take place irrespective of market conditions' p.20.
Due to the progressive nature of estate duty this relief was substantial for owners of
large areas of farmland- so much so that, it encouraged capital transfers into land and a
significant number of wealthy individuals made 'death-bed' transactions in land to
diminish tax liability. Indeed, Ward (1953) attributes much of the investment in
agricultural property in the immediate post-war era to this preferential treatment of farm
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based wealth. A further impetus for the investment momentum was the 1961 Trustees
Investment Act which removed restrictions on trustees from the necessity to invest all
their funds in gilt-edged government stock and as a result agricultural land became a
candidate for such funds.
In a comparison of the investment performance of agricultural land and corporate equity
during the post war period Nicolas Byrne writing in the Farmland Market calculates that
both the capital gain on land and open-market rents had grown far more than the
Financial Times Ordinary share index and dividends. Whereas £100 invested in land in
1945 was worth nearly 15 times in nominal terms by 1973 equities could only boast a
modest growth multiple of 2.5, similar to the rate of inflation: an index of open-market
rents had grown 2.75 times yet dividends barely 1.5 times having adjusted for
inflation.
In 1962 Capital Gains Tax (CGT) was introduced in the Finance Act of that year but
was subsequently modified in 1965 which remained the base date for computing capital
gains liability until the 1988 budget. CGT is charged on the sale or gift of an asset
which has appreciated by more than the rate of general inflation, given by the retail
price index. Prior to 1988 the tax was levied at a flat rate of 30% on the disposal of
chargeable assets. The gain relates to the difference to the vendor of the initial cost and
selling price adjusted for inflation. Where the disposal is in the form of a gift the market
value of the asset is given to be the disposal value. For assets acquired before 1965
then the difference is calculated the basis of the assets price in 1965.
Although when introduced CGT had the avowed aim of taxing gains arising from
speculation in the land market, farmers and landowners have subsequently been granted
a number of reliefs in view of the vast accumulation of inherited wealth required in
order to farm.f Most importantly is the facility for working farmers to defer CGT
liability on the sale of farmland providing that the proceeds of the sale are then used to
purchase similar chargeable assets. This concession, known as 'roll-over' relief, was
extended to include gifts of farming assets and has been supplemented by retirement
relief, which allows a working fanner to reduce his CGT liability providing he is over
65 years of age.
8 For example, the cost of farm improvements and construction of farm biuldings can beadded to the
acquisition cost to reduce the amount of capital gain liable to CGT, and the farmhouse, animals
and moveable property are also exempt
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Whilst the effect of roll-over relief has not been quantified, it is generally recognised to
be an important influence in the land market. For although the price of land sold for
development is excluded from land price series that analysts use, there is generally
believed to be a potent indirect affect if the proceeds from the sale are used to acquire
more farmland, as is often the case since the proceeds are exempt from CGT. The effect
is particularly acute when a farmer sells farmland to development and re-enters a thin
land market since development values are many times higher than agricultural values.
As Peters (1966) notes, with some 15,000 ha. of farmland being sold to developers
annually the effect may be significant, and was one reason cited in his article for the
high land values relative to returns that were observed in this period. More generally,
anecdotal evidence from land agents suggests that up to half the purchases of farmland
may be financed with roll-over funds in years when large capital gains may be realised,
(Farmland Market 1989).
Importantly however, owners of tenanted land cannot claim roll-over relief because the
land does not qualify as a business asset. Whilst this discrimination is yet another
reason cited for the demise of the tenanted farms it is also recognised that such
landlords (particularly the institutional owners) do not generally sell land in order to
buy more but sell in order to accrue capital profits and thus the legislation may actually
retain more land in the tenanted sector than otherwise.
II.(v) A New Era of Volatility
(a) Accession to the European Community and Macroeconomic
Instability
Accession to the EC in January 1973 concluded over a decade of negotiations during
which the UK had made two unsuccessful bids (in 1963 and 1969) at membership.
Adherence to the principles of economic union and adoption of the price support
mechanisms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) entailed higher consumer
prices, underlined in a parliamentary White Paper of 1970 which estimated that retail
food prices might rise by 18-26% inducing a 4-5% increase in the cost of living.9
This inflationary pressure was nevertheless overshadowed by the first of two oil crises
9 However, the high and unpredictable burden that had been placed on the Exchequer throughout the
1960s by the deficiency payment system had led the government to progressively implement
CAP-type support measures anyway and Tracy (1989) notes that it was the aim of the conservative
government elected in 1970 to shift support completely towards this system for financial reasons
independent of accession.
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and a world food commodity 'shortage' in the early 1970s which resulted in double-
figure inflation and low economic growth in the economy generally. Nevertheless, the
1970s represented a prosperous period for agriculture since uncertain supplies and high
world prices for many commodities, (short-lived though they were) became a potent
stimulus for agricultural expansion within the EC. A government White Paper Food
From Our Own Resources actively encouraged the expansion of certain foodstuffs on
these grounds, and the fall in the value of Sterling against most major currencies,
observed in this period only served to intensify the impetus for agricultural expansion.
Thus despite a general backdrop of stagflation it is not surprising that agriculture fared
well during most of the 1970s particularly so since the CAP had adopted an element of
the UK's pre-accession Annual Review machinery, the so called 'objective method' of
determining farm product prices, which allowed industry representatives to incorporate
rising production costs into high support prices.
(b) The Land Price Boom
The combined effect of soaring inflation, economic recession and CAP support
mechanisms had dramatic ramifications on the land market and led to the most turbulent
period in the market's history since the frenetic activity in the 1920s. In real terms, land
values in 1975 were only slightly higher than those prevailing in 1971 yet this conceals
the doubling of land prices during 1972 and 1973 and the subsequent free-fall in 1974.
The volatility of the land market during this short-lived period had all the hallmarks of a
speculative bubble. Whilst it is true that financial institutions increased their holdings of
tenanted land by more than 500%, analysis by Munton (1975) indicates that the
majority of sales were to private individuals, who were acquiring vacant possession
land irrespective of quality with the intention of reselling for development. It appears as
though the sudden emergence of institutional investors simply pushed what is typically
a thin market into an unstable state.
On the supply side, fanners were reluctant to sell yet eager to acquire land on the
strength of prospects for farming within the EEC, particularly so amidst the world
food crisis. Thus even had the financial institutions not entered the market, speculation
by wealthy individuals and the strength of farming demand would have raised farmland
prices considerably. However, at the same time that land began to look more attractive,
the traditional investments of pension funds and life assurance companies, began to
look increasing poor alternatives to land: good quality commercial property was in
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short supply, industrial equities looked increasing vunerable and fixed-interest stocks
would be the first to be overtaken in an inflationary spiral. As a result these financial
institutions also began to purchase land, particularly in the tenanted sector since they
did not have sufficient farming expertise to manage vacant possession farms
themselves. Compounding these events was the sheer amount of funds that the
institutional buyers had at there disposal. Writing at the beginning of 1974 William De
Salis, economics secretary of the Country Landowners Association noted,
'Life assurance companies and pension funds had £2200 million of new money to
invest in 1972 alone, and the 1973 figure was probably £2,500 million. An
investment of £10 million in land in anyone year by an insurance company may
well represent a very small proportion of a major institution's placement of funds in
that year. So it takes only a handful of life assurance companies to have a major
effect' Farmland Market 1974 p.17
Given that the total value of sales in 1973, a quite extraordinary year, amounted to only
£205 million, even marginal shifts in pension fund portfolios can have had a
destabilising effect on the land market. So acute was the demand for tenanted farms by
financial institutions that the price of this land rose more rapidly than that for vacant
possession with the result that the vacant possession premium fell to around 16%, its
lowest level since the 1930s, Munton (1975).
In 1974 there was an abrupt break in prices. Whilst some commentators have sought to
account the downturn in prices to the proposed introduction of new fiscal measures,
namely Capital Transfer Tax and a Wealth Tax or to a reduction in available funds due
to falling business profits, the free- fall of prices in 1974 owes as much to the nature of
the boom in 1973. To the extent that the boom was driven by speculation, the downturn
simply reflected that land was perceived to be overvalued by 1973. When the bubble
burst, the number of farms for sale burgeoned temporarily, particularly in the tenanted
sector since this is where the institutions had bought most extensively, and land prices
fell rapidly. As with most speculative 'crashes' an over-compensation occurred due to
the herding instincts of the speculative investors, so that by the 1975 trough in prices,
land had become seriously undervalued. A rapid rate of price increase followed that
lasted well into 1979. Land prices were appreciating at nearly 20% per annum even in
real terms so that by the peak in 1979 land values were nearly as high in real terms as
they had been in the boom of 1973.
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(c) New Fiscal Measures
The volatility of the land market during this brief period led directly to a number of
changes to fiscal policy; namely the introduction of Capital Transfer Tax (CTT) and
Development Land Tax (DLT). In an attempt to close the numerous loopholes in Estate
Duty, such as lifetime transfers, which had in effect made it a voluntary tax, 'paid by
those who disliked their heirs more than they disliked the Inland Revenue' (Sandford
1983), the Labour government replaced Estate Duty with the more stringent CIT in
1975.1 0 When first put before Parliament the tax represented, ' ... a determined
attack on the maldistribution of wealth in Britain.' (Hansard 1974), since in addition to
the taxation of lifetime transfers, it abandoned the generous agricultural reliefs available
under Estate Duty. However, by the time the Finance Act received the Royal Assent
concessions to full time farmers had been granted and these in tum were modified and
extended in the following year in the form of Agricultural and Business Relief.
Nevertheless, the reliefs only applied to those actively engaged in farming, and as such
private landlords did not generally qualify for these reliefs on their let land, (in contrast
to their position under estate duty where owners of all land received a 45% abatement
from tax liability). This change had important repercussions on farm tenure since it
encouraged landowners to take their tenanted land in hand whenever formal tenancies
naturally expired. Because land taken in hand, (i.e. 'farmed' by the landowner,
perhaps as a partnership, or as a farming company) was deemed to qualify for
Agricultural relief and/or Business relief - amounting to a 50% reduction in CIT
liability - the large landowner had a potent incentive not to renew tenancies and both the
Country Landowners Association and the National Farmers Union believed that the
legislation would accelerate the demise of the tenanted sector.
A further response to the high prices of agricultural land was the introduction of
Development Land Tax in 1976 chargeable when the disposal of land realised a
development value. The tax was similar to the short lived development gains tax of the
1947 planning legislation and had a similar objective, namely, to enable society to share
in the gains which accrued to land sold with planning permission. Under DLT all
capital gains in excess of £75,000 were taxed at a flat rate of 60%. Although the tax
was repealed in 1985 (whereupon land sold to developers became liable to CGT) unlike
CGT there were no roll-over provisions where the proceeds were reinvested in land,
10 CCT is levied at the time of gift at increasing rates, having regard to the cumulative total of
lifetime gifts, with a final cumulation of the assets passing on death. Although originally the rates
were the same for lifetime gifts and transfers on death major changes have taken place. See Later.
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and as a consequence a marked upturn of land sold for development was witnessed
after the repeal of DLTin 1985.
(d) Tenurial Legislation in the 1970s
In 1976 a major amendment was made to the tenurial legislation with the passing of the
Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act which caused a greater furore than any
other piece of tenurial legislation (Nix, Hill and Williams 1989). Prior to that time a
tenancy agreement was terminated with the death of the tenant. However, provisions of
the 1976 Act granted security of tenure not only for the existing tenant but for two
subsequent generations subject to certain 'eligablility' and 'suitablity' conditions.
Whilst the motivation for the legislation was to retain more land in the tenanted sector,
the Act was heavily criticised on a number of counts, but most notably on the grounds
that it would actually reduce the size of tenanted sector.
Owners of let land argued that it represented an unacceptable infringement of their
freedom, and like similar legislation in the past, would be followed by a diminution of
new tenancies coming onto the market: landowners preferring to amalgamate the land
into other tenanted holdings, take it in hand to farm themselves, or sell and thereby
realise a vacant possession price, rather than offer a new tenancy which would prevail
for 1()() years or more. As a result the entry of 'new blood' into the industry would be
stifled with long term implications for the efficiency of the industry, since it is these
potential entrants that are generally believed to be the most educated about best-practice
farming.
In light of the changes to legislation embodied in the 1976 Act the Agricultural
Holdings (Notices to Quit) Act of 1977 consolidated previous legislation on serving
eviction notices and the tenants right to seek appeal to an Agricultural Land Tribunal in
respect of the eviction order. Although the 1977 Act (like previous tenurial legislation)
was intended to give tenants security and landlords safeguards against abuse it only
served to heighten the grievances of landowners who maintained that legislation
afforded tenants, particularly poor ones, too much protection. Whereas in 1927 64% of
farmland was rented this proportion had only fallen to 62% by 1950 and was 30% in
1990, although due to complex manner in which land is held and fanned for reasons of
tax planning a more accurate estimate is believed to be around 30-35%.
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(e) The Northfield Report and its Repercussions on the Land Market
In 1979 the report from the Northfield enquiry into the ownership and occupation of
farmland was published. Although it was the emergence of financial institutions in the
land market that motivated the report, the Committee concluded that only a very small
proportion of land (1.2%) was found to be held by such institutions, with a further
8.5% being held by the traditional landowning institutions such as the Crown, Church,
Universities and charities. Furthermore, on average only 10% of farmland was
purchased by financial institutions annually so that by 2020 financial institutions were
projected to own some 11% of farmland, Despite the contributory role role played by
institutional investors in land price boom, Northfield concluded that in general their
effect on land prices was negligible. As a result rather than impose punitive restrictions
on the activities of the financial institutions (which had been threatened) most of the
recommendations of the Committee pertained to possible changes in capital taxation and
tenurial legislation to prevent further decline of the tenant sector and much of the
legislative changes introduced in the 1980s respond directly to the recommendations of
the Committee of Inquiry. For example, so persuasive was the argument concerning
exclusion of owners of tenanted land from the relief to CIT that concessions were
granted to landlords in 1981.
In addition, changes were made to the tenurial legislation of 1976 under provisions in
the Agricultural Holdings Act in 1984, following a joint submission by the CLA and
NFU acting on a Northfield recommendation. Although a repeal of the 1976 legislation
was initially requested to stem the decline of new tenancies, it was recognised this had
to be offset by the need to ensure that tenants were not abused. This was particularly
so, when much of the tenanted sector was being purchased by financial institutions,
who, it was argued, have the potential to be the worst sort of absentee landlord,
although such claims are frequently exaggerated by the rural fundamentalists. I I The
main provision of the 1984 Act stated that whilst the rights of succession provided for
in the 1976 Act should remain for existing tenancies this should not apply to new
lettings, unless by voluntary agreement.
The 1984 Act also changes the instructions to rent arbitrators concerning the term 'rent
properly payable' due to the concern expressed by the NFU in the 'joint submission'
11 Whilst the Country Landowners Association suggest that the downward trend is actually because of
the legislation, the number of farms leaving the tenanted sector has fallen at the same rate after the
1976 legislation as it did before, at some 3000 per year.
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that arbitrators were frequently including such factors as 'scarcity' and 'proximity' in
fixing rents since the reduction in new tenancies led to the removal of the sale reference
point used by rent arbitrators in setting rents for sitting tenants. As a result of the 1984
legislation the key factor to be taken into account was the productivity and earning
capacity of the holding; factors such as the scarcity of holdings available for rent in a
locality, and the convenience of offering land to a tenant (or tenderer) who may farm
other land close by were to be excluded. The Act also amended provisions in the 1948
Agriculture Act concerning short-term lettings and introduced fiscal attractions to
owners of let land. Essentially, the changes broadened the scope of a landowner to
offer a short term tenancy (i.e.without security of tenure) as opposed to a fully
protected tenancy agreement and reclassified rental income as earned (rather than
unearned) income thus making landlords immune from the 15% investment income
surcharge. These amendments have subsequently been consolidated in the 1986
Agricultural Holdings Act which governs virtually all the law pertaining to landlord and
tenant to the present day.
Since the 1976 legislation there has been a keen interest in forms of farming partnership
that do not confer full tenant status in law. Utilising a loophole (some say deliberate
since it has not been closed in the 1984 Act) in the 1948 legislation a normal tenancy
may be established for more than one year and less than two which does not give
security of tenure to the tenant. Since this type of tenancy (often called a Gladstone v.
Bower tenancy) can be renewed it is a potentially attractive arrangement and has been
frequently used. Keen interest has also been shown in unconventional types of
arrangement such as fanning partnerships and share fanning which bestow important
advantages to the landowner while giving the farmer opportunity to farm. These
arrangements have increased significantly as tenurial legislation has developed and it is
argued that landlords and fanners have entered into such arrangement far more
frequently than new tenancies, (Panes 1980). In addition to the benefits introduced in
the 1984 legislation concerning short term lettings these arrangements carry other fiscal
advantages, most notably with regard to CIT liability since a landowner letting land
fanned in partnership or as a share contract may be classed as a working fanner and
thus may be eligible for relief from CIT.
Nevertheless, the tenure issue still remains an important one, to the extent that the
Minister of Agriculture has recently made public his intention to alter the tenurial
legislation further and a consultation document is currently being drawn up.
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Responding to yet another recommendation by Lord Northfield, and a change in
political persuasion, the newly elected Conservative government introduced the
Planning and Land Act of 1980 which accommodated the longstanding criticism by
landowners and developers alike, that planning procedures were unnecessarily involved
and too restrictive. The Act attempted to speed up the planning process but more
importantly actively encouraged the planning authorities to be sensitive to the
requirements of developers where a specific proposal accrued economic benefits to the
local economy. Although no carte blanche to developers, the Act facilitated a
circumvention of green-belt plans and other restrictions that were previously not
negotiable.
After the boom, the land market remained relatively buoyant through to 1978 with
considerable interest shown in vacant possession and tenanted land. Land with vacant
possession was demanded by farmers for amalgamation on the strength of CAP
support policies and also by wealthy individuals for residential and amenity
considerations, particularly for land near villages and towns. Despite the fiscal and
tenurial legislation in the mid-1970s which undoutably encouraged some landlords to
sell their let land the market for tenanted land was buoyant. Interest in this land did not
come from tenants wishing to buy their land; indeed, there was a marked downturn in
tenant demand since tenants perceived purchase to be a relative luxury given their newly
won security of tenure. Rather, there was a steady and strong demand by financial
institutions which stepped in and took their place.
(f) A Re-orientation of Policy 12
1977 saw the emergence of a discernible re-orientation of Community policy toward
agriculture. Pricing policy and the need to reform were brought progressively into
sharper focus by the growth in output and accumulation of surplus products. The
appointment of a new head of the Commission in 1977 heralded the beginning of a
'prudent price policy' : a mere 3% rise in average support prices being proposed by the
Commission in that year, far removed from the double-figure settlements of 1974/5. In
the vanguard of budgetary reform was the UK who had been a vocal reformer,
primarily because it had been a net donor to the EC budget since accession.l ' The
12 A major aspect of this reorienation of CAP policy since the late 1970s was the shift towards
structural, social and environmental policies.
13 Prior to entry a government White Paper had estimated that due to the UK's reliance on food
imports the import levy system operated by the Ee would result in the UK contributing 31% of
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1979 White Paper, Farming and the Nation was indicative of the UK's position. The
document went to great pains to assure domestic agriculture of further expansion and
the continuation of national support measures (in the form of grants, tax reliefs and
technical education and advice), but it also declared a policy to constrain EC prices with
a view to limit the expansion of supplies.
Despite numerous attempts to restrain prices and the introduction of guarantee threshold
quantities for the major products the entrenched positions of a number of Agriculture
Ministers prevented any rigorous reform. Indeed, the 1982/83 package included an
average increase in farm product prices of 10.4% in ecu terms. The inadequacy of these
measures became increasingly evident as the financial implications of continued
oversupply became critical during the mid-1980s. Furthermore the impending accession
of Spain and Portugal (in addition to Greek membership in 1981) placed even greater
demands on the Community budget. In a further attempt to limit agriculture expenditure
the Commission report, Adjustments to the CAP, stressed the need for a 'restrictive'
price policy. Although the co-responsibility principle lf had been applied to milk
production since 1977 under the 'Action Programme' for milk, the guaranteed
threshold was exceeded by nearly 7% in 1983 and constituted the most urgent problem
at that time. Under the regulations of the co-responsibility system this level of
overproduction would entail price reductions of 12% in the following year. In an
attempt to resist such dramatic price cuts the Agriculture Council hastily adopted the
system of milk quotas at the Fountainbleau Sumitt. In addition, the Agriculture Council
adopted the co-responsibility principle in the cereals sector which came into operation
for the 1986n year and which was subsequently strengthened by quality standards and
small price reductions on intervention grains and an additional levy on milk production
over quota.
In 1988 a major new initiative was launched, that of 'Budgetary Discipline' with the
intention of limiting expenditure of the CAP. To achieve the requirements of budgetary
discipline the stabilizer mechanism and supplementary measures were introduced. The
Stabilizer mechanism involved setting production thresholds for a number of products
most notably cereals - Maximum Guaranteed Quantities - which if exceeded resulted in
a pro rata reduction in prices. In addition schemes were implemented to encourage
early retirement of farmers (with the land being left fallow for at least five years), direct
the EC budget. yet due to the small number of farmers in the UK (the major beneficiaries of EC
expenditure). the UK would receive only 6% of EC spending in return. Tracy (1989).
14 This entails farmers paying a tax on production that exceeds an agreed threshold.
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income aids, grants for extensification (reduction of farm output by 20%) and arable
land set-aside. The set-aside scheme is voluntary and allows annual grants of some
£150 per hectare for land to be received by fanners leaving 20% of their land fallow or
under non-supported commodities.
(g) The Land Market in the 19808
Throughout the 1980s prices for both vacant possession and tenanted land descended
rapidly in real terms. This trend was abated temporarily in 1987 and 1988 by the surge
in non-agricultural demand for farmland that followed on the back of the short-lived
property boom and bouyancy of the macro-economy. In 1979 land prices stood at
levels comparable to those prevailing at the height of the land price boom in the early
1970s and at the heart of the downward trend lay a realisation that land had become
considerably overvalued. As the market faltered in late 1979 on this realistion, the chill
winds of change emanating from Brussels and the uncertain prospects for the macro
economy motivated a major revision in expectations. Rising interest rates which
continued into 1980 and 1981, made farm purchase immediately more expensive and
added to the attractions of alternative investments. As the economy slipped into
recession urban development came to a standstill and the introduction of DLT meant
there was little 'roll-over' money in the market unlike the situation that had been
witnessed in the 1970s.
By the mid-1980s the purchases of land from the institutional investors had virtually
ceased. Whereas net annual purchases were around 17,000 ha. in the 1970s, by 1984
only some 600 ha. had been added to their stock reflecting uncertainties of the CAP,
rising interest rates, and resistance to rent increases by tenant farmers. Although there
continued to be strong demand for farms in the southeast with residential potential, the
storm clouds that had been gathering burst in 1984 with the ill-prepared introduction of
Milk: Quotas.
The introduction of quotas brought the sale of dairy farms to an immediate standstill in
1984 although when the market resumed in 1985 the effects of quota were somewhat
disparate. When it became clear that milk quotas were attached to the land and could not
be transferred without sale of the land, obtaining a good price for dairy land relied
almost entirely on its milk quota allotment. Whilst land with a high quota maintained
the highest of farmland prices in the generally gloomy 1980s, the value of dairy
holdings without any quota dropped by some 40% in a year. Land agents in 1985 were
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valuing an average allotment of quota at around £500 per ha. Milk quotas were only
partly responsible for the sharp downturn in land prices in 1985 which fell some 15-
20% on the year. Of perhaps more importance was the changes in the CAP that milk
quotas signalled: many commentators feared the introduction of quotas for cereals as
well, and there was a considerable liquidation of assets held in land, by unprofitable
fanners and nervous investors alike. Indeed, institutional investors were beginning to
take a very jaundiced view of the market with rents hardly budging and alternative
investments doing much better. Further, amendments to the rules concerning arbitration
in the 1984 Agricultural Holdings Act complicated the arbitration procedure, which
from then on necessitated the opinions of solicitors, surveyors and farm management
consultants in order to mount a successful claim. With these costs exceeding the
disputed rent increase many landlords liquidated their holdings and the value of let land
fell between 20-25% in 1985, on top of the 10-15% falls in 1984.
Turning to fiscal issues, in 1986 Capital Transfer Tax was abolished and Inheritance
Tax established in its stead. Whilst it is fair to say that when first introduced CIT was
widely considered to be a particularly onerous tax that would lead to the fragmentation
of medium aswell as large farms, successive reliefs granted since 1979 have diluted its
initial potency. The concessions were introduced often with the prime purpose of
easing the burden of the farming interest. For example, in 1981 owners of tenanted
land were also entitled to claim relief from CIT liability as well as working farmers - as
recommended by the Northfield report in 1979. The replacement of CTT with
Inheritance Tax further reduced its severity so that to all intents and purposes
Inheritance Tax is as permissive as Estate Duty. The tax has thus come full circle in that
it can be avoided altogether with the only a modicum of tax planning, as was the case
with Estate Duty. However, since CIT had been largely 'toothless' for some time, the
change to IT was little more than a change in name and consequently had no discernible
impact on the land market itself.
(h) Institutional Investors in the 1980s
The 1980s witnessed an abrupt reversal of the flood of institutional interest in the land
market. Large scale institutional investment in land ceased at the beginning of the 1980s
with a final spurt of activity immediately after publication of the Northfield Report,
which cleared the way for continued institutional ownership with the result that
ownership peaked in 1984 with 2% of farmland owned by financial institutions, some
86% of that being tenanted land. However, as soon as it became clear that the political
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will existed in Brussels to reform the CAP the institutions began selling their farmland
whenever it became prudent to do so - nearly 60,000 ha being liquidated in 1987 and
1988 alone, approximately 8% of their total holdings. While it is true that some
200,000 to 225,000 hectares of land is traded annually, entailing that the institutions
were only buying in the 1970s and selling in the late 1980s around 7 or 8% of the
total, it should not be forgotten that between 80 and 90% of land sold is with vacant
possession and thus the influence of the institutions in the tenanted sector may be
particularly significant in years where large sales occur. For example in 1988/9 about
40% of sales were by financial institutions and this clearly artificially depressed
tenanted land prices, as indicated by the vacant possession premium which climbed to
over 100%. Whilst the financial institutions can offer many advantages to the industry
the role they play in price instability is probably not one of them.
Despite owning high quality arable land where the effects of quotas, price reductions
and set-aside are less important, institutions have been liquidating land acquired in the
1970s due to the somewhat gloomy prospects for capital growth and rents. Although
the initial yield of farmland has historically been relatively low, capital gains have
adequately compensated for this in the past, but the poor prospects for capital growth in
the 1990s accounts for the large sales of farmland and increased interest in forestry due
to the belief that long term prospects appear to be better than those in farming.
(i) A Two-Tier Market
The influence of non-agricultural demand for farmland has been a persistent one during
the twentieth century, yet in general the influence has been diluted sufficiently by
agricultural demand not to merit critical attention. Although Ward (1953) commented on
the strong demand for residential holdings and hobby farms during the post war
housing shortage, it was not until the 1980s when a combination of retrenchment of
policy and the urban property boom led to the emergence of a two-tier market for
farmland. EC support policies geared to restraining rather then encouraging output
reduced agricultural demand and encouraged institutional investors to liquidate their
assets, particularly so since there were more attractive investment elsewhere in the
economy. By the time the property boom of 1988 was in full swing, there was
considerable demand for residential 'farms', a £350,000 house in London being
equivalent to a 70 hectare farm at 1988 prices. Furthermore, the high prices of land sold
for development ensured that there were substantial roll-over funds waiting to go into
land.
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As a consequence, whereas land and buildings that had only commercial potential sold
for prices that reflected the modest agricultural earning potential and worsening
prospects within the CAP, small farms with attractive views, quaint farmhouses and
outbuildings situated near to major road or rail networks - particularly in the Home
Counties - could command prices that were divorced from their agricultural potential.
Nevertheless, it was not only the south-east of England in which residential demand
was influential, for even in relatively remote parts of England residential and amenity
considerations were as important to land agents as soil quality. By 1988 Strutt and
Parker reported that commercial farms in Devon and Cornwall were averaging £5,300
per hectare whereas farms that were mainly residential sold for more than twice that at
an average of £11,800 per hectare, (Financial Times 8.7.89).
So influential was the non-agricultural demand that the Statutory land price series
reveals a distinct resurgence in farmland prices from 1987 through to 1989, despite the
continued weakening of farm product prices throughout this period. However, the
artificiality of the resurgence was revealed during 1989 as rising interest rates ushered
in economic recession. In fact interest rates almost doubled during the year choking the
property boom and with it the non-farming demand for land. In addition developers
ceased purchasing land speculatively as the value of industrial land fell 50% in 1989
which meant much fewer roll-over funds moving into land. The Farmland Market
reported that the relative importance of roll-over funds slackened to 14% of total
acreage purchased in 1989 compared to 42% in 1988.
As the effects of high interest rates and recession rippled throughout the economy
farmland prices fell sharply in 1990 and appear to be on a downward trend with only
set-aside payments and grants that take the emphasis away from agricultural production
putting a floor to the market. By 1991 non-farming demand had almost vanished with
the result that,
'Not so since the early 1970s has the value of farmland moved so sharply towards
reflecting little more than its productive capacity' Farmland Market 1991.
This view seems to be widely held and most commentators suggest that the outlook for
the land market seems to rest on the commercial viability of land and not residential
amenity considerations. Should the GAIT talks coerce more stringent measures to
restrain production and prices within the CAP, the downward trend is expected to
accelerate although acute price falls are not expected.
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II.(vi) Some Concluding Comments
This overview has served to illustrate the multi-faceted nature of the land market. In
tracing the evolution of the market, trends in ownership, occupancy, transactions and
price have been identified and some tentative explanations provided where possible.
However, probably the most striking feature of this overview is the sheer amount of
legislation that has affected the land market, reflecting the political importance of land
and agriculture generally. The fact that the emergence of legislation relating to land
coincided with the decline of the land owning class in Britain is not a mere coincidence:
much of the early legislation was aimed directly at changing the way in which land was
owned and fanned. Since then state intervention in agriculture has burgeoned into a
complex web of laws and regulations on which the prosperity of the industry now
rests. Deciphering the effects of anyone piece of legislation is a treacherous and
ultimately futile exercise: participants in the land market form a heterogeneous group
with different aspirations, means and ability and hence the actions of the aggregate take
considerable time to emerge. Furthermore, by the very nature of the asset land does not
lend itself easily to instantaneous change. Consequently, legislation has more of a
cumulative effect on the actions of participants involved in its ownership and use, and
in turn this is reflected in the evolutionary nature of change that is observed in general
in the land market.
What is undeniably clear is the strength of the link between the land market and
agriculture: in the absence of a title, the land price series illustrated in Figure 1 could
easily be mistaken for a ratio of output and input prices in agriculture, or for farm
incomes, or some other measure of farming prosperity. Whilst it is true that non-
farming demand has played an important role during short periods of the postwar
period, agricultural demand, whether from farmers or financial institutions dominates
the market and what's more, looks likely to do so. Despite the retrenchment in policy
the price of land seems tied to the financial reward obtained from its utilisation and it is
this theme that is developed in the rest of the thesis.
Land Price Detennination
Chapter III
Price Determination in Durable Asset Markets
III. 1
III. (i) Introduction
The purpose of the following chapter is to present a basic analytical framework of price
determination in the land market. The analysis seeks to clarify the concepts of supply
and demand in the context of durable asset markets and explore the micro-economic
foundations of the empirical land price models discussed in subsequent chapters.
Necessarily, what follows is a theoretical abstraction relying heavily on assumption.
The model is a purely heuristic device, serving to isolate the principal forces and
mechanisms at work, and in so doing clarify the misconceptions that may still persist
with regard to the determination of price and quantity traded in a market for a durable
asset such as land.
The methodology has been formulated by numerous writers since the tum of the
century. The works of Wicksell (1954)1, and Wicksteed (1910), cast a significant
insight into the mechanism of market exchange, demand and supply and the pricing of
factors. These tools of analysis have been grasped by subsequent economists who have
applied and extended this understanding in many contexts. For example, Clower
(1954), adapted these principles with reference to the process of investment of durable
goods and Clark (1969) alluded to a conceptual approach in asset pricing (as presented
here), in his largely empirical work on land values. Surprisingly, until Harvey (1974),
description of the theoretical framework of the land market was generally cursory. As
Harvey (1974) remarks,
"The modem explanations [on the concept of the land market] have been
extremely brief and do not discuss the nature or role of transactions in any detaiL."
[p.61]
The second point Harvey raises in the quotation is of considerable importance for it
emphasizes the need to clarify the nature of price determination and the function of
transactions in durable asset markets, such as that for land. This is necessary since they
are distinct from the more common simultaneous determination of price and quantity in
markets for non-durables. This distinction however, is either absent or disregarded in
empirical researches into the land market both before, (e.g. Tweeten and Nelson
First published in German in 1893.
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1967), and after, ( e.g. Traill 1980), Harvey's account. The reasons for this
divergence between the theory and modelling of the land market are discussed later.
The work presented here is a synthesis of established economic doctrine. It applies and
develops the work of Clower (1954), Currie (1981) and Harvey (1974). The Chapter
begins by setting out the assumptions of the micro-economic model used to examine the
process of asset price determination. Following this a discussion of the role of
transactions is presented and the process of price determination examined in detail.
Trade and land prices are examined in a simple four-agent model in Appendix A. The
independence of trade and prices suggested by this analysis is then demonstrated with
the aid of some comparative statics. Finally, a reduced form equation of the market is
presented that will be used as a basis for empirical modelling of the land market
III.(ii) Framework and Assumptions
To begin, let us conceive of a number of homogenous units of land which comprise the
immutable stock of land. This stock of land is to be allocated among individuals via the
price system, in a situation where input, output and financial markets are all perfectly
competitive. It is further assumed that each individual in the market forms a valuation of
land on the basis of a subjective expectation of the discounted net returns to land
ownership accruing over the period of ownership. In each time period differences in
valuations across individuals will lead to a reallocation of the land stock via trade, so
that in equilibrium those individuals that own land are content to do so at the prevailing
market price. Before we proceed to examine the mechanism that leads to equilibrium it
will be worthwhile to examine some of the underlying assumptions in a little detail.
The requirement for all units of land to be homogenous is used primarily to simplify the
analysis. It implies that there is a constant ratio between the stock of land and the flow
of services derived from it at any given point in time: the price of land therefore relates
to units of constant quality. If it is further assumed that the stock of land is fixed, then
the determination of equilibrium price reduces to a problem of finding that price at
which agents in the market are willing to hold the entire stock. For simplicity it is
assumed that any individual will not wish to hold any more than one unit of land at any
one time, and therefore participates in the market as either a prospective purchaser or
current owner, the two types of agent being mutually exclusive.
We may now examine the optimizing behaviour of economic agents in the market It is
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assumed that each participant in the market has access to full information pertaining to
the market over the relevant past and is able to compute a valuation of land on the basis
of expected future net returns discounted by an appropriate discount rate. Combining
this valuation with a simple decision rule results in purchase, sale or no change in
behaviour. The decision rule employed is; if the individual's valuation of land exceeds
the prevailing market price that agent will wish to purchase land; conversely, if the
valuation is below the market price the individual will not wish to buy (if he does not
already own land) and will wish to sell (if he does).
Four points need to be made concerning valuations. First, valuations are based upon
the concept of present value. Clearly, in practice, individuals may use some other
method of valuation, or even no method at all, in which case the valuation is an
outcome from a purely random generating process and represents no more than a
guess. It is assumed here that agents use present value methods, or rather, they act as if
they do in assigning their own valuations to the land. Second, any particular valuation
is assumed to hold irrespective of whether the agent currently owns land or not, i.e.
there are no transactions costs. Third, an agent's valuation will be revised in light of
new information but will hold in the absence of any new information. Consequently,
the valuation encapsulates all information pertinent to the individual about the future and
is an expectation that the individual believes will materialise. In essence, each agent acts
as if he has perfect foresight. Fourth, valuations are assumed to vary across agents.
Despite the assumptions of homogenous units of land and perfect information,
individuals are required to act on past information differently. Whilst this assumption
appears to run counter to intuition at first glance, it need not be a cause for concern. Net
returns to land ownership are unlikely to be the same for all owners due to the varying
importance individuals attach to non-pecuniary returns of landownership, differences in
fanning ability and the discount rate that each participant uses to convert expected future
returns to an equivalent present value. Moreover, because an individual's valuation is
based on expectations and these are necessarily stochastic, valuations across individuals
(and over time for anyone individual) may differ considerably.
Let us now focus on the precise nature of the net present value concept, i.e. the
discounted value of the expected flow of net income from land. First, it is important to
make the distinction between income derived from land ownership and that derived
from farming. Whereas returns from farming represent the reward to the physical and
managerial effort of the cultivator, the reward to land ownership can be thought of as a
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payment to an owner of land for the use of the flow of services from the land. Should
the landowner be required to perform maintenance of the land and the structures on it,
an additional payment will be required from the cultivator to perform these duties.
Whilst in practice these components of the rental payment may be difficult to identify,
conceptually the distinction is apparent.
Although the point above stresses the distinction between returns to land ownership and
returns from farming, this does not deny a link between the two. The demand for land,
like any other factor of production, is derived from the demand for the output that it
generates. Consequently, the demand for the flow of services from land will be derived
from the demand for agricultural products implying a causality between land prices and
such factors as the input-output price ratio and technology via rents.
Theoretically, we can dismiss the differences between owner-occupancy and the
landlord-tenant tenure systems by assuming that owner-occupiers recognise the market
cost of the land they farm and impute a value for net rent. As Harvey (1974) puts it;
"The owner of land can be thought of as renting the land in his capacity as the fanner
from himself as the landlord." (p. 64 )
The present value of a stream of net rents may not be the only determinant of land price.
Individuals may attach some importance to the ownership of land itself and hence may
purchase land for the subjective satisfaction that owning land bestows, as well as its
value as a factor of production. As Currie (1976) wrote,
"Land has always been much more than simply an economic asset. The most
tangible non-pecuniary attractions arise from the various potential uses of land for
residence, amenity and recreation. The most nebulous attraction is the frequently
quoted landownership per se", (p.215)
In practice, some individuals may attribute considerable significance to, 'being the
master of all one surveys' or to 'the social prestige of land ownership' or to 'the
preservation of the Family estate'. Indeed, a survey by Denman (1957) into the
determinants of farmland demand indicated that such 'psychic utility' exerts a non-
trivial influence on land prices. Whilst difficult to quantify empirically the presence of
non-pecuniary returns to landownership need not present a problem in this conceptual
analysis providing that participants can attach a pecuniary value to it. To avoid
unnecessary abstraction it is assumed that non-pecuniary benefits to landownership
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may exist and participants are willing to pay for them. An agent's valuation therefore
represents the discounted sum of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns to land
accruing over the period of ownership.
In order for the desire to purchase land to be consistent with the concept of 'effective
demand', a perfect market for financial capital must exist. It is therefore assumed that
each individual has unrestricted access to credit at the prevailing interest rate and thus
the supply of credit is perfectly elastic. Transaction costs are ignored for simplicity, so
that the rate of interest defines both the cost of borrowing and return on capital. As
investment in financial capital represents the market alternative to land purchase, the
interest rate represents the opportunity cost to investors in land and thus the interest rate
will defme the market rate for discounting future income streams from land. If an agent
uses the market rate of interest to discount expected income then P, can be interpreted
as being the (maximum) sum of money that could be borrowed now given the
expected profile of net income. Similarly, it is the (minimum) sum of money which if
loaned in the capital market would accrue an equivalent stream of income over the
period of ownership. However, participants in the market may not automatically use
this market rate in the discounting exercise but elect to adopt private discount rates that
differ from the interest rate prevailing in the financial market.
On the basis of these assumptions we are now ready to define a simple formula for
obtaining the present value of a stream of net returns that we assume rational agents use
to obtain their valuations of a unit of land at any point in time. Although we will discuss
this concept in more detail later, it will be assumed here that valuations are computed in
an inflation free environment according to,
00
~ = 8L 8E1 [ ~ + j ]
j=O (111.1 )
where P t is an agent's valuation computed at the beginning of time t; 8 is the
discounting constant, defined as (1/1+r) where r is the agents rate of discount, E, is
the agent's expectation conditional upon information available at the beginning of time
period t and R; the net returns to land ownership comprising both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary returns in period t. Hence, the present value of a unit of land is the
discounted sum of the future income stream from that land.
To recap the assumptions of the model are;
1. There is a large number of homogenous ownership units in the land market
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2. There are sufficient agents in the land market to own all ownership units at a
non-zero price, i.e. there is excess demand for land at a price of zero.
3. Each participating agent wishes to hold only one unit of land.
4. There are no transaction costs in transfer of ownership or any other barriers
to ownership.
5. Input and output markets are perfectly competitive.
6. Any non-pecuniary benefit to land ownership is quantifiable.
7. Individuals aim to maximise their income (pecuniary or otherwise).
8. No government regulation of any kind.
9. The decision to purchase land is based solely on an individuals net present
valuation of land.
10. Individuals act with perfect knowledge of the present period and subjective
certainty of future periods.
11. There is a perfect capital market in which the supply of credit is perfectly
elastic for any individual at the prevailing rate of interest.
III. (iii) The Demand and Supply of a Durable Asset
(a) A Stock Concept
Like other economic commodities the price of land is determined by the opposing
forces of supply and demand. Attention however, needs to be paid to the actual
defmition of these concepts. Because a durable asset has a useful life that extends over
many production periods, (in the limit, perpetuity) the term 'supply' does not have the
conventional (flow) meaning of 'that amount entering the market per time period';
rather it refers to the accumulated stock of the commodity, not all of which will
necessarily be offered for sale. Indeed, only a small fraction of the stock may be traded
in any given period. Furthermore, given that additions to or depletions from the stock
of land will be negligible, even over considerable time horizons the supply of land can
reasonably be treated as fixed.
The demand for the stock of land may also be interpreted similarly, in that it describes
the desire of all participants in the market to hold land and not simply those agents
wishing to purchase land. In other words, the demand for the stock of land originates
from prospective purchasers and current owners of land.
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The concept of stock demand can be clarified using the following reasoning developed
by Wicksteed (1910)2. Given that each agent has a valuation of land determined by
its net present value, the stock demand curve represents a ranking of those valuations in
descending order, irrespective of whether the individual is seeking to purchase at a
particular price or an owner registering the worth he attaches to the unit he currently
owns. Thus we can define the valuation of a current owner (his reservation price) as
the minimum sum he would be prepared to accept in exchange for his land.
Conversely, the valuation of a prospective purchaser (his offer price) represents the
maximum sum he would be prepared to buy land for.
The implication here is that the stock demand curve includes the 'offer prices' of
individuals wishing to buy land, and the 'reservation prices' of individuals who
currently hold land. As the market price of land rises not only are there fewer people
willing to buy land but fewer reservation prices implying a negative relationship will
hold between the quantity demanded and price. As if in an auction room, a unit of land
will only be sold at a price equal to or above the reserve price set by its current owner.
The reservation price of the owner simply means that the owner has a positive demand
for his land at, or below that price. As Wicksteed (1910) asserts;
"It would be stretching language too far to talk of the seller at a reserved price as
being a purchaser, but obviously her effect upon the market is precisely the same as
if she were; and when we state the conditions that determine the market price. in their
ultimate forms of "quantity of the commodity in the market" and "relative scales [of
prices and quantities] of the persons constituting the market" we have already included
in the latter not only the whole body of purchasers but the whole body of sellers at
reserved prices". (pp.230)
Figure IlL 1 illustrates a fixed quantity of land available, denoted by the stock supply
curve QS, and a ranking of valuations denoted by the stock demand curve DD. The
intersection of these curves purely establishes an equilibrium market price (re) based on
the demand to hold the stock of land. Bearing in mind that at any given price, demand
for the total stock will be composed of individuals who are simply registering that they
have a positive demand for land at that price (and therefore do not necessarily want to
buy land), the number of transactions is naturally independent of the process of price
determination. The equilibrium merely refers to a current price at which individuals are
collectively willing to hold that stock of land.
2 Particularly pp.228-237.
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that the equilibrium price will remain constant over
consecutive periods. For although each individual is certain that his expectation of
future income and discount rates will hold at a given point in time, (the 'perfect
foresight' assumption), there will be revision of expectations at successive points in
time, which may shift the demand curve and hence the equilibrium price. As Clower
(1954) writes;
"... because foresight is unlikely to ever propose what hindsight knows, the market
for any durable good is necessarily "speculative". Thus, current market price is a
highly temporary phenomenon". (pp.66)
(b) A Flow Concept
We have now established the process by which price is determined for an asset in fixed
supply and have inferred that the level of transactions is independent of price in such
circumstances. Equilibrium price reflects a valuation of land such that all individuals,
(collectively), are prepared to hold the existing stock at a point in time. It says nothing
regarding the allocation of land among individuals. Conceivably, at the equilibrium
price there will be some individuals who own land but wish to sell, (their P t < pe),
and some individuals who wish to buy land at the current price, (their Pt > pe). So, at
the market equilibrium price there may exist individuals who are not in equilibrium.
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Trade in land will take place at the equilibrium price to resolve what can be thought of
an intra -market disequilibrium. As Harvey (1974), asserts;
"Transactions are the mechanism by which the allocation of land among individuals
achieves equilibrium, so that the owners of land are content to hold that land".
(p.70)
Let us now examine this mechanism more closely in terms of the flow concept of the
demand and supply for transactions of land. The 'supply of transactions' during a
given period, (i.e. the number of units of land that owners wish to sell in a particular
period), will depend on the extent of the misallocation of land amongst owners in the
market. The transactions supply schedule will thus comprise reservation prices only
and ceteris paribus, the higher the price, the more land will be offered for sale. Thus
the transaction supply curve ss will have a positive gradient as depicted in Figure 111.2.
The quantity of land that owners collectively wish to sell at any given price will be
determined by the number of owners whose valuation of land is less than that given
pnce.
'Transaction demand' can be thought of in a similar way, in that, it represents the
valuations of agents in the market that wish to purchase land at given prices. Clearly,
the distinction between this and stock demand lies in the fact that the latter represents
valuations of all individuals whereas transaction demand only comprises the valuations
of those agents who actually wish to buy land at that price, i.e. offer prices of
prospective purchasers. Ceteris paribus, individuals will wish to purchase a greater
quantity of land the lower its current market price and hence the transaction demand
curve is defined with a negative slope as dd in Figure III.2. The quantity of land that
prospective purchasers will wish to buy during any period will be determined by the
number of valuations of prospective owners equal or greater than the current market
pnce.
Using the more familiar flow concept of demand and supply, it is evident that both
price and the volume of trade in equilibrium may be determined. Providing that it is
borne in mind that the flow functions represent the demand and supply curves for land
sales and not the stock of land, no confusion between the two need arise.
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Let us now investigate the link between the stock and flow concepts. As will be seen
later in Figures III. 3 and III. 4, each pair of curves intersect at the same equilibrium
price level. This is not merely coincidental but rather a logical implication of their
construction. To demonstrate this, assume that at time t, there are n agents in a land
market, each possessing an initial stock of land Qit (this being zero for the potential
entrant) for i = I, ..., n. Each agent also has a downward sloping demand curve in
relation to price, Pt, for the ownership of land. This demand curve is D il = DjPt) for
i = I, ... , n. The equilibrium price of land, pet. reflects the intersection of the
aggregate (stock) demand curve for land with the perfectly inelastic stock supply curve:
fl fl
L D i l ( ~ e e = LQl
i=l i=l (III. 2)
The condition for equilibrium is given by the basic present value rule, equation (III. I )
although we will leave the derivation of this result to Section (vii). The amount of land
that will be traded while maintaining equilibrium may be small or large. The market for
land sales - the flow market - may be described by the demand and supply of
transactions, i.e. the excess demand or excess supply curves of agents in relation to
endowments. At a specified price i{ ,assume that m agents (where, m < n) have
non-negative excess demand3;
3 Note that here, excess supply is simply the non positive excess demand, hence, both may exist at
anyone price.
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EDi/P, ) = Di/(P' ) - Qit > 0, for i = 1, ... , m
and the remaining n-m agents have non-negative excess supply;
ESiP, ) = Qi/ - Di.p' ) >0, for i = m+1, ... , n.
The m agents with a non-negative excess demand are potential purchasers of land; the
remaining n-m are potential sellers of land. At lower prices, aggregate (non-negative)
excess demand increases partly because the number of prospective purchasers can
increase and partly because the demand for ownership increases. Conversely, aggregate
(non-negative) excess supply diminishes with lower prices. The transactions demand
curve is represented by the quantity of aggregate non-negative excess demand in
relation to land price; the transactions supply curve is represented by the quantity of
aggregate non-negative excess supply in relation to land price. At equilibrium price,
pet, the aggregate ED and ES curves intersect:
h fI
0< LEDi l ( ~ e e = L es; ( ~ e e > 0
i=1 i=h+l (111.3)
where, h agents have non-negative excess demand and (n-h) agents have non-
negative excess supply. To show that the stock and flow equilibria coincide consider
(llL3) which implies,
h fI
0< LDi l ( ~ e ) ) Q, = L Q, -Di t ( ~ e e > 0
i=1 i=h+l
Rearranging (llI.4) in terms of the stock of land yields,
fI fIL o, ( / ~ e e =L Q,
i=1 i=1
(111.4)
(111.5)
which is identical to equation (lII.2). Consequently, equilibrium price will be
determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves for the stock and for
land sales. Given that the transaction curves provide an illustration of both equilibrium
price and quantity traded, we may proceed without the explicit inclusion of the stock
demand and supply functions, which become superfluous. Further, the volume of
transactions at the equilibrium price depends on the disparities in the demand curves for
ownership amongst the n agents and the distribution of initial endowments and not the
level of the equilibrium price. As will be demonstrated in section III.(v), the level of
price and trade in equilibrium are determined independently. The role of transactions is
to transfer land from individuals placing a lower value on land to individuals placing a
higher value on land, such that in equilibrium valuations by current owners of land are
above valuations by prospective purchasers.
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In passing it is noted that if we relax the assumptions of costless transaction and perfect
mobility of land then these factors can block prospective trades between otherwise
legitimate buyers and sellers, and hence affect the volume of transactions at any
particular time. Transactions costs include: (a) the cost of searching for suitable land
and verifying its attributes for prospective purchasers, and costs of negotiation for
prospective sellers; (b) costs of implementing final contracts. Land immobility implies
that potential buyers may not trade with potential vendors if they are in different
locations. Consequently, the strict inequality in (111.3) will only hold for a subset of
agents who, after consideration of transactions costs and location, actually trade land
such that,
k g
0< L EDit ( J ~ e e = L es; ( J ~ e e > 0
i=} i=}
where, k agents (less than h) being purchasers of land, g agents [less than (n-k)]
being vendors of land and there being (n-g-k) agents who are content to hold the land
they currently own.
(c) Equilibrium in Durable Asset Markets
We can now proceed to marry the stock and transaction supply and demand together to
illustrate what Clower (1954) called 'temporary' and 'stationary' equilibrium in a
market for durable assets." The stock demand and supply curves conveniently
illustrate the equilibrium price at which collectively agents are willing to hold the stock
of land. In other words, the market could be thought of as being in equilibrium, in that
a price has been established at which agents are collectively willing to hold the stock of
land. However, within the aggregate there may be agents that do not hold their
equilibrium quantity (here, zero or one units of land) at that price. Where this is so,
there will be current owners who wish to dispose of their holdings (their valuation of
land is less than market price), and prospective owners wishing to purchase at that price
(their valuation of land is greater than market price) and trade will occur between
4 To the extent that equilibrium normally implies a state in which there is no motivation to change,
the identification of two distinct types of equilibrium is rather unfortunate. The terminolgy is
upheld here for the simple reason that these two states were first explicitly recognised by Clower
(1954) who coined the terminology. In essence the use of adjectives to describe an equilibrium
reflects the fact that trade and price are determined independently for durable goods: temporary
equilibrium refers to a state where price only is in equilibrium; stable equilibriwn refers to a stale
in which both trade and price are in equilibriwn.
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willing vendors and willing purchasers at the market equilibrium price. The market
equilibrium simply requires that there exists the same number of individuals wishing to
purchase land as there are current owners prepared to sell land at the equilibrium price.
This is the temporary equilibrium described by Clower (1954) and is depicted in Figure
III.3.
Note that this situation is characterised by a disequilibrium allocation of land at the
market equilibrium price, P", More specifically, the extent of the misallocation is given
by the number of transactions that occur in each period; here it is, q. Under the
assumption that a valuation of land by each individual holds irrespective of whether that
individual holds land or not, each transaction will entail that the reservation price of the
vendor becomes his offer price as a prospective purchaser. Similarly, the offer price of
the prospective purchaser will, after the transaction has gone through, become his
reservation price as a land owner. With each successive sale the transaction demand and
supply curves shift horizontally toward the price axis until there are no willing vendors
or potential purchasers at the equilibrium price.
Figure 111.3 : Temporary Equilibrium
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Consequently, the transactions mechanism results in a situation where all reservation
prices lie above all offer prices. At this equilibrium all owners of land are content to
hold the land they own and hence no transactions take place. This is depicted in Figure
IlIA, and is the stable equilibrium to which Clower (1954) referred. The 'stability' of
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this equilibrium arises from the fact that in the absence of change to the valuation of
each participant, the equilibrium price P" will hold indefinitely and no further
transactions will occur.
Figure IIL4 : Stable Equilibrium
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The transfer of ownership is the mechanism by which stable equilibrium is reached. In
contrast to the relationship between price and quantity for non-durable goods, trade is
independent of price, as the rate of transactions depends only on the extent of the
misallocation of land among individuals at the equilibrium price and not the price itself.
The role of transactions is therefore one of redistribution within the market, so that, not
only are all individuals collectively willing to hold the stock at the equilibrium price, but
that the stock is allocated among those individuals who have a positive demand for land
at that price.
Two observations are worth noting at this point. First, bearing in mind that valuations
are revised at the end of each market period, the price level is likely to fluctuate as
information becomes available. Second, the result that the position of no-trade is
indicative of equilibrium may at first sight appear perverse. Clearly however, this
outcome hinges solely on the assumptions of the model, regarding information-
processing and trade. When we admit market imperfection, time lags, and transactions
costs it is clear that a stable equilibrium is an outcome confined solely to theoretical
abstraction.
Land Price Determination IILI5
III.(iv) Price Determination in the Land Market
So far the analysis of price determination for a durable asset such as land has been
cursory. However, we may glean useful insights into durable asset markets if we
concentrate on the determination of price itself. We will initially focus attention on the
transactions supply and demand functions using the analysis of Currie (1981, pp.87-
89) and then tie it in with the demand and supply functions for the stock of land. To aid
exposition the analysis begins with the simplest of cases and builds up to case where
there is a large number of agents.
(a) Case 1
To begin, assume the market consists of one unit of land and two agents; a current
owner and a prospective purchaser. A necessary condition for trade requires that the
offer price of the prospective owner (P0,1) must be at least as great as the reservation
price of the current owner, (Pr,l )' Providing Po,l > Pr,l trade will occur, yet, the
precise level of the equilibrium price (PC) is indeterminate, lying in the range, P0,1 > P"
> P
r
,1 which Currie (1981) calls 'the core'. The precise level of equilibrium price
obtained will depend on the relative bargaining strengths of the two agents>. Clearly,
if the valuations of the two agents are exactly the same i.e. P0,1 = Pr,l a determinate
price is obtained, but in such circumstances it is unclear which of the two agents
actually holds the land at any point in time. Here, trade is an ongoing phenomenon,
ownership constantly switching between the two agents.
(b) Case 2
If we now introduce a third agent into the market - a prospective purchaser - with an
offer price (P0,2) such that, P0,1 > P0,2 > Pr ,l it is clear that it is impossible for him
to enter into trade because any initial agreement between the current owner (r,l) and
the new entrant (0,2) could be bettered by (0,1). However, the new entrant plays an
important role in the market because his offer price narrows the range within which the
equilibrium price can lie (i.e. he shrinks the core). Should trade between (0,1) and
(r,1) occur at a price below P0,2 then (0,2) could improve on it to (r,1)'s advantage.
This implies that neither of the prospective purchasers could obtain the unit of land
below P as the other could always renegotiate a dominant contract with the current
0,2
5 Of course, as a co-operative game a determinate solution could be found, i.e. the Nash equilbirum,
but the assumptions required for such a solution are restrictive and we need not detain ourselves
with it as our primary interest is in the market composed of many agents.
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owner. Hence, the presence of (0,2) bids up market price and narrows the range
within which the equilibrium price may lie. Given that P > P > P then0,1 0,2 r,l
equilibrium price is indeterminate and lies in the core, P0,1 > pe > P0,2 . In the case
where P0,1 = P0,2 > Pr ,1 equilibrium price is determinate (being equivalent to the
offer prices of both prospective purchasers) but it is uncertain which of the prospective
purchasers will obtain ownership at any particular point in time. Again trade will be an
ongoing phenomenon.
(c) Case 3
Let us now consider a situation in which the stock of land comprises two homogenous
units and four agents; two prospective purchasers and two current owners of land.
With this example another feature of price determination emerges. Specifically, all units
offered for sale will be traded at the same price, the equilibrium price. Suppose that the
offer and reservation prices of the four agents are such that P0,1 > P0,2 > P
r
,2 >
Pr,l ' Because the lowest offer price (Po,2) exceeds the highest reservation price (Pr,2)
then both units, i.e. the entire land stock, will be traded. Each transaction will occur
within the core set by P0,2 and Pr,2 because at prices above P0,2' (0,2) would not
wish to purchase the second unit of land, and at prices below P
r
,2' (r,2) would not
wish to sell the second unit of land.
All units will be traded at one price since the prospective owner paying the higher price
and the current owner receiving the lower price would renegotiate until both units of
land were traded at the same price. This iterative bargaining process can be illustrated
by the following. Given that agents valuations are such that, P0.1 > P0,2 > Pr ,2 >
Pr,l assume that (0,1) initially negotiates with (r,2) at a price between their respective
offer and reservation prices, denoted p*; and that (0,2) negotiates a trade with (r,1) at
a price P**, also between their respective offer and reservation prices, such that p* >
p** .Consequently, (0,1) and (r,1) have an incentive to negotiate a new deal because
they are paying and receiving more and less respectively for a homogenous unit of land
than the other agents in the market. As a result of cancelling their initial contracts they
open up the entire market for renegotiation. Clearly, the motivation for recontracting
will only cease when both units of land are sold at the same price. Hence, equilibrium
price lies in the core set by P
r
,2 < pe < P0,2 This is more clearly seen in Figure IlL5,
which depicts the transactions supply and demand curves as step functions.
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Figure III.5 : Determination of Equilibrium Price in a market comprising
two owners and two prospective purchasers
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The transaction demand curve is the function joining the points (abcde) and the
transactions supply curve is that represented by the points (fghij). Notice that the
intersection of the transactions functions occurs at 2 units and equilibrium price lies
between Pr,2 and P0,2 as explained above.6 Appendix lILA examines the possible
price-quantity outcomes in the four agent model and categorizes them according to
whether the stable equilibrium explained above is attainable.
(d) Case 4
Using these principles we may now examine the case where there is a large number of
agents and hence continuous functions (such as those used at the beginning of this
chapter) may be used as legitimate approximations of the step functions drawn in the
preceding cases. Assume that there are m prospective owners and n owners of land in
the market, (which by definition, consists of n homogenous units of land). Denoting
6 Although the stock supply and demand functions have not been explicitly drawn in Figure 5 it
should be clear that the stock supply curve is represented by the dotted line (ej) and the demand
curve for the stock in this case would correspond to the transaction demand curve and would then
continue as the mirror image of the transactions supply curve (the mirror being placed in the ej
plane).
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P r .i as the reservation price of the i th owner (i = 1, 2, ... n) and P . as the offer
. ;th.. O,}
pnce of the J prospective purchaser U= 1, 2, ... m) we can define the transactions
demand and supply curves respectively as a ranking such that:
po,] > Po,2 > > Po,m
Pr,] < Pr,2 < s Pr,n
If it is further assumed that P0,1 > Pr.l then there exists a misallocation of land among
agents which will motivate trade. Following similar lines to those set out above, all
transactions will occur at the same equilibrium price. Assuming k units are traded to
rectify this misallocation of land the general rule for obtaining the core within which
equilibrium price must lie is given by,
max (Pr,k' Po,k+]) < pe < min (Po,k' Pr,k+]) (111.6)
To see why this is so, it is convenient to return to a four agent market model defined by
Po,1 > Pr,2 > Po,2 > Pr,1' Substituting these values into (111.6) we have,
max (Pr ,1' P0,2) < pe < min (P0,1' Pr ,2)
Po ,2 < pe < Pr ,2
This result is illustrated in Figure 111.6 where the transaction demand curve is
represented by the function (abcdef) and supply by (ghdcij).
The second element in each of the brackets either side of equation (111.6) is important
because it limits the range in which the equilibrium price can lie. For example, if a third
prospective purchaser is introduced into the market such that P0,1 > P,,2 > P0,2 >
P0,3 > P,,1 a single unit continues to be traded, but the size of the core has been
reduced. Referring to Figure 111.7 which illustrates this model, the transaction supply
function is unchanged at (ghdcij) and the demand for transactions is represented by the
function (abdefff').
The core is now bounded by P,.2 and P0,2 and has been reduced by the vertical
distance (ef), which represents the difference between the new entrant's offer price and
that which previously defined the lower bound of the core. In an analogous fashion we
can also reduce the core by introducing a third current owner of land (i.e. enlarging the
land stock) providing the new owner has a reservation price that lies somewhere in the
core set by the five agent model.
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Figure 111.6 : Equilibrium Price Determination With Two Owners and
Two Prospective Purchasers
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Figure 111.7 Price Determination With Two Owners and Three
Prospective Purchasers
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(111.7)
Returning to transactions in the n by m agent case we can now formulate a general
rule for the determination of the number of transactions. As stated previously, the
process of trade is the mechanism by which individual agents obtain their optimal
allocation of land. Trade achieves this by transferring ownership of land from willing
vendors at the equilibrium price to willing purchasers at that price. Where all
reservation prices are greater than all offer prices there is no trade as all owners are
content to hold land by definition. Letting (0, J) be the prospective purchaser with the
jth highest offer price and (r, i) be the current owner with the i th lowest reservation
price then a general formula for the number of transactions k occurring in a market
consisting of n units is given by,
k = m i n L ~ ( O ' J J ~ p"e, it(r, i) $W]
where Pue and ~ ~ are the upper and lower limits of the core respectively. Should the
equilibrium price be determinate then these limits will naturally coincide and pe may be
legitimately substituted for either in equation (III.7).
We may now link this analysis up with the demand and supply curves for the stock of
land. This is shown in Figure III.8 which reproduces the five agent model of Figure
III.7 and superimposes stock demand and supply.
Figure lll.8 : Stock and Flow Step Functions in a Five Agent Model
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Again, the demand and supply functions for transactions are given by (abdefff') and
(ghdcij) respectively and the stock supply curve is represented by the vertical line (jf)
and the stock demand curve by (abciekl). As demonstrated earlier both sets of functions
intersect to give the same equilibrium price, here the core is P < pe < P .0,2 - - r,2
An important result to emerge from this analysis is that, in a market consisting of n
units the core in which equilibrium price must lie is defined by the nth and the n + 1th
lowest valuations, irrespective of whether the valuations are from prospective
purchasers or vendors of land. This point is of some consequence for it clears up an
ambiguity present in Currie's (1981) analysis which implied that the equilibrium price
is determined by the valuation of the prospective purchaser and the valuation of the
current owner at the margin. Only after trade has occurred, and a stable equilibrium
attained will the 'marginal' vendor and 'marginal' prospective purchaser determine the
core and hence the range in which the equilibrium price will fall. Given that a stable
equilibrium will rarely, if ever be attained this point is worthy of note. For further
explanation of this point see Appendix lILA.
In passing it can also be noted that where there are a large number of agents it is likely
that the core will diminish to the point where it holds no practical significance and the
equilibrium price will be to all intents and purposes determinate. Moreover, in a market
consisting of n units equilibrium price will be determinate providing that the nth and
n +1th valuations are equivalent. This case is also illustrated in Appendix A.
In summary, this analysis demonstrates that the equilibrium price is that price at which
agents in the market are willing to hold the entire stock. In terms of the stock demand
and supply functions the core for a n unit market is defined by the nth and the n + 1th
highest valuations. In terms of the flow concept of transaction supply and demand the
the core is described by the expression,
max (Pr,k' Po,k+l ) ~ pe < min (Po,k' Pr,k+l)
where k units of land are traded to rectify the misallocation. Further, the number of
transactions required to achieve a stable equilibrium is given by,
k = m i { ~ ( O . j j ~ Po'. i ~ ( r r i) ~ lJe]
In addition, because k and n are independent we are able to state that there is no
theoretical basis to suggest a causal link between the number of transactions and the
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III.(v) Some Comparative Statics of the Model
To underscore the independence of price determination and quantity traded in a market
for a durable good it will be instructive to consider two comparative static propositions.
Both cases are polar extremes, yet are the proper outcomes given the rather unusual
conditions portrayed by each market. We will begin from a position of stable
equilibrium, characterized by current owners who are all content to own the land they
hold at the prevailing equilibrium price. Introducing particular stimuli into the model
results in a market characterised by,
(a) a price change but no trade and,
(b) trade but no change in price.
To illustrate the outcome of the first proposition assume there is a sudden increase in
farm product prices, all other factors remaining unchanged. Valuations of land by
current owners and prospective purchasers rise inducing a vertical shift in the stock
demand curve DD to D'D' in Figure III.9 reflecting the fact that land ownership is
more profitable.
Figure 111.9 : A Change in Land Price with no Trade
s' D'
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Provided that the initial product price rise is acted upon equally by all agents so that
every valuation increases by the same amount, the demand and supply curves for
transactions also shift vertically from dd and ss to dd' and SIS' respectively.
Consequently, no trade is induced; all that occurs is a rise in land prices to P2 to choke
off the excess demand at the previous equilibrium price Pl' The change in land price
from PI to P2 does not motivate any trade as there has been no change in their relative
valuations of owners and prospective purchasers. The owners of land at the initial
equilibrium remain content to hold the land they own at P2 and there is no motivation to
trade.
In a similar manner, it is possible to conceive of an impetus to the market which
motivates trade among individuals but does not change the demand for the land stock
per se. Providing the information that causes trade to occur has an equal and opposite
effect on prospective purchasers and current owners, no pressure on price will have
been generated, yet the entire market could conceivably change hands given a sufficient
disturbance to valuations. Providing that the nth and n + l th valuations remain
unchanged in a market of n homogenous units, so will equilibrium price. Figure IlL! 0
depicts a situation where q units are traded at the same equilibrium price Ps,
Figure 111.10 : Transactions With no Change in Land Price
s D s
s
q
D
Here, there is a horizontal shift in the transactions supply and demand curves, (to SIS'
and d'd') indicating that the fall in reservation prices is matched identically with a rise
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in offer prices and hence the stock demand curve does not change. Ceteris paribus,
once trade has taken place to rectify the misallocation the market will be restored to
stable equilibrium where all owners are content to hold the land they currently own at
the prevailing market price, pe.
III.(vi) A Numerical Example of The Land Market Model
This example illustrates the determination of price and trade and the role of transactions
in the operation of the land market, along the lines described in the previous sections.
For simplicity, it is additionally assumed that;
i) The land stock is fixed in supply at 10 units.
ii)There are 15 valuations for these units of land; 10 reservation prices of
current owners and 5 offer prices made by prospective purchasers of land.
Different valuations of land in this elementary model do not arise from differences in
land quality or location (all units of land are homogenous), but due to the [subjective]
expectations of each individual concerning future levels of rent, psychic utility and
discount rates. The 15 hypothetical valuations are presented in Table III.! and graphed
as supply and demand curves for transactions and the stock in Figure IILII.
Table 111.1: Net Present Valuations of Land by All Individuals in the
Market
Units of Land Reservation Prices Offer Prices of
of La ndow ne rs Potential Purchasers
1 300 310
2 320 290
3 340 270
4 360 250
5 380 230
6 400
7 420
8 440
9 460
10 480
From these rankings of reservation and offer prices the equilibrium price lies within the
core given by,
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max (Pr,k' Po,k+l) s pe < min (Po.k: Pr,k+l )
Pr,k < pe < Po,k
300 < pe < 310
which are the tenth and eleventh lowest valuations by definition. Furthermore, the
number of transactions required to attain a stable equilibrium is given by
k = minLt.(O,J)?' Po", i i (r, l) s W]
k=1
Figure 111.11 illustrates the temporary equilibrium of this market: the supply and
demand curves for transactions intersecting at a price between 300 and 310 which
corresponds to that given by the tenth and eleventh lowest valuation on the stock
demand curve and one unit is traded as shown by the intersection of dd and ss.
Following the transaction the lowest reservation price becomes 310 and the highest
offer price is 300 and consequently, all reservation prices exceed all offer prices and in
the absence of new information, no further trade will take place. The market is in a state
of stable equilibrium in which all owners of land are content to hold the stock of land at
the equilibrium price. This situation is illustrated in Figure III. 12.
Figure 111.11: Temporary Equilibrium in the Land Market
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Figure 111.12: Stable Equilibrium in the Land Market
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III.(vii) Reduced Form Expressions of Land Price Determination
We may now formulate a market based asset pricing equation, consistent with the
analysis of the previous sections, that may be used to estimate land prices in the
empirical chapters that follow. Recall that each participant in the market, whether he be
a current owner or prospective purchaser, is assumed to base his valuation of land
according to the present value rule given by equation (111.1), that is,
00
P, = 8L8Et [ R, + j ]
j=O (111.1)
where P t is an agent's valuation computed at the beginning of time t: 8 is the
discounting constant, defined as (1/1 +r) where r is the agent's rate of discount
defined by the market rate of interest, E, is the agent's expectation conditional upon
information available at the beginning of time period t and R, the net returns to land
ownership comprising both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns in period t. Equation
(III. 1) prices land according to market fundamentals, in that it asserts that changes in
land prices are attributable to new information concerning the returns to land ownership
. Assuming that net returns and the discount rate remain at their present level in
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perpetuity, then it can easily be shown that (III. I) collapses to7
~P, =-
r (111.8)
Equation (III.8) is a simple pricing rule employed by each participant and may be used
to derive the reduced form price equation of land price determination in the land market
as a whole. As an introduction let us look at the behaviour of the representative agent.
Assume that at time t, there are n agents in the land market, each possessing an initial
stock of land Qi1 (this being zero for the potential entrant) for i = 1, ..., n. Assume
that the i1h participant has a marginal value product (MVP) curve for land given by
Figure III. 13 which determines the marginal return he receives from owning additional
units of land.
Figure 111.13 The Marginal Value Product Curve of the ith Participant
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Consequently, the MVP curve defines the i1h participant's demand curve for land
which is downward sloping since it is assumed that there exists diminishing marginal
returns to his managerial skills as a landowner. The marginal value product of owning a
unit of land in year t will be the return he obtains from owning the land, R t·
Approximating the MVP curve with a linear form over the relevent range it may be
expressed as,
Rt, = Goi - at iOlt
where aOi is the intercept and ali is its slope.
(lII.9)
7 See Chapter IV Section II, for a derivation of the presentvalueof an annuity.
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The alternative to land ownership is investment in the financial capital market. The
annual return obtained from investing a sum of PI is thus rP I and this return
represents the opportunity cost to the ilh individual of land purchase. In order to assess
his optimal allocation of land at any given price of land (PI)' the i1h participant will
compare the return he could obtain from investing PI in land (RI) with the return on
the alternative investment, (rPI)' If R I from a unit of land exceeds rP I then land
purchase is profitable and he will desire to own that land. If R1 is less than rP I it will
not be profitable to own that unit of land and the participant will not desire ownership.
Consequnetly, the ilh participant will desire to own land until the returns on his
marginal unit of land is equivalent to rPI , i.e.,
rl{ =Goi - Ql i Qc4, (III. 10)
and Qdilis the ilh participants optimal allocation of land at a price PI'
Rewriting equations (111.9) and (111.10) in terms of actual and desired quantities of land
gives,
(111.11 )
Qc4, = (Goi - rl{)
Ql i (111.12)
In equilibrium actual and desired quanities of land held by the ilh participant will
coincide, hence equating (111.11) and (111.12) and solving for PI yields the present
value rule given by (111.8). This result is not surprsing since it was assumed that each
participant uses (111.8) as a basis for land valuation. Note however, that when this
holds for all n participants then we have a stable equilibrium referred to in the previous
section and no trade will occur since all participants will be content to own the land they
hold.
Whether the jlh participant enters the land market as a potential purchaser or vendor of
land at PI will depend on his initial endowment Qil' Consider the situation depicted in
Figure 111.13. Should his initial endowment be Qill then he is only obtaining a return
of Rill on the marginal unit he owns and thus will enter the market as a vendor of land
wishing to sell (QuI - Qd it ) units of land at PI' Conversely, if the participant
currently owns Qi/ units of land on which the marginal return accruing to him is R it2
he will enter the market as a purchaser of land wishing to buy an additional (Qd it -
Qi/) units of land. Clearly, if this individual is a potential entrant he will enter the
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market to buy Qdit units of land.
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Whilst the situation of no-trade is sufficent to obtain the equilibrium price, it is not
necessary, and in any practical sense, not relevant, since trade is an ongoing
phenomenon. As stated in Section (ii) if an individual has a demand curve for land, D it
= Di/(Pt ) for i = 1, ... , n then the equilibrium price is merely that which allocates
the stock of land among the n participants irrespective of whether they are content to
hold the land they currently own. Reproducing the equation presented earlier, the
equilibrium price is simply that which satisfies the condition,
n n
LDit ( l ~ e e = I Qt
i=1 i=1
By implication, at a disequilibrium price then,
n n n
LDit(ln- I Qt = IZit
i=1 i=1 i=1
(111.2)
(III.13)
n
is a non-zero quantity at that price. If L Zit > 0 then there are more participants in the
i = 1
market wishing to purchase the stock of land at that price than there is avaliable land
and hence competition by prospective purchasers bids up the market price. Conversely,
n
where LZit < 0 there is an insufficient number of participants wishing to hold the
;=1
stock and competition among current land owners exerts a downward pressure on price
to stimulate demand.
Noting that Qdit = D iPt) we may substitute the right hand side of equations (111.11)
and (III. 12) into (III.2) to yield, t (00; - rPt) = t (00; - R; t )
i =1 ali ;=1 a1 i (111.14)
To obtain the equilibrium price that satisfies (111.2) we simply solve (111.14) for Pt·
Dividing through by n and cancelling gives the reduced form of the market,
e R~ =-
r (111.15)
so that equilibrium price is defined by the average return from land ownership divided
by the market interest rate.
A number of points are now worthy of comment. First, it has been demonstrated that
short-run equilibrium market prices may be modelled by a single present value
equation. This reduced form representation obviates the need to employ a simultaneous
equations approach, which a priori will encounter problems of identification since, as
Land Price Determination 111.30
(111.17)
we have shown, factors that affect vendors of land are exactly those that affect potential
purchasers. Second, these results echo those presented in section (ii) in that the level of
transactions is independent of equilibrium price determination, transactions merely
being the process by which land is reallocated amongst market participants at the
equilibrium price, rather than determining the equilibrium price itself. Third, if there is
disequilibrium in the market then equation (III. 15) may be adjusted to account for it.
Substituting the expressions for an individual's actual and desired quantity of
land (111.11) and (11I.12)} into the disequilibrium representation of the market,
equation (III. 13), gives,
t (00; - riD - t (00; - ~ l l = tZil
;=1 ali ;=1 ali i=1 (111.16)
Solving (III. 16) for equilibrium price yields the expression,
P/ = R_ a l l
r r
where t, is the average difference between actual and desired quantities of land across
all participants. Hence, al i, Ir represents that price that must be added to the market
price existing in time t to achieve equilibrium levels. Since ~ is the average
difference between actual and desired endowments trade may still occur in equilibrium
as participants reallocate land subject to their individual preferences.
III.(viii) Concluding remarks
This chapter has served to explore the micro-economic foundations of price
determination in capital asset markets. The analysis presented here unifies the research
of Currie (1981) and Harvey (1974), demonstrating the equivalence of equilibrium
price in stock and flow representations of the market and developing formulae to
determine the price and number of transactions that obtain in a market where all
reservation and offer prices are known. Whilst such a situation is purely hypothetical it
nevertheless provides a valid platform on which the empirical modelling of land prices
may proceed. Whilst Harvey (1974) first identified the distinction between stock and
flow in the land market, and the independence of transactions and prices, his initial
insight has been extended here and three classes of market stability identified. The
distinction between stock and flow is an important one for it suggests that trade can
have no explanatory role in the determination of land prices. Yet, as we shall descover
in Chapter V, this has not been recognised in the econometric modelling of UK land
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prices. Finally, it has been demonstrated that a simple capital asset pricing model
represents the reduced fonn of the market for short-run equilibrium price determination.
This provides a convenient basis for the empirical models of land prices that follow.
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Appendix lILA
Determination of Equilbrium Price and Transactions in the Four Agent
Model.
The following analysis develops the work presented earlier in this chapter on the
various price-trade outcomes in a model comprising two prospective purchasers and
two current owners of the land stock (i.e. n = 2). The assumptions discussed earlier
are gennaine to this analysis also. Here, price and trade determination are examined
under eight market scenarios. Each of these eight outcomes fall conveniently into one of
three categories according to their market 'stability'. Specifically, a stable market is
one where, ceteris paribus, no trade occurs (k = 0) i.e. all owners of land are content
to hold the land they own at the prevailing equilibrium price. A potentially stable
market is one which is rendered stable after a finite number of transactions have taken
place (k > 0). Such a market, is equivalent to Clower's (1954) notion of 'temporary'
equilibrium. In an unstable market the motivation to trade does not cease, and ceteris
paribus, trade is an ongoing phenonmenon. Let us now consider the possibilities of
the two-by-two agent model in detail.
1. A Stable Market
In a stable market all reservation prices lie everywhere above all offer prices i.e. Pr.2
> P } > P } > P 2' Consequently, in the absence of new information affecting
r, o, 0,
agents' valuations it is clear that there is no motivation to trade, so k = O.
Equilibrium price in a stable market is confined to the range set by the reservation price
and offer price at the margin: the core is bounded from above by the lowest reservation
price and from below by the highest offer price, i.e.,
max (Pr•k , po•k+} ) s pes min (Po•k' Pr,k+})
Pr,l > pe > po,}
This is depicted by the step functions in Figure lILA1.
2. A Potentially Stable Market
In this type of market, stability is obtained by a finite number of transactions. Trade
results in a reallocation of the land stock so that all reservation prices exceed all offer
prices. Figures III.A2, III.A3, and IILA4 illustrate the possible markets in which this
may occur. Consider the market defined by po) > Pr ,2 > p o•2 > Pr.} · As with any
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market, equilibrium price lies in a core set by the valuations of the nth and n+ 1th
highest valuations; here the second and third highest valuations. One transaction is
necessary to return the market to a stable condition as may be seen in Figure III.A2.
Figure III.AI : A Stable Market
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Figure III.A2 A Potentially Stable Market with One Transaction
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Specifically, given that the core is set by
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the number of transactions is,
k = m i n L ~ ( O ' J J ~ P,;, i ~ ( r ' l l S; Fl']
k=1
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Note here that the marginal reservation and offer price define the equilibrium price but
that this is not generally the case in a market in which trade is occurring. For example
consider Figure IIl.A3 which depicts the market defined by po,] > P
r
,2 > P
r
, ] >
P0,2· Here, one unit is traded to rectify the disparity in offer and reservation prices at
the equilibrium price set by the core: Pr,] > pe > Pr,2. Due to the fact that the two
reservation prices lie between the two offer prices, it is not the valuations of the
marginal owner and prospective purchaser that defines the core but the two reservation
prices.8
As discussed in the main part of the chapter equilibrium price is determined by the
agents with the nth and n + 1th highest valuation of land and not the valuation of the
marginal prospective purchaser and marginal current owner. However, after trade has
occured the nth and n + 1th highest valuations will be those corresponding to the
marginal reservation and offer prices respectively. This demonstrates that we can only
state that equilibrium price is determined by the prospective purchaser and current
owner at the margin after trade has occurred, or more exactly, when the equilibrium is
a stable one. This may evaporate the ambiguity present in Currie's (1981) account of
price determination.
The market depicted by Figure III.A4 is such that all offer prices exceed all reservation
prices, po,] > P0,2 > P
r
,2 > Pr , ] and thus both units of land are traded at the
equilibrium price within the core given by, P0,2 > pe > Pr,2 · In all these cases trade
returns the markets to that shown in Figure lILA I, wherein all reservation prices
exceed all offer prices, and hence no motivation for trade exists ceteris paribus.
8 In a situation where the offer prices lie between the resevation prices the offer prices would dcfme
the core.
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Figure III.A3 : A Potentially Stable Market with One Transaction
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Figure Ill.A4 : A Potentially Stable Market with Two Transactions
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3. An Unstable Market
It is possible to identify four market scenarios which are characterized by instability, in
that ceteris paribus, trade never ceases. In each case the stability depicted by Figure
lILA 1 is never obtained despite the occurence of trade. Instability arises due to the
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equality of the valuations at the margin. Hence, ceteris paribus trade will be an
ongoing process in any market in which the nth and n + 1th valuations are equivalent.
Whilst equality renders both the quantity of units traded and equilibrium price
determinate some form of indeterminancy is always present. Here, the indeterminacy
manifests itself as perpetual trading, in that we cannot identify which of the two agents
holds ownership of the unit at any point in time.
In the cases that follow Figures llI.A5 and lli.A6 depict markets in which only one unit
is traded continually, Figures Ill.A7 and III.A8 markets where (in the absence of new
information) both units of land are continually traded. Figure III.A5 illustrates a market
defined by Pr ,2 > Pr ,l = P0,1 > P0,2' Given that one transaction occurs (k = 1) the
determinate equilibrium price is,
max (Pr,k' Po,k+1) < pe < min (Po,k' Pr,k+1)
P l=pe = P 1r, 0,
Figure III.AS : An Unstable Market with One Transaction
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Figure III.A6 illustrates a market defined by Pr,2 > Po,l = Po,2 > Pr,l - At the
determinate equilibrium price of P0,1 = pe = P0,2 the number of transactions is,
k = m i n L ~ ( o . J J ~ P,:. i ~ ( r . l l ~ /Je]
k=l
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Note here that after the initial trade has taken place the market is transformed but still
does not obtain stability. Specifically, the market reduces to that represented by Figure
III.A5, ceteris paribus.'
In Figures III.A7 and III.A8 both units of land are traded in the first instance. In Figure
IILA7, which characterizes a market defined by Po,l > Po ,2 = Pr ,2 > Pr,l
equilibrium price is P0,2 = pe = Pr,2 and the initial trade results in a market that is
transformed to that shown in Figure III.A5, where one unit only is traded continuously
in the absence of further information affecting valuations of agents. In a market where
all reservation prices and offer prices are identical (P0,1 = P0,2 = Pr,J = Pr,2 ) such as
that shown in Figure III.A8 no such transformation occurs and two units are traded
continuously at the equilibrium price.
Figure III.A6 : An Unstable Market with One Transaction
p
r,2
P
",1
o 1 2 Units
9 We can also concieve of the analogous case in which the supply curve was perfectly elastic (rather
than demand as shown in the text) so that Po,J > Pr,J =Pr,2 > Po,2 In a similar fashion, one
unit is traded at a detenn inate equilibrium price Pr.l =pe =Pr,land the market reduces to that
depicted in Figure Ill.A5 also.
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Figure III.A7 : An Unstable Market with Two Transactions
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Figure III.AS : An Unstable Market with Two Transactions
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Chapter IV
Present Value Methods of Asset Valuation
IV.!
IV.(i) Introduction
The examination of price determination in the last chapter suggested that the market
price of a capital asset could be conveniently modelled using a single present value
equation. However, in that Chapter little justification was given for the use of present
value methods in asset valuation. Here, the origins, behaviour and implications of
present value models are explored theoretically and empirically using relevant data for
England and Wales. The present value approach to modelling is then extended with an
examination of the role of expectations in asset valuations.
This Chapter is organised along the following lines. We begin in Section (ii) by
focussing attention on the theoretical link between asset returns and asset prices, as
embodied by the present value hypothesis and SOIne simple specifications of the present
value hypothesis are derived and their implications examined. Despite their obvious
simplicity, present value models exhibit much of the behaviour that one observes in a
time series of asset price, and a small simulation exercise is presented to evidence this
view. In Section (iii) the discussion turns to the problem of defining the term 'returns'
in the farmland context. A number of different measures have been employed in
previous studies of land prices and a brief evaluation of the merits of each is warranted
prior to any empirical analysis. Section (iv) is dedicated to the investigation of the role
of expectations in price determination. Given that participants in the market must form
some impression of the future regarding the stream of future returns to land in order to
arrive at a current valuation, one may suggest that expectations play an integral role in
capital asset pricing models. Three expectation mechanisms, namely adaptive naive and
rational, are incorporated into the present value model and their applicability evaluated
using empirical data. In Section (v) a number of ancillary issues are considered such as
disequilibrium pricing, the opportunity cost of farmland and simultaneous modelling of
the tenanted and vacant possession sectors. The Chapter draws to a close with some
concluding remarks in Section (vi).
IV.(ii) The Present Value Hypothesis
Whilst there are obvious similarities in the acquisition of goods bought for consumption
and investment, in that both are purchased at a single point in time and yield some
'satisfaction' to the purchaser, the two types of good are inherently different. For
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example, the act of consumption liberates an immediate utility to the consumer, but
involves destruction of the good. In contrast, investment goods yield a return that may
accrue over many periods, in the limit, perpetuity, and are thus 'destroyed' only
gradually, or perhaps not at all. Agricultural land is a case in point since it may be used
in perpetuity without destroying the inherent qualities from which returns are derived.
Clearly, capital assets have an inter-temporal dimension which has logical implications
for the pricing of such assets. Because all economic decisions which are inter-temporal
need to be compared with the utility derived from not investing, all inter-temporal
decisions ultimately collapse to questions about consumption.
An integral part of reducing all investment choices to an equivalent amount of current
consumption is the assessment of the time value of money - the interest (discount) rate -
since there is an opportunity cost to consumption (investment). Interest rates are
universally positive reflecting two underlying influences;
(a) the productivity of economic assets and,
(b) the time preference of consumption.
With reference to the first point, the postponement of consumption in the current period
allows an enhanced level of consumption in some later period. For example, we may
consume a quantity of wheat grains now or plant them to yield a future crop of grain
larger than the original quantity of seeds. Second, deferral of consumption implies a
cost in terms of postponed utility, so that another reason for positive interest rates is
that individuals have a preference to consume now rather than later.
One method that attempts to translate a stream of future income into an equivalent sum
of money available for current consumption, (having taken account of the time value of
money), is that suggested by present value theory. For the purpose of this introductory
exposition the following points are assumed, although some will be relaxed later.
1. The opportunity cost or time preference of money is exogenous and determined
in the (external) economy by market forces.
2. This opportunity cost of money is unique so that there is a single rate of interest
at any point in time which may be used in any discounting or compounding
exercise.
3. The interest rate is non-stochastic, entailing it is known with certainty in all time
periods so that should the interest rate change, the timing and extent of the
change is known to all in the market with certainty. To simplify the analysis
further it is assumed that the interest rate is constant over all relevant time
horizons.
4. The process of discounting and compounding occur discretely, say annually for
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simplicity. 1
5. The interest rate is determined in a perfect capital market characterised by perfect
information, zero transaction costs and unlimited access to financial capital at
the prevailing rate of interest.
6. Over all relevant time horizons the general price level is constant entailing zero
inflation.
(a) A Simple Capital Asset Pricing Model
In order to introduce the present value models used later it will be useful to recapitulate
some fundamentals of compounding and discounting. Because of positive rates of
interest, future sums (whether in terms of actual commodities, utility or financial
spending power) will always be greater than present values. Investing a principal (V)
now at an annual rate of interest (r) will yield a future sum (5 t ) of V(l +r) at the end
of this year; and a future sum, (1+r)[V(I+r)] = V(I+r)2 by the end of the
investment's second year. This discrete compounding exercise, given the assumptions
stated above Yields the familiar compound interest formula,
S, =V(l+rt t = 1,2,... n. (IV.I)
In a similar manner we may obtain the present value of a sum received at some point in
the future by discounting. Solving (1) for V, yields,
V = 5t(1+rfn t = 1,2,... n. (IV.2)
A frequently encountered discrete compounding situation is the constant annuity
(installments) case, where the present value of a stream of constant annual payments
(the annuity) over a number of years is sought. The present value of an annuity of £a
per period at an interest rate of rover n years is given by,
= { 1- (1 + n:]An r
'r (IV.3)
Equation (lV.3) is derived by discounting the stream of periodic payments (a).
Assuming that the first payment is made at the end of the first year then
a a a a
A =--+ + + ... + n
n ,» 1+ r (1 + r)2 (1 + r)3 (1 + r) (IVA)
Denoting u = [1/(1+r)] equation (IVA) may be rewritten as,
2 3 nAn ,r =au+ au +au + . . . +au (IV.5)
Multiplying (IV.5) by u and subtracting the result from (IV.5) gives,
For a discussion of present value methods in a continuous time framework see Copeland and
Weston (1988), pp.851-855
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A -uA -au-aun + 1n,r n,r -
and thus,
An r = au(1 - un)
, l-u
Substituting back for u in (lV.6) yields,
A - a[rtrJ[1- (1 + rrnJ
n.r >: [ 1 - I ~ r r
= a[ 1- (1 + rrnJ
(1 + r)[ 1+r-I ]
1+r
IVA
(lV.6)
which is identical to (IV.3). In the application of present value theory to land values it
will be convenient to consider the case where the asset yields a (constant) return in
perpetuity in which case (IV.3) simplifies to
lim An r = ~
, r
n ~ 00 (lV.7)
since r > 0 and thus in the limit (1+r)-n tends to zero. Consequently, within the
framework outlined above, the present value of an infinite stream of constant payments
is given by (IV.?).
(b) A Growth Model of Asset Pricing
Whilst it may be appropriate in certain cases to assume that the annuity does not grow
through time it is possible to introduce a fixed rate of annuity growth into the model
which collapses to a simple equation in the limiting case. As it may be more realistic in
some circumstances to assume that asset returns are growing over time, we may
incorporate this earnings growth as follows. Let the growth rate of asset returns be a
constant g and let ao be the current return on the asset of interest. At the end of the
first year the anticipated return will therefore be al =ao(1 + g) and the expected
return at the end of the second year is a2 = [ao(1 + g )](1 + g) = (1 + g)2 ao'
Assuming that this rate of growth (g) continues for n years at an interest rate of (r)
then the present value of a growth annuity (An,f,g) is,
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A al G2 Gj + a;ft,r,g = -- + + +
1+ r (l + r)2 (l + r)3 '" (l + rt
= Go (l + g) Go (l +g)2 Go (1 +g)3
1+ r + (1 + r)2 + (1 + r)3 +...
By letting u = (l+g)/(l+r) equation (IV.8) can be rewritten as
Aft, r. g = Go u + ct u2+ Go u3+ . . . Go u"
= uao (1+ u+ u2 + . . . + u" - 1)
+ _ct_(_l+_g)_ft
(l +rt
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(IV. 8)
(IV. 9)
(IV. 11)
Multiplying (IV.9) by u, subtracting the result from (IV.9) and rearranging yields,
A = UGo (l - uft )
n.r.s I-u (IV.IO)
Substituting for u in (IV. 10) and noting that al = ao(l + g) we obtain,
a [1- ( ~ ) f t tA = 1 1+r
n ,r,g
r-R
Conditional upon the rate of annuity growth being less than the rate of interest in each
and every time period, then the limiting case of (IV. 11) [i.e. where the number of
annuity payments are infinite] collapses to,
1· A allIll n,r,g =--
n---+
oo r-R (IV. 12)
smce,
(
1+g)ftlim -- =0
n---+oo I+r ' iff g < r
Consequently, in circumstances where the rate of returns growth is less than the
discount rate, equation (lV.I2) describes the formation of an asset's present value.
(c) Some Observations on the Capital Asset Pricing Models
Despite the simplicity of these present value models a number of interesting results
emerge in their application to land price modelling. For the time being we will not
define formally the mechanism by which expectations of future returns are generated,
but simply assume that at any point in time t current returns are known with certainty
and this determines all future returns, as with the annuity models discussed above.
Using the notation of earlier chapters, where P, and R, correspond to land price and
annual net return respectively, the equations (IV.7) and (IV.12) may be rewritten as,
~ =CR/ where C = 1/r (IV.7')
~ = DR/ where D = l/r-g (lV.I2')
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From equations (IV.?) and (lV.12) it is clear that the exponent f3 in (lV.7') and
(lV.I2') is unity. Interestingly, f3 is the coefficient of elasticity, so that each of these
valuation models imply unit elasticity of returns to land prices, hence a 1% increase
(decrease) in net returns from land ownership results in a I% increase (decrease) in
land values.s
Turning to equation (IV.7') in which returns are constant over all time horizons, it is
useful to note that the ratio of asset returns to asset value (RIP) defines the
capitalization rate (C) from which we may derive the rate at which financial capital is
discounted in the agricultural sector, i.e. the opportunity cost of capital invested in
farmland, T. Under the assumptions outlined at the start, this rate of return required
from capital used in agriculture should be equivalent to the rate of return available from
investments in other sectors of the economy. Consequently, if the market rate of
interest in the economy is 5 per cent then the relationship implied by (lV.7') suggests
that land prices sell at 20 times the annual return on land, i.e. the capitalization rate
(C) of annual returns into land values is,
1C=-=20
0.05
Changes in expected annual returns influence land values through the unit elasticity
coefficient; changes in the opportunity cost of capital feed through into land prices via
the capitalization rate. Should land prices be high (low) relative to the returns accruing
to landowners, this implies that the capitalization rate is also high (low). This in turn
means that the opportunity cost of agricultural capital is necessarily low (high).
If we now introduce expectations of growing annual returns in to the asset pricing
model as in (lV.l2') it is easy to show that the discount rate in agriculture may differ
from that prevailing in other sectors of the economy, as defined by the market rate of
interest on capital. If it is assumed that the market rate remains at 5 per cent and that
participants in the land market have an expectation of growing returns of the order of 3
per cent per annum, i.e. g = 0.03, then from (IV.12') it can be seen that the
opportunity cost of capital for land capital is now only 2 per cent. Hence, despite
borrowing capital for land purchase at the market rate of 5 per cent, owners of farmland
2 Elasticity is calculated as (dPldR)(RIP). So, differentiating (IV.?') for example, with respect to
R yields,
(dPldR) =/3CRf3-J
Noting that P = CRf3 we may rewrite the elasticity formula as,
{(j3CRf3-J)/(CRf3)}R ={3( 1/R)R
=/3
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will be content to receive an annual yield of only 2 per cent because they will receive the
remaining 3 per cent in the form of real capital appreciation given that the elasticity of
asset returns to asset value is unity.
There are two implications that arise from this simple analysis. The first is that in the
presence of expected returns growth, discount rates in agriculture may be lower than in
other sectors of the economy. Second, land values may therefore be much higher than
one may expect given the market rate of interest. In the example above, investors
seeking a total return on their investment in farmland of 5 per cent will price the asset to
yield an income return of only 2 per cent so that the asset will sell at 50 times earnings,
i.e.the capitalization rate (D) of returns into land values is,
1
D= = 50
0.05-0.03
Furthermore, this analysis suggests that land prices may be highly volatile when
expectations of future returns are revised in light of new information. In this example, a
sudden upward revision of expected income growth from zero to 3 per cent growth by
land market participants increases the capitalization rate from 20 to 50 resulting in a 250
per cent rise in land prices. The initial revision of expectations thus bestows enormous
capital gains for those agents actually holding land when participants in the market
perceive persistent returns growth. Windfall gains are exaggerated further if the rate of
growth rises from a non-zero base. For example, if the expected growth in returns rises
from say 3 to 4 percent in our model then the capitalization rate leaps from 50 to 100
and land prices rise by an additional 200 per cent ceteris paribus.
However, intuition and historical evidence suggest that expectations of returns growth
cannot continue forever. Indeed, capital losses seem inevitable; writing in 1983
Melichar (1984) notes,
"Back when savings accounts were paying 3 per cent interest, a favorite mathematical
exercise was to calculate the present value of $1 invested in year 1 A.D. at 3 per cent
interest compounded quarterly. The Answer is now about
$55,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, or slightly more than the present value of
the entire Earth plus a few other minor planets and a solar system or two...
Obviously, wealth is continually being destroyed aswell as created." p.5
Should negative returns growth be expected, the capitalization rate falls and the pricing
mechanism of equation (lV.12') is set in reverse, leading to falling asset values,
although due to the arithmetic of the present value formula at realistic rates of real
interest, the expectation of negative rates of growth from a stable base (i.e. the no
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growth situation, where g = 0) do not lead to such enormous changes (in absolute or
percentage terms) as do positive gro wth rates.3 For example, when expectations first
change from stable to falling annu al returns, of say 3 per cent, the opportunity cost of
capital in agriculture rises from the market rate of 5 per cent to 8 per cent forcing the
capitalization rate down from 20 to 12.5 resulting in an immediate drop in land prices of
some 37 .5 per cent. Should returns contraction acce lerate further from say 3 to 4 per
cent the capitalization rate drops from 12.5 to 11.1 and land prices fall a further 12.6
per cent. The response of asset prices to both positive and negative gro wth rates from a
stable base are illustrated in Figure IV.l, where g = -4 , -3, .. 3, 4. The diagram
clearly illustrates the exponential growth in the change in asset values from the stable
returns situation when g is positive and a more gradu al decl ine when negative rates of
growth are assumed in the model.
Figure IV.! : Percentage Changes in Asset Values under Positi ve and
Negative Rates of Growth
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Annual Expected Returns Gro wth (g)
However, the asymmetry of the respon se to positive and negative growth rates is
misleading for it implies that asset prices acco rding to (IV.12') are precluded from the
'free-fall' occasionally observ ed in the land market. However, sho uld land prices have
been ascending rapidly , a slowdown or reversal of expectations of returns growth will
cause the price of the asset to plummet. For example if at time zero, returns to land are
stable at £10 per unit and the opportunity cost of capital is 5 per cent then land price is
calculated as ,
3 Note that Mel ichar's (1984) assertion that negative growth rates have an equally powerful effect on
as set values (as postivc ones) is only true if expected returns have previously been growing.
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1200= -10
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If a 3 percent growth in returns is suddenly anticipated, then ceteris paribus land price
in the following period will immediately rise to,
1500 = 10
0.05-0.03
Should the expectation of income growth be unwarranted, so that expectations are
revised downward in the next period, say to zero, land prices will return to their initial
value of £200. In this respect, the mechanism of (lV.I2 1) is equally powerful in
reverse. Thus, given positive rates of returns growth a downward revision in expected
returns growth creates the momentum for equally large capital losses as capital gains.
Consequently, when land is perceived by market participants to be a growth stock
capital gains may be vast for those owners wishing to sell, but as soon as the rate of
growth slows down,land prices fall dramatically. The ramifications of this volatility are
numerous. Clearly, those owners who bought land on a rising market may well be
holding a depreciating asset. The situation becomes more critical if the land is used as
collateral to secure loan-finance, particularly so if the money is invested for the
purchase of addi tional land.
(d) A Simple Simulation Exercise
To gain some feeling for the outcomes that these simple models produce, this sub-
section works through a simple 24 period simulation exercise of land prices that has
been generated according to equations (lV.7') and (IV.I2 1) . Changes to the market rate
of interest and expectations are superimposed in a sequential fashion so that the effects
of each change can be identified. The stylized portrayal of events that follows merely
serves to demonstrate the flexibility of these simple models, which have the ability to
mimic the behaviour observed empirically. The land price series, plotted in Figure IV.2
is calculated from the information contained in Table IV.I. The changes that are
imposed and the resulting effect on land prices is explained in a story-board format
below.
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Figure IV.2 : A Plot of the Land Price Simulation
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Period 1 - 4 : Initial conditions
The initial conditions are that the market rate of interest is 5%, current returns
are £50 per hectare and no growth in returns is expected. Consequently, the
capitalisation rate is, 1/0.05 = 20 and thus land price is £1,000 per hectare
Period 5 - 9: Unexpected growth in returns
Returns grow by £1 per hectare per period so that by period 9 rents have
increased by 10%. Since there is unit elasticity between returns and land prices,
this means that land prices grow proportionately over this period. At period 9
land prices are also thus 10% higher at £1,100.
Period 10 : Unexpected/all in returns
Returns unexpectedly fall by 10% and initiate an immediate 10% fall in land
prices, back to £1,000.
Table IV.! : A Simulation of Land Prices
Time Rents Cap. rate Land price Time Rent Cap. rate Land price
1 50 20 1000 13 50 25 1250
2 50 20 1000 14 50 33 1667
.
15 50 50 25003 50 20 1000
4 50 20 1000 16 50 29 1429
5 51 20 1020 17 50 20 1000
6 52 20 1040 18 50 20 1000
7 53 20 1060 19 50 33 1667
8 54 20 1080 20 51 100 5100
9 55 20 1100 21 51 20 1020
10 50 20 1000 22 51 14 729
11 50 20 1000 23 50 20 1000
12 50 20 1000 24 50 20 1000
The Present Value Hypothesis IV.ll
Period 11 - 12 : A period of stability
No change in either the market interest rate, returns or expectations, hence the
capitalisation rate and land price remain constant.
Period 13 -15 : Falling market interest rates
The exogenously determined interest rate falls by 1% per time period. In period
13 the discount rate in the economy falls to 4% inducing the capitalisation rate to
rise to 1/0.04 = 25. Consequently, land price rises to £1,250. In period 14 the
discount rate falls to 3% entailing a rise in the capitalisation rate to 1/0.03 = 33,
and land prices rise to £ 1,667 accordingly. In period 15 the interest rates fall to
20/0, the capitalisation rate becomes 1/0.02 = 50 and land price climbs to £2500.
Period 16 -17 : The interest rate resumes it's original level
In period 16 the interest rate rises to 3.5% entailing the capitalisation rate falls to
1/0.035 = 29 and land price falls accordingly to £1,429. In period 17 interest
rates rise further to 5% and land price returns to its original level of £1,000.
Period 18 : Brief calm
No change and land prices remain constant.
Period 19: Expectation of returns growth
There is an expectation of returns growth that is assumed to continue forever.
Rents are assumed to grow at 2% per year hence the capitalisation rate is
1/(0.05-0.02) = 33 and land prices rise to £1667.
Period 20: Returns growthfuels expectations
The expectation of rent has materialised and rents rise to £51. This however
fuels expectations regarding future growth in rents and expectations are revised
upwards to 4% yielding a capitalisation rate of 1/(0.05-0.04) = 100 and land
prices surge to £5100 per hectare.
Period 21 : The bubble bursts
The growth in returns is not realised and rent remains constant at £51.
Expectations of future rent rises are no longer held and and the capitalisation
rate falls to 1/0.05 =20. Land prices decline sharply to £1020.
Period 22 : A Decline in returns is expected
Due to exogenous factors returns are expected to fall in perpetuity by 2%. The
opportunity cost of financial capital in the land market now rises above the
market determined interest rate and the capitalisation rate falls to 1/(0.05+0.02)
= 14. Land prices drop slightly to £729.
Period 23-24 :Expectations stabilise
The expectation of falling returns is realised and rents now decline to 50.
Expectations of further rent decline is not anticipated and the capitalisation rate
returns to 1/0/05 =20 and land price is £ 1000 per hectare.
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We will resume the discussion of these present value models in Section (iv), and
elaborate on their specification. However, before we do so it will be appropriate to
examine what is meant by the returns to landownership. In the preceding discussion
little has been said about what actually constitutes the return that owners of land receive
and how it may be paid, and a number of issues emerge when this question is
examined.
IV.(iii) The Returns to Land Ownership
Whilst in practice there may be a whole host of factors that determine the 'net return' to
landownership, it should be clear that the return will critically depend upon the use to
which the land is put. Land desired for its recreational value will yield a return to the
owner that bears little relation to that accruing to owners of land where the land is
employed for residence, hobby farming or indeed, agriculture. If it is reasonable to
assume that land is demanded as a factor of agricultural production then the gross return
accruing to landowners represents a payment for the right to use the 'land' as a medium
for the production of crops and livestock'[. In a setting characterised by two mutually
exclusive groups comprising landowners and farmers, then the return to landownership
is the payment from farmers to landowners i.e. agricultural rent. Given competition for
land, then the actual level of rent paid will be determined by those factors influencing
the profitability of the production process, such as input prices, output prices,
managerial ability and the rate of technological change. Whilst we will not examine rent
determination in any detail in this thesis, it is implicitly assumed here that the returns to
landownership, as measured by farm rents, are market determined by the factors
affecting the profitability of farming.>
Historically, the form of the rental payment has been in terms of labour services, farm
output or cash; although we can legitimately dismiss the former as being an artefact of
feudal agriculture. Whilst it is customary in many parts of the world for the rent (or part
of it) to be paid in kind, with farm produce, as in the share-tenancy arrangement, such a
practice has not been common in England and Wales, where the cash rent tenancy has
dominated all other forms of rental payment. Moreover, rents in England and Wales
have typically been fixed sums, agreed in advance of the harvest, based on some
4 Here, the term 'land' may be interpreted in its widest sense so to include farm buildings, roads and
the farmhouse; in essence all the basic infrastrucutre that makes it possible to farm the land.
5 The interested reader is referred to Chapter IV of Harvey (1974) for a neoclassical derivation of rent
determination.
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average measure of historical profitability of the land, and paid at the end of the fanning
year.
(a) The Rental Contract
The precise details of the leasing arrangement between the landowner and farmer will
typically be stipulated in a formal agreement negotiated by the two parties involved,
called the rental contract. Whilst the form the contract actually takes will vary, it is
typically the obligation of the landowner to maintain the farm infrastructure and pay for
any improvements to it, such as field drainage and modernisation of farm buildings. In
return the cultivator agrees to pay a specified level of ex ante rent and supplies all the
working capital such as livestock, machinery, hired labour feed and seeds. In order to
derive a measure of the net return to landownership it is necessary to deduct the
landowner's expenses in maintaining the land, such as outgoings on improvements and
the taxes payable on the gross income.
In a setting characterised by owner-occupiers one individual performs the functions and
thus receives the rewards of both landowner and cultivator. Because the owner-
occupier cannot obviate the obligations and rewards of landowner or farmer there
appears no justification to treat land held by owner-occupiers any differently to land
held in the tenanted sector. Whilst differences between tenant farmers and owner-
occupiers may exist, particularly their respective wealth (and the implications this may
have in imperfect capital markets), in general such differences should have a negligible
effect on the determination of rent. Although the 'latent' rent of the owner-occupier is
internalised and thus less visible, it must still exist as the services which rent is a
payment for, have not disappeared.
(b) Empirical Measures of Returns to Land
(i) Net farm income
Despite the seemingly straightforward definition of cash rent and the empirical
availability of such series, researchers in the UK and USA have frequently used the
'net farm income' of operators as a proxy for the returns to land ownership instead.v
The explanation typically given to account for this approach centres on the
predominance of owner-occupation as a mode of land tenure, so that net farm income
represents the return to owner-occupiers and by association, their land. By using
operators net rann income, (which had been relatively stagnant in the US during the
6 See for example Herdt and Cochrane (1966), Tweeten and Martin (1966), Duncan (1977) and Traill.
(1979).
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196Os) to measure earnings from assets (which incidentally had risen commensurately
with land prices) researchers made an important error regarding the recipient of net farm
income. Net farm income, as defined in official statistics actually represents the total
return to the farmers' labour, management and working capital, such as machinery and
livestock purchase and not the return of capital invested in land.? As a measure of the
return to land, net farm income is therefore clearly inappropriate to the extent that its
choice as a land income measure seems quite puzzling in retrospect.
However, use of net farm income as the return to land was reinforced, albeit ironically,
by the 'seeming paradox' (Scofield 1957) of rising land prices in the face of stagnant or
declining net farm income that have been observed in the US and UK since the Second
World War. The solution of this paradox represented an exciting avenue of enquiry, yet
such was the familiarity with farm incomes in this context that, rather than query the
legitimacy of the empirical measure of returns to land used, attention was diffused into
rather peripheral issues. A clutch of papers were published that investigated the
influence of issues such as the emergence of non-agricultural demand for farmland,
technological change and farm structure, as possible explanations for land price
trends.f With hindsight, the solution to the paradox seems almost trivial and the
investigations into the peripheral areas a diversion that threw empirical research off the
'right track' temporarily, yet arose simply out of confusing returns to land and returns
to farming. Nevertheless, dissent was apparent from a number of quarters and new
measures of returns were developed in order to overcome the problems of farm income
and a declining tenanted sector.
(ii) Imputed Returns to landownership
A number of empirical studies conducted in the US used a residual income to measure
returns to land and was obtained by deducting costs from gross farm income.f
However, the residual income measure is likely to be defective due to empirical and
conceptual problems. As stated by Alston (1986),
'This (residual) measure incorrectly treats land as the residual claimant for agricultural
production and suffers from severe measurement problems, particularly relating to
imputing costs for capital equipment and management'. p. 5,
7 Indeed, net farming income as defined in official statistics explicitly excludes the return to land paid
in the form of rent
8 See inter alia Chryst (1965), Clery and Wood (1965), Herdt and Cochrane (1966), Tweeten and
Martin (1966) and Reynolds and Timmons (1969)
9 See for example Hauschen and Herr (1980), Dobbins et. al. (1981) and Melichar (1979), Phipps
(1984).
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A conceptual problem is that residual income is a return to entrepreneurship not land.
'This distinction is particularly clear in the land rental market where the landowner
obtains rent, contracted in advance. and the land-user claims any pure profit from the
land. The same distinction should apply whether the landowner rents the land to
himself or to someone else.' Alston (1986) p.5.
An additional conceptual problem concerns the use of a residual measure in a world
characterised by uncertainty. If we admit the presence of uncertainty in yields and
prices and an aversion to risk on behalf of land owners then it is intuitively clear that an
ex ante fixed cash rent will be different to that implied by the ex post residual measure
of returns. As Robison et al. (1985) suggest,
I ••• the tenant bears all the risk inherent in the farming operation. the cash rent
then is considered a certainty equivalent income for the use of land.' p. 795.
These defects are compounded by empirical evidence suggesting that cash rents are a
more accurate measure of farming returns to land than residual measures. Having
computed a residual income measure Scofield (1965) compares the series to rents, and
is able to conclude that,
"Cash rents for farms provide a more direct measure of the returns realized by
landowners than do the imputed returns"
More recently, the majority of land price models published in the US have used cash
rents as a measure of farm returns and have generally inferred a stable relationship
between the two, particularly so in areas that are predominantly agricultural.U' Ex
ante cash rents are also favoured from a conceptual point of view due to the fact that
the rental payments are akin to the measure of 'returns' used in the capital asset pricing
framework, and as such lend well to the construction of capital asset type models from
which most modem land price models emanate.
(c) Other Considerations
Whilst it is generally accepted that farm rents provide a reasonably good estimate of the
returns to land ownership where the demand for land is agricultural, this should not
imply the redundancy of other factors in the determination of land prices. Motives for
land purchase will be site specific: in areas designated 'agricultural', non-farm demand
for land may exert an almost negligible influence, but this clearly may not be the case
where the geographical location of land makes it suitable for development, residence or
10 See for example Burt (1986) and Tegenc and Kuchler (1991).
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amenity. More generally, land purchase may be motivated by tax liability, long term
investment potential, speculation and inflation hedging. Whilst the importance of these
factors is largely an empirical question, which will be addressed in subsequent
chapters, there still remains a problem which is more difficult to solve. This concerns
the presence and magnitude of any non-pecuniary returns to land, a factor which
commercial land agents and commentators of land market trends are only too keen to
emphasise. Indeed, seldom does a description of the UK land market not include a
reference to the 'nebulous attractions of landownership'. Whether this utility stems
from social prestige, heritage, the ownership culture, or some other factor, it is difficult
to identify, as indeed is whether participants actually attach a monetary value to it: the
influence of psychic utility may well be a myth that vanishes in the hard light of the
auction room. Notwithstanding its potential importance, in the absence of an empirical
measure of this utility there is little chance of resolving the issue in a time series
framework, although evidence from cross-sectional survey data may well throw some
light on- this subject and research currently in train at the University of Cambridge
attempts to do this.
In summary, it is probably clear that no ideal measure of the returns to ownership
currently exists or indeed may be computed from raw data in the future given the
diversity of uses to which land may be put and the measurement errors involved in
computation. Of all the measures considered here, cash rents appear to offer the most
attractions and given that long historical time series exist, it is cash rents that will be
used in the empirical analysis that follows. Whilst the bulk of the empirical modelling
appears in later chapters, in the remainder of this chapter we investigate the implications
of expectations formation in the capital asset pricing model, at the theoretical and
empirical levels.
IV.(v) An Expectations Augmented Present Value Framework
In Chapter III it was demonstrated how the present value hypothesis may represent the
reduced form equation for short-run equilibrium price determination in a capital asset
market. Here, we demonstrate how the present value rule may be elaborated to include
various types of expectations mechanism that lead to instructive abstractions about the
behaviour of the market. A priori, one may suspect that expectations playa crucial role
in determining agents' valuations, due to the longevity of the asset and the considerable
sums required in order to secure acquisition of land. However, the form of expectation
mechanism that characterises price formation in the land market has not been previously
explored at either the theoretical or empirical levels. To address this issue, three
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competing specifications are developed that reflect adaptive, naive and rational
expectation mechanisms. Each specification is logically deduced from a common
present value hypothesis and then tested for empirical validity using data on average
land prices and rents from England and Wales.
To recap, the notation is as follows,
E, : expectations operator at time t. This is a conditional expectation given the
information available to agents in the land market at time t.
N, : average nominal price of land traded in England and Wales (£/ha) at the
beginning of year t.
Y t : average nominal (cash) rent (f/ha) negotiated in year t.
F, : index of the GDP deflator in year t.
t, :rate of inflation in year t.
= [F;'l J-1
: real price of land (£/ha) at the beginning of year t.
Nt
F;
: real return to land (£/ha) in year t.
Yt
=---
F;(I+j;)
r : (assumed) constant real discount rate.
: discounting constant.
1
=--(1 + r)
The real discount rate represents the marginal rate of substitution between present and
future consumption of the representative agent involved in the land market. A constant
rate may seem unduly restrictive but it may be argued that due to the long-term nature of
land purchase, participants are most likely to use a single rate to discount future
earnings. I I More importantly, imperfections in the capital market may prevent equality
between the real discount rate and the opportunity cost of capital. In this light it is
perhaps simplest to regard the real discount rate as the rate of return required by
landowners in equilibrium. Historically, the rate of return on land has tended to be
'low' although no empirical investigation at an aggregate level has attempted to quantify
it.
11 Sec Section IV.(vi) for more on this point
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In terms of the definitions set out above, strictly speaking, land prices should be dated
at the beginning of year t and returns measured as the flow over year t. Similarly, the
general price index should be dated at the beginning of the year and the inflation rate
should represent the percentage change over the year. These conventions are employed
in this section, although as explained later, data measurement problems prevent a neat
carry-over into the empirical analysis.
(a) An Alternative Representation of the Present Value Hypothesis
In Chapter III it was demonstrated that the reduced form price equation of an
equilibrium market model is,
00
~ =oL, 8 E ; [ ~ + j j}=o (IV.I3)
Equation (IV.I3) prices land according to market fundamentals. It embodies a decision
rule which asserts that changes in the price of land are attributable to new information
concerning the returns to land. A special case of equation (IV.I3) is where expected
future returns are a random walk: Et[Rt+j] = Et[Rt] for all j > O. If we combine this
with naive expectations, (where Et[Rt] = Rt- 1) , this implies that,
~ - -~ = - -
r
However it is informative to consider alternative formulations of the present value rule
since if equation (lV.I3) is used to form Et[Pt+l], and 0 Et[Pt+Il is subtracted from
(IV.I3), then we have,
(IV.I4)
Equation (lV.I4) states that the real price of land at the beginning of t is equal to
discounted expected real returns over t plus discounted expected real price at the
beginning of t+1. As such, it allows for speculation in the land market. Indeed, the
relationship between (IV.I3) and (IV. 14) is seen by considering the class of forward
solutions to (IV. 14) interpreted as a linear difference equation,12
00 • (I )'~ = o ~ c 5 ' e [ ~ + j ] + Y Y 8
J=O (IV.I5)
where 'Yt is any random process that obeys Et[}j+d = }j. What equation (lV.I5) is
asserting is that land price is the sum of a market fundamentals component, M, and a
speculative element Si, i.e.,
(IV. 16)
where,
12 See Sargent (1987) p.95 for further explanation of this relationship.
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MI = 8 L 8 J ; [ ~ + j j
j=O
is assumed to be a convergent sum and,
with the property that,
or,
51 + 1 - (1 + r)St = WI + 1
where, wt+1 is a random variable with the property that,
1;-j[W I +l ] = O for all j z O.
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Thus, equation (IV.16) permits a divergence between the prevailing market price and
that determined by market fundamentals. In the land market, expected capital gains or
losses independent of expected future returns to land are a possible candidate for a
speculative element in determining land price and thus an equation in which speculation
may be accommodated is rather appealing. Specifically, it may be suggested that
equation (IV .14) embodying a one-period decision rule, is more applicable in empirical
analysis than (IV.I3) for three reasons. First, the unpredictability of the long term in
the land market; second, that agents are unlikely to employ sophisticated expectations
about the long term and, third, that arbitrage over time is difficult because of the low
turnover in the land market, so that speculation cannot be ruled out. 13
As a result equation (IV.I4) will be used as the common basis of the present value
hypothesis in the econometric modelling that follows and takes the form,
P; = 81; [ [ +?t + tJ + UI (IV.17)
where u, is a random error term. In order to render (IV.I7) operational in the
estimation of equilibrium prices, the mechanism driving expectations must be initially
specified. The next sub-section derives three specifications of this model that
correspond to adaptive, naive and rational expectations.
(b) Expectations Formation
Under adaptive expectations the relevant part of (IV.17) may be written as,
13 Equation (IV .14) implies a weaker and thus more flexible present value rule than equation (IV.13)
in the sense that whereas (IV.14) can be derived from (IV.l3) the reverse is not true. See Chow
(1988) for more on the relationship between these two specifications.
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where, a is the expectations coefficient, (0 < a < 1)
L is the lag operator
vIis a random error term, uncorrelated with u;
Substituting (IV. 18) into (IV. I?) and re-arranging yields the following,
I Da I
Pr = I ~ (l-a)Pr-1 + I D ~ - - + D (Dvt+ut-(1-a)ut _l )
-ua -a I-a
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(IV. 18)
(IV. 19)
It may be useful to note here that when estimated by ordinary least squares, we will
clearly only obtain a single estimate for each of the compound coefficients in (IV .19).
The structural parameters (a and 8) that make the compound coefficients and about
which we are primarily interested in, will then be derived following the initial
estimation.
Naive expectations are a special case of (IV.I9) where a = 1. Consequently, in the
presence of naive expectations equilibrium market price is given by
D u,Pr = - - ~ ( ~ - - +Vt)+--I-v I-D
i.e., the stochastic representation of the familiar present value model,
I
Pr=-!?t-I+t1
r
where, £1 are serially uncorrelated.
(IV. 20)
Finally, a rational expectations model is considered. This representation is formed by
noting that a rational expectations equilibrium in the land market requires that the
expected percentage rate of return on land as an asset, stemming from expected capital
gains and expected income flow, is equal to the (constant) real rate of discount,
~ l P r + + J-Pr + 1 ; l ~ ~
-------=r
Pr (IV.21)
Furthermore, under this version of rational expectations,
Pr + 1 - 1; [Pr + 1] = e,+ 1
where the et+l are serially uncorrelated. Consequently, USIng the expression in
(IV.21), reducing the subscripts by one and rewriting gives,
Pr = D-1Pr-1 +et -Er-I [!?t-I] (IV.22)
Further, assuming, as is usual in the rational expectations literature, that agents have the
same knowledge that is available to the econometrician, then rents may be modelled by
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IV.21
(IV.24)
n
~ = ¢+ I f 3 i ~ - -
i=l (lV.23)
Hence, Et-1[Rt_d in (IV.22) can be replaced by the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimate of Rt- 1 from (IV.23), denoted ~ - - to yield,
-1 A~ = 8 ~ -1 - R, -1 + 17/
where 1Jt are also serially uncorrelated.
We have now derived the three competing specifications that may be tested with
empirical data in the sections that follow. Although the series used here are discussed at
some length in the Data Appendix, a brief summary and explanation is given here.
(c) The Data
Following the notation of the previous section we define,
P, : real average price of all sales of agricultural land [£/hectare] traded in England
and Wales in calendar year t.
WP t : real average price of without possession (tenanted) land [£/hectare] traded in
England and Wales in calendar year t.
VP t : real average price of vacant-possession (owner-occupied) land [£!hectare] over
20 hectares traded in England and Wales in calendar year t.
R, : average real cash rent of agricultural land [£/hectare] in England and Wales
during calendar year t.
RN I : real average cash rent of agricultural land [£!hectare] in England and Wales that
has undergone a rent change during calendar year t, ( i.e. average rent
negotiated in year t).
FI : index of G.D.P. deflator for U.K. as an average over calendar year t. Base
year 1985.
D, : dummy variable for E.E.C. entry. D, = 1 for 1972 and 1973, D, = 0 for all
other years.
The data series Pi and Ri are available for the years 1946 -1987; WP t , VP t and RNt
for 1969 - 1987.Before the results of estimation are presented three points should be
noted concerning the data.
(i) Due to the conventions used by the authorities, published statistics do not
correspond perfectly with those specified in the theoretical model. For example, in
theory PI represents the average land price prevailing at the beginning of year t,
whereas a datum for P, is an average land price observed during year t. Similar
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problems exist in the rent and deflator series. Land sold with development potential is
excluded from agricultural land price statistics, but the (residential/amenity) value of a
smallholding may inflate average land prices (most notably for vacant-possession land)
above its price based solely on agricultural earning potential. An attempt has been made
to reduce this (upward) bias in the vacant-possession series by the exclusion of those
sales below 20 hectares. In general, the market for tenanted land is unaffected by this
factor and thus has not been adjusted. The 1946-87 time series has also been left
unadjusted due to the fact that that sales by size and tenure were not recorded prior to
1969. In order to maintain a long and consistent time series suitable for estimation (and
being content that such 'residential/amenity sales' exert a smaller effect in the 'all sales'
land price) this series is also left unadjusted.
(ii) The land price series are derived from statistics reported by the Inland Revenue and
are adjusted to take account of the delay that is observed between the date at which sales
actually occur and the date at which they are reported to the Inland Revenue. Because
this delay is generally believed to be about 9 months on average, sales of land reported
during the 12 months ending 31st September in year t will more accurately reflect the
sales, and hence market conditions generally, that took place in calendar year t - 1.
(iii) The commercial rent paid on tenanted land, (R t ) , is used as the measure of the
annual return to land for the 'all sales' series. R, is the average rent paid in year t:
because of legal provisions binding landlords to maintain the same rent for at least three
years, only approximately one-third of rents included in this rent series will have been
increased in anyone year. This lag in rent adjustment will entail that the rent data will
not be the most accurate indicator of rents negotiated in any particular year. As a proxy
however, it is considered here to be a reasonable one, and one that allows a far larger
sample for the purposes of estimation. However, for the two separate series of land
prices (WP t and VP t ) the rent variable RNt is used and represents the average rent
negotiated in the year in question.
(iv) Owing to accession to the E.E.C., agricultural land prices rose to extraordinarily
high levels in 1972 and 1973 and a dummy variable has been included to account for
the extra-ordinary events during those years. Concluding an article on land price
movements during 1972 and 1973 Munton (1975), remarks,
'It is generally agreed, however, that prices were far in excess of those that could be
justified on farming grounds alone and even, perhaps, in terms of long term property
investment aswell.'
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'... land price movements in 1974 and 1975 reveal, as many auctioneers correctly
predicted, the artificiality of prices in 1972 and 1973.' p.130.
From a statistical perspective the inclusion of a dummy variable is also warranted on the
grounds that, in its absence, econometric results would be biased due to the unusually
large weighting given to the estimated residuals in those two years and indeed
preliminary regression results without a dummy variable support this inference.
(d) The Empirical Testing of Expectation Hypotheses
The theoretical derivations of the present value rule under adaptive (AE), naive (NE)
and rational expectations (RE), equations (IV. 19), (IV.20) and (IV.24) are estimated
for the three land price series, P t, VP t, and WP t at our disposal and the results are
presented in Tables IV.2, IV.3 and IVA respectively. Turning to these tables it is
evident that constant terms are redundant in most of the regressions, suggesting that the
data are consonant with the theoretical derivations. Equation (IV.19) actually implies
serial correlation in the empirical AE models. Rather than remedy the problem with an
orthodox corrective procedure - which will typically assume a simple form of
autocorrelation, usually AR(1) - an alternative method is employed which incorporates
lagged OLS residuals (denoted et-l and et-2) as extra regressors. This latter approach
is adopted as being more appropriate given the potentially complex nature of the error
term of (IV.19). However, contrary to, (IV.20) and (IV.24) the empirical NE and RE
models are also serially correlated and have been corrected in a similar manner.
As noted above in order to estimate the rational expectations formulation of the PV rule,
a forecasting model for Et[Rt-Il in (IV.22), is required. Fitted values generated from
third order polynomial distributed lag forecasting models are estimated for each rent
series and are denoted ~ and RNI • Three diagnostic tests of model adequacy are
presented in the tables: OJ represents an assessment of a recursive Chow (1960) test
for parameter stability. A cross (x) under this heading indicates a statistically significant
difference between parameters estimated before and after the land price boom of the
early 1970. The test statistics VI and ~ indicate the presence of serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity respectively, and are accompanied by 5% critical values (reported in
bold type).
The results from the regressions comprising Tables IV.2, IV.3 and IVA may be
summarised as follows. All estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% level and
have signs consonant with a priori beliefs. Indeed, the adaptive and rational models
-2
appear to perform quite satisfactorily, having 'good' explanatory power (R ) and
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stable coefficients. The similarity in the performance of the two types of model is not
surprising since they only differ in the rent series that is actually used. Whereas the
adaptive models use actual rents, the rational model employs the forecasted rent series
from equation (IV.22). However, since it is the interest in the underlying structural
parameters that is motivating this investigation, the similarity in the statistical
performance of the two types of models reported in the tables does not imply that land
prices are generated both rational and adaptive expectation mechanisms. The
interpretation of the ordinary least squares estimates is left to the next section where the
applicability of each hypothesis is evaluated.
Table IV.2. :Regression Models for the All Sales Land Price Series (PI)
for the Three Expectations Hypotheses.
Regressors Diagnostics Equation
C r., u,:
A
-2 ,Rt -1 Dt et-l et -2 R OJ VI
Adaptive Model
0.580 +17.689 +1935.2 +0.640 0.95 3.08 2.27 (IV.25a)
(9.69) (6.40) (9.32) (4.46) 4.96 4.60
Naive Model14
-948.3 + 56.98 +2879.5 +0.807 x 0.27 1.87 (IV.25b)
(-5.47) (17.36) (5.89) (3.09) 4.13 4.10
Rational Model
+0.623 +16.100 +1790.5 +0.842 -0.356 0.95 0.02 1.73 (IV.25c)
(9.58) (5.35) (8.45) (5.10) (-1.97) 4.17 4.13
The statistical results from the NE models are less satisfactory however. Equation
(IV.25b) which estimates the all sales land price series under naive expectations has a
significant constant, contrary to the theoretical derivation in (IV.20) and exhibits
unstable coefficients over the sample period. It should also be noted that virtually all
models are augmented with lagged residuals to adjust for serial correlation. Whilst this
14 Note that model (IV.25b) is estimated with an intercept, contrary to the theoretical derivation of
(IV.20). This empirical model is also heteroscedastic and consequently a simple weighting
procedure is employed to obtain homoscedastic residuals. Due to this transformation, the R2
statistic gives misleading results and has not been reported. Intercepts and weighted least squares
were not necessary in models (IV.26b), or (IV.27b) supporting equation (IV.20).
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is expected in the AE case it runs contrary to the theoretical derivations of NE and RE,
described by (IV.20) and (IV.24). Although serial correlation may simply represent a
nuisance inherent in the data it may also reflect a misspecification of the RE and NE
(and even possibly the AE) models. Consequently, these preliminary results indicate
that the NE models are generally inferior to their AE equivalents, and that there is little
formal evidence favouring either the AE or RE specification.
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Table IV.3 : Regression Models for the Vacant Possession Land Price
Series (VPt) for the Three Expectations Hypotheses.
Regressors Diagnostics Eq. No.
VPt-l
,.
-2RNt-l RN, -1 Dt et-1 e'_2 R co VI ,
Adaptive Model
0.385 +25.787 +2002.8 +0.704 0.73 2.20 2.60 (IV.26a)
(3.60) (5.16) (7.26) (3.09) 4.96 4.60
Naive Model
+41.632 +2726.9 +0.810 0.69 0.11 0.17 (IV.26b)
(17.36) (5.89) (3.09) 4.75 4.60
Rational Model
+0.416 +27.417 +1917.6 +0.721 0.81 4.26 0.04 (IV.26c)
(3.88) (4.88) (6.72) (3.05) 4.96 4.67
Table IVA. : Regression Models for the Without Possession Land Price Series
(WPt) for the Three Expectations Hypotheses.
Regressors Diagnostics Eq. No.
RN,-l
-2 ,WPt-l RNt-l Dt e1-J R to VI
Adaptive Model
0.500 + 15.71 +2081.5 0.74 1.85 OAO (IV.27a)
(3.92) (3.78) (6.03) 4.60 4.49
Naive Model
+29.705 +2744.1 +0.703 0.70 0.61 0.05 (IV.27b)
(20.98) (7.10) (3.27) 4.60 4.49
Rational Model
0.505 +15.583 +2043.6 0.73 2.67 0.29 (IV.27c)
(4.39) (3.54) (5.76) 4.60 4.49
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(e) Interpretation of the Coefficients
Having estimated the three land price series using the present value hypothesis under
adaptive, naive and rational expectations, we now solve the OLS coefficients to obtain
the structural parameters I" e the "" ""
, " expectauons coetnc.em ( a ) and the discounting
constant ( 8), from which the implied real rate of discount (r) may be derived.
(i) The Adaptive Expectations Solution
If we denote the coefficients on Pt-1 and Rt - l in (IV.19) as a and b, then'1 '
a= (1- a) (IV.28) and b = oa (IV.29)
1- s« 1- s«
Noting that both a and b have a common term in So: then rearranging (IV.28) and
(lV.29) gives,
Ba = a-I + a
a
oa = b-boa
from which we may solve for the structural parameters of interest, which gives,
W b
a = -1b -a+ 1 (IV.30) and 0= (IV.3!)
+ a(1 +b)
Recalling that 8 = 1/0+r), the real rate of discount, r is simply (1/8) - 1. Hence
using the estimates of a and b from the OLS regressions (IV.25a), (IV.26a) and
(IV.27a), the estimated structural parameters for the three land price series are:
A(a) The 'all sales' land price series, P, ; a = 0.969, 0 = 0.977
and; = 2.38%
(b) The vacant-possession series, VPt ; a = 0.986, 8 = 0.976
and; = 2.42%
A(c) The tenanted land price series, WPt ; a = 0.972, 0 = 0.966
and; = 2.91 %
The real discount rate; implied by these models seems plausible lying between 2 - 3%
and as we can interpret; as being the real rate of return required on average by land
market participants, the estimates accord quite well with the widely held belief that
returns on land are traditionally low. Focussing now on the expectations coefficient
(a ) whilst we do not have any priors concerning its empirical value it is interesting
that in all three AE models the expectations coefficient is almost unity. Since a value of
a of exactly unity would imply that expectations are revised naively, it is instructive to
determine whether the empirical results of the AE model actually imply naive
expectations. However, as the structural parameters have been derived indirectly,
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[from the OLS estimates of a and b in (IV.25a), (IV.26a) and (IV.27a)] It IS not
possible to obtain their standard errors directly, which could then be employed in
standard hypothesis testing. It seems however, that we could test the hypothesis,
Ho: a = 1 against HI: a < I by two other approaches, namely; estimate the standard
errors of the structural parameters of (IV.19) using non-linear least squares, or
alternatively evaluate the legitimacy of results we would obtain if a = 1, actually
existed. Although this latter approach is somewhat unorthodox it demonstrates quite
clearly what we wish to know. To implement this 'test', we begin by multiplying
(IV .30) by (I +b) so that,
ab-a(I+b)+(l+b)
a=--------
I+b
which after cancelling leaves,
-a
a-I =--
I+b (IV.32)
Now, if we assume that b > 0 in (IV.32), then (a - 1) < 0, if and only if -a < 0,
i.e. a > O. It follows therefore that (a - I) < 0 if and only if a > O. Consequently,
on the assumption that b > 0, we may test the hypothesis, Ho: a = 1 against HI: a < I
in the structural model by testing, Ho: a = 0 against HI: a > 0 in the empirical
models. This assumption is reasonable since b is the coefficient relating rents to land
prices and as such is positive and statistically different from zero. Using a one-tailed t
test, the null hypothesis (that Ho: a = 0) is rejected for all three models, inferring that,
because a > 0 in the empirical models [(IV.25a), (IV.26a) and(IV.27a)] then a
cannot equal unity in the structural model (IV.19). In other words, the AE models
estimated here do not imply naive expectations of land price formation. 15
(ii) The Naive Expectations Solution
Since the expectations coefficient is unity by assumption under naive expectations
attention here focuses on the required rate of return. The theoretical interpretation of the
coefficient on R1- 1 in the NE model (IV.20) is simply 1/r. Consequently, under NE,
the real rate of discount, (r ) implied by equations (IV.25b), (IV.26b) and (lV.27b) is
estimated at, 1.75% for the all sales series, 2.40% for the vacant-possession land series
and 3.37% for the tenanted land price series. Interestingly these estimates correspond
quite closely with those obtained using the adaptive expectations model.
15 As a matter of interest, hypothesis testing using the estimated standard errors from non-linear least
squares also arrives at this conclusion.
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(iii) The Rational Expectations Solution
When expectations are revised rationally, the coefficient on Pt-l in (IV.24) represents
1/8. With a positive real rate of discount, this coefficient should exceed unity.
However, the coefficients of the rational expectations models estimated in (IV.25c),
(IV.26c) and (IV.27c) are all less than unity, implying negative real rates of discount.
The estimated real rate of discount, (r ) is -37.74% for the all sales series; -58.45%
for the vacant-possession land price series and -49.5% for the tenanted series.lv
Further evidence that the RE hypothesis is inconsistent with the data is suggested by the
coefficient on the rent variable in each empirical model. From (IV.24) this coefficient
should be -1, yet the estimates obtained in equations (IV.25c), (IV.26c) and (IV.27c)
are positive and 5.68, 3.78 and 5.06 standard errors away from minus unity
respectively. It thus appears that, within the PV framework, the data refute this version
of the RE hypothesis. Furthermore, given that the AE empirical models do not infer
naive expectations formation, yet have higher explanatory power and stable
coefficients, it seems reasonable to simply use the AE models in further investigation.
IV.(vi) Some Ancillary Issues
Before we depart from this preliminary econometric investigation there are a number of
related issues that seem appropriate to tackle here. The first relates to the possibility of
disequilibrium pricing in the land market; the second, concerns the opportunity cost of
capital and finally we investigate the simultaneous modelling of land prices in the
tenanted and vacant possession sectors of the market.
(a) Disequilibrium Pricing
The possibility of disequilibrium pricing was introduced in Chapter III in connection
with the derivation of the reduced form price equation where it was suggested that
disequilibrium could be identified by the presence of an additional term in the present
value equation representing excess/insufficient demand for the stock of land. Since data
on the quantity of land offered for sale and desired in any year is not available, it is not
possible to test directly the statistical significance of such a variable if included in the
present value price equation. However, it is possible to test for the presence of
disequilibrium pricing if we tackle the problem from the viewpoint of price adjustment.
Disequilibrium would imply that price does not fully adjust to the equilibrating value in
16 To test the possibility of positive real discount rates it could be assumed arbitrarily that r = 0.02
and test the hypothesis that, Ho : 1/8 = 1.02 against the alternative that HI : 1/8 < 1.02. Using
a one-tailed t test, statistics calculated from all three RE models reject the null hypothesis,
confirming the results in the text,
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a particular year so that with P t < P / there is excess stock demand and quantity
rationing simultaneously in the transactions market; or with P
t
> P/ there is excess
stock supply with agents unable to sell land in the transactions market. Viewed in this
light then disequilibrium will manifest itself as some form of price stickiness. An ad
hoc procedure for examining price stickiness is via the partial-adjustment model
(Bowden 1978):
(lV.33)
where P/ is the market equilibrating price specified in Section IV.(v) and A is the
adjustment coefficient, such that 0 < A < 1. Incorporating (lV.33) into the AE
theoretical model (IV.19) yields,
1- A+ 1- a (1- A)(1- a) Aa8
P.= P; - P; + 1)
t 1_ Aa8 t - 1 1_ Aa8 t - 2 1_ Aa81'l -1
1
+ A 8(A8vt + u, - (1- a)ut-l ) (IV. 34)1- a
Now, if price stickiness is observed in the land market then, A represents the
proportion of the adjustment to equilibrium actually achieved in the market. Thus, if A
assumes the value of 1 there is complete adjustment to equilibrium in a single period.
There appear to be two approaches that one could use to test for sticky prices. First,
(lV.34) could be estimated by non-linear least squares and a hypothesis test conducted
on the estimate of It From a practical point of view, it may be preferable to adopt a
simpler approach using ordinary least squares since, if A = 1 then the compound
coefficient on P t -2 will be zero. Hence, we may test the hypothesis that, Ho : A= 1
against HI: A< 1, by a straightforward one tailed t test on the coefficient on P t-2 in
the OLS regression of, r, = f(P t- l • Pt-2, Rt-1 }.
Estimation of this OLS regression for each of the three land price series yields
equations in which the second lag of price is not statistically significant from zero.
Consequently, this implies that A = I and thus the adjustment to equilibrium land
prices is complete, not partial in the tenanted, vacant possession and aggregate land
17
markets.
(b) The Opportunity Cost of Capital
The basic PV model of Section (v) assumed a constant real rate of discount as
postulated by standard neoclassical theory. Further support for the use of a near
constant real rate of interest is provided by Burt (1986), who states,
17 Applying non-linear least squares to (IV.34) yields estimates of the structural parameters, a,8
and A.. In each of the land price models A was not significantly different from one, confirming
the results shown in the text.
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'With the long term investment characteristics of farm land and the sizeable
transactions costs involved, market participants are apt to use an estimated long run
equilibrium rate of interest in the classic capitalisation formula to approximate land
values'. p.12
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However, it is possible that the opportunity cost of capital may have a short run
influence on market prices. The possible influence of both the real and the nominal
opportunity cost of capital is investigated as follows. First, let Xl = 1 / (1 + il )
where i l is the real opportunity cost of farmland capital in year t. The basic present
value rule given by (IV .17) may be modified to include this variable,
P; = 8E, [ [ + ~ ~ d + [3(X I - 8) + UI (lV.35)
so that i l > r, implies that Xl < 8 and a real opportunity cost of capital above the
discount rate depresses land price. Second, it may be that nominal rather than real
interest rates have a short run influence on land prices via cash flow considerations.
Let i, be the nominal rate of interest, then (IV.17) may be modified,
~ = 8E, [ [ + ~ ~ 1] - ( ) / ) . . + UI (lV.36)
so that rising (falling) nominal interest rates can have a short-run depressing
(stimulating) effect on land price but no permanent effect. Incorporating the adaptive
expectations model (IV.19) in (lV.35) yields an equation of the form,
f3a8 (1- a) Sa [3 [3a~ = + ~ - - + Ri., + /}.Xl + X I - 1
1 - Sa 1- Sa 1- Sa 1- Sa 1- Sa
I
+ 8(Dv I + UI - (1- a)uI-I) (IV. 37)I-a
Now, if the real opportunity cost of farmland has no discernible effect within this
framework then f3 =°and (IV.37) collapses to the original AE model, equation
(IV. 19). For each of the three land price series, we estimate,
Pt =f { bo, b1P l -b b2R l - 1, b ~ I - I I b4L1X'1-1' bsDI }
using OLS, where bo is a constant term.
18 To test the null hypothesis that [3 = 0 in
the structural model, (lV.37), a restricted regression is estimated for each land price
series in which f3 =°is imposed. Hence, testing the null that f3 = 0 in the structural
model is equivalent to implementing an F statistic using the empirical models based on
the null hypothesis that,
flo: bo= b3 = b4 = 0 against
HI: bo '# b3 '# b4 '# 0,
18 Note that ~ ~ 1-1 and X1-2 are employed not ~ ~ 1 and Xl-I. This is due to the fact that Xl
represents the real opportunity cost of farmland during time period t, and is thus unobservable at
the beginning of t.
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The test statistic generated for each land price series is unable to reject the zero
restrictions imposed under the null hypothesis, implying that f3 is not significantly
different from zero in the structural model (IV.37). Consequently, the real opportunity
cost of farmland does not have a statistically significant effect on agricultural land price
formation in this instance.
To test whether nominal interest rates (it) affect farmland the adaptive expectations
model is incorporated into equation (IV.36) to give a structural model of the form,
D _ (1- a) D oa 8. (1- a) 8 .
.rt - .rt 1 + R, 1 - 8 . . + 8 . .(1- oa) - (1- oa) - (1 - oa) (1 - oa) - 1
1
+ 1- ao(ov t + u, - (1- a)u t - .) (IV. 38)
Note that if nominal interest rates have no discernible effect on farmland values, 8 = 0
in (IV.38), and that equation reduces to the standard PV expression, (IV.19). In an
analogous fashion to the above, one may test whether 8 = 0 in (IV.38), by applying
OLS to a model where19
r, = f { b IPt-1, b2Rt_1, b38.i t_1, b48.it_2, bSDt }
and test the hypotheses that Ho: b 3 = b4 = 0 against HI :b3 i:- b4 i:- 0 using an F test
for the zero restrictions imposed under Ho.
The resulting test statistics imply that the zero restrictions imposed under the null are
valid for the tenanted and vacant-possession markets, but not for the 'all-sales' data
series.20 As a result it appears that nominal interest rates affect the all sales series but
neither vacant possession or tenanted land prices. One plausible explanation for this
rather anomalous result is that the acquisition of small farms (excluded from the VP t
series and relatively unimportant in the WPt ) is influenced strongly by the nominal rate
of interest. As the all-sales series used here includes purchases of these smallholdings,
(often bought as hobby farms, residence, or to amalgamate into a neighbouring farm) it
may well be picking up this special form of demand, not present in either of the other
series. Given the consistent rejection of nominal interest rates in the VP t and WP t
models, which arguably use more pertinent information to estimate land prices, the
results obtained for the all-sales series may be spurious or may depend upon non-
agricultural demand. Furthermore the sign of the coefficients on the interest rate
variables are contrary to the predictions of the theoretical model and thus cast some
doubt over their apparent significance. Nevertheless, despite these somewhat
unsatisfactory conclusions, estimates of the structural parameters derived from the
19 Again, note that &t-l and t1it_2 are employed not illt and t1it_1•
20 Estimation of (IV.38) by non-linear least squares (using the three land price series) suggests the
same conclusion.
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interest rate augmented all-sales model are virtually identical to those obtained from
(lV.25a), in that a = 0.960, 8 =0.978 and r = 2.30%.
(c) Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE)
Our final concern is with the existence of two closely related sub-markets - tenanted and
vacant-possession - for farmland in England and Wales. As was noted in Chapter II
the markets for vacant-possession and tenanted land are, in practice, quite distinct due
to the security of tenure afforded to tenant farmers in law. Because sitting tenants have
security of tenure, prospective owner-occupiers can only purchase land sold with
vacant possession and thus a premium exists for this land. However, it seems
reasonable to assume that the two markets respond in a similar way to features in the
general economic environment affecting agriculture.
When modelled, the effects of common factors such as exogenous shocks and
unquantifiable or omitted variables will be captured in the error term of each model. If
the two markets actually do respond in similar ways, the error term of one model will
be correlated with the error term of the other. Where this is so, there is said to be
contemporaneous correlation in the set of seemingly unrelated regressions which can
be exploited to aid parameter estimation if the equations are estimated jointly. More
specifically, it can be shown that if the regressions are estimated jointly there exists a
generalized least squares (GLS) estimator that provides more efficient (lower variance)
parameter estimates than those obtained when each regression is estimated separately by
OLS?1 The SURE procedure uses this GLS estimator, and the degree of correlation
between the two error terms may be described by a simple correlation coefficient (corr)
such that,
cov(£\ ,£2)
corr=----
0-£1 0-£2
where cov(£j ,£2 ) is the estimated covariance between the two error terms using
SURE and C5£1 0-£2 are their estimated standard errors. If no contemporaneous
correlation is detected then the GLS estimates are identical to those in the OLS case.
Here, corr = 0.287 implying an advantage in the estimation of these models by SURE.
A formal asymptotic test suggested by Breusch and Pagan (1980), confirms this
conclusion at the 5% significance leve1.22 Applying the SURE procedure to the two
21 Intuitively, this is so because GLS makes use of the information contained in the two correlated
error structures in estimation. See Judge et al . (1985) for a formal derivation of this result
22 The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic follows a X2 distribution on one degree of freedom, if
the null hypothesis of no contemporaneous correlation is true. A test statistic of 24.99 here
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land price models yields,
VPt = 0.441 VPt-l + 22.168RNt_ 1
(4.96) (5.55)
-2
R : 0.86
WPt = 0.414WP t_l + 17.254RNt_1
(3.79) (4.54)
-2
R : 0.77
+ 20.69D t +
(8.54)
+ 2093Dt
(6.57)
0.514et_1
(3.24 )
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(lV.39)
(lVAO)
Figures IV.3 and IVA graph the actual and fitted values from the models estimated
using SURE.
Figure IV.3: Actual and fitted real prices of vacant possession land in
England and Wales(1971-87).GDP deflator 1985 base year
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Using (IV.39) and (IVAO) to derive estimates of the structural parameters, a ,8 and
; yields;
(i) for the vacant-possession series, VP t ; a = 0.981, 8 = 0.975 and; = 2.52%.
(ii) for the tenanted land price series, WP t ; a = 0.977, 8 = 0.967 and; = 3.37%
confirms the use of the SURE procedure which, incidentally, may be deduced from the higher
explanatory power and improved significance of the SURE models. See p.247 of Breusch and
Pagan (1980) for the construction of this test statistic.
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Although these results are similar to those estimated using equations (IV.26a) and
(IV.27a) SURE leads to slightly higher real rates of discount for each land price series.
For comparison, it may be noted that Burt (1986) obtains an implied real discount rate
of 4% when modelling land prices in the United States, whilst Chow (1988) estimates
the real discount rate at 3.8% for US stock prices. The lower rate of discount on
vacant-possession land is explained by the vacant-possession premium that separates
the two sub-markets for agricultural land in the UK.
Figure IV.4 : Actual and fitted real prices of without possession land in
England and Wales(1971-87). GDP deflator 1985 base year
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IV.(vi) Some Concluding Comments
This Chapter has sought to build on the findings of Chapter III where it was established
that the present value price equation represents the reduced form of a competitive
market for a capital asset. The discussion has highlighted the merit of present value
methods, in that such models have sound theoretical underpinnings and are capable of
mimicking empirical price behaviour. Indeed, this type of capital asset pricing model
offers many attractions to the applied economist, not least of which is its flexibility. The
framework is a tractable one that allows expectations mechanisms to be incorporated at
the theoretical level and tested empirically. Using annual data on cash rent and land
prices the empirical results suggest that the process of farmland price determination is
best characterised by adaptive learning, although naive expectations could be viewed as
a reasonable approximation, given that most expectations coefficients were estimated at
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around 0.96. The version of rational expectations considered here is refuted by the
data. The models also allow the implicit real rate of discount on land purchase to be
derived and this is consistently estimated at around 3%, a figure which accords well
with a priori beliefs. Finally, there is insufficient evidence to support the notion of
disequilibrium pricing in the UK land market, and the data refute the presence of a
statistically significant role for interest rates in the determination of agricultural land
prices.
The Traill Model
Chapter V
A Critique of Empirical Research: TheTraill (1979) Model
V.I
V.(i) Introduction
Of the extensive literature on land market research in the UK, there has only been one
serious attempt to model land prices, that undertaken by Bruce Traill in 1979.1 This
Chapter seeks to evaluate the credibility of this model in light of the analysis of land
price determination already presented. The model was heralded as a milestone in the
modelling of UK land prices and the reticence of other workers to develop competitors
after its publication may well reflect its percieved dominance, particularly since the
model fitted so comfortably into the story of State support being capitalised into land
values, a topical issue during the 1970s. However, close scrutiny of the model reveals
some disquieting features which seriously question its validty. Whilst the concern about
the capitalisation of agricultural support into land values and its repercussions remain
generally undisputed, the empirical model and its theoretical underpinnings are rather
suspect. Before we discuss the model in detail, a very brief review of the land price
literature in the United States is given since much of the criticism directed at the early
models of US land prices are also germane to the Traill model.
This Chapter comprises four Sections and an Appendix. Section (ii) offers a brief
summary of the isues that have dominated the American literature on land prices. In
Section (iii) the Traill (1979) land price model for the UK is examined in some depth
and a number of criticisms are put forward to question the original model's apparent
performance. Section (iii) reports results obtained from a re-estimation of TrailI's model
over an enlarged sample period and Section (iv) contains some concluding remarks.
The Appendix details the statistical tests used to evalute the model's performance.
V.(ii) Recent Issues in the American Literature
The paucity of economteric work in the UK contrasts with the situation in the United
States where a high 'propensity to regress' has created a large yet contradictory
literature on landprice modelling. Herdt and Cochrane's (1966) article was the first of
three papers published in the 1960s (Tweeten and Martin 1966, Reynolds and
1 Harvey (1974) estimated a simple linear regression of land prices on an index of imputed returns to
land as part of his Ph.D. thesis. The 'model' has not been developed or published subsequently and
is not considered here any further.
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Timmons 1969) that sought to model U.S. land prices using a simultaneous equation
system and net farm income. Klinefelter (1973) departed from this systems approach
and used a single equation model, in which net farm income remained the major
explanatory variable. Despite their satisfactory performance over the original sample a
review paper by Pope et al.( 1979) found that all these models performed poorly over
extended samples and concluded that,
' ... if one is concerned with both the predictive ability and economic structure,
additional research is needed to explain recent movements in farmland prices' p.115
The Pope et al. study encouraged research into single equation models of land values
and the Duncan (1977) is one such example. However, like earlier models, Duncan
incorporates a whole host of factors - including net farm income - into the estimating
equation in an ad-hoc fashion, without any formal justification. Espel and Robison
(1981) comment,
'Duncan, like many of his predecessors, simply hypothesizes correlations without
exploring the behavioural link which causes the correlation' p.11.
Land price models developed subsequently, such as Hanschen and Herr (1980), and
Dobbins et al. (1981) favour the use of imputed returns to land rather than offical net
farm income statistics. However, these models focus on the demand for land, ignoring
or mis-specifying the supply of land as the number of transactions. Furthermore, all
these early models adopt what could be termed 'kitchen sink' econometric
methodologies, in that the influence of a host of potential determinants is tested without
any formal justification for their inclusion. Coupled with differences in specification
and data, each model promotes a different set of variables as having an explanatory
role. Espel and Robinson's (1981 )conclude that,
'(1) a carefully deduced land market model is needed; (2) this model must include both
the supply and demand forces in determining land's prices; and (3) to evaluate such a
model an appropriate model of income to land is needed' p.14.
The poor performance and structural inadequacies of these models has led to a large
number of published articles in the 1980s, primarily in the American Journal of
Agricultural Economics. Virtually all of the more recent models adopt some variant of
a capital asset pricing model such as the present value hypothesis. Whilst these models
initially used some imputed measure of returns to land, more latterly the use of cash
rents has been more common. Nevertheless, the contradictory conclusions of published
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research in the States remains. Although a detailed discussion of the issues and
methodologies germane to the US experience in recent years is beyond the scope of this
analysis, the following description attempts to give a flavour of the debate.
At the close of the 1970s Reinsel and Reinsel (1979) argued that loose credit markets
were responsible for the land price boom of recent years whereas Melichar (1979)
believed that the root cause of the boom were capital gains and growing returns to land.
Feldstein (1980) used a portfolio choice model to show that rapid inflation such as that
which occured in the 1970s was an important force driving land prices. These papers
and public discussion of their contents inspired a host of empirical land price studies
which sought to pin down the determinants of farmland prices. For example Phipps
(1984) obtained empirical results that suggested non-agricultural demand for farmland
was of trivial importance, yet this finding was disputed by Robison et al. (1985) who
argued that non-farm demand coupled with inflation played pivotal roles in the market.
However, evidence provided by Alston (1986) and Burt (1986) suggested that it was
not inflation that was important but rental rates. Further contradictory evidence was
obtained by Shalit and Schmitz (1982) who found that credit market constraints cause
both a rapid price explosion when the collateral value of the assets was increasing and
rapid price decline when the collateral value of assets declined. This contrasted starkly
with Reinsel and Reinsel findings that the cause of the land price boom at the end of the
1970s was loose credit markets. As Just and Miranowski (1988) assert,
' ... many empirical studies use a relatively unstructured econometric approach in
which spurious correlations with inappropriate variables or natural correlations with
omitted variables can cause results to vary widely depending on model specification'
p.2
Another reason to account for the discrepancies that have emerged is the number and
type of data sets that have been used in estimation and hypothesis testing. Whereas in
the UK it is only the aggregate time series that are sufficiently long enough to submit to
an econometric investigation, in the US rent and land price series are constructed on a
State basis, with the result that many 'rent' and 'land price' series abound. Regional
variations in motivations for land purchase and differences in the composition and
construction of the series do not help to clarify these issues. Of particular irnportance is
the proximity to urban areas, since in some States the non-agricultural demand is
widely recognised, yet in others it is barely discernible.
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Despite the contradictory empirical evidence of these American models, a number of
salient points do emerge that are of importance generally. Firstly, the final estimating
equation ought to be derived from a sound theoretical base, that includes both the
supply and demand sides of the market. Secondly, the use of transactions as a measure
supply is inconsistent with theory and should thus be avoided. Third, it is apparent that
land price models in the US have become increasingly parsimonious. Whilst this
undoubtedly reflects the technical complexity of incorporating many different potential
determinants into the theoretical framework, it does help reduce the likelihood of
isolating spurious correlations, which plagued the US literature in the 1960s and
1970s. Since the adoption of parsimonious models is likely to cause problems caused
by omitted variables diagnostic checking ought to playa central role in the modelling
exercise. Finally, on an empirical note, the American literature implies that farm income
or imputed measures of returns are poor indicators of the returns to land, and should be
avoided if consistent rent series are available.
V.(iii) The Traill (1979) Land Price Model
A significant model of the land market in the UK was developed in the aftermath of the
land price boom of the mid 1970s by Traill (1979).2 The model represented a
necessary requisite of a much broader study concerning the beneficiaries of agricultural
price support policies.Traill's central thesis maintained that gains to farmers from price
support policies would accrue in the short run only. Improved incomes would place an
upward pressure on market rents and therefore land prices. This 'capitalization' of farm
income growth (via rents) into land values entails that in the long run the benefits of
price support policy accrue to current owners of agricultural land, not farmers.
Moreover, high land prices and rents may be detrimental to those wishing to farm the
land. In order to demonstrate this proposition Traill constructed a dynamic econometric
model of farmland prices in England and Wales which simulated movements in land
values during the 1950 to 1978 period.
(a) The Theoretical Framework
Traill's model of land price determination is based loosely in the theoretical framework
developed by Harvey (1974) and Currie (1976) that was discussed in some depth in
Chapter III. To recap briefly, this approach depicts a competitive market for
2 Much of the discussion here relates to a more detailed explanation of the model thatwas published
in 1980. See the references for details.
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homogeneous units of agricultural land as shown in Figure V.1. QS represents the
stock of agricultural land which is assumed to remain fixed at any point in time. The
demand curve for the stock of land DD represents the total demand for agricultural land
at a point in time and comprises the valuations of every individual in the land market,
whether they be current owners or prospective owners of land. The valuation of each
current owner represents his reservation price, that being the minimum value the
owner would be prepared to sell land for. Conversely, each prospective owner has an
offer price, which represents the maximum they are prepared to offer for a unit of
land. By distinguishing between the valuations of these two types of agent it is possible
to conceive supply and demand curves for land sales (ss and dd respectively); the
former being the reservation prices of current owners ranked in ascending order and the
latter being the offer prices of prospective purchasers ranked in descending order.
Figure V.I. Transactions in the Land Market
Price
D S
D
Q Quantity
Assuming that a valuation of land by each individual holds irrespective of whether that
individual holds land or not, (i.e. transactions are costless and agents are indifferent to
location) each transaction will entail that the reservation price of the vendor becomes his
offer price as a prospective purchaser. Similarly, the offer price of the prospective
purchaser will, after the transaction has gone through, become his reservation price as a
land owner. Ceteris paribus, at the equilibrium price pe the transactions mechanism
will entail that the market for land will converge on an equilibrium, wherein all offer
prices lie everywhere below all reservation prices. At this equilibrium all owners of
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land are content to hold the land they own and hence no transactions take place. Figure
V.2 depicts this situation.
Figure V.2 : Equilibrium in the Land Market
D
Q Quantity
Although not explicitly stated in Traill's study it is the demand and supply curves dd
and ss that Traill uses in order to estimate land prices. In addition Traill assumes that
each individual bases his valuation of land upon the present value of a stream of future
net benefits accruing from the ownership of land. Given that the unit of land is expected
to be owned for T periods, at a constant opportunity cost, the expected net present
value of land can be represented by the standard expression-',
p, _ T - 1 1; [ ~ ] + 1; [PT ]
1; [ t ] - t t (1 + r)t (1 + r)T- 1
where,
E, =expectations operator conditional upon information available at time
zero, (beginning of time t)
R t =net return to landownership in period t, (accruing at the end of r),
--------3 This expression may be written as if the current owner had no intention at time 0 to sell at time
T. Hence, in the limit,
[ ] _ ~ Et [R, ]E, P, - L. t
t =1 (1 + r)
Note that the Et[PT] in (1) simply represents the sum of the net returns to land ownership from
time period T to 00.
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= resale value of land at the beginning of time period T,
= (constant) opportunity cost capital, where t = 1, .. .,T - 1.
Whilst acknowledging that the potential influences on land values are manifold and
include both pecuniary and non-pecuniary attractions to land ownership, Traill focuses
on the 'profitability of farming', as represented by net farm income, as the major
determinant of land prices. Given that a change in the profitability of fanning will
change both the maximum prices potential purchasers are willing to pay and the
minimum prices that current landowners are willing to accept, land prices can also be
expected to change by an amount equivalent to the present value of the increase in
farming income received in perpetuity.
To clarify this statement consider a situation in which net farm income rises by £4 per
unit. Given that every individual in the land market maintains 'naive' expectations of
the future at anyone point in time, then a prospective purchaser of land may expect to
receive the increase in net farm income every year, yet, will pay only once for the
ownership of that unit. Hence, the increase in the price that the prospective purchaser is
willing to pay for land as a consequence of the £4 per unit increase in net farm income
will naturally depend on the value that is attached to receiving £4 per unit every year in
perpetuity. Noting that, at a constant opportunity cost of capital (represented by the rate
of interest r ) the present value of receiving an annuity of £4 per unit indefinitely can
be shown to be A I r, then, a £1 increase in net farming income per unit, at an interest
rate of 5%, may be expected to increase land prices by £20 per unit. It is in this way
that increases in net farming income are said to be 'capitalized' into land values.
Following earlier studies, [Herdt and Cochrane (1966), Tweeten and Martin (1966)],
Traill attempts to circumvent the problem of unobservable data by employing data on
transactions to represent the quantity of land demanded and supplied at various prices.
Consequently, the average prices observed will hence refer to 'equilibrium' prices since
in order for transactions to take place quantity demanded and quantity supplied are
equivalent by definition. By using this approach, the [unobservable] desired quantities
depicted in supply and demand curves are replaced by the [observable] rate of
transactions at various ('equilibrium') prices. However, this expedient introduces a
theoretical inconsistency present in many of the earlier analyses. This concerns the
'relationship' between the number of transactions and equilibrium price. From the
discussion in Chapter III it is clear that the level of transactions in any period is
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independent of price. A particular number of transactions may be associated with either
a high or a low equilibrium price because transactions merely represent the mechanism
whereby land is reallocated amongst individuals who have a positive demand for land at
the prevailing market price. This degree of misallocation depends not on price but on
the extent to which valuations of prospective purchasers exceed those of current land
owners at the prevailing equilibrium price and statistical evidence presented in a recent
paper by Wollmer (1988) implies that the area of land traded is independent of land
price in England and Wales.
However, Traill (1980) accepts this 'transactions' specification of the model,
evidencing its validity with casual observation of the plot between nominal land price
and the level of transactions, which, over the 1945 to 1977 period clearly depicts a
negative relationship. On the basis of this statistical correlation Traill (1980) suggests
that the plot may be assumed to represent,
'. .. some form of demand curve [for land].' p.17
and then concludes,
'This apparent discrepancy between theoretical and statistical results may be
explained if we are prepared to make two assumptions about the nature of the
demand and supply curves.f p.17
These state that (i) the 'demand' curve IS 'stable', and (ii) the supply curve is
exogenous to the model, i.e. perfectly inelastic. The 'demand' curve will be stable if
sales of land in any period do not discernably affect transactions in the following
period(s). Consequently, the demand curve will no longer shift horizontally towards
the price axis as a result of transactions, (as described in Figure V.2). In order for this
to occur, one of two conditions must be met. The offer prices of actual purchasers of
land in one period must either be replaced by equivalent offer prices of new prospective
purchasers, (whether they be the valuations of new entrants or of the previous owners),
or that the withdrawal of these prospective purchasers through actual sales has a
negligible effect on demand for land>. Without prior knowledge of the number of
individuals who are willing and able to purchase land at a particular point in time this
assumption is untestable, yet it should be noted that both conditions sit uncomfortably
beside the outcomes that one may reasonably expect.
4
5
My emphasis.
The reasoning advanced by Traill (1980) to account for a stable demand curve, i.e. 'a large number
of potential purchasers' will, strictly speaking, only infer stability if actual sales are negligible.
Only when there is perfect replacement of offer prices can stability be ensured.
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The second assumption is however, rather more serious since a perfectly inelastic
supply curve denotes that the quantity of land sold in any period is unaffected by the
previous, current or expected future price of land. Whilst it is reasonable to accept that
some land sales will be involuntary, (through bankruptcy, death or enforced retirement)
the actual and expected price of land is likely to playa decisive role in the timing of
voluntary sales of farmland, [particularly so since the emergence of the financial
institutions, [see Nix et al. (1987)] for whom a vital motive for acquisition is inter-
temporal asset appreciation]. Having considered these assumptions one may reasonably
surmise that far from explaining the discrepancy between empirical observation and
theory, the restrictions imposed establish conditions under which such a discrepancy is
possible. Nevertheless, the adoption of these assumptions entails that the observed
combinations of average land price and quantity traded can be plotted and the
[statistical] relationship between these two variables estimated econometrically. The
similarities of the Traill model and the early American attempts are thus apparent, in that
in addition to the use of farm incomes, the model assumes a perfectly inelastic supply
curve of reservation prices, and hence ignores this side of the market entailing that the
price-transactions combinations that are observed are believed to specify the loci of a
demand curve.
(b) Specification of the Empirical Model
So it is evident that Traill outlined an essentially demand orientated relationship between
average price and total area of land traded. Other explanatory variables of land price
determination have the effect of shifting the demand function up or down in a
systematic fashion. Traill (1980) identifies the following as having an important and
quantifiable affect on land prices.
(i) The current and expected profitability of farming (represented as net farming
income and growth of net farm income),
(ii) The opportunity cost of capital, (measured by the Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation loan rate),
(iii) The expected capital gains from land purchase, (proxied by land price changes
in previous years) and,
(iv) A dummy variable for accession to the European Economic Community.
Note that all value-based data used in the estimation are expressed in current prices
(i.e.nominal terms). Clearly, this will influence the estimation and quality of inference
The Traill Model V.IO
considerably as will be discussed later. The first two of these variables form an
expression in the model which approximates to the first term in equation (V. I), in that,
an increase in expected farming income or a decrease in the interest rate will increase the
expected price of land.
The model also employs a variable to account for capital gains in agricultural land
values [CAPGAIN t ] . In its most simple form, this variable may be interpreted as
representing an attempt to 'explain' expected land price movements that are not strictly
due to land's expected agricultural income earning potential, (and accounted for in the
present value expression). Clearly, the inclusion of this variable represents a marked
departure from the theoretical model outlined above, since, in that framework all returns
to landownership, (pecuniary and 'non-pecuniary), are incorporated in the present
value formula. Hence, this variable is a rather ad hoc addition to the model's
specification. However, given that published figures of net farming income do not
include any speculative element or encompass all the 'returns' that landownership
bestows, a simple present value formulation, (using farming income) may well be
inadequate as the sole determinant of land prices. Traill (1979) justifies the capital gains
variable on the grounds that,
'... some people may have expectations of land price changes that are
inconsistent with their expectations of farm income growth'. p.219
Several authors have emphasized the importance of capital gains as a motivation in land
acquisitions, particularly during inflationary periods. Moreover, it is suggested that the
expectation of future capital gains is in itself prophetic,
'... expectations of this nature tend to be self-fulfilling. If enough key people
expect land prices to rise, they will do so. The fact that they do reinforces the
expectations of future rises'. Currie (1976) p.308
This variable also represents the 'dynamic' element of the model: specifically, Traill
hypothesizes that it is lagged land prices that form the basis of the expectations
formation, and that these contribute to the determination of current land prices. Owing
to the increased amplitude of land price movements after 1972 the definition of this
variable was altered to reflect the apparent change in the way expectations in the land
market were formed. Prior to 1972 a three period moving average of past changes in
land prices was employed, although this was replaced by a one period change in land
prices for years after 1972, reflecting the increased volatility of expectations concerning
land prices.
Other factors which are often reported as being of potential importance in the
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determination of land prices, such as capital taxation, technological change and attitudes
to risk were excluded from Traill's original model either because they were difficult to
quantify or because their inclusion produced unfavourable statistical results.
Hence, the form of the estimated model can be summarized as,
r, = f [Tt , PVt , CAPGAlN t , o, ]
where, P t is price of land; T, is number of transactions; PVt is expected fanning
income in the current period; CAPGAINt is expected capital gains in the current
period; and D, is a dummy variable.
(c) Estimation and Examination of the Model
The model was estimated using a weighted least squares procedure to correct for
heteroscedasticity, under the assumption that the residual error variance is proportional
to the magnitude of the variable PVt. As a result of using this remedial procedure R2
tends to be overstated, consequently, the correlation coefficient (r2) is presented
indicating the goodness of fit between actual and estimated land prices.
Equation V.2 of Table V.I is the final form of the model estimated by Traill (1980)6.
The statistical results indicate that the model simulates movements in land prices over
the sample quite satisfactorily; r2 suggests a high degree of correlation between fitted
and actual land prices and the t statistics are all statistically significant at the 5 per cent
level. Appropriate diagnostic tests performed on the regression for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation do not indicate either of these econometric problems, however,
there is considerable evidence of multicollinearity, a feature not noted in Traill (1980).
Because of this, results of the two test procedures used are detailed in Appendix I.
Although these tests are by no means conclusive, their results do indicate a statistically
significant degree of con-elation among the regressors in the land price model,
particularly between PVt and AREASOLD t . This inference is not entirely surprising
given the strong statistical con-elation between the number of transactions
(AREASOW t ) and the price of land. Noting that, (in theory at least) the price of land
is the present value of the discounted stream of net returns to land, and that this is
approximated by the PV t variable, then one may reasonably expect PV t and
AREASOWt to also exhibit collinearity.
Another potential source of collinearity is Traill's use of variables valued at current
6 This model is a replication of the Traill (1980) equation. The coefficients of the Traill (1980)
model are ; 60.04, 11.13, 0.83, -0.19, and 89.25 Differences that exist are assumed to represent
rounding errors.
The Traill Model V.12
prices. Because inflation will tend to trend all value-based series in a similar fashion ,
not only will the use of nominal series increase the explanatory power of the regression
as a whole, but it will also render the PV t and CAPGAIN t variables collinear.
Although the effect of inflation is of minor importance during the early part of the
sample period, its trending effect will undoubtably become more serious, and hence
represent a more disquieting aspect of the model during the high rates of inflation
experienced in the mid 1970s. Because collinearity will tend to produce high standard
errors and hence low t statistics, its presence will increase the likelihood of accepting a
false null hypothesis and may thus lead the analyst to drop important variables on the
basis of statistical insignificance. The fact that the coefficients in the model are all
statistically significant, may lead one to assume that the deleterious effects of
multicollinearity are irrelevant, in this instance. This however is not so, for the effects
of multicollinearity may well have influenced the original specification of the model".
Hence, although this point is essentially conjectural, it should be noted that omission of
important variables constitutes a specification error and may seriously bias the
estimation of the remaining variables; over or under estimating their 'true' values.
In order to gain some insight into the explanatory power of the model it is worthwhile
examining the precise specification of the variables used to determine land prices.
Recall that the PVt variable approximates to the first term in the present value
expression (V. 1) : the numerator is the product of current income and the expected
growth in farming income and hence establishes an expected net farm income at the end
of time period t. The denominator is simply an appropriate measure of the opportunity
cost of capital by which future income should be discounted to obtain its present value.
With an infinite time horizon, naive expectations of income growth and a constant rate
of discount, (as depicted in the simple theoretical model), the formula collapses to,
~ [ ~ ~
r (V.6)
which represents the present value of an annuity. Traill adopts a slightly different
specification by disregarding this naive expectations hypothesis and substitutes it for
one in which expected future farming income need not be constant. Although this
7 For example, certain variables that may be considered to be of some importance, such as
technological change and a discounted version of the capital gains variable, (which were excluded
from the final model on the grounds of insignificant I values and/or because they did not improve
the explanatory power of the land price equation), may have been dropped from the model on the
basis of such 'false' test statisitics.
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formulation is more appealing, it entails the inclusion of only one expected future value
into the computation of the present value expression, [as opposed to the infinite income
stream depicted in equation (V.6) above]. This is a necessary restriction because for
any year where the rate of farm income growth exceeds the opportunity cost of capital,
the stream of expected future income will sum to infinity8. Thus, although PVr is
akin to the theoretical expression (V.6) it is not identical to it. However, the results do
compare favourably with those produced with the theoretical model. Using mean
interest rates and expected growth rates over the sample period, (7.8% and 6.5%
respectively) and correcting for the the downward bias created by use of UK farming
income figures (instead of England and Wales), the long run effect of a £1 per acre
increase in UK farming income, (ceteris paribus), is an increase in average land price
in England and Wales of £13.73. The equivalent figure derived from (V.6) is £12.82.
A further comment concerns the modelling of average land prices published by the
Inland Revenue, for which there is a time lag between the date at which a transaction
actually takes place and the year in which it is included in the statistics compiled by the
authorities. Because this time-lag is generally believed to be approximately nine months
in duration, the average land price reported by the Inland Revenue in the 12 months
upto 31st September in calendar year t+1 will more accurately reflect the land prices
prevailing in the 12 months upto 31st December in calendar year t. This lag does not
present any major problems providing that data on the other variables are adjusted to
accommodate for it. However, this adjustment is absent from the model estimated by
Traill (1979, 1980) and hence the timing of the variables used is inappropriate.f
Table V.I : Summary Regression Results of the Land Price Models
8 For a mathematical proof see Copeland and Weston (1988) pp.847-848.
9 This can be illustrated as follows. Noting that an expected net income received at the beginning of
year t+1 has a present value (as is assumed here) equivalent to the discounted value of the product
of current farm income (i.e. at the beginning of year t) and the expected rate of farm income
growth between t and l+ 1, then, in order to use this expression to determine the average land
price for the year t, a figure for net farming income at the beginning of year t is required. This
will represent an initial farm income which when multiplied by the expected rate of growth will
yield the expected future value in t+1. Given that farm income statistics for year t relate to the
J unet - May l+ 1 year it will be inappropriate to use them in year t because land price data for
year t (Octoberj.j - September.) will actually reflect sales of land in the calendar year t-I. It
would be more in the spirit of the present value framework to explain land prices published for the
12 months ending 31st September in year i, (which actually relate to the calendar year t-1), by
the use farm income in the Junet_2 - MaYt-l year, instead of the Junet_l - May, year employed
in Traill (1979, 1980).
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Estimated with 1945-77 Data Series
Equation (V.2) Equation (V.3) Equation (VA) Equation (V.5)
Nominal Terms Real Tenns
Original Adjusted Income Original Income Adjusted
Constant 60.20 103.64 130.39 145.20
(1.34) (1.74) (6.98) (7041)
PV t 11.12 12.38 3.19 1.57
(13.40) (9.83) (1.41) (0.68)
CAPGAINt 0.81 0.40 0.40 0.42
(4.96) (1.94 ) (2.37) (2041 )
AREASOLD t -0.19 -0.27 -0.1 5 -0.15
(-3.67) (-3.96) (-7.98) (-7.61)
Dt 85.21 137.33 39.67 44.35
(1.98) (2.69) (2.35) (2.87)
Diagnostic Tests 10
r2 0.97 0.94 0.82 0.80
Hetero' Not Present Present Not Present Present
Autocorr Not Present Present (negative) Not Present Not Present
Collinearity Present Present Not Present Not Present
All statistical tests conducted at the 5% significance level
10 Here, Hctero' denotes hetemscedasticity, Autocorr' denotes autocorrelation and Collincarity denotes
multicollinearity. See Appendix J for details of these tests.
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Re-estimating the model to account for this lag in land prices yields the results
displayed in Table V.l as Equation (V.3). The equation is somewhat inferior to Traill's
original model in that the adjusted income model is subject to autocorrelation,
heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. The estimated coefficients however, are quite
similar, with the exception of the coefficient on the capital gains variable: thus the
importance of this adjustment relates to the dynamic properties of the model. Although
both models are stable, in that they converge to equilibrium levelsl l , the change in the
value of the estimated coefficient will affect the 'transient' solution - the time-path to
equilibrium. Figure V.3 illustrates the dynamic properties of the two models by
simulating the effect of an increase in expected net farm income on predicted land prices
in each modell-.
Figure V3 : The Dynamic Properties of Models (V.2) and (V.3)
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Although the long run effect is quite similar in both models, (in that land prices
stabilize at an equilibrium value about £12 per acre above the initial value), the
magnitude and duration of the oscillations that characterize the path to equilibrium are
quite different. The adjusted income model exhibits less pronounced oscillations and
converges on an equilibrium value in around six years compared to around 35 years
indicated by the original specification.
11 The condition for convergence in this instance is simply that the absolute value of the coefficient
on CAPGAlNt be less than one. . .
12 In both models, the specification of the CAPGAlNt variable used to illustrate the ume path IS the
one-period change in land prices i.e. that used by Traill for the years after 1972.
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(V.7)
(V.8)
(V.9)
Although the inclusion of a variable for 'capital gains' may appear justifiable, the way
in which the variable is constructed and employed in the model is not wholly
satisfactory. Not only is the definition of the variable changed post 1972 in a rather ad
hoc manner but more importantly, the specification of the variable itself in the
estimating equation does not appear to be consistent with the theoretical framework;
implying that the empirical model is misspecified. As an illustration, consider the
following hypothesis of nominal land price formation in a present value framework:
1
Nt = [ . ] ~ [Xt +u.,1 ]
1+E; It
where, N t= nominal land price at the beginning of year t
Xt= nominal cash returns to land over year t accruing at the end of year t
it= nominal discount rate over year t.
Focussing on the income and capital gains terms, Traill's model may be described as
~ [Xi] _
Nt = Al [ .] + ,1,2 r; [s»,+ 1 ]
1«t; ~
where Et[L1Nt+ 1l = Et[Nt+1l - Nt. Note that this corresponds to the post 1972
definition of CAPGAINt• A partial reconciliation between the present value rule (V.7)
and the Traill model (V.8) can be achieved by rewriting (V.7) as13
l + e [ ~ J J E;[XtJ ] 1 [ Xt]
N, = E; [ ~ ] 1+ E; [ ~ ] + 1+ E; [ ~ ] E; Nt+ I - T
where Et[Nt+1 - X/it] can be interpreted as the excess of expected price at t+lover
the present value of land according to its earning potential based on expected returns
over period t. The term E t[Nt +1l reflects market fundamentals, in the sense that it
incorporates expectations concerning future returns from land. However, it could also
reflect any speculative element - capital gains or losses - unrelated to market
fundamentals, allowing the land price to overshoot its long-run equilibrium value. In
Traill's study, past capital gain is used to represent expected capital gain and this in turn
might be loosely interpreted as a proxy for,
13 This derivation Utili[zesXt] [it Xt XtXt ]
E, (1 + it) =E, (1 + it ) it + it (1 + it ) - it (1 + it )
[
X, 1 Xt ]
=e, i; - (l + it )i;
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However, the tie-up between Traill's empirical model (V.8) and the theoretical model
(V.9) is incomplete for other reasons: specifically, the parameters Al and ~ in (V.8)
imply constant nominal interest rates in (V.9), whereas actual nominal interest rates
changed markedly over TrailI's data set. 14
A further criticism concerns the use of net farming income as a measure of the return to
land ownership. Clearly, under a pure landlord-tenant system of tenure the net return to
land ownership (excluding any 'psychic utility' or non-pecuniary benefits) would
simply be net rent. However, the prevalence of owner-occupation in the UK has led
researchers in the past to disregard published rent figures and seek some other measure
of the returns to holding agricultural land, which can then be used in a present value
expression. However, figures published for farming income are far from satisfactory
because they represent the return to labour and physical assets employed in production
(such as machinery and livestock), and not the return to land itself. In fact, (as Traill
acknowledges) farming income explicitly excludes the return to land and buildings paid
in the form of rent. Thus, it is important to recognise that changes in farming income
will only affect land prices to the extent that changes in farming income affect farm rent
and its owner-occupied 'equivalent'. The distinction between the profitabilty of farming
(as represented by farming income figures) and the profitability of land ownership is an
important one, not least because there appears to be a weak negative correlation
between farming income and land prices in real terms, as illustrated by Figure VA.
Thus, given that as a measure of the returns to land ownership published figures for
farming income are less than ideal, the statistical significance of the PV variable - which
employs farming income data to explain land price movements - is curious. A credible
explanation may be attributed to the effect of inflation. In Traill's Model both the
farming income and land price series are valued at current prices. Because of this, the
rate of inflation will link these variables to some degree, and consequently have a
systematic influence in the regression. In order to assess the trending effect of inflation
in the model, equations (V.2) and (V.3) were re-estimated using deflated series, and the
results are displayed as equations (VA) and (V.5) in Table V.IIS.
14 Furthermore, solving (V.9) for it using the coefficients estimated in (V.2) yields inconsistent
results. Specifically, the coefficients on PVt and CAPGAINt should imply the same expected
discount rate, yet we obtain rates of 9.88% and 23.16% using the coefficients estimated in (V.2).
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The results of the deflation exercise are interesting although not entirely surprising
given the foregoing discussion. The elimination of the 'trending' of inflation lowers the
degree of association between actual and fitted land prices from 97% to 82% and
remedies the multicollinearity problem highlighted in the current price models. More
importantly however, the present value variable PV t is no longer statistically
significant at the 5% levellv,
Figure 4 : Average Land Prices in England and Wales and UK Net
Farming Income per acre of Crops and Grass in Real Terms
(Base year = 1945)
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This evidence casts some doubt over the efficacy of net farming income data for the
determination of land prices in the UK and suggests that the systematic relationship
between these variables is due to the trending effect of inflation and not to any causal
relationship, (as was implied by Traill) .
Although Traill's land price model performs well statistically over the 1945-77 sample
period, certain features of the model are disquieting from a theoretical or
methodological standpoint. These features are summarized as follows.
(i) On the strength of a high statistical correlation between land area traded and
average land price Traill presents a model in which price is a function of area
15 The data were deflated by the GD? deflator ,(base year 1945).
16 The estimated coefficient on PVr in equations (VA) and (V.5) are statistically significant at 20%
and 50% levels respectively.
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traded, yet [theoretically] it can be shown that these two variables are
independent of each other. Because correlation does not infer causality the
fundamental relationship on which the model is built may well be a spurious
one.
(ii) In order to be consistent with the spirit of the present value framework the net
fanning income series must be adjusted to accommodate for the lag in the
published land price series. Although Traill's model has not done so, making
the necessary changes does not affect the statistical significance of the model,
but it does alter its dynamic response quite significantly. In effect, expectations
have a far less pronounced effect on land prices in the adjusted model.
(iii) The specification of the capital gains variable appears to be inconsistent with
that derived from the theoretical framework, and hence implies a rather ad hoc
formulation of the model. Furthermore, this aspect of the model is compounded
by the switch in the expectations mechansim during the sample period.
(iv) Because net farming income is a poor indicator of the returns to land
ownership, the inclusion of this variable as a determinant of land prices within a
present value framework seems inappropriate. This conclusion is corroborated
by an apparent negative correlation between land prices and net farming income
using deflated series.
(v) The use of monetary series valued at current prices is another questionable
feature of the model. Removal of the trending effect of inflation reduces the
model's explanatory power considerably and invalidates the inclusion of the
present value variable - a variable which assumed crucial importance in the
original model. This result also questions the efficacy of net farming income as
a measure of the returns to land ownership, as indicated in point (iv) above.
V.(iv): Re-estimation of the Traill Model Over an Enlarged Sample
Period
In light of the criticisms presented in the preceding section Traill's land price model is
re-estimated using additional data. Table V.2 comprises summary statistics of the four
models of Table V.I re-estimated using an enlarged (1945-85) sample. Referring to the
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models expressed in current prices, [equations (V.IO) and (V.II)] there appear to be
three important consequences of the updating procedure. These are summarized as
follows.
(i) Although the correlation coefficient (r2) has fallen slightly it is still relatively
high indicating that fitted land prices accord reasonably well with actual values
over the enlarged sample period. However, comparison of equations (V.2) and
(V.3) with their updated counterparts indicates that re-estimation of the models
over an enlarged sample period has resulted in a substantial change in the
estimated values of the parameters 17. In order to test whether the estimated
parameters of each model have shifted through time, a Chow (1960) test for
structural stability was conducted on the updated models and the results indicate
that structural change has occurred; i.e. parameters estimated over the 1949-77
period no longer hold over the 1949-85 sample period.
(ii) An important consequence of the structural change relates to the dynamic
property of the models. Specifically, the coefficient on CAPGAIN
r
in
equations (V.IO) and (V. 11) exceeds unity and hence each model will exhibit
unstable dynamics. Thus, given an initial increase in net farm income for
example, land prices will no longer converge to a new equilibrium, but
'explode' in ever increasing oscillations around that equilibrium. The unstable
dynamic responses of equations (V.IO) and (V. 1I) are illustrated in Figures
V.S and V.6
(iii) In both Equations (V. 10) and (V.11) the coefficients on the area of land traded
and the dummy variable are statistically insignificant and the sign of the latter
runs contrary to a priori expectations. Such perverse results are likely to be a
consequence of the multicollinearity present in the data, of which a classic
symptom is 'high r2 and low t statistics'.
(iv) Referring to equations (V.I2) and (V.I3), which represent the enlarged sample
counterparts of equations (VA) and (V.5), it is clear that although r2 has
remained largely unchanged, coefficients estimated from the original sample
period are no longer appropriate to the extended sample period, as indicated by
the Chow test. This structural instability is most conspicuous in the present
17 Parameter estimates tend to be sensitive to the addition of new data in the presence of multi-
collinearity and autocorrelation. Both these features are present in the updated models.
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Figure 5: The Dynamic Response of the Updated Model Equation (V.IO)
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Figure V.6: The Dynamic Response of the Updated Income Adjusted
ModelEquation (V.II)
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value variable, which assumes a negative coefficient in both the updated
models. Although this may be due to the multicollinearity that is still present in
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these models it is equally as likely that this coefficient is simply picking up the
weak negative correlation between real farm incomes and real land prices
suggested by Figure V.4.
Table V.2 : Summary Regression Results of the Land Price Models
Estimated with 1945-85 Data Series
Equation (V.10) Equation (V.11) Equation (V.12) Equation (V.13)
Nominal Terms Real Terms
Updated Adjusted Income Updated Income Adjusted
Constant -161.40 -144.58 173.06 181.32
(-0.90) (-0.99) (16.45) (16.56)
rv, 20.27 21.27 -1.69 -2.54
(8.15) (10.02) (-0.93) (-1.36)
CAPGAINt 1.64 1.23 0.48 0.51
(3.50) (3.19) (2.56) (2.94)
AREASOLD t -0.08 -0.11 -0.15 -0.15
(-0.37) (-0.62) (-6.67) (-7.09)
Dr -45.48 90.88 44.46 39.26
(-0.25) (0.67) (2.11 ) (2.26)
Diagnostic Tests 18
r2 0.85 0.89 0.81 0.81
Hetero' Not Present Present Present Not Present
Autocorr' Present (Positive) Present Not Present Present
Collinearity Present Present Present Present
Chow Test Str. Change Str. Change Str. Change Str Change
All statistical tests conducted at the 5% level of significance
18 Here, Hetero' denotes heteroscedasticity, Autocorr' denotes autocorrelation and Collinearity denotes
multicollinearity. Sec Appendix I for details of these tests.
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v.(iv) Conclusion
From this discussion it is apparent that econometric models of land prices on both sides
of the Atlantic have encountered similar problems and are guilty of similar
inadequacies. This is due to the relatively unstructured approach that these studies have
adopted, with little attention being paid to the underlying economic rationale of the final
estimating equation. Not surprisingly these models have broken down when re-
estimated over longer time series. The Traill model is a case in point since it no longer
captures the causal behavioural relationships once proposed and employs a specification
of the market that is theoretically and methodoligically suspect. As demonstrated, the
'high' performance of the model is attributable to the systematic effect of inflation
correlating the value-based variables in the regression and the strong, albeit spurious,
correlation between transactions and land prices. The most recent models of land prices
have attempted to resolve past deficiencies by adopting a logically consistent capital
asset pricing framework similar to that discussed in previous Chapters. However, to
the extent that all econometric models suffer from a lack of hindsight, ex post criticism
is unavoidable, although new developments in econometric methodology may be of
considerable assistance in this area. Having established the theoretical underpinnings of
the present value framework, an empirical model that wishes to supplant the Traill
model should also meet the requirements of this new econometric methodology and
thus it is to these advances in econometrics that attention focuses in the Chapters that
follow.
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(a) Results from Two Diagnostic Tests
Original Land Price Model, Equation
V.24
for Multicollinearity on Traill's
(V.2)
(i) {Zero Order] Correlation Matrix ofExplanatory Variables
PVt CAPGAINt AREASOLDt Dt
PVt 1
CAPGAINt 0.156 1
AREASOLD t -0.620 -0.421 1
D t 0.178 -0.016 -0.195 1
(ii) Farrar-Glauber Test
For the model,
k:
YI = LXlj f3j + UI
j=1 (V.AI)
regress each explanatory variable from (V.A 1) on the remaining explanatory variables,
k -1
XI) = L Xlj f3j +ul
j = 1
where i v ] for all i = 1,... k.
Forming the hypotheses,
Ho: 11 = 0 for all} (no linear dependence)
HI: 11;;:. 0 for all} (linear dependence)
the following F tests are performed, where the 5% critical value of F (3, 22) = 3.05
(a) PVt =f {CAPGAINI' AREASOLDI' o, } F: 5.16
(b) CAPGAINt =f {PVlAREASOLDI' o, } F: 2.63
(c) AREASOLD t = f {CAPGAINI' PVI' o, } F: 10.43
As HI cannot be rejected in (a) and (c) at the 5% level of significance there is evidence
that the explanatory variables have a systematic effect on the dependent variable in these
regressions, implying they will be co-linear in equation (V.2).
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(ii) Diagnostic Tests Used in Tables V.I and V.2
The results reported are based on results obtained from the following diagnostic tests :
(1) Heteroscedasticity : For the auxiliary regression,
2 ,,2
e. = constant + aPt
... 2
where p, is the estimated land price squared.
Ho : a =0 against HI : a :t:- 0
(2) Multicollinearity: a) Zero order correlation of explanatory variables.
b) Farrar Glauber (1967) Test.
(3) Autocorrelation: Because of the implicit presence of lagged dependent variables
incorporated in the regressor CAPGAINt , Durbin-Watson's d statistic and Durbin's
h statistic are not admissable. The test used here is based on Godfrey (1978) and is as
follows. For the model,
k
Yt = L x., {3j + £1
j = 1
apply OLS and obtain the residuals e, and form the regression
k
~ = L XIj ~ ~ + aet - 1 + CUr
j =-1
where OJt is a random error term and conduct a t test on Ho :a = 0 against HI :a:t:- 0
(iv) Structural Instability: The Chow (1960) test is conducted as follows,
For the [restricted] model.
k
Y, = LX ,j {3j +£1
j = 1
denote the [restricted] residual sum of squares as RSSR.
The unrestricted form is,
Y, = t. X,j {3j + x., ')j Dt + £1
j = 1
The Traill Model V.26
where t = 1, ... n ; m < n ; D I = 0 if t ~ m , D I = 1 if t > m and the
[unrestricted] sum of squared residuals from this regression is denoted as USSR.
Conducting an F- test on H o: Yj = 0 (no structural change)
HI : Yj # 0 (structural change)
where the test statistic is
F = (RSSR - RSSU)1k
(RSSU/(n - 2k))
which is assumed to follow an F distribution with (k,n-2k) degrees of freedom if Ho
is true.
Stationarity
Chapter VI
Stationary Processes in Time Series Analysis
VI.l
VI. (i) Introduction
In recent years considerable attention has been paid to the time series properties of the
empirical series used in statistical analysis. To an extent, this interest stems from a
realisation that whilst the overwhelming majority of statistical techniques commonly
used have been developed for a class of process with specific properties, most of the
variables employed in empirical work have not exhibited such properties. Generally
speaking, econometric techniques and the theoretical results that underpin them have
been developed for a class of process characterised by parameters, (namely the mean,
variance and covariance) that are invariant over time. This requirement is a necessary
condition for the estimation of both pure time-series (ARIMA) and Gaussian
(regression) type models since each method fumishesfixed estimates of the parameters
of interest. In a situation where these parameters are not fixed, but vary over time, the
estimation of fixed coefficients from a sample of observations, whether as a means of
simulating the underlying relationship, testing economic hypotheses or forecasting
future values, is seriously corrupted.
The use of time-dependent series violates important assumptions upon which estimation
and inference are based and may lead the analyst to identify spurious relationships
between uncorrelated variables. Whilst the discrepancy between theory and practice has
been well known since the advent of applied econometrics, this important issue has
only been confronted quite recently due to the proliferation of empirical work,
(particularly involving time series data which is prone to time dependence) that has
inevitably rendered its consequences more widespread.
In order for valid inferences to be made from time series data it is necessary to
demonstrate that each series employed is described by parameters that are independent
of time and it has become best practice in the recent literature to report such findings
prior to any econometric analysis. The issue of time independence is called stationarity
and is the focus of this Chapter, which is arranged as follows. Section (ii) describes
stationarity and the two types of stationary processes that have been proposed in the
literature. In Section (iii) a framework for testing for stationarity is presented and
Section (iv) comprises a digression on variance stabilization in empirical time series.
The empirical results are presented in Section (v) and a summary of the investigation is
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given in Section (vi). For convenience, tabulations of relevant critical values of the unit
root tests are given in Appendix I.
VI.(ii) Stationarity and the Properties of a Stationary Process1
By means of introduction let us define a stationary time series to be one that has a
constant mean and variance, and an autocovariance that depends on the distance apart in
time but not on the position in time. Further, a series Y1 is said to integrated oforder d
if the series becomes stationary after differencing d times. Such a series is denoted Y1
- I(d). Consequently, if Yt is stationary after first differencing ti.e. Yt - Yt- I = ~ Y Y
is stationary) then we may denote Yt - I( l) and ~ Y Y - 1(0). Whilst few economic time
series are stationary, most can be converted into series that are by application of certain
transformations that render the mean, variance and covariance time invariant.
In order to clarify these statements, let Yt be a set of observations, YI'Y2' .. . ,Yn
where t = 1, 2, , n which represents a single realization of continuous random
variables from a stochastic data generating process. The series Yt may be thought of as
being generated by a set of jointly distributed random variables such that anyone
realization of Yt represents just one outcome of an infinite number of possibilities of
the joint probability density function P(Y1,Y2 , ... ,yn )·2 A future value of Yt
(say Y
t
+ ] ) can similarly be viewed as being generated by the conditional probability
density function given the preceding observations of the series Yt .
Now, the series Y
t
is said to be strictly stationary if the joint distribution of the set of
random variables is unaffected by the origin or starting date of the series, so that the
joint probability distribution of the set of random variables Ytl,Yt2 , · .. Yte is the
same as Y T Y T Y T for any t t ,t2,· . .,tk, T or k. In essence, strictt]+ ' t2+ ,... , tk+ '
stationarity requires the joint and conditional probability distributions to be stationary.
This however is overly rigorous and for practical purposes may be replaced by weak
(covariance) stationarity which simply requires that the parameters that describe any
particular realization of Y
t
are invariant to their position in time: viz, weak stationarity
The following explanation of stationarity is applicable to the analysis of annual time series such
as those used in this study. Where quarterly or monthly data are employed seasonality should be
taken into account in assessing the order of integration of a series and a discussion of intcgrauon
tests using seasonal data may be found in Dolado et al. (1990).
2 The relationship between the stochastic data generating process and a particular realisation (Yt) is
analogous to that betwecn population and sample in classical statistics.
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implies that the series Yc is characterised by a constant mean (j.1) and variance (02)
throughout time, with autocovariance (Yk) and hence autocorrelations (r.J that depend
only on the lag (or distance apart in time) k.3 More formally, a series is weakly
stationary if the following conditions hold for all t
E[Yc] = J1
var(Yc) = E[(Yc - J1)2] = (J2
cov(Y,YC_k) = E[(Yc - J.1)(YC-k - J1)] = Yk
Yk cov(Yt,Yt- k )
rk = - = -;:.=================
Yo Jvar(Y{ ) var(Y{ - k )
(VI. 1)
(VI.2)
(VI.3)
(VIA)
Consequently, each realization of Yc will have the same probability of occurrence and
we may derive estimates of these quantities using the one realisation at our disposal,
that being the sample data. These estimates are given by
n
J1 = Y = n -1 L Y{
t = 1 (VI.5)
~ n
if = n- 1L(Yt _ y)2
1=1
n
Yk = COVk = n-
1 I(Yc - Y)(Yt - k - Y)
t = 1
(VI.6)
(VI.7)
(VI.8)
The most simple example of a stationary stochastic process is the trivial case
comprising a series of uncorrelated random variables with constant mean and
variance.f Because all observations in the series are uncorrelated, such a series,
termed white noise (£1) generates (approximately) zero autocovariances for all lags k
> O. Consequently, the autocorrelation function (ACF) is characterised by the value of
1 at zero lag and zero thereafter and the series is summarized as,
3 Note however that since a normal distribution is completely characterized by its mean m and s2
then if a series is weakly stationary and the random variables distributed normally the process is
also strictly stationary.
4 The mean of a white noise process may assume any real number; however, it is assumed to be zero
here for simplicity and implies no loss of generality.
Stationarity
E[ £1'£t-0 = d2 when k = 0; 0 when k"# 0 and hence,
'rk =Y/Yo = 1 when k = 0; 0 when k"# O.
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The simplest example of a non-stationary stochastic process is the first order
autoregression in which the autoregressive coefficient, </> is equal to unity. Such a
series is called a random walk process and takes the form,
(VI.9)
t = 1,2,... , n ; £t - iid(O,a2)
We will examine (VI.9) in some detail in order to obtain a handle on non-stationary
processes per se. Testing for stationarity in (VI.9) simply involves testing hypotheses
concerning the value of the autoregressive parameter </>. Providing the process, (whilst
observed at t) actually begun at some point in the distant past, a sufficient condition for
stationarity in the first order autoregressive {hereafter AR(l)} case is simply, I~ <
1.5 This may be shown by performing successive substitutions of lagged values of
Yt into (VI.9) yielding
n-l
Y, = </>n Y,- n + L </>i £,_ i
i= 0 (VI. 10)
If the process began in the distant past (i.e. n tends to infinity) then the first term in
(VI. 10) is negligible, hence
00
Y, = I </>i e; - i
i=O
where the mean is given by its expected value,
E[ ~ ~ = E[ f </>i £, _i] =0
1=0
and variance by,
E[t/l = { ~ ¢ i £ ' - - = i i ¢2iE[t?-i]= d Z/i
(Vl.ll )
When the AR( 1) process is characterised by I</>I < 1 the expected value of Yt is zero
for all t with a finite variance independent of t since summing the squared coefficients
5 Note here that any finite MA process is always stationary. See Harvey (1981) pp.21-53 for the
conditions of stationarity in AR(P), and ARMA(p,q) processes.
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in (VI. 11) as a geometric progression yields ,
if I¢2i = d
i=O (1-&)
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and thus the variance is time invariant. The autocovariance at lag k is also independent
of (if I I < 1 since setting i = k gives,
}1c = E(Y" Yt-d =E[(¢*Yt-* + : : ¢iE,_i )Yt-*]
which collapses to
because Ct'· . ·£t-k+ 1 are all uncorrelated with Yt-k' It is thus clear that the
autocovariances depend only upon the distance apart in time (k) and not time itself.
In contrast, when 1</>1 = 1, the mean of the series becomes
E[Y,] ={to ¢i E, -i] +E[¢iy,_i] =r.,
which although constant, depends on the starting value of the series in (-00. More
critically, the series now has infinite variance since (YI.ll) is obviously an infinite
quantity. When I I > 1, the mean and variance of the series grow exponentially
through time and hence in the limit are also infinite quantities.
VI.(iii). Trend and Difference Stationary Processes
Having reviewed the properties of these simple stationary time series it should be
apparent that few economic series actually exhibit such properties. Indeed, the trends
and cycles observed in economic time series exemplify non-stationary behaviour,
although in almost all cases stationarity may be induced by application of an appropriate
transformation. What form the transformation takes critically depends on how the non-
stationarity is generated. Nelson and Plosser (1982) identify two classes of non-
stationary processes: the trend stationary (TS) process and the difference stationary
(DS) process. While both exhibit behaviour that is virtually indistinguishable by casual
inspection their properties are quite distinct and the implications of incorrectly
identifying the process generating a time series can, in many cases, be quite serious.
A series rendered stationary by differencing such as,
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Y1 = a + YI -1+ £1 (VI. 12)
where Er is iid(O,crl) is an example of a difference stationary process, (DSP) whilst
one that requires detrending to achieve stationarity such as,
Y1 = a+ f3t+ £1 (VI.I3)
is a trend stationary process, (TSP). Note that in the DSP case it is the first difference
of the variable that is stationary; whereas it is the deviations from a deterministic
function of time (here a linear trend) that is stationary in a TSP. The similarity of the
two models can be made apparent by accumulating changes in Y1 using (VI.I2) from
any historical value (say Yo). This yields,
I
Y, = Yo + at+ I£,
j = 1 (VI. 14)
which does not appear to be vastly different from (VI.I3). However, two important
differences emerge from a comparison of (VI.I3) and (VI.I4). First, the intercept in
(VI. 14) is not a fixed number but a function of the historical past. Second, it is the
deviations from trend in (VI.I3) that are stationary whereas in (VI.I4) these deviations
from trend are accumulations of stationary changes - and hence non-stationary. In
essence, trend stationary processes are fundamentally deterministic whereas difference
stationary processes are purely stochastic although telling the difference between the
two types of non-stationarity by 'eyeballing' is virtually impossible, particularly in
small samples.
When attempting to obtain a stationary series from a non-stationary series, it is
important to know the type of non-stationarity that is present since each requires a
distinct transformation. For example, differencing a TSP will produce an over-
parameterised and misspecified model, since first differencing the TSP shown in
(VI.13) will induce serial correlation and thus further manipulation is required to
achieve stationarity.. However, the implications of detrending a DSP are more serious
and in practice, far more common, since detrending is the usual remedy employed in
series that give the appearance of trend, as most economic series do. Indeed, Nelson
and Plosser (1982) found that twelve out of the fourteen series they considered for the
US economy were difference stationary processes, yet time trends were frequently
employed in published work that used those series. Nelson and Kang (1981, 1984)
analyse the effects of including a trend in a series that is actually difference stationary
and the following points are particularly worthy of note. First, conventional testing
leads to highly spurious inference : assuming Y1 is generated by a random walk
process (i.e. is a DSP) then a standard t test of the significance of the trend variable in
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(VI.I3) will incorrectly reject the null ([3 = 0) 87% of the time. Consequently,
standard tests will suggest the use of time trends even when they play no role in
explaining the behaviour of a time series. Second, the explanatory power of regressions
with time trends are artificially high. For example, the R2 of a random walk process
that is regressed solely on a time trend will lie around 44%, and will approach unity as
the sample size increases if drift is present in the random walk. Coupled with the first
result, this implies that time trends will invariably be used in time series regressions.
Moreover, since time trends are usually employed as a proxy for such influences as
technology, inferences concerning say, the rate and efficacy of technological change
will be highly misleading. Furthermore, the autocorrelation function of a detrended
random walk will suggest the presence of a (spurious) long cycle and in tum this may
lead to completely spurious analysis of say, business cycle effects in the data. Finally,
the residuals of a detrended random walk will have a variance that is only some 14% of
the true stochastic variance of the series and thus seriously affect inference concerning
other explanatory variables.
Consequently, incorrectly identifying the type of nonstationarity exhibited by a series
has serious implications for modelling. Fortunately the testing framework outlined
below incorporates tests which are able to discern the two. The essence of these tests
may be summarised by considering the following. If, in the regression,
Yt = a + ¢Yt -1 + If + e,
¢ < I and y i:- 0 then Y t is trend stationary and if ¢ = I and y = 0 then Y t is
difference stationary. Although there is another possible combination, i.e., ¢ = 1 and
Yi:- 0 this is unlikely to occur in practice, as will be discussed below.
VI.(iv). Testing for Stationarity"
As noted above, the AR( 1) process
(VI.9)
t= 1,2,... , n ; ct iid(O,a2)
is stationary only when the autoregressive coefficient 14>1 < 1. The process will thus be
non stationary for all other values of ¢. However, the explosive behaviour implied by
6 See Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Dickey, Bell and Miller (1986) for a review of unit root tests.
For a didactic account of the unit root testing procedure see Appendix A of Perman (1989).
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I I > 1 is implausible for economic time series in general and hence when testing for
stationarity hypothesis tests are stated as Ho: I I = 1 against HI: I¢I < 1. Note that if
¢ = 1 then (VI.9) follows a random walk and is said to have a unit root.
Consequently, testing for stationarity is simply a case of testing for the presence of a
unit root. If (VI.9) has a unit root it is non stationary but its first difference,
i 1 1 =Yt-Yt- 1 = t1
is stationary by assumption. Expressing (VI.9) in first difference form all terms are
stationary under the null and may be estimated legitimately by OLS.7 Thus in order to
test the null in (VL9) the equation is reparamterized to yield
i1Yt =pYt - 1 + e; (VLI5)
where p = (t/>- 1). Consequently, testing the hypothesis that p= 0 in (VI.15) is
equivalent to testing for a unit root in (VI.9). Should estimation of (VI.I5) indicate that
p = 0 then Yt has a unit root, the first difference of Yt is stationary and hence Yt -
l(l) and i1Yt - 1(0). This demonstrates the link between stationarity, unit root tests and
the level of integration of a series.
(a) Informal Tests of Stationarity
A commonly used tool for identifying stationarity in a time series is the correlogram
which is a visual representation of the autocorrelation function plotting it against the
length of lag, k. Given that white noise comprises independently distributed random
variables with zero autocovariances for k > 0, the correlogram will die down
immediately, with autocorrelations randomly distributed around zero. In contrast, the
temporal dependence that characterises a non-stationary series entails that the
autocorrelation function has high values that die down only slowly as the length of lag
increases, and thus the correlogram decays slowly in an almost linear fashion. Between
these two extremes lie the correlograms of the stationary AR(p) and ARMA(p,q)
processes. Although the form the correlogram assumes will depend on the generating
process, any series that exhibits a rapidly decaying correlogram will be stationary.
Whilst this is not a formal test of stationarity the autocorrelation function and
correlogram are useful diagnostic tools for the detection of stationarity and are used in
the empirical analysis to corroborate results from the testing framework outlined below.
In passing it should be noted that other tests of stationarity have been developed in the
literature[inter-alia by Barlett (1946), Box and Pierce (1970) and Ljung and Box
7 This is because the standard results of regression analysis only apply to stationary processes.
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(1978)], however a discussion of these tests is unwarranted due to the formal testing
framework developed more recently. It will suffice here simply to mention that all these
procedures attempt to test whether successive autocorrelations of the residuals in a
regression such as (VI.9) are distributed as white noise.
(b) Formal Tests of Stationarity
Formal statistical tests for the detection of stationary series (commonly known in the
literature as tests for unit roots) have been developed primarily by Dickey and Fuller
(1979, 1981) and more recently by Phillips and Perron (1988) and Kwiatkowski,
Phillips and Schmidt (1990). The appropriate test for stationarity, critically depends on
the choice of
(i) maintained model
(ii) null hypothesis and
(iii) form of alternative hypothesis.
In what follows the maintained model is assumed to be an adequate representation of
the data generating process and hypothesis tests are based on relevant alternatives that
may exist within the confines of each maintained model as defined. We will begin with
the most elementary form of model, which implicitly imposes the most restrictions, and
successively relax each implicit restriction until we arrive at the most general
(unrestricted) maintained model. For convenience the testing procedure is demonstrated
for a series Yt that has an AR( 1) representation, although, as will be shown later we
may test any AR(P) model in an analogous fashion.
Note that in testing for stationarity we assume under the null that the series Yt has a
unit root and is thus 1(1), against the alternative of stationarity, in which case Yt is
1(0). The hypotheses are formulated such that the null is stationary in first differences
whereas the alternative is stationary in levels. In what follows e, is a sequence of
independent random variables normally distributed with zero mean and constant
variance, i.e. nid(0,cr2).
Maintained Modell:
Yt = l/>Yt -J + e,
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Ho:¢=I, ~ ~ Y t = £ £
HI : -1< </> < 1 ~ Yt= ¢Yt- J + e, where ¢ ~ O.
Under the null, Y t is a random walk with no drift and hence a non-stationary l(l)
process, but ~ Y Y is stationary by definition, e, being a white noise process. Under the
alternative Yt is a stationary first order autoregression.
Model I may be assumed too restrictive in that it assumes Yt has a zero mean. If we
incorporate a non zero mean (denoted by u) which is zero under the null we have
Maintained model Il:
Yt = C + ¢Yt -J + e, where c = u(l - ¢)
Ho : </> = 1 ~ ~ Yt = £t
HI: -1< ¢ < 1 ~ Yt = u(1-¢) + ¢Yt -J + e,
Under the null Yt is a random walk with no drift and ~ Y Y is stationary. The alternative
states that Yt is a stationary AR(l) process with no zero mean. In cases where the null
cannot be rejected in the two models above the results suggest that Yt is a random walk
with no drift and ~ Y Y is a stationary process with zero mean. In order to test whether
the drift really is zero we may use the t ratio in a regression of ~ Y Y on a constant. If
significant, this implies that Yt has a trend component which drifts the random walk
upward if 8> 0, (downward if 8 < 0), i.e.
Yt = 8 + Yt -J + e,
We may now generalize the model for Yt further and allow for the possibility of a
deterministic linear time trend, this yields,
Maintained Model Ill:
Yt = CI + C2t + ¢Yt -J + e, where cl = u( 1 - ¢),
c2 = (3( 1 -¢L)
Ho : ¢ = 1 ~ ~ Yt = [3 + e,
HI: -1 « o c 1 => (Yt - u - [3t) = ¢(Yt_J - u - [3t-J) + £t
The formulations of the hypotheses here requires some explanation. L is the lag
operator so that under the null, cl disappears and the time trend reduces to a constant
{3 implying that Yt is a random walk with drift and is thus nonstationary, but its first
difference is a stationary process with non zero mean. The alternative states that
deviations of Y
t
from a linear function of time i.e. (Yt - u - {3t) follow a stationary
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AR(l) model. This is more easily seen if we expand the model under the alternative and
let,
Zt = (Yt - U - f3t), in which case the alternative may be restated as Z = ""z + e
t 'r t -I t:
The alternative used here is the trend stationary process discussed earlier.
For convenience the preceding development has been confined to the simple AR( 1)
case, however, as Nelson and Plosser (1982) demonstrate, if we allow the process
generating Yt to be of higher order, (in addition to a time trend and non zero mean)
i.e.,
(YI.16)
the process can be made stationary by differencing only if
p
L¢i and [32 =0
I
These conditions represent the AR(P) equivalent to the unit root test in the AR(l) case
of the maintained model III above. Notice that by rearranging the lagged Y's in (YI.16)
into lagged first differences yields,
Yt =[ , , 4>i ]Yt - 1 +[ - i i 4>i ]EYt - 1 - Y'-2 J+ ...+(-4>p)(y,-p+ I - Y,-p) +PI +f32 t+ E;
which, having subtracted Yt -I from both sides, leaves,
Maintained model IV:
P
~ Y Y =f31 +/32 l+[33 YI - l + L 8 j ~ Y I - j + £ £ (YI.l7)
i = 1
which is the equation adopted by Dickey and Fuller for the unit root testing procedure
of a series in which the order of autoregression is unknown.8 Equation (YI.l7) is
known as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression where /31 represents a
nonzero mean, t is a linear time trend and p is chosen so that the resulting residuals
from (YI.l7) are white noise. Because, all terms in (YI.l7) are now stationary under
the null, estimation of the parameters is efficient. Testing the Augmented model is
identical to that set out for maintained model III.
Inclusion of a time trend in (YI.l7) is warranted on the grounds that inferences from
8 The structure of the residuals is taken into account using non-parametric adjustments developed by
Phillips and Perron (1988), and yield tests of higher power than the ADF unit root tests where a
moving average term is present in the series or where the disturbances are heterogeneously
distributed.
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testing for a unit root in the AR( 1) model are only valid if the series does not exhibit a
(linear) time trend. Clearly, if a trend is apparent in (VI.17) then this differenced series
will have a time dependent mean and hence cannot be stationary - invalidating the
inferences made solely on the basis of the estimate of the autoregressive parameter ~ ~
However, generally speaking, the case where Yt has both a linear trend and a unit root
is implausible for time series encountered in economics. The reasoning Nelson and
Plosser (1982) put forward to account for this rests on the need to transform most
economic time series into natural logs because their mean and variance tend to vary in
proportion to absolute level. Consequently, if Yt represents the log of Yt' then under
the null of a unit root, a significant time trend would imply that the rate of change of Yt
i.e. ~ Y Y in (VI.I7) is deterministic: ever increasing if the time trend coefficient is
positive, ever decreasing if negative. Such behaviour, they conclude is inadmissible for
economic time series.
We may now turn to the ADF testing procedure itself. Initially it is assumed that
(VI.17) is an adequate representation of the data and hence forms the most general
maintained model within which successive restrictions are tested until we obtain the
most parsimonious representation of the time series. After checking for the appropriate
number of first differenced terms to be incorporated into the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
regression,
p
~ Yt = f31 + f32 t + f33 Y/ - 1 + I 6j ~ Yt - j + e;
j = 1
the test procedure can be thought of a comprising three steps.
Test 1
To test whether a unit root is present in Yt we initially test the hypothesis
Ho : f33=0
HI : f33 "# 0
using a standard t test. Under the null Yt is non-stationary against the alternative of
stationarity. If the null cannot be rejected this implies that ~ Y Y is stationary", i.e.
9 Note that if the null cannot be rejected and there are grounds (such as exponential growth of Yt)
for believing second differencing is required to ensure stationarity.we may test for the presence of a
second unit root by forming the regression,
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Test 2
As noted earlier, inferences based on {33 are only valid in the absence of a significant
time trend in .1Yr If the null could not be rejected in test 1 we may test the
significance of the time trend either by comparing the t ratio of {33 in the ADF with its
distribution under the null, or by performing an F test of the restrictions that {32 and
A are jointly zero by estimating the auxiliary regression,
m
. 1 1 = {31 + I 0 i .1Yt -i + C1
i = 1
If the null of test 2 is rejected it implies that .1Y t is non stationary having a
deterministic trend, however as alluded to above, this is not likely in the presence of a
unit root. If the null cannot be rejected then this implies Yt - l(l) and .1Yt - 1(0).
Test 3
Additionally we may wish to test whether the constant term in the ADF regression is
significantly different from zero. Having performed the previous two tests, this may be
ascertained in two ways. We may either compare the t-ratio of the intercept in the ADF
regression with the appropriate critical value, or estimate an auxiliary model in which
f3I,f32 and A are jointly restricted to zero, i.e.
m
. 1 1 = I oi.1Yt _ i + C1
i = 1
and test the validity of the restrictions imposed under the null using a standard F test.
The results of test 3 do not affect the conclusions of the previous two tests concerning
stationarity but rather identify the most appropriate representation of the differenced
senes.
(c) Critical Values of the Unit Root Tests
Despite being able to test for a unit root by ordinary least squares a complication arises
in hypotheses testing. As Fuller (1976, chapter 8) demonstrates, the least squares
estimate of f33 in the ADF regression is biased towards a value somewhat less than
J
.12 Yt = a 1 + a2 .1 ~ - 1 + I Oi.1 2Yt - i + t1
i = 1
and comparing the r-ratio of a2 with the appropriate critical value, which here is the tJl
statistic of Fuller (1976), p.373. Should the (absolute) value of the statistic exceed the chosen
critical value of tJl the presence of a second unit root is rejected and second differencing to achieve
stationarity is not required.
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zero and thus does not approach zero even asymptotically. Consequently, comparison
of the (ratio generated from OLS to standard critical values given by the (distribution
under the null that /33= 0, results in misleading inferences. 10 Tables of critical values
which take into account the nonstandard distribution of the unit root t statistic (and F
statistic where the null of a unit root forms part of a joint hypothesis test) are available,
although not for all sample sizes, numbers of parameters and significance levels.
Sources of these tables are listed below and have been reproduced in Appendix VI.A.l
for convenience. As is usual, the null hypothesis is rejected for all unit root tests
described aoove where the absolute value of test statistic exceeds the absolute value of
the designated critical value.
In applying Test 1, the r-ratio on /33 should be compared with the critical values of the
i:r statistic tabulated in Fuller (1976; p.373), and reproduced here as Table A 1 in the
Appendix. A more detailed tabulation of this statistic may be found in Guilkey and
Schimdt (1989).
In applying the ( test version of Test 2 the t ratio of /32 should be compared with the
critical value of the r/3. statistic in Dickey and Fuller (1981) Table III p.l 062 and as
Table A2 in the Appendix. Alternatively, if using the F version of this test, (which is
computed in the normal way using the restrictions imposed on the maintained model
under the null) the F statistic should be compared with the <1>3 statistic of Dickey and
Fuller (1981), Table VI, p.1063, (or Table A3 here).
Using the ( test version of Test 3, the t ratio of the intercept should be compared with
the distribution of the ra. statistic in Dickey and Fuller (1981) Table II p.l062, (Table
A4 in the Appendix). If the F version of this test is required, then the computed F
statistic should be compared with the <1>2 statistic of Table V in Dickey and Fuller
(1981) p.l063, (reproduced here as Table AS).
The complexity of testing for stationarity derives in part from its relative youth in the
literature, and the very nature of unit root testing which is sensitive to the choice of
maintained model, unlike a standard hypothesis test. In light of extensive Monte Carlo
simulation experiments conducted by Dickey and Fuller (1981) both F and ( type test
statistics are used here because where the empirical values of the intercept, trend and
10 As a point of interest, use of the adjusted tables raises the common 'rule of thumb' critical value
from 2 to about 3.5 for this test with sample size around 50.
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root are different, but close to the values implied under the null, the F tests have higher
power than the corresponding t type tests, although this does not necessarily hold
where the null is true.
VI.(v). Stabilizing the Variance of a Time Series
In the preceding discussion, use of a time trend or difference operator on a non-
stationary series resulted in stationarity. Whilst effective at removing trends and thus a
time dependent mean these techniques may have only a minor affect on stabilizing the
variance. Moreover, empirical time series in economics typically have variances that
grow in proportion to the absolute level of the series and hence motivates the use of a
log transformation in order to stabilize the variance. However, using the logarithm is
only one of a number of possibilities that may be used to stabilize the variance.
Informal evidence on the appropriate power transformation can be derived by plotting
what are called range-mean or range-median plots - a convenient tool for the detection
of non constant variance.
This involves splitting the time series into small subsets (of some 4-12 observations
depending on total sample size) for which the median and range of each subset is
calculated. When plotted, the resulting scatter is suggestive of the appropriate power
transformation that should be applied to the series in order to produce (approximately)
constant variance. I I Figure VI.l represents some hypothetical range median plots
annotated with the appropriate transformation necessary to achieve constant variance,
(i.e.the horizontal line).
For example a range median plot of linear form is suggestive of a logarithmic
transformation, whereas a horizontal plot suggests that the variance is already constant
and no transformation need be applied.
lIlt is usual to use range-median plots as these are more robust where the series being used is subject
to considerable variability. See Jenkins (1979) for further details.
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Frequently, empirical time series requires both a power transformation and differencing
to attain stationarity as is the case in the empirics that follow. Where the logarithmic
transformation and difference operator of the first order are combined a particularly
useful result emerges since,
(
y,) Y, YI-Y,- 1f1lnY, = InY, -lnY,- 1 = In -- == -- - 1 =---Y,- 1 Y1- 1 Y1- 1
Therefore, providing that the ratio (Y/Yt-l ) is mcxlerately small, the first difference of
the log of Yt is equivalent to the rate of growth of the original series Yr
We may now proceed to the empirical analysis where these techniques are applied to the
series on farm rents and land prices.
Stationarity
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VI.(vi). Testing for Stationarity in the Empirical Series
(a) Stabilizing the Sample Variance
As discussed in the last section, economic time series frequently require a power
transformation to stabilise their variances, to render them stationary in order that they
may be legitimately used in econometric investigations. Due to the similarity of the
results obtained from the various series, only the range-median plots of the Oxford land
price series are presented here, although identical conclusions are applicable to all the
other series. Using subsets (of 6 observations in length) of the series PX
t
, ranges and
medians are calculated and presented as a scatter in Figure VI.2 in which an erratic but
discernible upward pattern may be detected indicating that the variance of this series
rises proportionately with the level of the series.
Figure VI.2 Range-Median Plot of (PX t )
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The pattern of the scatter of points prescribes the use of a logarithmic transformation to
stabilise the variance as discussed above. Taking logs of this series and calculating new
ranges and medians yields the results illustrated in Figure VI.3 where the points appear
to be much more evenly dispersed implying that InPX t has reasonably constant
variance and may be used in further analysis.
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(b) Casual Inspection of the Data
As with most statistical procedures, testing for unit roots can quite easily become a
mechanical and opaque exercise in which the analyst's role is relegated to one of button
pushing and comparing critical values. Furthermore, it may be believed that the
presence of formal tests makes the process of familiarisation with the data redundant.
From a methodological standpoint it is essential that one gains some 'feel' for the data
under scrutiny, although all too frequently, attention focuses immediately on the 'black-
box' approach to statistical measurement in empirical work. Here, each of the time
series that will be used in the following chapters are illustrated in levels and (logged)
first differences. .
(a) The Agricultural Rent Series
Figures VIA and VI.6 illustrate well that both rent series are non-stationary in levels,
portraying dominant trends despite being expressed in constant (1990) prices.
Differencing the log of each series produces series in Figures VI.5 and VI.7 that are at
least candidates for stationarity, in that the means and variances of both series appear to
be constant. Furthermore, the means of each series could reasonably be expected to lie
around zero. This casual evidence suggests that stationarity may be induced simply by
differencing the logged series, implying that InRI and InRNI are integrated processes
of order one with stationary first differences, i.e. In? I - 1(1), InRI - 1(1); L1lnR I
Stationarity VI.19
- 1(0) , f1lnPl - 1(0).12
Figure VIA: Average Real Farm Rents R, (
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Figure VI.S: The f1lnR( Time Series
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12 Due to the similarity of the series R1 and RN1 the time series plots of the latter, have not been
presented here.
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(b) Farmland Prices
A similar story emerges with the land price series as with rents, in that transformation
of the series expressed in levels is clearly necessary in order for these series to resemble
stationary processes. When expressed in logged first differences, the shorter average
land price series illustrated in Figure VI.9 appears to exhibit constant mean (that could
reasonably be zero) and a constant variance.
Figure VI.8: The Average Land Price Series P,
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Figure VI.9: i1lnPt Time Series
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Whilst .1lnPXt also appears to have zero mean, Figure VI.II suggests that the
variance of the series is characterised by a degree of time dependence despite the log
transformation. In particular the dispersion of .1lnPXt appears to be larger after the
crash in land prices in the 1920s than before the crash. With this reservation in mind
(which we will return to in the next section), the casual evidence presented here
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suggests that lni', - 1(1), lnl'X, - 1(1); ,1lnPt - 1(0) and t1lnPX1 - 1(0).
(d) The GDP Deflator
The deflator series, F, illustrated in Figure VI.l2 is clearly non-stationary. Applying
log and first difference transformations yields the series in Figure VI.I3. Whilst these
transformations have clearly removed the upward trend present in F, the series still
appears to exhibit non-stationarity.
Differencing the series for a second time yields the time series in Figure VI.l4 which is
clearly stationary. The t12l nFt series does not appear to be over differenced since its
variance appears to be less than that of t12lnFt from casual inspection although this will
be tested formally later. Consequently, we may tentatively suggest that F, - 1(2),
2t1lnFt - 1(1) and t1 InFr - 1(2).
Figure VI.12 : The GDP Deflator Time Series (1871 base year) Ft
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Figure VI.13 : The i11nFI Time Series
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Consequently the first differences of the logarithm of each of the rent, and land price
series appear to be stationary whilst the deflator appears to require double differencing.
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Due to the fact that the combination of log and difference operators measures the rate of
change in the original series, this informal inquiry suggests that the rate of change in
rents and land prices are stationary, the rate of inflation is I( 1) and that the rate of
change in inflation is stationary. Whilst such visual inspection of the data is useful, let
us now find more formal justification for these tentative conclusions.
(c) Testing For Unit Roots
The empirical results of testing the rent series (InRt and InRN t ) , the agricultural land
price series (In?t and LnP20t) and the deflator series (lnFt) are presented below. The
shorter series for land prices are not tested due to the relatively small sample size
available. In all the tables that follow t ratios are in parentheses.L'
(a) LnR t
As an initial exercise, the correlograms of Ink, and its first difference L1LnR t are
presented in Figures VI.15 and VI.16 respectively. It is evident that lnk, is non-
stationary ; the correlogram exhibiting a slow linear decline. However, its first
difference, L1lnR t appears to be a candidate for stationarity: autocorrelations appear to
fluctuate around a mean of zero in a sine wave - behaviour characteristic of a stationary
AR(2) model. Pretesting Ink, indicates that one lagged dependent variable is sufficient
to obtain white noise residuals in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller regression, which lends
support to the notion that rents are AR(2), as indicated by Figure 16.
Figure VI.15 : Correlogram of lnlc,
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13 All the series under investigation have also been tested for double unit roots. The tests strongly
reject the null hypothesis that any of the series are 1(2) which allows us to be more confident in
the inferences made in the text where this possibility was not directly tested.
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On the assumption that InRI is adequately represented by the model,
InRI = f30 + f3 l t + f32 InRI_} + f33(lnR 1_} -lnR I _2) + £1 (VI.I8)
where £1 are independent and identically distributed (0, (J2) random variables, we
may perform the unit root tests outlined in the previous section. Reparameterizing
(VI.I8) in terms of !1.lnRI, yields the ADF regression, (VI.I9) and the restricted
versions of it ((VI.20), (VI.21) and (V1.22)}, which are presented in Table VI.1.
Figure VI.16 : Correlogram of f1lnRt
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Recall that if InRI has a unit root then the t ratio on the coefficient of InRl _} in (VI.I9)
should be insignificantly different from zero. Comparing the test statistic of -3.13 to the
5% critical value of i:r of -3.51 indicates that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot
be rejected at the 95% confidence level. Consequently, this implies that InRI has a unit
root and that its first difference is stationary, i.e. InRI - 1(1) ; L11 nRI - 1(0).
However, this result is conditional on the linear time trend in (VI.19) being
insignificant. For reasons stated earlier, a significant trend is most unlikely in the
presence of a unit root, and the F statistic testing the restriction that the coefficients on
time and InRl _} are jointly zero, is,
<I> = (0.0485574-0.0391089)/2 =4.22
3 0.0391089/(39-4)
which compares to a 50/0 critical value for <P3 of 6.73 indicating that the restrictions
imposed under the null are valid at the 95% confidence level. This inference is not
supported however, by the rl3-r statistic - the t ratio on the trend coefficient. The 5%
critical value of rl3-r is 2.81 indicating a non-zero time trend although due to the higher
power of the F test and the improbable implications of a significant trend, the r/h
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result is treated as spurious. Consequently, InRI is a random walk with drift and
f1lnRt is stationary with non-zero mean. Hence, YI- l(l) and ~ Y t t 1(0). We may
now test for the significance of the drift in InR t by performing an F test of the
restrictions that /30= /31 and /32 = 1 in (VI.I8), or equivalently, that the first three
parameters in (1) are jointly zero. The test statistic,
<1> = (0.0498748-0.0391089)/3 = 3.2
2 0.0011174/(39- 4)
implies the null cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level, the critical value of <1>2
being 5.13. This result however is contradicted by a simple t test on the intercept of the
ADF regression (VI. 19) of 3.17 which compares to a 5% critical value of ra r of 3.14.
Whilst the contradictory evidence of the r-type tests is not wholly satisfactory here, the
the F-type tests (which have superior power) points to the conclusion that the second
order autoregressive process InRI has a unit root and is therefore l(l) implying that
f1lnR l - 1(0) with zero mean.
Table VI.l: Testing for Unit Roots Tests in InRI
Equation No. Regressors RSS
constant Time trend InRt _1 f1lnRt _1
(VI. 19) 0.875 0.005 -0.231 0.623 0.0391089
(3.17) (2.85) (-3.13) (4.78)
(VI.20) 0.126 -0.028 0.536 0.0467803
( 1.35) (-1.28) (3.90)
(VI.21 ) 0.006 0.515 0.0485574
(1.00) (3.45)
(VI.22) 0.574 0.0498748
(4.17)
Sample comprises 39 observations (1950 - 1988) of the dependent variable t1lnRt:
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(b) lnRN t
The autocorrelation function of lnRNt is very similar to that of lnk, shown in Figure
VI.8, displaying a slow linear decline indicative of nonstationarity. Figure VI.17 is the
correlogram of t1lnRNt which appears to suggest the series is stationary due to the
rapid fall in the correlogram. The spike in the correlogram at the 16th lag may
reasonably be considered to be spurious: for pure chance will produce a 'significant'
autocorrelation coefficient every twenty lags on average, if the 5% significance level is
used.
Turning to the unit root results in Table VI.2, one lagged differenced term is introduced
into the ADF regression (VI.23) to induce observationally white noise errors,
suggesting that lnRNE, is also a second order autoregression. The ADF test statistic
(ir ) in (VI.23) has a 5% critical value of -3.50
Figure VI.17 : Correlogram of MnRNt
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which does not allow rejection of the unit root null implying that lnRNt - I(1) and its
first difference t1InRNt - 1(0). To test whether the time trend is simultaneously zero
under the null the <1>3 is computed as,
<1> = (0.0791818-0.0687221)/2 =2.66
3 0.0687221/(39-4)
which cannot reject the null at the 95% confidence level, the critical value of the <1>3
distribution being 6.73. This inference is also supported by the i{3T statistic which
tests whether the t ratio on the time trend in the ADF regression (VI.23) is
insignificantly different from zero. The test statistic of 1.97 cannot reject the zero
restriction under the null, the 5% critical value of i{3T being 2.81.
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These tests suggest that lnRNI is a random walk (possibly with drift) and i1lnRNI is
stationary. To check whether the drift implied above is actually non-zero the <1>2 statistic
is computed using the residual sum of squares from (VI.23) and (VI.26) - the latter
model being estimated with the restrictions imposed under the null. This yields,
<l> = (0.0813643 - 0.0687221 )/3 = 2. 15
2 0.0687221/(39-4)
which cannot reject the null at the 95% confidence level the critical value of <1>2 being
5.13. This result is corroborated by the t ratio on the constant in (VI.23) which does
not exceed the 50/0 critical value of the Tar statistic of 3.14. Therefore, the zero drift
null cannot be rejected. The upshot of this testing is that InRNI is a non-stationary I(1)
series and that i1lnRNI is a stationary 1(0) variable with zero mean. These results are
qualitatively identical to those obtained from the first rent series tested.
Table VI.2: Unit Root Tests Results on InRNt
Equation No. Regressors RSS
constant Time trend lnRN1_1 i1lnRN1_1
(VI.23) 0.722 0.003 -0.183 0.476 0.0687221
(2.34) (l.97) (-2.30) (3.34)
(VI.24) 0.163 -0.036 0.437 0.0759256
(1.34) (-1.27) (2.98)
(VI.25) 0.008 0.408 0.0791818
(l.03) (2.79)
(VI.26) 0.447 0.0813643
(3.16)
Sample comprises 39 observations (1950 - 1988) of the dependent variable t1lnRNt:
(c) InRH I
The Correlograms of InRH I and !1lnRHI are similar in shape and forrn to those for the
other rent series and indicate that InRHI is nonstationary and that !1lnRHI is stationary
due to the rapid decay of the correlogram for the first differenced series. Results of the
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formal unit root tests are reported in Table VI.3 and all critical values of the tests relate
to a sample size of 100. Pre-testing indicated that one lagged differenced term was
sufficient to produce residuals that are empirical white noise.
Table VI.3 : Unit Root Test Results on InRHt
Equation No. Regressors RSS
constant Time trend uuu., dlnRH'_l
(VI.27) 0.104 -0.000009 -0.023 0.351 0.37189
(1.11) (-0.04 ) (-1.27) (3.91)
(VI.28) 0.100 -0.023 0.350 0.37189
(1.64) (-1.70) (4.03)
(VI.29) -0.003 0.348 0.38137
(-0.62) (3.97)
(VI.30) 0.352 0.38267
(4.04)
Sample comprises 117 observations (1873 - 1990) of the dependent variable L1lnRHt·
Comparing the t ratio of the coefficient on lnRH'_l in (VI.27) with its 5% critical
value, suggests that InRH, has a unit root but that that !1.lnRH, is stationary. The t
ratio on the time trend coefficient is clearly insignificant, as would be expected given
the previous result indicating that InRH, has a unit root. For completeness, the <1>3
statistic testing the zero restrictions on the time trend and InRH'_1 is computed as,
<1> = (0.3g137 - O. 371g9)/2 = 1.44
3 0.37189/(117-4)
which cannot reject the null at the 5% critical value of 6.49, lending support to the
conclusions from the individual t tests. Consequently, these results imply that InRH,
is a random walk (possibly with drift) and that !1.lnRH, is a stationary AR( 1) process.
To test whether the drift in this process is significant we compute the <1>2 statistic [using
the residual sum of squares from (VI.27) and (VI.30)] as,
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<I> = (0.38267 - 0.37189)/3 = 1.64
2 0.37189/(117-4)
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which is too small to reject the zero restrictions imposed under the null at the 5% critical
value of this test (4.88). Using the Tar statistic to test this hypothesis yields the same
conclusion since the t ratio on the constant in (VI.27) is 1.11 compared to the 5%
critical value of Ta • being 3.11.
These results are similar to those obtained from the previous rents senes and
furthermore bear out the conclusions of the informal investigation, namely in that all the
rent series are driftless random walks in levels and thus zero mean stationary processes
in first differences.
(d) InP t
The log of the average land price series in levels lnl", is characterised by a persistent
correlogram indicative of nonstationarity, but appears a priori to'be stationary in first
differences as Figure VI.I8 illustrates with a correlogram that decays rapidly in the
form of a sine wave - similar to the rent series.
Figure VI. IS: Correlogram of L1lnPt
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Table VIA summarizes the results obtained from estimating the ADF regression and the
restricted versions of it for tests 2 and 3. A prior search indicated the need for two
lagged terms in order to obtain white noise residuals, suggestive of a third order
autoregressive process generating InPt.Again t ratios are in parentheses. On the
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assumption that lni', is adequately represented by such a model, we adopt the previous
testing framework with,
/slnl", = f30 + f3i t + !3llnPt -1 + !3J(lnPt -1 - InPt_2)
+ f34(lnP t-2 - InPt_3) + e, (VI.31)
as the maintained model, where e, are independent and identically distributed (0, (J2)
random variables.
Table VI.4: Unit Root Test Results for [nPt
Equation. No. Regression Parameters RSS
constant Time trend InPt_1 t1lnPt_1 t1lnPt_2
(VI.32) 1.486 0.007 -0.204 0.538 -0.399 0.611981
(1. 77) (1.42) (-1.73) (3.64) (-2.37)
(VI.33) 0.37
-0.045 0.45 -0.508 0.661087
(0.96) (-0.91 ) (3.36) (-3.57)
(VI.34) 0.025 0.465 -0.556 0.667914
(1.13) (3.26) (-3.92)
(VI.35) 0.475 -0.537 0.691678
(3.32) (-3.80)
Sample comprises 39 observations (1950 - 1988) of the dependent variable L1lnPt:
Visual inspection of the ADF regression (VI.32) suggests that lni', has a unit root so
that Alnl", - 1(0) ; lnl", - 1(1). Specifically, the if statistic (of -1.73) is well inside
the 5% critical value of -3.51 indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root. As this result is conditional upon the the time trend being insignificantly
different from zero the <1>3 statistic is computed from the residual sum of squares of
(VI.32) and (VL34), the latter being the auxiliary model estimated under the null that
/31 = f32 = O.
<1> = (0. 667914 - O. 611981) /2 = 1.55
3 0.611981/(39- 5)
which fails to reject the null at the 5% critical value of 6.73. The ior statistic,
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estimated at (1.42) also fails to reject the null that /31 =0 when compared to its critical
value of 2.81.
Computing the <1>2 statistic under the joint set of restrictions imposed under the null that
/30 = /31 = /32 = 0 we may test the significance of drift in I nP r implied by the
previous results.
<1> = (0.691678-0.0687221)/3 = 1 4
2 0.0687221/(39-5) . 8
which cannot reject the restrictions imposed under the null at the 5% significance level
(critical value 5.13). This result is also corroborated by the Tar statistic of 1.77 which
is well below the 5% critical value of 3.14. Consequently, Slni', appears to be a
stationary process with zero mean and InP/ a non-stationary third order autoregression
with no drift.
(d) InP20t 14
The series InP20 r has a persistent autocorrelation function but L1lnP20t appears
stationary as Figure VI.19 illustrates..Verifying this observation with the ADF
framework yields results shown in Table VI.5.
Figure VI.19: Correlogram of L1lnP(
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As for the previous land price series two lagged terms are required to obtain white noise
residuals and thus equation (VI.31) represents the maintained model for InP20 t also.
The i
r
statistic of -1.84 in the ADF regression (VI.36) does not allow rejection of the
14 Recall from the data appendix that P201' denotes a series of real average agricultural land prices in
England and Wales excluding those sales of 20 ha.
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unit root null suggesting that lnP20 t is a random walk and t1lnP20 t a stationary
variable. The f 13• statistic is also too low at 1.50 to reject the null of an insignificant
time trend, the 5% critical value being 2.81.
Table VI.5: Unit Root Tests Results for lnP20t
Equation. No. Regression Parameters RSS
constant Time trend lnP20t_1 t1lnP20t _1 t1lnP20t _2
(VI.36) 1.694 0.007 -0.233 0.525 -0.382 0.676695
(1.88) (1.50) (-1.84) (3.52) (-2.25)
(VI.37) 0.512 -0.062 0.452 -0.521 0.721512
(1.15) (-1.11) (3.15) (-3.57)
(VI.38) 0.023 0.437 -0.557 0.746716
(1.00) (3.05) (-3.91)
(VI.39) 0.445 -0.452 0.767740
(3.11) (3.83)
Sample comprises 39 observations (1950 - 1988) of the dependent variable L1lnP20t·
Testing the set of zero restrictions imposed under the null of Test 2, (i.e. /31 = /32 =
0) reaches the same conclusion: The <1>3 statistic calculated from the residual sum of
squares from (VI.36) and (VI.38) is,
<1> = (0.746716-0.676695)/2 = 1.76
3 0.676695/(39 - 5)
and cannot reject the null at the 5% critical value of 6.73.
To test for the significance of the drift in lnP20t implied by the constant in (VI.36), we
compare the fa. statistic of 1.15 from (VI.36) with its distribution under the null that
its true value is zero. As the 5% critical value of fa. is 3.14 the coefficient is
insignificant, a result corroborated by the <1>2 test of the null that /30 = /31 =.!Jl =O.
<1> = (0.767740-0.676695)/3 = 1.52
2 0.676695/(39 - 5)
cannot reject the null at the 5% critical value of 5.13 implying that InP20 t is a simple
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random walk, hence an I( 1) variable and i1lnP20l is a stationary 1(0) process.
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(e) InPX l
The correlograms for the Oxford series in levels and first differences are very similar to
those presented for the other land price series and suggest that the first difference of the
series is a stationary AR(2) process due to the sine wave decay of the correlogram of
this series and the unit root test results are presented in Table VI.6 below. Pretesting
suggests that, in accordance with the other land price series the Oxford series also
requires two lagged differenced terms in the ADF regression to obtain white noise
residuals.
Table 6: Unit Root Tests Results for urx,
Equation. No. Regression Parameters RSS
constant Time trend InPX l _1 i1lnPX l _1 i1lnPX l _2
(V1.40) 0.141 0.0005 -0.021 0.207 -0.329 1.7312
(0.82) (1.63) (-1.01) (2.41) (-3.79)
(VIAl) 0.157 -0.019 0.221 -0.313 1.7690
(0.91) (-0.90) (2.57) (-3.62)
(V1.42) 0.003 0.212 -3.268 1.7807
(0.26) (3.05) (-3.83)
(VI.43) 0.212 -0.326 1.7816
(2.50) (-3.85)
Sample comprises 127 observations (1863 - 1990) of the dependent variable L11nPXt· All critical
values of the tests outlined below are for a sample size of 100.
Referring to the ADF regression (VI.40), the t ratio on the coefficient of InPX l _1 is
clearly insignificant, the critical value of the i. statistic being -3.73. The coefficient on
the time trend in (Vl.40) is also insignificant (critical value of The i fh being 3.11) and
consequently these results imply that InPX l has a unit root and that i1lnPX t is a
stationary 1(0) variable. Testing the joint restriction that both these coefficients are zero
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simultaneously corroborates this inference, <D3 taking the value of,
m (1.7g07-1.7312)/2
"V = = 1.74
3 1.7312/(127 - 5)
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which cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level (the critical value of <D
3
being
6.49). To test for the significance of any drift in the random walk process we compare
the r-ratio of the constant in the ADF regression to the critical value of the
ra-r statistic. At the 5% significance level the critical value is 3.11 thus the test statistic
cannot reject the null of no drift of this test. For completeness we may test whether all
three coefficients tested individually above are jointly zero by computing the <D2 statistic
which is calculated as,
<1> = (1.7816-1.7312)/3 = 1.18
2 1.7312/(127 - 5)
which cannot reject the null at the 95% confidence level (critical value 4.88). As with
the other land price series these results imply that lnPX{ is a driftless random walk,
hence an l( 1) variable and L1lnPX{ is a stationary 1(0) process with zero mean.
(f) The CDP Deflator series lnF{
The informal analysis of this series in the last section suggested that the series is
stationary when expressed in the second difference of the log of the original series, i.e.
2InF1 - 1(2) and f11nF1 - 1(1) and ~ InF{ - 1(0).
Figure VI.20 : Correlogram of ~ l n F F
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The Correlogram of L1lnFI is illustrated in Figure YI.20 and the slow decline that is
characteristic of non-stationarity is easily discernible, whereas the correlogram of the
double differenced series rapidly approaches zero.
Figure VI.21 : Correlogram of L121nF l
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On the basis of this informal evidence we set about testing for double unit roots. This
may be achieved by regressing L121nF I on a constant, L1lnF1_1 (and as many lagged
terms as required to induce white noise residuals) and comparing the t ratio of the
coefficient on L1lnF1_1 to the 'rJ1 distribution in Fuller (1976, p.373). Alternatively we
may regress L121nF I on F 1- 1, L1lnF1_1 and as many lagged terms as required to induce
white noise residuals and compute an F statistic for the joint significance of F1-1 and
L1lnF1_1• Under the null of a double unit root this statistic has a distribution given by
Hasza and Fuller (1979) as <1>1 (2). Here we will simply compare the t ratio with the
critical values of 'rJ1 although neither test performs particularly well in the presence of
departures from normality which characterises the distribution of this particular series.
Equation (VI.44) in Table YI.7 reports a t ratio of -4.92 which rejects the null (5% and
10% critical values of this test being -2.89 and -2.58 respectively) suggesting that InF l
does not have a double unit root, so that L1lnFl is stationary.
Stationarity
Table VI.7: Testing for Double Unit Roots in InF
t
VI.38
Equation No.
Sample 1873 - 1990
(VI.44)
Sample 1945-1990
(VI.45)
constant
0.012
(2.31 )
0.021
(2.40)
Regressors
~ l n F I _ _
-0.347
(-4.92)
-0.299
(-2.76)
The dependent variable is ~ 21nF1.
However the unit root tests perform poorly in the presence of departures from the
n.i.i.d. assumptions and in (VI.44) the X2(2) test for normality of the residuals yields a
test statistic of 194.28, the 5% critical value of the test being 5.99. This casts some
doubt on inferences made purely on the unit root test and suggests that we should look
elsewhere for criteria on which to base a decision. Noting that the variance of a series
diminishes with differencing until stationarity is achieved but increases if the series is
over-differenced this quick informal test may also shed some light on the appropriate
degree of differencing. Here the variances are,
var (lnF1) = 1.3964
var (L1lnF1) = 0.0041
var (L12InF1) = 0.0028
var (L13InF1) = 0.0067
which suggests that double differencing is required as ~ 2 I n F F has the lowest variance.
An alternative strategy is to limit the sample size since the departures from normality in
this series occur in the first half of the series. Given that the deflator will be most
extensively used in models based on post World War II samples this seems
appropriate. Unit root testing on a post war sample lends some support to the informal
evidence presented here, in that the 't' ratio in (VI.45) is not statistically different from
zero at the 5% level implying the presence of a double unit root and thus we conclude
that the inflation growth rate, (L12InF 1) is 1(0); inflation, ( ~ l n F I I is I( 1) and the GOP
deflator index, (F1) is 1(2).
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VI.(vii) Conclusion
Testing for stationarity forms an important preliminary stage of time series analysis, for
if inferences concerning the parameters that describe the series are to be valid it is
necessary that the parameters do not exhibit time dependence. The order of integration
of a series is a descriptive statistic and tells us very little about the economic behaviour
that underlies the series. However, since we wish to answer economic hypotheses
using statistical analysis the quality and accuracy of our final inference is critically
dependent on this somewhat arduous preparation. Furthermore, when we open up the
analysis to consider the relationships between two or more series, stationarity and the
order of integration play pivotal roles in an economic context, as will be discussed in
the following Chapter on cointegration.
The analysis of the empirical time series on farm rents, land prices and inflation has
indicated the need to apply a logarithmic transformation to each series prior to
differencing to stabilize their variances. All the series are therefore difference stationary
processes. No trend stationary processes have been identified. Using a battery of
informal and formal methods, the variables have been transformed into stationary series
characterised by constant mean and variance with autocovariances that depend only on
the displacement in time. Here, the rent and land price series are shown to be I(1)
driftless random walks in levels and hence stationary 1(0) series in first differences. The
GDP deflator appears to be 1(2) entailing inflation is a non-stationary I(1) process, and
the change of inflation 1(0). Despite the low power of some of the ADF tests used, the
formal results are generally consonant with the other less formal methods employed,
with the exception of the GDP deflator series where a substantial departure from
normality in unit root regressions biased inference in the ADF tests.
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Appendix 1: Summary Tabulations of Unit Root Tests
Table A1: Empirical Distribution of i,
Confidence Level
Sample Size
VI.40
0.90 0.95 0.975 0.99
25 -3.24 -3.60 -3.95 -4.38
50 -3.18 -3.50 -3.80 -4.15
100 -3.15 -3.45 -3.73 -4.04
250 -3.13 -3.43 -3.69 -3.99
500 -3.13 -3.42 -3.68 -3.98
00
-3.12 -3.41 -3.66 -3.96
Source: Fuller (1976, p.373)
Source: Dickey and Fuller (1981, p.1062)
Stationarity VI.41
Table A3: Empirical Distribution of <1>3
Confidence Level
Sample Size
0.90 0.95 0.975 0.99
25 5.91 7.24 8.65 10.61
50 5.61 6.73 7.81 9.31
100 5.47 6.49 7.44 8.73
250 5.39 6.34 7.25 8.43
500 5.36 6.30 7.20 8.34
00 5.34 6.25 7.16 8.27
Source: Dickey and Fuller (1981, p.1063)
Table A4: Empirical Distribution of A'faT
Confidence Level
Sample Size
0.90 0.95 0.975 0.99
25 2.77 3.20 3.59 4.05
50 2.75 3.14 3.47 3.87
100 2.73 3.11 3.42 3.78
250 2.73 3.09 3.39 3.74
500 2.72 3.08 3.38 3.72
00 2.72 3.08 3.38 3.71
Source: Dickey and Fuller (1981, p.1062)
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Sample Size
Table AS: Empirical Distribution of <1>2
Confidence Level
VI.42
0.90 0.95 0.975 0.99
25 4.67 5.68 6.75 8.21
50 4.31 5.13 5.94 7.02
100 4.16 4.88 5.59 6.50
250 4.07 4.75 5.40 6.22
500 4.05 4.71 4.35 6.15
00 4.03 4.68 5.31 6.09
Source: Dickey and Fuller (1981, p.1063)
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Chapter VII
Testing for Long Run Relationships in the Present Value Model
VII.(i) Introduction
The analysis of univariate processes examined in the previous Chapter serves both to
identify the temporal properties of the series at hand and as a prerequisite to the
arguably more interesting study of the relationship between variables. Specifically, the
belief that certain variables should not systematically diverge from each other, at least in
the long run, is a common one in economics. In a host of circumstances economic
forces militate against prolonged deviations from some ordained path, ensuring that
divergence is only transitory. For example, the prices obtaining to a specific commodity
in geographically separated markets, spot and futures prices, and short and long tenn
interest rates, all possess this common notion. For the most part, this belief manifests
itself in the equilibrium relationships posited by economic theory. The relationship
between asset prices and returns is a case in point; intuition and present value theory
suggest that there is a special relationship 'tying' these two variables together, such that
they do not 'drift too far apart' in the long run. The existence of short run discrepancies
reflects the possibility that adjustment to equilibrium is neither instantaneous nor perfect
or that extraneous shocks may temporarily upset the hypothesised relationship. In
short, such temporary divergences may be interpreted as representing some form of
short-run disequilibrium.
Loosely speaking, a set of variables that exhibits this special relationship is said to be
cointegrated. Consequently, testing for cointegration has recently become very popular
in applied circles as a means of identifying the existence of equilibrium relationships
posited by economic theory.
This Chapter has seven Sections and two Appendices. It opens with a brief review of
the approaches that have previously been employed to model non-stationary time series
prior to the development of cointegration. Leaning on the time series properties of
stationary and integrated processes developed in the previous Chapter the concept of
cointegration is set out and its relationship with error correction models explained. In
Section (iii) two procedures are then presented which estimate and test for the presence
of a cointegrating relationship in a data set. In Section (iv) there is a brief digression
about econometric methodology in which the limits of cointegration are discussed. In
Section (v) the present value ~ o d e e is re-introduced and in Section (vi) the techniques
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are applied to the empirical data and inferences are drawn. Finally, the results of the
empirical analysis are summarised in Section (vii). In addition there are two
appendices. The first summarises some relevant critical values for the cointegration
tests and the second explains the technical detail of the main technique used for
estimation and inference.
VII.(ii) Cointegration
(a) Modelling Non-stationary Variables
Following the work of Granger and Newbold (1977) considerable attention has been
paid to the time series properties of variables entering into econometric models. Of
particular concern is the use of integrated variables (characterised by strong trend
components) which one commonly finds in economics. Unlike those for stationary
series, the statistical properties of integrated series are not 'well behaved' as alluded to
in the previous Chapter. Of note, the regression coefficients do not converge in
probability as the sample size is increased; the regression coefficients and R2 have non-
degenerate distributions; and standard critical values are no longer appropriate in
significance testing, (although the correct values can be obtained). Consequently,
because orthodox estimation techniques, such as ordinary least squares assumes a
distributional theory that is applicable only when the underlying processes generating
the data are stationary the use of integrated series in these procedures invalidates the
statistical tests on which hypotheses are commonly tested and frequently lead to the
acceptance of spurious regressions. 1
The initial solution to the analysis of integrated variables, adopted by some time series
workers, was to formulate regressions in which variables were expressed as first
differences. Whilst this procedure tends to induce stationarity, (subject to the caveats
outlined in the previous chapter concerning trend staionary processes) it also entails
loss of the potentially valuable long run information contained in the variables
expressed in levels. Moreover, we are left with an equation comprising the short run
dynamic relationships, about which economic theory has little to contribute, and have
removed the long run relationships about which economic theory is informative.
The concept of cointegration has been introduced as a means of incorporating long run
(or levels) information into equations that comprise only stationary components to
which standard hypothesis testing may be legitimately applied. One class of models in
See Granger and Newbold (1974) and Phillips (1986) on this point.
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which this is the case is the 'error correcting model', (ECM) introduced by Sargan
(1964) and developed subsequently by Davidson et al. (1978) and in a number of
papers by David Hendry. Cointegration has become increasingly popular with applied
econometricians as a means of avoiding spurious regressions and as a means of
purging standard (yet illegitimate) practice.
(b) Time Series Properties and Cointegration
From the analysis of the previous chapter it should be apparent that the time series
properties of variables integrated to different orders are quite distinct. For example,
consider an 1(1) series, such as a random walk, given by,
Y t = Yt-J + £t
where £t is a normally distributed set of random variables with mean zero and constant
variance i.e. NID(O, 0-2) . The evolution of Yt is characteristically smooth returning to
a previous value (or say the mean) only very infrequently. The process also has a
variance that increases with the number of observations in the series and a persistent
autocorrelation function indicating that the memory of an 1(1) process is indefinitely
long.
In contrast, an 1(0) series, such as the first difference of a random walk, i.e. ,1Yt = £t
is characterised by a constant mean, (here it is zero) around which the series fluctuates
with constant variance, irrespective of sample size, and thus observations cross the
mean value frequently with sustained deviations being rare. Consequently, the mean in
an 1(0) series assumes a special significance, in that it represents a 'central tendency'
around which observations are dispersed. This contrasts distinctly with the mean of an
I(l) process which does not have such an interpretation. Furthermore, autocorrelations
in an 1(0) series decay rapidly as the lag increases indicative of a process with finite
memory. In the illustrative case considered here, ,1Yt is a white noise process thus
autocorrelations are zero for lags k > 0 indicating that the process has no memory at
all. The point of this recapitulation is that these contrasting temporal properties playa
pivotal role in testing for cointegration.
In general, any linear combination of two series integrated to different orders will result
in a series that is integrated to the highest order in the linear combination. For example,
suppose that,
Cointegration VIlA
where x t - I(a) and Yt- I(b) then in general Z, - I (max(a,b) }. A formal proof of this
result is given in Granger (1981), but the dominance of higher order series may be
demonstrated intuitively using the temporal properties of I(l) and 1(0) series
summarized above. Given that an 1(1) variable, such as a random walk has a variance
(ro 12) yet an 1(0) process has a constant variance (ao2 ) then a linear combination of
these series suggests that the 1(0) process will be swamped by the influence of the I(1)
process whose variance becomes infinitely large as the number of observations (t)
increases. Following on in the same vein, a linear combination of two or more I( 1)
series will also be 1(1) yet there may be instances where the linear combination is of
lower order and this exception to the rule occurs where the variables are
coiruegrated.s
(c) Defining Cointegration
Consider a (n * 1) vector of variables Yt comprising n series each of which may be
transformed into stationary processes (if not already). The vector of variables is said to
be cointegrated if there exists at least one n-element vector ai such that a linear
combination a/Yt = e, -1(0). In this framework a, is called a cointegrating vector
and if there exists r such linearly independent vectors, a i' (i = 1,... r) we may
state that Yt is cointegrated with cointegrating rank r allowing us to form a (n * r)
cointegrating matrix a = (aj, .. , «.) so that the r elements of the vector a/Yt are
also stationary.
This is a more general definition of cointegration than given in Engle and Granger
(1987), which required that all elements of Yt be integrated of the same order.
Motivating the use of this more general definition is the fact that in practice the analyst
will wish to include variables in Y/ that are integrated to different orders in the ECM,
(typically I( 1) and 1(0) processes} although only variables of the same order may be
cointegrated and hence enter the long run (cointegrating) regression. To see this,
consider the case where the l(l) variables do not form a cointegrating set so that the
residuals from the 'cointergating' regression are themselves 1(1). Clearly.ithe addition
,
of any number of 1(0) variables will not induce cointegration since a linear combination
2 This points out why regressions in which components are not 1(0) give misleading inferences
because a linear combination of I( I) variables which are not cointegrated will yield non-stationary
residuals which as a consequence will not have finite first and second moments (mean and variance)
and thus the basic assumption of OLS is violated.
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of the l(l) residuals and additional 1(0) variables will always be l(l). In contrast, where
cointegration is found among the I( 1) variables, the addition of 1(0) variables is
unnecessary.
It should be apparent that where Y, is composed entirely of 1(0) variables cointegration
is a trivial artefact since any linear combination of the 1(0) variables will yield a
stationary error term, Thus in cases where Yt contains both l(l) and 1(0) variables a
cointegrating vector will also be uivially discovered; that being the unit vector which
selects the stationary variables. However, in order to find a n element vector
(consistent with the definition above) in such circumstances implies the presence of a
special relationship between the l(l) components of Yt which yields an 1(0) linear
combination. Similarly, where Yt consists solely of l(l) components a linear
combination that is 1(0) implies cointegration and Engle and Granger (1987) have
shown that where Y, consists solely of I( 1) components there can be no more than (n
- 1) cointegrating vectors, i.e., r < (n - 1).
Moreover, where Yt comprises just two l(l) variables such that the normalized linear
combination, Y it + aY2t = e, is 1(0) the cointegrating vector (l a) must be unique,
since any other combination would yield Ct that was I( 1) although this is not
necessarily the case for n > 2 as is discussed below.3
To clarify the concept of cointegration let us consider the simplest case: where Yt
comprises just two variables, Y 1t and Y2t each of which is l(l) and generated by a
random walk process. Generally, any linear combination of these series, £t will also be
l(l), yet there may exist some vector a which renders e, - 1(0) . If this is the case
then the variables in Yt are said to be cointegrated and a is known as the
cointegrating vector. Noting that, in this instance o.'y, = £t is simply
[al a 2 J G : : ] ~ [ t ; ;
if we nonnalize on one variable", say, Yl t then,
3 To see why the cointegrating vector is unique in the bivariate case, consider the following. If we
change the cointegrating vector to (1 a - 8) we now have y1t = (a - 8)Y2t which differs by the
quantity 8Y2t. Since Y2t is 1(1), so will 8Y2t and thus Y1t - (a - 8)Y2t must also be
nonstationary. Consequently, (1 a - 8) cannot represent a valid cointegrating vector.
4 Normalising simply involves the division of every element of the cointegrating vector by the
negative of the coefficient on the dependent variable, so that the dependent variable has a coefficient
equal to minus one.
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The existence of a cointegrating vector implies that there exists a very special
relationship between the two series, in that, the behaviour of one series is 'mirrored'
(albeit with random error £1) by the other: a merely representing a scaling factor. If
we regard Yl 1 = aY21 as an equilibrium (or steady state) relationship posited by
economic theory then £1 denotes a quantity which measures the extent to which the
relationship is out of equilibrium; £1 may thus be interpreted as a 'disequilibrium
error'. Hence, the existence of a linear combination of two 1(1) series that is 1(0)
suggests that in the long run the series generally move together. Providing £t is 1-(0)
then non-zero values of £t simply reflect the fact that the adjustment to the steady state
equilibrium is not instantaneous but is observed with error - an error however, that has
a expected value of zero, given that the mean £t is zero.
If YIt is 1(0) and Y2J 1(1) then the only value that a could plausibly assume is zero:
in essence, the two series have such distinct temporal properties that no scaling constant
exists to produce the 'mirroring' that is implied by a cointegrating relationship. This
reveals why testing for the order of integration forms such an important part of
cointegration analysis. Therefore cointegration represents an effective specification test
against spurious regressions because only variables with the same temporal properties
can be cointegrated, i.e. have a long run relationship.
(d) An Error Correction Representation of a Cointegrated System
The consideration of cointegration presented so far has only focussed on the long run
or equilibrium properties posited by economic theory. Indeed economic theory itself
has very little to say of the dynamic process by which variables move toward
equilibrium. Engle and Granger (1987) have proved that if two or more series are I(l)
and cointegrated then there exists an error correction representation of the model and
vice versa. For example, consider two variables x and Y which have a simple
distributive lag structure of order one such that,
(VII. I)
where £1 are white noise residuals. Subtracting Yl-l from both sides of (VII. I) yields,
I1Yl = ao + alx1 + a2xt-1 + (a3 - l)Yt-1 + £t
Adding and subtracting (a, - l)x1-I from the RHS of (VII.2) leaves,
(VII.2)
Cointegration
~ Y Y = ~ + alxt + alxt-l - alxt_l + a2Xt_l + (a3 - I)Yt-l + Ct
= ~ + alfut + (a, + a2)xt_l + (a3 - l)Yt-l + ct
VII.7
(VIL2')
Grouping the terms of (VII.2') into linear functions of variables in first differences and
levels yields,
~ Y Y = alfut -A(Yt-1 -'VIXt-1 - 'Va) + e, (VII.3)
where A = (1- a3), 'V I = (a. + a2)/(l- a3) and 'Va = aoJ(l- a3)' Equations (VII.3) and
(VII.!) are observationally equivalent since each equation produces the same error term
Ct. Also, the error correction model lends itself quite nicely to economic interpretation.
The differenced terms in the ECM describe the short-run dynamic relationship given
here by al' whereas the long run information is picked up by the lagged-levels term in
parentheses: 'V I representing the long run relationship between the variables and Ais a
scalar adjustment coefficient which quantifies the extent to which the two series diverge
from their long-run equilibrium. The negative sign of A signifies that disequilibrium in
the previous period will be 'corrected' for in the following period as the process adjusts
back to equilibrium, hence the label error correction model. The novelty of the error
correction form derives from its incorporation of information pertaining to both the
long-run relationship and the short run dynamics between the variables.
To recognise the link between the ECM and cointegration note that if Y and x are I(1)
then the dependent variable, ~ Y Y is 1(0) which inturn must also be explained by 1(0)
processes. Whilst fut is 1(0) by assumption, the error correction term (Yt-l -'VIXt-1 -
'Va) contains 1(1) variables, namely Y and x. Consequently, there only exists an error
correction representation of these two variables if the linear combination of y and x is
1(0) and this will only occur where the two variables are cointegrated Further, the error
correction term in (VII.3) may be thought of as the residuals from a static cointegrating
regression of Y on x which will only be 1(0) if the movement in one variable is
reflected in the movement of the other, albeit with error given by (Yt-l -'VIXt-1 - 'Va)·
Thus if y and x are I( I) and cointegrated the error correction term will be 1(0). Should
they not be cointegrated, then the error correction term would be 1(1) and hence could
have no valid role in the ECM, which attempts to explain ~ Y t t which is 1(0) by
definition. Consequently, in the presence of cointegration the ECM represents a
plausible description of the dynamic process between a set of integrated variables. As
all components are stationary under cointegration, the ECM can be estimated by OLS
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and inferences may be legitimately based on standard critical values.
VII.8
(VIlA)
In many empirical applications of (VIl.3) the restriction 'V I = 1 is appropriate, since if
the variables are expressed in logarithmic form this restriction ensures that the ratio of
x to Y is unity in the long run. Consequently, the ECM takes the form,
!1.Yl = a + ~ & & -)'(yl-I -xl-I) + EI
which has a long run solution (when Yl =YI-l =Y and Xl =xl-I =X) of,
Y = a/y + X
Antilogging (VIlA) yields the non-linear function Y = KX, hence K is the scaling
factor which translates the level of X to Y in the long run. Although we will examine
the error correction formulation with reference to cointegration in the land market in
Section (iv), simply note here the similarity between Y = KX and the annuity derivation
of the present value hypothesis discussed in Chapter IV. In terms of the present value
hypothesis, K represents the capitalisation rate l/r between returns and land prices
where r is the long run rate of discount.
VII.(iii) Testing For a Cointegrating Relationship
The appealing properties of the ECM and its relationship with cointegration have
provided an (empirically tractable) bridge between static equilibrium in economics and
the role of dynamic behaviour. In recent years a great number of test procedures and
statistics have been spawned in the literature on cointegration, {inter alia Engle and
Granger (1987), Wickens and Breusch (1988), Johansen (1988), Stock and Watson
(1990) Park (1990) and Phillips and Ouliaris (1988)} most of which are reviewed in a
recent paper by Campbell and Perron (1991). Attention here focuses on two of the
most enduring and widely used test procedures of Engle and Granger (1987) and
Johansen (1988). The two approaches are essentially different in that each is grounded
in a distinct econometric methodolgy. Specifically, the Johansen procedure assumes
that all the variables of interest are endogenous whereas the Engle and Granger
approach assumes that there is one endogneous variable and the remaining variables are
exogenous. Consequently, the Engle and Granger approach uses a single equation, the
Johansen a system of equations approach. In special circumstances however both
approaches yield identical results, that being where all but one of the variables is
exogenous.
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(a) Cointegration Testing Using a Static Regression
The Engle and Granger (1987) test procedure is a two-step method in which a static
cointegrating regression comprising 1(1) components is estimated and its residuals
tested for stationarity. Finding stationary residuals implies that the 1(1) variables are
cointegrated. Conditional upon finding cointegration, residuals from the static
regression are then incorporated into an ECM to estimate the short run dynamics of the
hypothesised relationship. Applying OLS to the cointegrating regression yields,
AI A
a Y I = Et (VI.5)
Assuming that the residuals ~ follow an AR( 1) process so that,
(VI.6)
then cointegration in Y, implies that p < 1, i.e. the residuals E, are stationary.
In principle, any test for a unit root versus stationarity can be used as a test for no
cointegration versus cointegration when applied to the residuals of the cointegration
regression. Engle and Granger (1987) analyse the properties of seven tests for
cointegration and on the basis of their investigation, recommend two; the CRDW and
ADF tests. The Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CROW) statistic proposed
by Bhargava (1983) is advocated due to its simplicity although should only be used as a
means of obtaining 'a quick approximate result', Engle and Granger (1987, p.269).
The CRDW test uses the standard Durbin- Watson statistic,
x-r " " )2DW = L t=2 (E, - Ct-l
"" T "2L t = 1 £t
from the cointegrating regression and tests for cointegration in Y, by testing the implicit
hypothesis that,
Ho: P = 1
H 1: p < 1.
in (VI.6). Under the null of a unit root in (VI.6), ~ are a random walk and hence
cannot be stationary implying that there is no cointegration in Y" Under the alternative
E, are a stationary 1(0) process and this implies cointegration. In cases where E, are
non stationary the OW statistic will approach zero and the null hypothesis of no
cointegration will not be rejected. Hence a large OW statistic is suggestive of 1(0)
residuals and this implies cointegration. Critical values of the CRDW test are non-
standard, depending on the number of integrated variables in the cointegrating
regression and the order of the autoregressive process of E, . At present a limited
number of critical values are available but have been reproduced here in Table A 1 of
Cointegration
Appendix 1.
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The second and preferred test is the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test proposed by
Dickey and Fuller (1981). Using the residuals ~ from a cointegrating regression an
ADF regression is formed such that,
m
! 1 1 = < / > ~ - - + L 8 i ! 1 ~ - - + VI
i = 1
(VI.7)
where m is chosen so as to produce errors v, that are empirical white noise. The ADF
test statistic is the 'r-ratio' on the estimated value of </>.
Under the null hypothesis, Ho :</> = 0 , ! 1 1 are stationary, implying that ~ are not.
Consequently, if the variables in the static regression are cointegrated then ~ are 1(0)
and rejection of the null of the ADF test implies cointegration. Again, the distribution of
this statistic is nonstandard; importantly, critical values are not the same as those
applied to the raw series in unit root tests as they depend on the number of integrated
regressors in the cointegrating regression. Engle and Granger (1987) present some
summary tabulations of this statistic for the bivariate case although more extensive
tables appear in Engle and Yoo (1987). These are reproduced in Appendix I as Table
A2 and Table A3 for convenience. In circumstances where m = 0 in the empirical
specification of (VI.7), appropriate critical values are those in Table A2, otherwise use
those in Table A3. 5
Research by a number of authors has shown that when using the two-step procedure
cointegration has several important implications for the estimation and testing process,
which may be summarized as follows.
(i) When the variables are cointegrated, ordinary least squares (OLS) should give an
'excellent' estimate of the true long run parameter a in large samples. This arises
from the property of 'superconsistency' which characterises the cointegrating
regression under the null of cointegration. Stock (1987) proves that under
cointegration not only is the estimate of a consistent (in that it converges to the
true value as sample size increases) but it is also highly efficient (in that the
variance of the estimate is smaller than in the standard case where the variables are
5 Strictly, a set of critical values should apply for each m specified, hence the critical values
reported here where m = 4 are not fully efficient where the empirical specification of the ADF
docs not require four lagged first difference terms. Nevertheless, such efficiency will disappear as
the sample size increases.
Cointegration VILli
not cointegrated). Con seq uently, the parameters in the cointegrating vector
converge to the true parameter values more rapidly than the least squares estimator
in the standard case."
(ii) The superconsistency property does not require the absence of correlation
between the explanatory variables and the error term because the correlation is of
a lower order in T than the variance of the regressors. In short, biases arising
from correlation are asymptotically negligible, thus the long run parameters
estimated in the static cointegrating regression will be unbiased (in large samples)
despite misspecification (in this case exclusion) of the dynamics of the
relationship. See Stock (1987).
(iii) Engle and Granger (1987) demonstrate that estimates of the short run parameters
from the ECM are as efficient (asymptotically) as those that would be produced if
the true long run parameters had been used in the ECM (as opposed to those
estimated from the cointegrating regression). Intuitively, this result derives from
imposing the set of parameter values from the cointegrating regression, which
have minimum least squares errors and allow faster convergence for the
remaining parameters in the ECM.
(iv) If all variables are 1(1) and cointegrated then there always exists an error
correction model describing the short run relationship between the variables.
Further, the reverse is also true, in that data generated by an error correction
formulation must be cointegrated. This results derives from the Granger
representation theorem (Engle and Granger (1987) and may be recognized by
stating that if the variables are I(1) their first differences will be stationary 1(0) and
so every term in the ECM is 1(0) providing the residuals are stationary. This will
occur only if the variables in levels are cointegrated. If the residuals are not 1(0)
then the variables are not cointegrated and hence they do not belong in an error
correction model.
(v) For the two variable case the cointegrating parameter is unique since the estimate
of the cointegrating parameter from the reverse regression of Y2c on Yi c should
be equivalent to the reciprocal of a estimated in the forward regression in large
samples. However, this is not necessarily the case where the number of integrated
6 It is important to note that superconsistency is an asymptotic (or large sample) result Banerjee et
al. (1986) suggest that the bias in small samples may be considerable and for the bivariate case
outlined above is related to (1 - R2). Stock (1987) demonstrates that the finite sample bias to be of
the order T-l: monte carlo simulation experiments tend to confirm these analytical results.
Consequently, the benefits of supcrconsistency may be outweighed by the bias where the sample
size is 'small'.
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variables in the cointegrating regression exceeds two, a problem we will
investigate later.7
(vi) If y and x are cointegrated then there must be Granger Causality in at least one
direction as one variable can aid the forecasting of the other. Granger (1986).
Some Caveats Regarding the Two-Step Procedure
There are however a number of problems that remain unresolved in the empirical
application of the two-step procedure. Specifically, the bias of the cointegrating
regression parameter estimates in small samples has been shown by Banerjee et al.
(1986) to be around (1 - R2) . Second, recall that where there are more than two
integrated variables in the cointegrating regression the uniqueness of the cointegrating
vector is not guaranteed: indeed, for n integrated variables the number of distinct
cointegrating vectors is given by r < n - 1. Consequently, in circumstances where
there are more than two variables in Yt several equilibrium relationships may exist
depending on which variable is chosen as the regressand with no objective means of
identifying the true relationship. Although Hall (1986) suggests that the estimates from
performing all different inversions of the cointegrating regression may define bounds in
which the true equilibrium values of the parameters lie, ideally we require more than
informed supposition in this matter. Third, the test procedures do not have well defined
limiting distributions and are thus sensitive to choice of maintained model in which the
null and alternative hypotheses are nested. Fortunately, these problems have been
addressed by Johansen (1988a) who proposes a maximum likelihood estimation
procedure, to which our attention now turns.
(b) The Johansen Procedure
Given that there may exist upto n - 1 cointegrating vectors in a regression of n
integrated variables the analyst may be confronted with large parameter space in which
the true relationship may lie using the Engle and Granger (1987) method. Clearly,
where estimation of all the possible inversions of the original specification of the
cointegrating regression imply similar results the analyst may feel safe to assume that
each inversion is simply a reciprocal estimation of the same long-run relationship and
choose the regression with the highest R2 as yielding the most precise estimate of the
true relationship. Where this is not the case a method that allows the number of distinct
cointegrating vectors to be tested is clearly beneficial. The method proposed by
7 This is not so for OLS in general but arises under cointegration because of the supcrconsistency
property. See Hall and Henry (1988) for an intuitiveexplanation of why this is so.
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Johansen (1988a) and developed in Johansen and Juselius (1990) does precisely that
using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) methods. For instance, in a
trivariate system we may test the null of one cointegrating vector against an alternative
that there are two or three cointegrating vectors linking the variables - the latter case
being where all the variables are 1(0) in the first place (and is effectively a multivariate
or general test for unit roots).8
The Error Correction Model in a Vector Autoregressive Framework
It will be worthwhile to dwell at some length on the specification and testing framework
adopted by Johansen since such issues are ignored in the formal derivations given in
the references and a less rigourous treatment of the procedure has not yet been
published. To begin, the analysis is couched in a general polynomial distributed lag
framework, more commonly known as a vector autoregression (VAR) model. In this
framework each variable in the system is regressed on its own lagged values, lagged
values of each of the other variables plus any deterministic components (such as linear
trends, dummy variables and a constant) until the error term in each equation is
empirical white noise, implying that the chosen specification of the VAR is an adequate
(but perhaps over-parameterised) description of the data generation process for each of
the variables in the system. The VAR(k) model of variables comprising X t may be
written as,
X t = Il lX t - 1 + ... +nkx t _k + J.1 + <PZ t + e. t = 1,.... ,T (VI.8)
where X t is a (n * 1) vector of I( 1) variables, Z t a vector of 1(0) variables", J.1 a
constant vector and e, an (n * 1) vector of random disturbances of zero mean and
variance matrix Q, i.e. Ct - n.i.d.(O, Q). The VAR representation is attractive for a
number of reasons, not least because estimation proceeds in the first instance with the
minimum of a priori restrictions imposed on the model's structure: the nature of
causality between the variables in the system and the specification of dynamics are both
left to the data to determine, within the confines of the variables actually specified in the
first place. Restricted versions of the original VAR can then be tested against each other
8 Note that the Johansen procedure does not require all variables to be of the same order as Engle and
Grangers' two-step procedure does, thus the rank of the cointegrating matrix r may equal the
number of variables, in the case where all variables are 1(0), although clearly this is a special case
of trivial practical importance. As a result any 1(0) regressors are treated separately.
9 As a point of interest Zt actually represents a vector of any variables that are included in the
system to ensure that the errors in the system Et are as close to being Gaussian as possible and
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so that a final (and perhaps highly restricted model) can be demonstrated (rather than
presumed) to be consonant with the data. The methodological advantages of the general
to specific approach embodied in the VAR are however obtained at the cost of initial
over-parameterisation. Since the number of parameters increases dramatically as the
number of variables and lag length increases, the initial over-parameterisation implies a
loss of efficiency in estimation using small samples, and although the effect diminishes
asymptotically the inefficiency of the estimation is an acknowledged drawback. to
We will develop the notion of a cointegrating matrix below but for the time being it is
worth noting that if account is taken of the lagged influences between the variables in
the VAR (given by the coefficient matrices Il 1 + ... +n k) then what remains will
represent the coefficients of the long-run relations between the variables. From the
model in (VI.8) the cointegrating matrix is therefore,
1- n1 - n2 ... - nk = n
which is a (n * n) matrix with a rank r equal to the number of distinct long run (or
cointegrating) relations between the variables in Xl'
Due to the non-stationarity that characterizes economic time series in general, and the
implications this has on estimation and inference the vector autoregression
representation in levels, (VI.8), is reparameterized as an error correction model,
~ X X = r i ~ X t _ _ + ... + r k - l ~ X t - k + + + nXt_k + I.l + <1>Zt + e, (VI.9)
where
i=l. ... k-l
and
Notice that (VI.8) and (VI.9) are equivalent since the vector of errors in both models
are identical. This is an important point and deserves some explanation since it is not
immediately obvious why models with a vector of variables in levels and a vector of
variables in first differences on the LHS should possess the same error terms, although
as we will see the procedure is similar to that set out for the single equation case.
Consider the VAR(2) model that will be used in the empirical analysis,
X - 0 X + 02X 2 + I I + 1hZ + C' t = 1,. . . . ,T (VI. 10)t - 1 t -1 t - ~ 'V t Lt
10 If d represents the number of deterministic components in the V AR (constants, dummies, time
trends and so forth) then the number of cocfficents to be estimated is n(nk+d).
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which, according to (VI.9) has an ECM,
~ X X = 1 1 ~ X t _ _ + OXt_ 2 + Jl + <1>Zt + e, t = I,.... ,T
VII. IS
(VI.II)
The reparameterisation begins by subtracting X t -1 from (Vl.l 0) so that the LHS is in
first difference form yields,
~ X X = (-I + 01)Xt_ 1 + 02Xt_2 + Jl + <1>Zt + e, t = 1,.... ,T (VI.I2)
If we add and subtract (01 - I)Xt_2 to the RHS of (VI. 12) we have,
~ X X = (-I + 01)Xt_ 1 + 02Xt-2 + (01 - I)Xt_2 - (01 - I)X t_2 + Jl + <1>Zt + e,
= (-I + 01)Xt_ 1 - X t- 2 + (01 - I)X t_2 + 02Xt_2 + 11 + <1>Zt + e,
= (-I + 01)Mt_1 + (- 1 + 01 + 02)Xt_2 + Jl + <1>Zt + Ct (VI.13)
which is identical to (VI.ll) since in this example (-I + 01) is II and (- 1 + 01 + 02)
is 0. It should now be clear that it is legitimate to use Ez in both parameterisations since
by rewriting (VI.13) purely in terms of levels,
Xt -Xt-1 = -Xt-1 + 0IXt-l+ Xt-2 - 0I Xt_2 + (- 1 + 01 + 02)Xt-2 + Jl + <1>Zt + e,
it is obvious that -X t -1 cancels, leaving an equation composed entirely of levels.
Therefore, the manipulation has not altered the relationship between the variables in any
way but merely expresses it in a form that is statistically appropriate and more
economically meaningful than the (observationally equivalent) levels specification given
by (VI.8).
If X t comprises 1(1) processes then the ECM given by (VI.13) comprises stationary
components, if and only if, the 1(1) variables yield a linear combination that is 1(0).
This occurs where the variables are cointegrated, and since all components are
stationary, ordinary least squares can be legitimately applied. Where the variables
comprising X t do not cointegrate, the linear combination of the variables expressed in
levels will be I( 1) because in general, any linear combination of variables integrated to
different orders will have an order corresponding to the highest order in the linear
combination. I I This entails that the error term in the ECM will thus be I( I), violating
the classical assumptions on which estimation and inference are based.
Furthermore, if economic theory suggests that two or more variables form an
equilibrium relationship then economic forces will ensure that deviation from
equilibrium - disequilibrium - will be transitory. Disequilibrium enters the ECM of
lIThe exception to the general rule is where the variables cointcgratc.
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equation (VI.9) VIa n X t-k (see below) and will therefore be stationary if
disequilibrium is transitory. This implies that if a long run relationship exists between
the variables included in X t then nx t-k will be stationary and if not then the
variables in X t do not constitute a long run relationship. In this light the usefulness of
cointegration as a means of discriminating spurious and valid equilibrium relationships
is clearly apparent.
The interpretation of a VAR error correction mechanism follows similar lines to the
discussion in Section (ii) of this Chapter, except that by expressing the relationship
between a set of variables as a VAR there is no presumption concerning the direction of
the relationship(s) i.e. the causality. With a single equation an important prior has been
imposed on the estimation, in that the equation is specified as Y = f(X), without the
direction of the causality (in the Granger sense) actually having been tested. Using the
more general VAR approach there is no such presumption since all inversions of the
model are estimated within the VAR. The V AR does however collapse to a single
equation in special circumstances, namely where a subset of the variables are
exogenous to the remaining variable in the VAR. Consequently, if we begin by
assuming that all the variables in the system are endogenous and find that (n -1)
variables are exogenous to the remaining variable then the Johansen method of
estimating the long run relationship collapses to the Engle-Granger method where the
right hand side variables are exogenous by assumption.
A further advantage of the error correction specification is that it isolates the long run
equilibrium relationship from the short run (or dynamic) response to disequilibrium in a
convenient way. Returning to (Vl.ll), we can interpret r l ~ X t - - as describing the
short run dynamic relationships between the variables whereas the long run relations
pertinent to the concept of equilibrium are described in the linear combination nx t -2-
In order to interpret the coefficients of Il in an economically meaningful way Johansen
(1988a) defines two (n * r) vectors, where r is the rank of Fl, such that,
n =aW
where the linear combination,
(VI. 14)
~ ' X t - - = W t=3, ... T
is a (r * r) matrix of stationary variables. The presence of cointegration implies that r
> 0 and that the number of rows in Wrepresents the number of distinct cointegrating
relations, r. Assuming that r = 1 so that the cointegrating vector is unique the single
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row of coefficients in P' define the parameters of the cointegrating or long run
relationship between the variables of the system. The error correction model can
consequently be rewritten in the form,
~ X X = r 1 ~ x l _ _ + aW + J1 + (]>Zl + £1 t = 1,.... ,T (YI.I5)
The role of the (n * l) vector a now becomes clear in that it represents the fixed
coefficients to which the disequilibrium errors are weighted in each inversion of the
ECM. Because each element of a weights the disequilibrium errors in each equation a
is the vector of error correction coefficients which Johansen calls the loading vector.
The coefficents of a represent the average rate of adjustment back to equilibrium in the
error correction model given an initial disequilibrium error. In other words, each
coefficient in the loading vector gives the sign and magnitude of the error correcting
term in each of the dynamic equations represented by (YI.ll).
Using maximum likelihood methods, Johansen demonstrates that ~ may be consistently
A
estimated by f3 from the available sample data and develops two likelihood ratio
statistics that test for the presence of cointegration, called the trace and maximal
eigenvalue statistics. These test statistics are derived in Appendix II, however, both
seek to test hypotheses concerning the rank of the estimated cointegrating matrix D
since it is this that determines the number of distinct cointegrating vectors ~ = ( ~ l l ~ 2 2 .
. . ' ~ r ) ) Denoting r = Ranktll), there are two possible cases,
(i) r = 0 and n is the null matrix since there are no cointegrating vectors in ~ ~ This
means that all linear combinations of Xl are I(l) and thus do not belong in an
ECM. None of the variables cointegrate and the VAR must be respecified by,
for example, the inclusion of extra variables.
(ii) 0 < r < n so that Il is of reduced rank, implying that there exist r linear
combinations of some or all of the variables in Xl that are 1(0). Providing that
all the variables in Xl are 1(1) this implies cointegration and allows us to
formulate the hypothesis that Il =ap' described above.l?
The trace statistic tests the null that there are at most r cointegrating vectors and the
12 Should r = n so that Il is of full rank, this implies that there are n cointegrating vectors in p.
This means that all variables in Xl are stationary since all linear combinations of 1(0) variables
are also 1(0). However, because all stationary variables are confined to the Zt vector in the
formulation given in (I) the full rank case should not occur by construction.
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maximal eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors against
the alternative of r + 1 cointegrating vectors. Whilst both statistics have invariant and
well defined limiting distributions, entailing that a single set of critical values can be
tabulated for any number of variables specified in the VAR, the presence of a constant
term plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the model and the underlying
probabilistic analysis - requiring two sets of critical values depending on whether the
constant in (VI.9) is included explicitly or not.
Johansen (1991) Theorem 4.1 proves the general result that if Il = a ~ ~ a constant term
I.l in (VI.9) implies that the non-stationary variables in X t have linear trends.
However, where linear trends are absent from X t simply excluding I.l from (VI.9) not
only restricts the trend term to be absent but also entails that (VI.8) has no constant.
This is because the constant term in (VI.9) can be decomposed into two parts, one of
which contributes to the intercept in the cointegrating relation and the other which
determines a linear trend. The coefficents of the linear trend are functions of I.l although
only through aT'1.l where aT is an n * (n - r) matrix of vectors chosen orthogonal to
a', i.e. aTa '= O. Thus in order to restrict the trend to be absent from (VI.8) but not
the constant term Johansen augments the WXt- k term to ~ * ' X t _ k k where ~ ~ = (W,
Wo) and X t -k* = (X t_k,I). To see how this gives a constant term to both (VI.8) and
(VI.9) without implying a trend, consider by means of illustration the restricted VAR(2)
model in error correction form where Il = a ~ * ' '
~ X X = r l ~ X t _ _ + a ~ * ' X t _ _ + <1>Zt + e, t = 1,.... ,T (VI.16)
Assuming for simplicity that n = 2 and r = 1, then,
~ * ' X t - k * * ( ~ l X l , t - - - ~ 2 X l , t - - - ~ o o
so that when combined with the loading vector a the constant vector in (VI.16)
becomes al ~ o o This implies that the constant in a levels VAR equivalent to (VI.16) is
restricted to be I.l = a l ~ O O Consequently, and as Johansen and Juselius (1990) state,
testing for the absence of linear trends in X t given that Il = ap' simply boils down to
testing whether I.l =al ~ ~ is a hypothesis supported by the data. Critical values of the
trace and maximal eigenvalue statistics are reported in Johansen and Juselius (1990)
and have been reproduced here for convenience Tables A4 and AS corresponding to
whether a time trend in X t is observed or not respectively.
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Estimation of the VAR and Testing for Cointegration
Johansen estimation is performed automatically in a number of econometric packages
such as REG - X, PC-Give and MicroFIT, although due to the relative youth of the
technique in the literature, the routines required to apply the full set of hypotheses that
are discussed shortly are still being dcvcloped.U The statistical details of the
procedure are explained more formally in Appendix II and the reader may well wish to
refer to it in what follows. An impression of the procedure may be given using the
following three-variable example.
For illustrative purposes we will begin by assuming that a VAR(2) version of equation
(VI.8) adequately characterises the data generation process of each of the three I(l)
series of interest (say Xt' Yt and Zt) in that the residuals of each equation are
empirical white noise. Further, it is assumed that because these series are characterised
by linear trends, a constant is explicitly incorporated in the specification of each first
differenced process.
The aim is to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of a , , and Q. To do this the
likelihood function - a formula proportional to the probability of drawing the particular
set of error terms - is concentrated with respect to the free parameters, (i.e. given initial
values of those parameters to which cointegration does not impose restrictions on)
namely, the coefficients of I" l' J..l (and the coefficients on any dummy or 1(0) variables,
if included). This is achieved by regressing t1X t and X t-2 on 1, t1X t-I and any
dummy variables or 1(0) variables. Omitting dummies and 1(0) variables for simplicity,
we have two sets of regressions, 14
13 Consequently, the coverage of the empirical analysis is somewhat limited, although detailed
explanation of the hypothesis testing is included as comprehensive software is soon to be released
and will be applied at a later date.
14 Where the integrated variables do not appear to be trending over time the constant in (VILI7) and
(VILI8) no longer appear and the two sets of regressions take the following form:
dX t = al dX t-I + a2d Yt-I + a3d Zt_I
dYt = b1dXt_ I + b2d Yt-I + b3dZt_I (VI1.1 7)
dZt = cIdYt- I + C2dXt-I + c3d Zt_I
and,
Xt-2 = d 1dXt-I + d2dYt-I + d3d Zt-I
Yt-2 = eldXt_I + e2 d Yt-I + e3d Zt_I
Zt-2 = £1 dYt-I + f2d X t-I + f3d Zt_I
I =gldYt-I +g2dXt-I +g3d Zt_I
(VII.18)
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(VII.I7)
M t = ao + aIMe_] + a 2 ~ Y e . . + a 3 ~ Z t _ _
~ Y Y = bo + bIMt_] + b 2 ~ Y e _ _ + b 3 ~ Z t _ _
~ Z Z = Co + c I ~ Y t - - + C2Mt_] + C 3 ~ t - -
and,
X t-2 =do + d l M e_] + d 2 ~ Y e - - + d 3 ~ Z t _ _
Yt-2 = eo + eIMt_] + e 2 ~ Y t - - + e 3 ~ t - - (VII.18)
Zt-2 = fo + f l ~ Y t - - + f2M t_] + f 3 ~ Z t _ _
which yield residual vectors that are substituted into the likelihood function. The
procedure then involves maximising the likelihood function for the remaining
unknowns, namely a , , and Q. The solution to this constrained maximisation yields n
eigenvalues and their associated eigenvectors: each eigenvector comprises the
coefficients of one of the n candidate cointegrating relationships and represents a
column of the matrix p. In order to establish the number of distinct cointegrating
vectors implied by the data, (i.e.the rank of ~ ~ each eigenvalue that corresponds to an
eigenvector is tested to determine whether it is significantly different from zero.
Therefore, for every non-zero eigenvalue there is a corresponding eigenvector which
yields a candidate cointegrating vector. Denoting Xl as the i th largest eigenvalue
(where i = r + 1 to n) we may test the null hypothesis that there are at most r distinct
cointegrating vectors by calculating the trace statistic, given by
n
-2ln(Q) = -T I In(1 - Xd
i = r+ 1
The null will be rejected for values larger than the appropriate critical value.
Alternatively, we may use the maximal eigenvalue statistic (Amax)' calculated as,
A
-2In(Q) = -Tin (1 - Ar + 1 )
and test the null that there exist r distinct cointegrating vectors against the alternative
that there are (r +1) cointegrating vectors. The critical values of these tests are not
distributed as X2 even asymptotically, but as multivariate versions of the Dickey-Fuller
distribution, although critical values have been tabulated by monte carlo simulation and
are presented in Johansen and Juselius (1990) and have been reproduced here for
convenience; Tables A4 and AS corresponding to whether a time trend in X t is
observed or not respectively.
Thus the n eigenvalues are used to test for the rank of ~ to find the precise number of
and the residuals are used as above in the computation of the tests for cointegration.
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cointegrating vectors implied by the data. Once this is known then the maximum
likelihood estimates of I"1 )l and Z, are then obtained by substituting the estimates of ex
and ~ back into the VAR.
In situations where a priori one expects a cointegrating relationship to exist, obtaining
results indicating two or more distinct cointegrating vectors is puzzling and frequently
has no useful economic interpretation, for whilst multiple equilibria are allowed for in
the estimation, it is not clear what this means in an economic context. All being well
however, only one distinct cointegrating vector should be identified using the test
statistics. Note however, that in circumstances where the variables of Xl have not been
adequately tested for stationarity the Johansen procedure will select a cointegrating
vector for each 1(0) variable identified in Xl. A quick glance at the ~ matrix however
will detect this occurrence since the cointegrating vector would look something like (00
o1) after normalisation.
Hypothesis Testing
(i) Linear Trends
The Johansen procedure faciliates the testing of a variety of hypotheses using standard
likelihood ratio tests. All hypotheses are restrictions on the n2 parameters of the Il
matrix. Unless it is clear that all the variables in X, do not possess a linear trend, the
first hypothesis that we need to test is whether such a restriction is supported by the
data. Assuming that r cointegrating vectors have been found in the unrestricted model,
(with linear trends) we may test whether the absence of linear trend is congruent with
the data by comparing the ratio of the likelihoods from the with and without trend
models under the assumption that there are r cointegrating vectors. Hence the
likelihood ratio test is computed as,
-2In(Q) = - T I In{ (1 - ~ ~ )}
i=r+l (1-\) (VII.19)
where Xj· and Xj are the i th eigenvalues in the restricted and unrestricted (i.e.
constant included) VARs. The test statistic is distributed asymptotically as X2 with n -
r degrees of freedom under the null that absence of the trend is consistent with the
data.
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(VIL20)
(ii) Restrictions on the cointegrating matrix ~ 1 1
Frequently, it may be desirable to establish whether certain parameter values estimated
in the Johansen procedure are consistent with predictions of the theoretical model.
Economic theory has little to say about the short run dynamics of a relationship so the
testing of theoretical predictions will focus on the parameters of the cointegrating matrix
~ ~ To simplfy this discussion suppose that a single cointegrating vector has been
identified, i.e. r ( ~ ~ = 1. Johansen formulates theoretical restrictions under the
hypothesis, ~ = H<1> where H is a (n * s) matrix of restrictions and <1> is an (s * r)
vector of parameters to be estimated from the data, where s reflects the nature of the
restrictions. The V AR is then estimated subject to these restrictions and a likelihood
ratio test developed to test whether the restrictions are supported by the data. The test is
calculated as,
-2In(Q) = T.t In{ (1 - i ~ l l )}
1=1 ( l - ~ ~
A
where AII.i are the eigenvalues of the VAR estimated under the null hypothesis. The
test statistic follows a X2 r(n - s) distribution under the null that ~ = H<1>.
By means of an example consider the simple bivariate present value relationship to be
estimated in the following section. Suppose that a single cointegrating vector has been
identified and that we wish to establish whether the unit elasticity hypothesis of rents to
land prices can be maintained as a cointegrating relationship from the data. Denoting
InP, and InR, as the log of land price and rent series respectively, then unit elasticity
simply implies that the coefficients of each variable in the cointegrating vector ~ is equal
with opposite sign. The null of unit elasticity is thus,
Ho : ~ ~ = - ~ ~
against the alternative,
Ho : ~ ~ "# - ~ ~
In matrix notation this hypothesis can be formulated as ~ = Ho, i.e.
~ = [ ~ ~ ~ J [ : :
where <1> is a (2 * 1) column vector of coefficients to be estimated from the data. The
eigenvalues from the VAR estimated under the ~ restrictions can then be substituted
15 In the empirical analysis that follows the hypotheses that are tested are limited to those imposed
on the cointegration matrix p due to the lirnitiations of the software used to run the Johansen
procedure, although as mentioned above the other tests are described for completeness.
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into the likelihood ratio test given by (VIL20) to ascertain whether the restriction is
supported by the data. To see how this implies unit elasticity the cointegrating vector
P'X becomes,
Normalising on land prices by dividing through by </>1 yields the cointegrating
relation,
Using this type of formulation any number of homogenous linear restrictions can be
imposed on the cointegrating relation. For instance suppose XI contained four
variables we could test the equivalence of two pairs of coefficients simultaneously by
manipulation of the H matrix.Iv Note that where the intregrated variables of Xl do
not contain linear trends the matrix of restrictions is augmented to allow for a constant
term and in the bivariate case considered here, H is an (n + 1 * s) matrix of
restrictions and <t> remains an (s * r) vector although p now has dimensions of (n + 1
* ) .r , t.e .
p = [ [ ~ ] ]
A useful application of this testing procedure is to ascertain whether the space spanned
by p in the Engle and Granger cointegrating regressions would be accepted by those
produced by FIML in the Johansen procedure. Suppose that the Engle and Granger
method had estimated a relationship between the log of land prices (InPl), log of rents
(InRI) and inflation (L\lnF I) such that after normalisation on land price we have an
estimate of the cointegrating relationship,
InPl = 1.061nR l - 1.50L\lnFl + constant
In order to test whether it is possible to accept the hypothesis that the coefficient on
rents is 1.06 times that on land prices and that the coefficient on inflation is minus 1.50
times the coefficent on land prices with the constant left unrestricted using the Johansen
procedure, we again formulate the hypothesis in matrix notation as, p= Hq> where
_ [ 1 . ~ ~ ~ ] [ < / > > ] = l . t ~ ¢ ¢p- 1.50 0 <!>J. 1.50</>1
o 1 <!>J.
16 For an example of more than one homogenous linear restriction see Johansen and Juselius (1990)
p.195.
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Therefore the cointegrating vector p'X becomes,
l n n
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[ <I>t -1. 06<Pl 1.50<l>t l lfh ] f1lnF; = <PI l n n - 1.06<pI l n n + 1.50<PI f1lnF; -l/>2
-1
which after normalisation and rearranging for lnP1 yields a cointegrating relation,
lni; = 1. 0 6 1 1 + 1.50f1lnF; + (l/>2 /¢I )
Using the likelihood ratio test in (VII.20), we may test the restrictions using the data by
comparing the largest eigenvalue from the restricted VAR estimated under p= H<l> with
that from the unrestricted model.
(ii) Restrictions on the Loading Vector ex
Johansen has also developed a likelihood ratio test for hypotheses on the vector that
weights the long-run relationships in (VII.14), i.e. the coefficients attached to the error
correcting terms. To perform such tests it is necessary to have first identified at least
one cointegrating vector when estimating the VAR unrestrictedly. Restrictions on the
(n * r) matrix of loadings ex are formulated in a similar way to those on p. Under the
hypothesis that a = A'V where A is a (n * m) matrix of restrictions and ur an (m * r)
matrix of parameters to be estimated under the restictions imposed in A the VAR is
estimated and its eigenvalues compared with those from the unrestricted VAR. There
are essentially only two types of restriction on ex that we would wish to test, relating to
the sign of each loading coefficient in ex and the number of statistically significant
loading coefficients in a. If a single cointegrating vector has been isolated, it follows
that a must also be a vector to conform in the combination lI = exp'. A useful
hypothesis to test in this circumstance is whether only one of the elements in the
loading vector is statistically different from zero since where this is the case the n
dimensional VAR collapses to a single equation. this implies that the long run vector
may be estimated as a single equation rather than in the VAR. Johansen and Juselius
(1990), Corollary 6.2, prove that when a single cointegrating vector is isloated so that
the rank of P' is one, acceptance of the hypothesis that,
Ho : a2 = a3 =, ... , = an = 0
implies that (n - 1) variables are exogenous to the system and thus need not be explicitly
modelled. As a consequence, the maximum likelihood estimate of p is given by the
coefficients of X t-k in the OLS regression of A 'f1XI on X t-k» B 'f1XI and f1X1-1' .
. . , f1XI _k+1, ZI and the constant; where A is the (n * m) matrix of restrictions on ex
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and B is an (n * (n - m)) matrix such that B'A = O.
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To test this hypothesis, which in effect is a mulitvariate Granger casuality test, the VAR
is estimated under the null that all but one of the coefficients in a are zero. Using the
bivariate model to illustrate, the restrictions a = A'V take the form,
U= [ ~ ] [ V ' I I
and the likelihood ratio statistic calculated to test whether the resulting estimate of the
parameters in the restricted model occupy the cointegrating space spanned under the
unrestricted model is computed according to (VII.20) and follows a X2 distribution on
(n - (n - r)) degrees of freedom. If the null cannot be rejected then a single equation
may be used legitimately to estimate a and p. Hence, in this special case the estimates
of a and p from the Engle and Granger two step procedure are identical to that from
restricted Johansen estimation.
Using the three variable illustration of land price, rent and inflation, then, accepting the
null hypothesis entails that two of the equations in the VAR are redundant since they
can be treated as being determined exogenously to the VAR. Should this be the case,
then the VAR(2) of equation (VILI 0) reduces to a single equation, the autoregressive
model,
A(L)lnPr = B(L)lnR t +C(L)tllnFr + d + eD72r + e, (VII.2I)
where the lag polynominals are of second order, d is a constant, D72 t the dummy
variable and e, are nid(O,cr2).
In full, equation (VIL2I) may be written as,
(l-a}L-a2L2)lnPr = (l+b}L+b2L2)lnRt + (l+c}L+c2L2)tllnFt + eD72 t + e,
= LlnRr +b}LlnRr + b2L2lnRr + tllnFr + c}LtllnFt
+ c2L2tllnFt + d + eD72 r + e, (VII.22)
To obtain the static long run solution we evaluate (VIL22) at L = 1. Noting that in
equilibrium we may drop time subscripts this leaves,
(l-a}-a2)lnPX = InRH +b}lnRH + b2lnRH + tllnF+ cl tllnF + c2tl lnF + d + Er
= (l +b}+b2)lnRH + (l +c}+c2)tllnF + d
This may then be incorporated into the error correction model for land prices. The
usefulness of this hypothesis test is therefore two-fold in that not only does it simplify
matters considerably, but since there are fewer coefficients to be estimated the
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efficiency of the estimation process improves.
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(iii) Testing Joint Restrictions on a and P
As a logical progression in the hypothesis testing framework Johansen and Juselius
(1990) develop another likelihood ratio test in which restrictions are imposed on both a
and p. Specifically, the ECM paramterisation of the VAR is estimated under the
hypothesis that, a = A tj/ and p= Ho, A model embodying both sets of restrictions is
then compared to the unrestricted long run matrix 11 and a likelihood ratio statistic
computed according to (VII.20) to test whether the remaining coefficients estimated
under the full set of restrictions is consistent with the original unrestricted specification,
such that
Ho : 11 = A tj/<P'H'
and where linear trends are found to be absent in the integrated variables,
Ho : 11 = A vr<P'H', J.1 = apo'
where Po' is an (r * 1) vector that allows for a constant in the cointegrating relations
but restricts the time trend to be absent.
VII.(iv) Cointegration in the Research Strategy - A Digression
Whilst the measurement and testing of economic theory is the econometrician's raison
d'etre he has frequently been accused of the inability to distinguish between competing
theories, or uncover the real processes at work that theory attempts to model. Indeed,
it is commonly suggested that econometrics has led to the proliferation of theories, all
with 'significant' t ratios 'high' R2s and valid interpretations. Consequently, when
first reported in the literature, cointegration ignited considerable interest in an audience
that was much wider than that which typically received developments in econometrics.
The primary reason for this was the belief that cointegration could bridge the gap
between economic theory and empirical observation, allowing the applied
econometrician to test, in a coherent way, the multitude of hypotheses suggested by
economic theory. The zest with which the techniques were initially greeted and applied,
has subsequently mellowed despite a much richer understanding of the theoretical
foundations of cointegrated processes. In part this reflects the naive optimism of the
techniques potential and the realization of the limitations and pitfalls of the statistical
procedure. Aside from the practical difficulties encountered in the estimation and testing
of cointegrating vectors, (such as the low power of some of the test procedures, small
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sample bias and fragility of the tests in the presence of structural breaks) cointegration
offers many opportunities. Rather than symbolizing some holy grail of econometrics
cointegration is now regarded to assume the more humble mantel of an effective
selection tool in models comprising integrated variables. Certainly, this is the spirit with
which it is used in the econometric methodology propounded by 'The LSE School' of
which Professor Hendry is the primary exponent.
As a tool of model selection cointegration allows the analyst to address interesting
questions such as the existence of long run equilibria posited by theory, what variables
may legitimately form an equilibrium relationship, the number of such relationships
implied by the data and the nature of the dynamic behaviour in which the equilibrium
relationships are shrowded. Obviously, cointegration is not endowed with the ability to
identify the true model since all models, by definition, merely represent
simplifications of a hugely complex underlying data generating process. In this sense,
to use cointegration to validate any particular model endows the technique with a
power that it does not possess. Nevertheless, as a means of testing the adequacy of a
proposed model cointegration is particularly useful. Viewed in this light cointegration is
little more than a general specification test which serves to reduce the number of
competing theories and their associated (spurious) regression statistics. In addition,
because cointegration effectively tests the model specification it requires the anlayst to
base empirical models more rigidly in theory, thereby avoiding what may be termed
'kitchen-sink' econometrics in which a whole host of factors are included In a
regression based on illegitmate t values with the result that a high R2 is obtained.
However, because cointegration was frequently perceived as something much grander,
extravagant claims concerning the validation or refutation of particular theories invited
considerable criticism, such as Darnell and Evans (1990). It appears though that much
of the criticism is directed not so much at the technique itself but rather at the naive and
unquestioning way in which cointegration results were interpreted. Thus whilst critics
are correct in stating that finding no cointegration does not in itself represent sufficient
evidence to refute a theory, (specification of maintained model and alternative
hypothesis or measurement errors in the data being equally likely explanations) where
cointegration is found it suggests that the model under scrutiny is consonant with the
data and as such is an adequate simplification of the relationship at hand. As with all
statistical techniques inference is only conditional on the framework in which testing
takes place and moreover the results are only as good as the data with which a
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hypothesis is actually tested.
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VII.(v). The Present Value Model
In this section we briefly develop land price equations to be estimated within the VAR.
Recall that the present value rule for land price determination is,
00
~ = £ 5 L O i ~ [ ~ ~
j=O (VII.23)
where £5 = 1/0 + r).That is, land price is the expected present value of an infinite
stream of future rents. For simplicity we will adopt the special case of (VII.23) where
rents are expected to continue at their present level for ever. In this case,
Et [R1+) = Et[Rt]
for all j > O. Combined with naive expectations (where E, [R
t
] = R
t
_
/
) , this implies
~ =Ck .,
where C = lIr is the capitalization rate. This special case embodying the capitalization
of constant expected rent into price is appealing in the present context. Specifically, it
might be expected that there is a long run tendency for land price to be tied to its
capitalized rent. Indeed, in the case of a fixed rent, R*, then the long run equilibrium
price, P*, is given by:
p. = CR· (VII.24)
where the long run elasticity of price in respect of a permanent change in rent is unity.
Applying natural logarithms to (VII.24) yields
InP* = InC + lnR* (VII.25)
which can be estimated by ordinary least squares.
In the short run, land prices and rents may diverge and the dynamic adjustment of price
to rent may be represented, (provided that rents and land prices are cointegrated) by an
error correction model. The specification of the dynamics of the error correction model
is data determined, but using the form that is estimated in the empirical section yields,:
~ l n P P = al ~ l n R t _ _ + a 2 ~ l n P t _ _ -A(lnPt_2 - InR t_2 -InC) + e, (VII.26)
This theory is basically microeconomic in nature. However, it may also be relevant to
enquire into the relationship between land values and institutional and macroeconomic
factors. Peters (1966) emphasizes factors such as inflation hedging, interest rates,
speculation, capital taxation and amalgamation demand as playing important roles in the
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determination of land prices. From a time series perspective the last three are
troublesome because realistic measurement is difficult, if not impossible. The effect of
interest rates has been examined in Chapter IV where it was concluded that the real rate
of interest has no discernible effect on real land prices. I? The results seem to suggest
that participants in the land market use a constant rate of interest to discount future
returns because of the long term nature of investment in land and the sizeable
transactions costs that are incurred.
However, since land serves as an asset for wealth holding, it may be that participants in
the market perceive it to be a preferred form of wealth in periods of high inflation viz a
viz other similar assets, such as stocks and shares, and thus acquire land as a hedge
against inflation. This rationale owes as much to historical precedent and psychological
factors as it does to economic theory. Consequently, formalising the hedging
philosophy is difficult, despite that fact it is a widely acknowledged motivation for
acquisition in the UK. It is apparent that land is perceived to be capable of holding its
value during inflationary periods and thus provides a 'gilt-edged' means of acquiring
indebtedness and a more stable form of security for loans. An indebted land owner may
gain from inflation since his equity may grow faster than the rate of inflation. The
hedging argument is a self fulfilling p r o p h e ~ ~ since if enough participants believe land
provides better security during inflationary periods, more land is purchased for that
reason, which in turn maintains a buoyant demand and thus price. Consequnetly we
will also examine whether changes in the general level of prices affect the real price of
land. Other macro and institutional considerations such as changes in capital taxation
and property rights however are ignored.
The models (VII.25) and (VII.26) may be augmented quite simply to allow inflation
effects on real land prices. If land is an inflation hedge so that at least some agents shift
the composition of their wealth portfolio into land when inflation is rapid, the
equilibrium relationship (VII.25) may be augmented as :
InP* = InC + InR* + ~ ~ n F F (VII.27)
where MnP* is a fixed rate of inflation.Similarly, the ECM is augmented as,
~ l n P P = a l ~ l n R t _ _ + a 2 ~ l n P t _ _ + a 3 ~ 2 I n F t _ _
- A(lnP t_2 - InRt_2 - InC - ~ ~ l n F t _ 2 2 + £t (VII.28)
with ~ being the long run elasticity of land price to a steady inflation rate.
17 Estimation using the cointegration methodolgy set out in this Chapter also supports that
conclusion and results have not been included in the interest of brevity.
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These models now form the basis of the estimation exercise to which the remainder of
the Chapter is dedicated.
VII.(vi) Empirical Testing of the Present Value Hypothesis
The empirical investigation begins with the definitions of the data used to test the
hypothesis of cointegration and then proceeds to estimate a VAR for the bivariate case
and a trivariate case where the basic relationship is augmented by inflation. Finally, a
long historical data set is used to test the same hypothesis.
(a) The Empirical Data 18 :
lnP20 t :The log of average price of all land sold over 20 hectares in England
and Wales (£/ha.) expressed at constant 1990 prices for the calendar
years 1946 to 1989.
lnPX t :The log of average price of a sample of farm sold at auction over 5
hectares in England and Wales (£/ha.) expressed at constant 1990 prices
for the calendar years 1871 to 1990.
lnRN t :The log of average rent paid on tenanted farms that have undergone a
rent increase in the past year in England and Wales (£/ha.) expressed at
constant 1990 prices for the calendar years 1946 to 1990.
lnRH t :The log of average rent of agricultural land in England and Wales
(£/ha.) expressed at constant 1990 prices for the calendar years 1871 to
1990.
10Ft :The log of the Gross Domestic Product Deflator, 1871 to 1990. Base
year 1990.
Recall that Chapter VI established that the land price and rent series are non-stationary
l(l) processes in (the log of the) levels and stationary 1(0) processes when expressed in
first differences, i.e. lnP20 t ,... 1(1), lnRNt ,... 1(1), t1lnP20t ,... 1(0), t1lnRNt ,... 1(0).
The (log of the) GOP deflator is integrated of order two so that inflation is a non-
stationary 1(1) process and the change in inflation is a stationary 1(0) process, i.e. 10Ft
2
,... 1(2), hence t1lnF t ,... I( 1) t1 lnFt ,... 1(0)
18 See the Data Appendix for a detailed explanation of these series. Any dummy variables that are
included are additive (not multiplicative) and are defined with the integer one in the year that they
operate and zeros elsewhere.
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(b) The Bivariate case
(i) The Johansen Method
Prior to the estimation of the VAR it is necessary to determine whether linear trends are
present in the variables (in levels) of the VAR and also the order k of the VAR itself.
As the InRN t and InP20 t time series are moving upwards over time a constant is
initially included although this will be tested formally later. Determining the order of the
VAR can be achieved simply by estimating the n equations of the VAR separately for
various orders of k and testing the residuals from each equation for normality and
serial correlation that are required given that tt in (VIL8) and (VII.9) are Guassian. The
most parsimonious (lowest k) set of n equations to yield stationary residuals denotes
the order that will be used to estimate the VAR. The Parametrisation (VII.9) is used in
preference to (VII.8) since all variables will be 1(0) in the presence of cointegration and
thus standard critical values may be used for inference. 19
For the bivariate model this necessitates two equations in error correcting form in which
k was initially set to 4 with appropriate dummy variables, i.e.
k-l k-l
I 1 l n n = J1 + I I 1 l n ~ _ _ + I I1lnRNI _ i + l n ~ - - + lnRN I - k +D1
i=l i=l
k-l k-l
I1lnRN I = J1 + I I 1 l n ~ - - + I I1lnRNI - i + l n ~ - - + lnRN I - k +D1
i=l i=l
Pretesting indicates that the residuals of each pair of regressions remained stationary
when k > 1 entailing a VAR(2) system represents an adequate representation of the
data. Table VII. 1 reports the results for the models in which k = 1, 2.
From the table the VAR(l) errors do not appear to deviate significantly from normality
since the J-B statistic for each (which is based on the skewness and kurtosis of an
empirical distribution) does not exceed the 5% critical value. Visual inspection of a
histogram of the residuals (not shown) also bears this out. The residuals are however
serially correlated as indicated by the Q* statistics at 1, 5 and 10 lags. Recall from
Chapter VI that both the first difference of the rent and land price series were AR(2) and
thus it is of no surprise that the residuals in the VAR( 1) model are serially correlated.
The residuals from the VAR(2) model comply with the n.i.i.d. requirement of the
estimation and on the basis of the statistics presented in the Table VII. 1 and by visual
inspection of a histogram and ACF (not shown here) this model can now be assumed to
19 Equation (VII.9) also minimises the deliterious effects of multicolinearity, which a priori, would
be significant in (VII.8) due to the presence of lagged variables.
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be an adequate representation of the data generation process.
Table VII.! : Some Test Statistics for the niid Assumption for the
Residuals in (VII.9) with k =1 and k =2 in the Bivariate Model
B-1 S EK Q*(l) Q*(5) Q*(lO)
k = 1
M t 1.89 -0.29 0.86 1.14 8.71 20.65
!1R t 4.00 -0.65 0.74 11.25 11.56 26.97
k=2
M t 0.04 0.23 -0.08 0.10 2.61 9.43
!1R t 3.13 -0.16 1.30 0.28 4.56 7.46
5% CV 5.99 3.84 11.07 18.30
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where 1-B is the 1arque-Bera (1980) statistic approx distributed as X2 (2) under the null of normality
S is the coefficient of skewness which is zero [or the normal distribution
EK is the coefficient of excess kurtosis which is zero for the normal distribution
Q* (k) is the Ljung-Box (1978) statistic for serial correlation in the residuals, approx
distributed as a X2 (k) under the null of no serial correlation. 95% critical Values are in bold
where they apply.
Following these results it is assumed that the VAR(2) of equation (VIL8) with an
unrestricted constant and additive dummy variables for 1972 and 1974 is an adequate
description of the data generating process. Reparametising the system into the ECM
formulation given by (VII.9) and applying maximum likelihood yields estimates of the
long run matrix Il = up' which are reported in Table VIL3.
The interpretation of the results is made easier if we establish the number of distinct
cointegrating vectors given by the rank (r) of O. Table VIL2 reports the trace (Trace)
and maximal eigenvalue (Am ax) statistics for the bivariate VAR(2) model with 95%
and 90% critical values for each statistic. Both statistics are unable to reject the null of
no cointegrating vectors implying that there is not one linear combination of rents and
land prices that is 1(0) from which we can establish that rents and land prices are not
cointegrated. Estimating the VAR(2) system in which the constant term in (VII.9) is
restricted leads to the same conclusion so results have not been presented.
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Table VII.2 : Trace and Maximal Eigenvlaue Statistics for the Bivariate
VAR(2) Model
Trace 95% 90% Amax 95% 90%
Ho HI Ho HI
, ~ ~ ,?-1 9.74 15.41 13.32 ,=0 r = 1 18.17 14.07 12.07
, ~ ~ ,?-2 1.56 3.76 2.89 r = 1 ,=2 1.56 3.76 2.68
'"Table VII.3 : The Eigenvalues A and Eigenvectors Pi with Loading
Vectors Ui in the Bivariate Model
~ i g e n v a l u e e
A 0.181 0.037
Eigenvectors ~ ~ Loading Vectors a,
InP20 -0.806 0.161 InP20 0.102 -0.0125
(-1.000) (-1.000) (0.081 ) (0.020)
InRN 1.248 0.390 loRN -0.080 -0.039
( 1.547) (-2.425) (-0.065) (0.006)
Note: The figures in parentheses represent the coefficients in the cointegrating vectors normalised on
the coefficient on InP20t_2 being -1.
Whilst this result is sufficient to preclude the need to analyse the Il matrix in any detail
it is interesting to note that had either of the candidate cointegrating vectors of Pyielded
a cointegrating relationship then PI' the vector associated with the highest eigenvector
would have implied a long run relationship of the form,
(- InP20 + 1.547InRN) or InP20 = + 1.5471nRN
and the second candidate cointegrating vector ~ ~ implies,
(- InP20 + 0.390InRN) or InP20 = + 0.3901nRN
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The sign of the elasticity coefficient between rents and land prices in both vectors is
postive although neither is particularly close to unity as implied by present value theory.
A quick glance at the loading vectors also supports the findings above in that all the
normalised loading coefficients are very close to zero. Given that the linear
combinations of rents and land prices is I(1) then the loading coefficients could not
feasibly assume any other value since the dependent variable in each equation is a
stationary 1(0) process.
We may also test for cointegration using residuals from a static regression as proposed
by Engle and Granger. Applying OLS yields,
InP20t = 2.02 + 1.771nRNt
-2
R : 0.71 CRDW : 0.48 AOF(1) : -2.55
The signs of the estimated coefficents are consistent with a priori expectations and all
variables are statistically significant at the 5% level. 20 Critical values of the CROW
and ADF(1) tests at the 5% (10%) level are 1.03 (0.83) and -3.67 (-3.28) suggesting
that the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected. Consequently, the empirics suggest
that land prices and rents alone do not constitute a cointegrating vector, however, the
statistics are encouraging enough to suggest that the bivariate model may simply need
augmenting by one or more variables in order to satisfy the requirements of
cointegration.U
(c) The Trivariate Model
As a result we resume the empirical analysis with the inclusion of inflation. As stated
earlier the GOP deflator index (expressed in natural logs) over the current sample is
integrate of order two so that first differencing yields an 1(1) series that measures the
rate of growth of the deflator, i.e. the rate of inflation. We will begin by using the
Engle and Granger two stage procedure and then use the Johansen method.
Pretesting suggests a static cointegrating regression of the form,
InP20 = 2.24 + 1.29lnRN + 2 . 4 4 ~ l n n
-2
R : 0.78 CROW: 0.92 AOF( 1) : -5.28
20 Note however that inferences based on the t statistics from the cointegrating regression are
conditional on the presence of cointegration. As a result some researchers prefer not to report t
statistics.
21 Hallam et al (1992) arrive at a similar conclusion for the bivariate case despite using slighlty
differentbasic data.
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The inclusion of inflation has reduced the coefficient on rents slightly and marginally
increased the explanatory power of the equation. More importantly, the CRDW has
risen considerably and suggests, along with the ADF statistic (which has 5% and 10%
critical values of -3.67 and -3.28 respectively) that we are able to reject the null of no
cointegration-Z This evidence suggests that an 1(0) combination of I(1) variables has
been identifed and this implies cointegration. This may now be investigated more
thoroughly in the VAR using the Johansen method.
Again, the first step is to ascertain the order of the trivariate VAR. Assuming that a
VAR(4) is more than adequate to induce white noise residuals we then test sucessively
more parsimonious speifications of the VAR. The three equation system with k = 4, 3,
2, 1 is thus,
k-I k-I k-I
111nP, = J.1 + I I1lnE1-i + I I1lnRNt-i + I 11 2InF;_i + 1nP,-k +lnRN t - k +l1lnF;-1e +Dt
i=1 i=1 i=1
k-I k-I k-I
111nP, = J.1 + I t!.lnE1-i + I t!.lnR Nt - i + I. t!. 21nF; - i + 1nP, - k: + InR Nt - k + t!.lnF; -Ie + D,
i=1 i=1 i=1
k-I k-I k-I
t!.21nF; = J.1 + I. t!.lnJ1 - i + I t!.1nR N, - i + I. t!.2 InF; - i + InE1- k + InRN, - k + t!.1nF; - k: + Dt
i=1 i=1 i=1
Table VIlA reports statistics for normality and independence for the VAR(l) and
VAR(2) specifications of the system. With a VAR(l) specification the B-1 statistic for
normality of the residuals from rents and inflation looks a little suspect and serial
correlation appears to be present in the residuals from rent and possibly land price
equations. These features are corrected in the VAR(2) system. Consequently, a VAR(2)
system of the three I( 1) variables with an unrestricted constant and additive dummy
variable for 1972 are maintained as an adequate description of the data generating
process of equation (VII.8).
22 From Table Al in the Appendix to this chapter critical values for a trivariate 1(1) regression are not
given although by looking at the other critical values in the table it seems likely that the CRDW
critical value at even the I% level is considerable below the test statistic computed here.
Cointegration VII.36
Table VIlA: Some Test Statistics for the niid Assumption for the
Residuals in (VII.9) with k =1 and k =2 for the Trivariate Model
B-1 S EK Q*(l) Q*(5) Q*(lO)
k = 1
~ l n P P 0.65 0.31 0.05 2.02 3.71 15.43
~ l n R R 3.23 -0.61 0.60 10.98 11.45 28.43
~ 2 1 n F F 4.40 0.79 0.04 0.34 0.83 3.92
k=2
~ l n P P 1.83 0.30 0.85 0.09 3.26 12.14
~ l n R R 0.33 0.08 0.41 0.14 3.06 8.47
~ 2 l n F F 1.52 0.43 -0.39 0.22 3.31 12.72
90% CV 4.60 2.71 9.24 15.99
95% CV 5.99 3.84 11.07 18.30
Notes: Same as for Table VII. 1
This system is then formulated as an ECM given by (VII.9). Applying maximum
likelihood yields estimates of the long run matrix Il = a ~ ~ and this is tested for
cointegration, the result being presented in Table VII.5.
Table VII.S : Trace and Maximal Eigenvlaue Statistics for the Trivariate
VAR(2) Model
Trace 95% 90%
Ho HI
'5.0 ,?,.1 33.11 20.97 18.60
r 5. 1 ,?,.2 8.56 14.07 12.07
'5.2 ,?,.3 2.91 3.76 2.68
Amax 95% 90%
Ho HI
r=O r =1 44.58 29.68 26.79
r =1 r=2 11.46 15.41 13.33
r=2 r=3 2.91 3.76 2.68
From Table VII.S it is clear that the inclusion of inflation has resulted in a marked
increase in the trace and maximal eigenvalue tests for cointegration. Both test statistics
strongly reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors and cannot reject the
hypothesis that there is no more than one cointergating vector at the 95% confidence
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level. Curiously, both the test statistics reject the null of two cointegrating vectors in
favour of three cointegrating vectors at the 90% confidence level. However, given that
each hypothesis concerning r is strictly conditional upon the results from the previous
hypotheses (and that these clearly signalled the presence of a unique cointegrating
vector) we may treat this slightly anomolous result as spurious. A plot of the residuals
from all three cointegrating vectors supports this view in that only one of the vectors in
combination with Xl yields stationary residuals, the other two exhibiting distinct non-
stationary behaviour. It is therefore concluded that there is only one cointegrating vector
in the data.
Before we analyse the estimates of the long run matrix II = aW in detail it is
appropriate to test whether the constant term in the ECM specification of the VAR
should be restricted as discussed above. Using eigenvalues from the restricted and
unrestricted models yields a test statistic computed from (VII.19) as,
= -40{ In(0.976) + In(0.999)}
= 1.01
which cannot reject the restriction under the null since the X2 (2) critical value at the 5%
significance level is 5.99. Consequently, exclusion of the constant in (VII.9) is
supported by the data. Re-estimating the VAR with this restriction yields the trace and
maximal eigenvalue statistics reported in Table VII.6 which now clearly demonstrate
that there is only one cointegrating vector, as intuition led us to believe.
Table VII.6 : Trace and Maximal Eigenvlaue Statistics for the Trivariate
VAR(2) Model with Restricted Constant
Ho HI
'SO ,?.1 46.03 34.91 32.00
r S 1 ,?.2 12.81 19.96 17.85
rs2 ,?.3 2.91 9.24 7.53
Trace 95% 90% Amax 95% 90%
Ho HI
r=O r =1 33.22 22.00 19.77
r =1 r=2 9.90 15.67 13.75
r=2 r=3 2.91 9.24 7.52
We may now proceed with the interpretation and hypothesis testing using the restricted
(constant excluded) model. Table VII.7 reports all the candidate cointegrating vectors
and their loadings. Since only a single cointegrating vector PI has been identified we
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may disregard the remaining vectors, (although all cointegrating vectors have been
reported for completeness). This automatically entails that only the first loading vector,
u l is important in this system in order for Il =up' to be conformable. Notice that the
coefficients in the other loading vectors are virtually zero, as we would expect given
that only a single 1(0) cointegrating vector exists.
The single cointegrating vector implies a long run relationship between land prices,
rents and inflation such that, (-lnP20 +1.177lnRN+ 4. 190tllnF) implying that,
InP20 = 2.568 + 1.174lnRN +4.211 ~ l n n (VII.29)
Since all the variables are expressed in natural logarithms the coefficients in (VII.29)
are elasticities. Of specific interest is the rent elasticity since present value theory
dictates that this should be unity. This will be tested formally below.
Table VII.7 : Estimates of the Cointegrating Vectors Pi and Loading
Vector «, in the Trivariate Model
~ i g e n v a l u e e
0.000A 0.564 0.219 0.070
Eigenvectors Loading Vectors
PI P2 P3 U I U2 U3
InP20 -1.085 -0.085 -0.062 InP20 0.508 -0.088 0.110
(-1.000) (-1.000) (-1.000) (0.551 ) (-0.008) (0.007)
InRN -1.277 0.562 -0.364 loRN 0.074 -0.127 0.000
(1.177) (6.545) (-5.889) (0.081 ) (-0.011) (0.000)
~ l n n -4.545 -2.781 -1.690 ~ l n n -0.106 -0.067 0.023
(4.190) (-32.428) (-27.339) (-0.115) (0.006) (0.00 1)
Constant 2.785 -1.657 2.225
(2.568) (-19.320) (35.988)
Note: The figures in parentheses represent the coefficients in the cointegrating vectors normalised on
the coefficient on InP20 being -1.
We may interpret the normalised loading vector U I = (0.551 0.081 -0.115) as
measuring the extent to which disequilibrium, or excess demand for land enters into the
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three equations in the system. The numerical value of each coefficient denotes the speed
of adjustment towards the equilibrium state, so that a low coefficent implies slow
adjustment and a high coefficent rapid adjustment. Hence, the cointegrating
relationship, WX t = (-lnP20 + 1.174lnRN + 4.211 i1lnF) will have a coefficient of
0.551 in the land price equation, 0.081 in the rent eq uation and -0.115 in the inflation
equation. The signs of the loading coefficients are of the correct sign in the land price
and inflation equations, in that movements of land price and inflation from their
equilibrium values are being corrected, however the coefficient in the rent equation runs
counter to such an interpretation implying that disequilibrium is compounded, although
the estimate (0.086) is so small in the rent equation (and for that matter in the inflation
equation as well) that it may simply mean that changes in rents (and inflation) are
exogenous to the system and thus our estimate of the error correcting coefficient is in
fact an estimate of zero.
Focussing on the land price equation: if average land price is above its equilibrium level
so there is excess demand for land then WX t = (-lnP20 + 1.174lnRN + 4.211 i1lnF)
will be negative and there is a downward correction in land prices given that the
normalised loading coefficient is positive. Conversely, if land price was below it
equilibrium level then WX t is positive implying that an upward pressure on land prices
will be present. In either case the size of the loading coefficient (0.551) implies that
50% of any disequilibrium pricing is being corrected in anyone year.
A number of interesting hypotheses emerge now we have identified a single
cointegrating vector. First, we may wish to test whether the hypothesis of unit elasticity
between rents and land prices implied by theory is supported by the data; second,
whether the loading coefficients in the rent and inflation equations are zero, since this
would imply that these variables are exogenous to the remaining variables in the VAR,
in this case land prices. If these two loading coefficient are zero, this would allow us to
estimate the long run relationship in a single equation with land price as the dependent
variable. Third, we may wish to test whether the long run relationship obtained from
the Engle and Granger approach spans the cointegrating space identified using the
Johansen procedure.
In order to investigate whether the unit elasticity hypothesis can be maintained between
rents and land prices we test whether the coefficients of rent and land price in the
cointegrating vector are of equal and opposite sign, i.e.,
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HO : PI = -P2
against the alternative,
Ho : PI "# -P2
Here, we formulate the null as,
H=[I o 0] ¢1~ ~ and ¢=[:J
VII.40
which yields a cointegrating vector W= (-<1>1 <1>1 <1>2 <1>3) to be estimated by the data.
Combining the cointegrating vector with Xt _2 yields a long run relationship (-<I>l lnP20
+ <l>l lnRN + < l > 2 ~ l n n + <1>3) which having normalised on land prices gives,
(-lnP20 + InRN + < l > 2 / < I > I ~ l n n + <1>3/<1>1)
The Pmatrix under this restriction is estimated as,
-1.0228
(-1.0000)
1.0228
(1.0000)
4.8213
(4.7140)
3.3936
(3.3181)
where the figures in brackets are coefficients normalised on the coefficient on InP20
being minus one. Imposing the unit elasticity restriction has increased the normalised
coefficient on inflation from 4.190 to 4.714. The likelihood ratio test for the validity of
this restriction, given by (VII.20) yields a test statistic of 2.72 which follows a x2(l )
distribution under the null. Critical values at the 5% and 10% significance level are 3.84
and 2.71 respectively and thus the test statistic is on the 10% borderline. If we are
prepared to assume that the coefficent is not significantly different from one this result
implies that the long run unit elasticity of rents to land price is congruent with the data,
or more specifically, that the coefficients given above span the cointegrating space.
We may turn our attention to hypotheses concerning the vector of loadings given by al
in Table VII.6. Ideally, we wish to test whether the second and third coefficients in this
vector are simultaneously zero in the VAR using the tests described above.
Unfortunately, tests on the loading vector cannot be conducted with the software
currently available, although we may throw some light on this problem by estimating
the equations in the VAR separately and looking at the t ratio on the loading coefficient
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in each equation. Re-estimating the three ECM equations of the VAR given by (VILlI)
separately using the residuals of the cointegrating vector from the Johansen procedure
normalised on land prices suggests that the loading coefficients are statistically
significant in the land price and inflation equations but not in the rent equation.U This
suggests that the long run relationship is not important in determining rents but that it is
in determining land prices and inflation. The influence of rents and land prices on
inflation at first sight seems somewhat curious, since one might not expect such a small
market to have a significant influence on GOP inflation. In the first instance, one might
reasonably assume that the small loading coefficient in the inflation equation is simply
an estimate of zero although the statistical significance of the coefficient implies this is
not the case. In this light plausible explanations should be sought to account for the
feedback from the land market to general GOP inflation. Two explanations spring to
mind. First, rent and land price trends may be positively correlated with a third
variable, whose influence on inflation may, a priori, be more powerful. At first glance
house prices may seem plausible. Whilst there seems no reason to believe that returns
to farming (as embodied in cash rents) and home ownership are correlated it could be
that land price and house prices are correlated since investment value is likely to be a
motivation for purchase in both markets. Another, and perhaps more plausible reason
may lie in the notion that rents and thus land prices embody the price movements for a
whole host of commodities such as those which comprise the inputs and outputs to the
agricultural sector. Thus if, as the thrust of this thesis suggests, land prices are
ultimately determined by agricultural input-output price ratios this second explanation
may well be a more credible argument. However, given that single equation estimation
of the three equations that make up the VAR ignores any cross equational constraints
the result obtained here may be refuted by the more formal methods described in the last
section. This is an issue that will be addressed in future research.
The third hypothesis that we may wish to test concerns the comparability of the long
run relationship estimated from the Engle and Granger static regression and the
maximum likelihood technique of Johansen. As set out in the previous section, we may
test whether a set of estimates span the cointegrating space by imposing restrictions on
the estimated pmatrix. The estimates of the static regression were,
InP20 = 2.24 + 1.291nRN + 2 . 4 4 ~ l n n
Imposing the restriction that under the null ~ = H4>, i.e.,
23 The respective t ratios are -4.62, -1.49 and 3.32.
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[
- 0.551
+ -0.081
0.115
_ [ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ] [ ¢ 1 1~ ~ 2.440 ¢2
o 1
the VAR is estimated. This yields a new set of eigenvalues which are substituted into
(VII.20) gives a test statistic of 11.06. Under the null the statistic folows a c2(3)_
distribution and has 5% and 10% critical values of 7.81 and 9.34 respectively.
Consequently the estimates of the Engle and Granger cointegrating regression do not
span the cointegrating space identified using the Johansen procedure. Two reasons may
account for the discrepancy. First, it may be that single equation estimation is
inappropriate, as implied by the exogeneity results above. Second, the exclusion of the
short run dynamics in the Engle and Granger approach may have a non-trivial effect on
the estimation of the parameters in the static regression. Whilst this effect diminishes
asymptotically, given the relatively small sample size and the large outlying observation
for 1972, it may be relevant in this case and indicate the benefits of using the VAR
approach in which the dynamics and outliers are taken into account in the estimation of
the long run relationship.ln any case, the message that seems to be emerging is that the
static regression does not represent a vaild simplification of the VAR and thus our
attention continues to be focussed on the ECM estimated within the VAR
framework. 24
The VAR(2) model of equation (VIl.ll) estimated using the Johansen procedure (in
which the constant has been restricted to enter via the long run relationship only), i.e.,
M t = r1M t - 1+ nx l -2 + <DZ1 + E1
may be written in its full form as,
[ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ] = [ ~ o o g ; ; ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ ] [ ~ : : : " ~ I I ] + [ ~ O ~ ; 5 ] Z ZL\ 21nF; 0.045 -0.065 -0.416 L\21nF; -1 0.035
1nP20t - 2
0.648 2.307 1.414 ] InRNt - 20.095 0.3339 0.208
O 296 L\lnf;-2-0.136 -0.483 -.
1
where Z, is a dummy variable for 1972 and the (3 * 4) matrix of coefficients on the
second line is the long fun matrix Il, the first row and column of which contains the
24 Furth .. . cd i order to have confidence in the assertion and will be conducted whener testing IS rcquir In
the software becomes available.
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(d) Interpreting the Land Price Error Correction Model
Focussing on the land price ECM, that has been estimated in the unrestricted VAR(2)
above, we have a long run or cointegrating relationship given by,
InP20 = 2.568 + 1.1771nRN + 4 . 1 1 9 ~ l n n
Antilogging (VII.30) we have,
P20 = 13.03 * RNl.l77 * e ~ l n F 4 . 1 1 1
(VII.30)
(VII.31 )
(VII.34)
Recall that the constant term of the cointegrating vector represents the log of the real
capitalisation rate of annual rents into land values. Denoting the long run or equilibrium
real discount rate by r then, 1/r = 13.03 implying that r = 1/13.03 = 0.077, i.e.the real
rate of discount is 7.7% in the land market. Whilst this result is plausible it appears to
be rather high. Note however that the unit elasticity coefficient between rent and land
prices could not be rejected at the 5% level in the VAR implying that 1.177 is a
plausible estimate of unity. The long run cointegrating relationship estimated in the
VAR under the unit elasticity restriction was,
InP20 = 3.318 + InRN + 4 . 7 1 4 0 ~ l n n (VII.32)
Antilogging (VII.32) we have,
P20 = 27.61 * RN * e ~ l n F 4 . 1 1 1 (VIL33)
from which the long run real rate of discount r = 1/27.61 = 0.036, i.e. 3.6%. This
lower figure seems more likely, and accords well with real rates of discount obtained in
Chapter IV that were estimated to be around 3% and also those estimated by Burt
(1986) in his study of the land market in the United States, which were around 4%.
Furthermore, (VIL33) implies a long run inflation elasticity of 0.31 at the mean values,
suggesting that in the long run real land prices are affected little by changes in
inflation.25
Using the estimate of the long run relationship given by (VII.32) which is denoted by
Wt and noting that the coefficient of the explanatory variable .1lnP20t_1 in the VAR is
simply an estimate of zero we have the final error correction formulation of the land
price equation,
.11nP20t = 1.401.11nRNt_ 1 + 1.80 1~ 2 1 n F t _ _ - 0.543Wt-2 + 0.5052t
(3.22) (2.40) (5.33) (4.60)
25 Given that equation (VII.32) is scmilogarithmic with respect to inflation, the elasticity of land
prices with respect to inflation is calculated as 4.714(0.066) =0.31, where 0.066 is the mean level
of inflation.
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Figure VII.I is a plot of fitted and actual land values using (VII.24) which tracks the
growth rate of land prices reasonably well, particularly so given the parsimonious
nature of the estimating equation.
Figure VII.t : Fitted and Actual Values of the ECM for ~ l n P 2 2
t
---a- Pined
• Actual
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
The coefficient on W I -2 in (VII.34) represents the degree to which disequilibrium
prices are adjusted in the following year: hence on average approximately half of any
disequilibrium pricing is corrected for in anyone year, i.e the half life of the
adjustment process is about one. Bearing in mind that the point estimate has a 95%
confidence interval of 0.34 to 0.74 the half life is around 2 years and 9 months
respectively. 26
Turning now to the dynamic behaviour of land prices in response to changes in rents
and inflation, the point estimates of equation (VII.34) imply that on average land prices
initially overshoot the equilibrium value in response to changes in (lagged) rents and
(lagged) changes in inflation. Whilst an ex post rationalisation of dynamic responses
is invariably conjectural, it seems plausible that the initial overshooting with respect to
inflation, as implied by the coefficient of 1.80 I in (VII.34), reflects the speculative
behaviour of institutional investors, who are invariably interested in farmland as an
26 In order to accomplish 95% of any disequilibrium takes four years when the adjusunent coefficient
is 0.551; seven and a half years at 0.34; and two years at 0.74.
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inflation hedge; or in other words, the real capital gain on land viz-a-viz other assets.
Given that even marginal changes to the investment portfolios of the large institutional
investors can have significant effects on the average price of farmland (See Munton
1975) the speculative nature of this demand may well induce a transient over-reaction in
land prices. The model suggests that if there is a 1% rise (fall) in the rate of inflation,
ceteris paribus, land prices rise in the following year by 1.8% overshooting the long
run level which is only 0.3% above (below) the original equilibrium. If inflation is
maintained at its new higher level then, ceteris paribus, land price falls in response to
the disequilibrium pricing until it is some 0.3% higher than the previous equilibrium; a
process that will take around three years.
The affect of real rent changes on land prices In the short run (as given by the
coefficient of lAO 1) is sufficiently close to the long run response (of one) to indicate
that the apparent overshoot is merely due to sampling error, and thus it seems
reasonable to infer that short and long run effects to real rent changes are the same. 27
(e) Cointegration in the Historical Time Series
We now proceed to examine whether the same relationship that is identified over the
post-war period holds over the much larger sample spanned by the Oxford Institute
land price series. The sample comprises 120 observations over the years 1871 to 1990
and is thus nearly three times as long as the MAFF based data used previously. From a
methodological point of view, the use of long time series for the purposes of estimation
is beneficial although in practise such series are frequently quite troublesome since they
span a number of volatile periods in economic history. Here, there is the Great
Depression of UK agriculture in the 1880s, the commodity price collapse in the early
1920s, two World Wars, the Great Depression as well as the oil price shock and land
price boom in the 1970s. These 'unusual' events produce large numbers of outliers
with the result that the empirical distribution of each series is charactersied by long tails.
This has implications for the statistical procedures which assume that the frequency
distributions are normal. Here, judicious use of dummy variables induces normality in
the landprice and rent series although this is not possible to do the same for inflation
which remains non-normally distributed in VARs upto 6 lags in length. Table VII.8
reports some tests for normality and independence for the VAR(2) specification, which
will be adopted in the estimation despite violating the normality assumption since it is
the most parsimonious VAR to induce normally distributed independent residuals in the
27 OLS estimation of (20) cannot reject the hypothesis that 1.401 is significanLly different from one.
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land price and rent series. The ~ l n P P regression includes a dummy for 1972; the
~ l n R R regression uses dummies for 1917, 1921, 1922, 1935 and 1936; and the
~ 2 l n F F regression uses dummies for 1917, 1921, 1922 and 1975.
The non-normality of the inflation variable is evident from the Jarque-Bera test statistic
of 18.98 in Table VII.8.
Table VII.8 : Some Test Statistics for the niid Assumption for the
Residuals in (5) with k =2 for the Trivariate Model
B-J S EK Q*(1) Q*(5) Q*(10)
~ l n P X X 3.08 -0.18 0.71 0.22 4.28 12.61
~ l n R H H 1.09 -0.13 0.38 0.26 2.15 9.18
~ 2 1 n n 18.98 -0.10 1.96 0.50 3.86 7.09I
90% CV 4.60 2.71 9.24 15.99
95% CV 5.99 3.84 11.07 18.30
where 1-B is the 1arque-Bera (1980) statistic approx distributed as X2 (2) under the null of normality
S is the coefficient of skewness which is zero for the normal distribution
EK is the coefficient of excess kurtosis which is zero for the normal distribution
Q*(k) is the Ljung- Box (1978) statistic for serial correlation in the residuals, approx
distributed as a X2 (k) under the null of no serial correlation. 5% and 10% critical values are
in bold where they apply.
The non-normality is almost entirely due to excess kurtosis, as we might have expected
given the discussion above. A priori, one would expect that the test statistics for
cointegration and parameter estimates would be more robust in the presence of excess
kurtosis than skewness, since kurtosis should only affect the variances of the estimates
whereas skew would imply bias aswell. However, an examination of the behaviour of
the cointegrating test statistics in the presence of departures from the nid assumptions
has not yet been published, thus the results should be treated with some caution.
We begin by testing for the presence of linear trend in the variables expressed in levels.
The test statistic using (VII. 19) is calculated as,
= -117 (In(0.753/0.757) + In(0.890/0.893) + In(0.953/0.963)}
= 2.68
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which is distributed as X2 (2) under the null of no linear trends. The 5% critical value is
5.99 hence we cannot reject the null. The test statistics for cointegration in the VAR
where the constant is restricted solely to the cointegrating vector are reported in Table
VII.9. At the 95% confidence level the trace and maximal eigenvalue statistics suggest
that a single cointegrating vector is present, although the null hypothesis of two
cointegrating vectors is rejected at the 90% level. However, a simple inspection of the
residuals from each of the cointegrating vectors confirms the presence of a single
cointegrating vector since PI is the only vector with anything like stationary residuals.
Table VII.9 : Trace and Maximal Eigenvlaue Statistics for the Trivariate
VAR(2) (Restricted Constant) Model
Trace 95% 90% Am ax 95% 90%
Ho HI Ho HI
r ~ ~ ,?,.1 52.90 34.91 32.00 ,=0 r = 1 33.23 22.00 19.77
, ~ ~ ,?,.2 19.67 19.96 17.85 r = 1 r= 2 13.98 15.67 13.75
, ~ ~ ,?,.3 5.69 9.24 7.53 ,=2 r=3 5.69 9.24 7.53
Table VII. 10 reports the decomposition of the long run matrix Il = up' for the single
cointegrating vector that has been identified above. Focussing on PI it is interesting to
note that whilst the inflation coefficient is over three times the size of the coefficent
estimated over the shorter period, the normalised coefficient on the rent variable (1.18)
is close to unity and almost identical to the estimate generated using the shorter time
series. Estimation of the coinegrating vector subject to the unity elasticity restriction
yields,
(-lnPX + InRH + I 1.66i1lnF)
Testing whether this restricted vector spans the cointegrating space yields a test statistic
of 0.670 which has a X2(l ) 5% critical value 3.84 implying that the restriction is
consonant with the longer data series used here as well.
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Table V11.10 : Estimates of the Cointegrating Vector ~ ~ and Loading
Vector a i in the Trivariate Model
VII.48
Eigenvalue Eigenvector
InPX 0.240
(-1.000)
InRH -0.282
(1.177)
i1lnF -3.061
(12.76)
Constant -0.571
(2.383)
Loading Vector
-0.253
(0.061 )
-0.009
(0.002)
0.130
(-0.031)
Note: The figures in parentheses represent the coefficients in the
cointegrating vectors normalised on the coefficient on InP20 being -1.
In addition we may test whether the coefficients estimated from the MAFF series are
consistent with the data used here. The null hypothesis of equivalence was rejected with
a test statistic of 20.38 which follows a X2(3) distribution under the null - the 5%
critical value being 7.81. This result is not too surprising given the macroeconomic
instability and institutional changes that have taken place between the sample periods.
The stability of the VAR and the effects of the institutional and macroeconomic change
during the earlier part of this long sample clearly requires further investigation and there
seems little virtue in detailed examination of the VAR unless these factors are properly
addressed. Supporting this view is the very low adjustment coefficient in the land price
equation estimated at 0.061, one-ninth of its value in the shorter series and is only
significantly different from zero at the 7% level. As a result we will leave the
cointegration analysis of the longer time series for future research since a proper
examination of issues such as a structural stabililty and violations of normality in the
VAR are beyond the scope of the present study.
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VII.(vii) A Summary of the Results
Cointegration seeks to determine whether a set of variables are linked together in the
long run, as perhaps economic theory or intuition suggest they should. The technique
of cointegration and related concepts such as stationarity, the order of integration and
error correction models serve as useful tools in the estimation of economic
relationships, since they help select from a host of potentially important variables and
inter-relationships those which can plausibly exist; discarding all others as spurious, or
more likely, incomplete explanations of the real world. Furthermore, by incorporating
an estimate of a cointegrating relationship within an error correction model we are able
to attempt to disentangle short run influences from this underlying behaviour of the
variables.
Using two approaches proposed by Engle-Granger and Johansen, the empirical
analysis suggests that the simple bivariate present value model of land prices is under-
parameterised and does not form a cointegrating relationship. Consequently, this result
implies that land prices in England and Wales are not solely explained by their
'agricultural earning potential'. However, if this relationship is augmented with
inflation, the hypothesis of cointegration is supported. Hence, over the post-war period
the I( 1) variables - land prices, rents and inflation form a long run relationship, in that
there is a linear combination of them that is 1(0). Using this model the unit elasticity
hypothesis between annual returns (rents) and asset value (land prices) is confmned to
lie within the cointegrating space and a long run real rate of discount estimated at 3.6%.
The short run dynamic behaviour of land prices with respect to rents is such that
changes in rents are immediately translated into proportionate changes in prices. In
effect, the short run response to rents changes is the long run response. In contrast,
land prices initially over-react to the rate of inflation in the economy since the long run
inflation elasticity is estimated at 0.31, implying that agricultural land prices are
inflation inelastic. Finally, whilst there is evidence to suggest that rents are exogenous
to land prices, inflation appears to be endogenous implying that single equation
estimation of the VAR is inappropriate. Whilst some of these results are echoed using a
much longer sample, the possiblity of structural change and violation of the
assumptions of the statistical analysis undermine the validity of the results and a
detailed examination of this series is left for future research.
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Appendix I :Summary Tabulations of Cointegration Tests
Table AI: Critical values of the CRDW Test Statistic
sample size AR( 1) process
1% 5% 10%
Higher Order Systems
1% 5% 10%
Bivariate Cointegrating Regression
50 1.00 0.78
100 0.51 0.39
200 0.29 0.20
0.69
0.32
0.16
1.49
0.46
0.13
1.03
0.28
0.08
0.83
0.21
0.06
Sources: Engle and Yoo (1987), Hall (1986)
Trivariate Cointegrating Regression
100 0.49 0.37 0.31
Notes
When the variables in the cointegrating regression are assumed to be AR(l) processes, use the critical
values on the left hand side of the table and for higher order processes use those on the right
Table A2: Critical values of the ADF Test Statistic
Maintained model : t 1 1 = ¢ ~ - - + VI
Number of Sample Size Significance Level
Variables
1% 5% 10%
2 50 4.32 3.67 3.28
100 4.07 3.37 3.03
200 4.00 3.37 3.02
3 50 4.84 4.11 3.73
100 5.45 3.93 3.59
200 4.35 3.78 3.47
4 50 4.94 4.35 4.02
100 4.75 4.22 3.89
200 4.70 4.18 3.89
5 50 5.41 4.76 4.42
100 5.18 4.58 4.26
200 5.02 4.48 4.18
Source: Engle and Y00 (1987, p.157)
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Table A3: Critical values of the ADF Test Statistic
4
Maintained Model : t 3 . . = ¢ ¢ - 1 + I s, t 3 . . - i + VI
i = 1
Number of Sample Size Significance Level
Variables
1% 5% 10%
2 50 4.12 3.29 2.90
100 3.73 3.17 2.91
200 3.78 3.25 2.98
3 50 4.45 3.75 3.36
100 4.22 3.62 3.32
200 4.34 3.78 3.51
4 50 4.61 3.98 3.67
100 4.61 4.02 3.71
200 4.72 4.13 3.83
5 50 4.80 4.15 3.85
100 4.98 4.36 4.06
200 4.97 4.43 4.14
Source: Engle and Yoo (1987, p.158)
Table A4: Critical Values for Johansen Procedure (no Linear Trends)
Maintained model: Sx, = r I t3.xt-1 + ... +r k-l t3.xt-k + I + r kXt-k + Et
n-r Trace Statistic
90% 95% 99%
Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic
90% 95% 99%
1
2
3
4
5
7.56
17.96
32.09
49.93
71.47
9.09
20.17
35.07
53.35
75.33
12.74
24.99
40.20
60.05
82.97
7.56
13.78
19.80
25.61
31.59
9.09
15.75
21.89
28.17
33.40
12.74
19.83
26.41
33.12
39.67
Source:Johansen and Juselius (1990, Table A3)
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Table AS: Critical Values for Johansen Procedure (Linear trends)
Maintained model: Sx, = J.1 + f1lut_ 1 + ... +rk-llut-k+l + fkxt_k + Er
r Trace Statistic Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic
90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99%
1 6.69 8.08 11.58 6.69 8.08 11.58
2 15.58 17.84 21.96 12.78 14.60 18.78
3 28.44 31.56 37.29 18.60 21.28 26.15
4 45.25 48.42 55.55 24.92 27.34 32.62
5 65.96 69.98 77.91 30.82 33.26 38.86
Source:Johansen and Juselius (1990, Table A2)
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(A2.l)
Appendix II : Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the VAR
The method of estimation aims to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of a,p and 0 in
equation (VII.8) To do this the likelihood function is initially concentrated with respect
to the free parameters, - those parameters which cointegration does not impose
restrictions on - namely the coefficients of u, <1> and r i, (i = 1, 2, ... , k-l ) by
regressing.
f:,.X t on f:,.X t-l' f:,.X t-2' f:,.X t-k+ 1, constant and Zl"
and
X t-k on f:,.X t _1 , f:,.X t_2 , f:,.X t_k +1, constant and t.;
giving residual vectors ROt and R kt respectively. The likelihood function can then be
written as being proportional to,
L(a, f3, 0) = 101-TI2 e x p { - - ±( ~ ~ + af3' Rt)' 0- 1 ( ~ ~ + af3' Rt)}
2 t = 1
Regressing ROt on -W R kt allows (A2.1) to be maximised over a and 0 for a fixed p.
Thus, establishing the first order conditions,
o'lnL = o'lnL =0
da ()Q
expressions for a(f3) and Q(f3) are given as,
fx(f3) = -SOk f3(f3' Skk f3r l
and
(A2.2)
(A2.3)
i, j = 0, k
which are expressed in terms of the product moment matrices of the residual vectors
which are calculated as,
T
s., = T 1 L Rtt ~ ~ I
t = 1
Substituting (A2.2) and (A2.3) into (A2.l) the concentrated likelihood function
collapses to,
L(f3) = In(f3)I-T12 = Isoo -Sokf3(f3'Skkf3r l {3'skol-T/2 (A2A)
entailing that maximising (A2A) with respect to pis equivalent to minimising In(jJ)1 .
The estimation of pproceeds by proving that
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and noting that
If3' Skk13 - Sk0 Si/o Sok131
1f3' s.. 131
may be minimised by solving the generalised eigenvalue problem,
us.. -SkO SOlO SOk I=0
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This solution gives n ordered eigenvalues Xl > X2 > ... > ~ of SkO SOlO SDk with
respect to Skk and n corresponding eigenvectors V= (VI, V2, ... , Vo ) normalised
such that V' Skk V= I where the maximum likelihood estimates of the matrix ~ ~ are the
first r eigenvectors of SkO SOlO SOk with respect to Skk i.e . fi = (VI, V2, ... , v
r
)
under the null n = ap'.
In order to obtain estimates of a and .0 the estimate of ~ is substituted back into (A2.2)
and (A2.3). The maximised likelihood function becomes,
r
-2/T I" I IT"~ a a = .0(13) = ISoo I (1- Ad
i = I (A2.5)
which may be compared to the likelihood obtained in the absence of the constraint that
n = ap', in which case r = n and ~ = I. Substituting these equalities into expressions
for a(f3) and 0.(13) the maximised likelihood becomes,
n
L ; ; ~ ~ = ISoo IIT(1 - id
i = I (A2.6)
The ratio of the two likelihoods, in (A2.S) and (A2.6) provides a simple test statistic
(called the trace statistic) for the number of cointegrating vectors and takes the form,
n
-2ln(Q) = -T I In(1-i)
i =r+ I
"
This likelihood ratio statistic tests that there at most r cointegrating vectors, where At
i =r + 1 to n are the n - r smallest eigenvalues.
In a similar vein a second statistic for the number of cointegrating vectors may be
constructed, (called the maximal eigenvalue statistic) in which the likelihood under the
null of r cointegrating vectors is compared to that when there are r + 1, and is given
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by,
"
-2ln(Q) = -Tln(l - Ar + 1 )
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The critical values of these tests are not distributed as X2 even asymptotically but as
multivariate versions of the Dickey-Fuller distribution, although critical values have
been tabulated by monte carlo simulation and are presented in Johansen and Juselius
(1990). Test statistics larger than the appropriate critical value signal a rejection of the
respective null hypotheses.
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Univariate Forecasting Models
VIII. 1
VIII.(i) Introduction
The econometric models presented so far have attempted to estimate the parameters of a
structural model using explanatory variables posited by economic theory. Whilst such
structural econometric models illuminate the mechanics of economic relationships and
allow for the testing of hypotheses arising from them, such models are frequently
impotent for the purpose of forecasting the variable of interest, since it is generally
necessary to obtain forecasts of each of the explanatory variables that also appear in the
model. Not only does this impose considerable demands on resources but also implies
that errors in forecasting the explanatory variables are subsequently compounded into
the forecast of the variable of primary interest. As a result specific models are
developed for the purpose of forecasting to which attention now turns.
In contrast to econometric models, those used for forecasting neither possess an
economic structure nor explanatory variables but attempt to 'explain' the series of
interest purely in terms of its past behaviour. Forecasting models fall into one of two
categories: deterministic and stochastic, although the former class of models will not be
considered here due to their inherent deficiencies. 1
Stochastic time-series models develop from the presumption that the series of interest
has been generated (or may be approximated) by some form of random or stochastic
process possessing a definite structure. Using the only realisation of the series
available, (the sample data), this structure may be identified and its parameters
estimated, so that future values may then be forecast purely from the series past
behaviour, obviating the need for explanatory variables. The methodology adopted in
this chapter was first proposed by Box and Jenkins (1970) and uses a tractable class of
Deterministic forecasting tools include models of Classical Decomposition and the simple
extrapolation and moving average models. Whilst quick and easy to implement their rather ad hoc
and deterministic nature are disquieting features and limits their applicability to situations in
which time and expertise is lacking. However, their most serious drawback relates to the fact that
because of their deterministic nature, standard errors and confidence intervals arc not generated.
Clearly, where policy making is concerned, margins of error are frequently as important as the
point estimates produced. For an introductory review of these deterministic models sec, Pindyck
and Rubinfeld (1981).
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linear models for the analysis of univariate time series, called integrated autoregressive
moving average or ARIMA models. Despite having little or no economic interpretation
ARIMA models describe the properties of a time series sufficiently well to yield
forecasting models that typically perform well over short forecasting horizons.
This Chapter contains ten Sections and one Appendix. Section (ii) gives an overview of
the steps involved in ARIMA modelling and in Section (iii) the characteristics of some
parsimonious ARIMA are discussed. Sections (iv) to (vii) explore each of the steps
introduced in Section (ii), namely, identification, estimation, diagnostic checking and
forecasting. Sections (viii) and (ix) contain the empirical analysis and finally some
concluding remarks are made in Section (x). The Appendix to this Chapter is a
simulation exercise in which identification of the linear models introduced in section
(iii) is attempted using artificially generated data.
VIII.(ii) The ARIMA Methodology
Box and Jenkins (1970) propose a model building strategy that is illustrated in Figure
VIlLI. It comprises four sequentially discrete but closely inter-related stages, namely
identification, parameter estimation, diagnostic checking and forecasting.
Figure VIII.! : The Box-Jenkins Strategy
Identify Estimate Model I---i Diagnostic~ Model r----+ Parameters Checking
1
SpccificaLion Acceptable?
1 1
No Yes
J 1
Forecast
., d t f forecasts h periods into theClearly, the object of the exercise IS to pro uce a se 0
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future. However, the forecasters first task is to identify the structure of the process that
is believed to be generating the data. Once a model or estimate of this structure is
determined, the parameters of the model are then estimated using the sample data so as
to minimise the sum of squared residuals, in a manner analogous to regression.
Following the estimation exercise a number of diagnostic tests are performed to ensure
that the model chosen is an acceptable representation of the process generating the data.
Should the diagnostic testing suggest that the model is an inadequate representation, the
identification stage is repeated and a new estimate of the structure identified and
estimated. Once an adequate specification has been identified and estimated the model is
then used to produce forecasts.
(a) The Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Functions
In order to explore the characteristics of different stochastic models it is necessary to
begin by discussing the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation
function (PACF) - which are used as important tools for identifying the most
appropriate model of an empirical time series. The ACF was introduced in Chapter VI
where it was examined in some detail with respect to stationarity. To recap, the ACF
describes the degree of association or the nature of the bonding between observations in
the same time series and is computed as,
Yk cov(Yt,Yt- k )
rk = - = -;::================
Yo Jvar(Yt) var(Yt- k )
where,
and,
where J1 is the mean of the process. In standardising the covariance between Y, and
Yt-k by the variance of the series, the autocorrelation function generates k
autocorrelation coefficients (rk) such that, -1 > rk < +1. Using estimates of the mean,
variance and covariance from the sample of observations available, a sample ACF can
be derived. To aid the interpretation of the sample ACF the Tk are typically plotted
against the length of lag k on a correlogram.
In order to introduce some objectivity into the interpretation of the ACF a number of
tests have been developed to test for the significance of successive autocorrelation
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~ [ [ +2 ±if]
n k= I
coefficients and most computer packages typically superimpose the standard error
bands on the correlogram to aid identification of the number of significant
autocorrelations. Barlett (1946) has shown that the standard error of ik for a stationary
normal process is approximately equal to,
(VIlLI)
for lags k > q.2 Consequently, if an autocorrelation coefficient assumes a value
greater (in absolute terms) than twice its standard error given by (VIlLI) this suggests
that it is significantly different from zero. Testing the significance of i
k
therefore
requires the inclusion of all previous autocorrelation coefficients, that is i j ~ i = 1, 2,
.. k-l.
Another tool frequently used in the model identification phase is the partial
autocorrelation function (PACF) and the partial autocorrelation coefficients it generates.
Since, in time series analysis, a large proportion of the correlation between Yl -k and
Yl may be due to the correlation these variables have with the intervening lags (Yl -
j,Yt -2,. .. Yt -k+ j) the partial autocorrelation coefficient at lag k, denoted ¢k is
frequently used to adjust for this correlation as it is a measure of the extra information
Yl -k contributes to Yl after the influences of Yl - j , Yl -b ... Yt -k+ j have been taken
into account. Consequently, partial coefficients are simply the coefficients of a multiple
linear autoregression of Yl on its lagged values, i.e.
Y l = <PI Yl - } + <P2 YI-2 + ... + ¢kYI-k e, (VIII.2)
As the order of the autoregression is unknown, obtaining the partial autocorrelation
coefficients requires fitting autoregressive models of increasing order to the sample
data: the estimate of the last coefficient in each model gives a measure of the partial
autocorrelation. Using a t test, the significance of the kth coefficient in each case can
be determined, and hence the correct order of the autoregression.
Alternatively, we may exploit a useful relationship between the partial autocorrelations
(¢k) and the autocorrelation coefficients (rk)' Noting that the autocovariances for lags
k in a pili order autoregression are calculated from,
n =E[ Yr - k (<PI Yr- I + ¢2 Yr- 2 + . . . + <pp Yr- p + E, )]
then, letting k = 0, 1, ... ,p results in p + 1 difference equations that may be solved
2 If the sample size T is large the sample estimates of 'fk will be approximately normally
distributed with standard error T-I/2. This large sample approximation is used in Appendix I to
calculate the significance of coefficients in both the ACFsand PACFs.
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simultaneously for the autocovariances Yo, Yl' ... ,Yp to yield,
ID = ¢1 }'t + l/>2 Y2 + . . . + ¢p YP + ~
l'1 = <I>t ID + l/>2 YI + . . . + ¢p }p - 1 + ~
...............................................
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and for lags k greater than p the autocovariances follow the equation,
}i = <I>t }i - 1 + l/>2 Yk - 2 + . . . + ¢p Yk - p (VII!.3)
If these equations are now divided by Yo we are left with a set of p equations called
the Yule-Walker equations that determine the first p values of the autocorrelation
function,
....................................................
and from (VII!.3) we have the autocorrelation coefficients for lags k greater than p,
ric = ¢1 ric - 1 + fh ric - 2 + . . . + ¢p ric - p
Now, if the autocorrelation coefficients are known or can be estimated from calculation
of the sample ACF then the Yule -Walker Equations can be solved to yield estimates of
the partial autocorrelation coefficients (¢o, ¢1' ... '¢p)' Again however this
requires prior knowledge of the order of the autoregression p which will not be
known. Hence, a recursive approach is necessary in which we solve the Yule-Walker
equations for successive values of p until the ¢p+l coefficient is insignificantly
different from zero. Hence, assuming that p = 1, the Yule-Walker equations are
solved, resulting in ¢J = rJ. If ¢1 is significantly different from zero then the
autoregressive process must be at least of order one. The procedure is then repeated
under the assumption thatp = 2, and the Yule-Walker equations solved to yield values
of ¢1' and 4>2' If the estimate of ¢2 is significantly different from zero then the
process is at least of order 2, although if it is not, it can be concluded that p = 1. In
practice the recursion continues k times so that k partial autocorrelations have been
generated, although only the first p of them will be significantly different from zero.
Using the sample of data at hand estimates of the coefficients above may be produced.
Again, the estimated coefficients of the sample PACF, ¢Jc are plotted against lag k on
a graph similar to the correlogram - the partial correlogram.
In fact the above computation is simplified by using a recursion proposed by Durbin
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(1960). H e r ~ ~ e s t i ~ a t e e of the ¢k coefficients in the equations that make up (VIII.2)
may be denved USIng the following updating equations, where hats denote sample
estimates, ¢k =¢kk and ¢kj denotes the other ¢k's so that for each equation j = 1,2, .
. . , k-l.
(VIllA)
Equation (VIllA) will be used later to derive the partial autocorrelation coefficients
from the models discussed in the following sections.
To aid identification of the order of an autoregressive process we need to test the
significance of each estimated partial autocorrelation coefficient, ¢k . Quenouille has
shown that under the hypothesis that the process is one of pure autoregression of order
p, the partial autocorrelation coefficients of order p +1 and above are independently
distributed with a standard error given by,
for k > p+ 1
and most computer packages provide the two standard error bands for identification of
significant partial autocorrelations.
VIII.(iii) Linear Time Series Models
This section describes the three types of linear stochastic models that comprise a general
framework for the 'Box-Jenkins' modelling of stationary univariate time series;
namely, moving average (MA), autoregressive (AR) and mixed (ARMA) models. The
assumption of a linear functional form simplifies the analytical process and facilitates
the use of standard statistical theory to produce confidence intervals for the estimated
parameters and forecasts. Since linear relationships (involving fixed parameters) are
used to estimate the underlying stochastic structure of the data generating process, it
follows that the process must exhibit stable time series properties, and thus the series to
be modelled must be stationary, as descri bed in Chapter VI. Although we will return to
the question of stationarity in Section (d) it is assumed for the time being that all series
are stationary.
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The simplest stochastic model describes a purely random series, that is,
r, = £[
where £t is a white noise process in which every observation is independently and
identically distributed through time with zero mean and constant' .
vanance, l.e. £t
i.i.d.(O, (5/). Such a series is shown in Figure VIII.2. Since each observation is
independent of all others the covariance between any two observations in the series is
zero, i.e. Yk = ( £t' £t-k) = 0, for all non-zero k. Consequently, knowledge of the
past cannot assist in forecasting future values of the series and the best forecast is its
mathematical expectation, which is zero.
Figure VIII.2: Time series of an i.i.d.(O,l) Variable
3
2
o
-1
-2
-3 -t------G-----......-----....---------,..------
o 20 40 60 80 100
Despite being quite rare in economics the white noise process is of fundamental
importance to stochastic modelling as every stochastic series is viewed as being the
outcome of a linear transformation of random innovations. Consequently, white noise
is perceived as the driving force behind all stochastic models since a weighted
accumulation of random innovations provide a good representation of many commonly
found non-white series as will be demonstrated below. The first step of time series
modelling is therefore to identify the linear filter that transforms white process to one
that is nonwhite. Attention now focuses on the three classes of linear filters.
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(a) Moving Average Models
Given that all stationary stochastic processes can be viewed as being the accumulation
of random innovations, the simplest form of linear filter is that represented by the
moving average model in which each observation Y{ is generated purely by a weighted
average of current and lagged random disturbances. The order (q) of a MA process
specifies the number of lagged disturbance terms that affect each observation. Thus the
MA(q) process is denoted as,
Y{ =j1+£,-81£'-1-82E1-2-" .-8q E1 - q (VIII.5)
where the parameters of the model, 81, ... 8q are the weights assigned to the
random innovations in the process £t and £{ i.i.d.(O, a/). Given this structure it is
easy to see that all MA processes must be stationary by definition since the mean value
of Yt in (VIII.5) is the constant j1 and variance is given by,
var(Yr ) = Yo = E[(\ -j1)2J
= E(£,2 + 8y £,2_ 1 + . . . + ~ c1- q - 281t1 £1-1- . . .)
= ~ + e t ~ ~ ... + 8 ~ ~
= ~ (1 + 8r + 8 8 + . . . + 8 ~ ~
which is also a constant. The covariance of Yt is also invariant to time, depending only
on the distance between the two observations, k and the order of the MA process, q,
Yk = (8 k + 81 8k + 1 + ... + 8q - k 8q )dc k = 1,.. .,q
Yk =0 k>q
As a result it is clear that any MA process satisfies the conditions of stationarity
discussed at some length in Chapter VI.
For simplicity the MA(q) is frequently written in the form,
Yt = 8(B )Et
where B represents a polynomial of order q i.e,
8(B) = 1 - 8 jB -82B2 - ... -8qB
q
and is called the moving average operator. Furthermore it is sometimes necessary to
express the moving average process in autoregressive form i.e.
e, = (J 1(B)Y t
that is,
1 8- l y£, = Yr + 8l1Yr _ 1 + £Ji Yr - 2 + ... + q r-q
This now implies that for every moving average process there is a u n i q ~ ~
autocorrelation function. However, this may not necessarily be the case unless certain
Forecasting VIII. 9
restrictions are imposed on the MA parameters; where these conditions are satisfied the
MA process is said to be invertible. It will suffice to state here that imposition of the
invertibility constraint ensures that there is a unique moving average process for a given
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function.
It is now appropriate to consider some simple moving average processes and in
particular analyse their mean, variance and autocorrelation function. These statistics
represent artefacts that may be analysed to aid identification of the process generating
the data at hand. In Appendix I the ACF and PACF of the processes reviewed below
are examined to identify the order of the process from a sample of observations which
have been generated artificially from known data generating processes. It is fortunate
that in practice one is only concerned with MA models of low order, typically 1 or 2
and so the presentation of MA models will be confined to these two processes.
(0 Moving Average Process of Order 1 :MA(1)
The MA( 1) process is expressed by the equation,
Y1 = J1 + Et - 81 £'-1 (VIII.6)
Dwelling on (VIII.6) for a moment it is evident that as 81 approaches -1 the series
assumes a smooth appearance, whereas when 81 tends toward unity the series will
appear even more erratic than a random series. It is clear that this process has mean )1
and variance given by,
var(Y,) = Yo = E[ ( ( -)1)2J
= EC£,2 + eT £,2_ I - 281 e; e : d
= dO + (1)
Its autocovariance at lag one is,
YI = E[ ( ( -J 1 ) ( ( - )1)J
= E[C& - 8\ &-1 )(Et-I - 81&-2)J
= -8 1 d
and in general for a k lag displacement in time it is,
I1c = E[ (& - 8I & - I )(Et -k - 8I & -k-dJ
= 0 for k > 1
Recalling that the autocorrelation function for a stationary process is simply the
autocovariance at lag k divided by the variance, the ACF of a MA( I) process is,
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'[k = - = k = 1
Yo 1+ 8r
= 0 for k > 1
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It is evident therefore that the MA(l) process has a covariance and thus ACF that
vanishes to zero for lags greater than one, so that the process has a memory of only
one period. As a result Yt is correlated with Yt -J and raj but no other observation in
the series, so that events occurring more than one period ago are irrelevant to the
current observation. The fact that the autocorrelation function cuts-off at lag one is a
useful artefact that can be detected simply by observing the correlogram. Notice
however that the solution of '[1 above is a quadratic in 81 and hence may be rewritten
as the quadratic equation,
88r + _1 + 1 = 0
'[1
so that a given value of '[1 will be associated with two different values of the parameter
81, In order to ensure that the autocorrelation function implies a unique value of 81
and hence a unique data generating process, it is necessary to invoke the invertibility
condition, which for the MA(l) model is simply -1< 81 < 1.3
Focussing on the ACF for the theoretical MA( 1) process it is evident that substituting
values of 81 with the range admissible for invertibility imposes bounds in which 't'1
may lie: specifically, -0.5 < 't'1 < 0.5
It should also be noted that the PACF for the MA( 1) process may bederived as,
-8dl- 8r)
¢k = [1 - 8i (k + 1) ]
which although not easily apparent, results in a exponential decline to zero as k
increases, in stark contrast to the sharp cut-off exhibited by the ACF for this process.
(See Appendix I).
(ii) Moving Average Process ofOrder two: MA(2)
The MA(2) process is expressed as,
Y, = J.1 +£, - 81e.: 1 - 82 £,- 2
3 Also note that an important reason for restricting attention to invertible processes is that non-
" . . , If f t Sec Harvey (1981) pp 161 for a discussion ofinvertible processes give nsc to me icicnt orecas s. .
this point.
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ith d vari 2 2 2WI mean J1 an vanance a: (1 + 81 + 82 ) and covariance at lag one given by,
Yl = E[(C1- 81C1-1 - 82C1 - 2)(C1 - 1 - 81 C1-2 - 82C1 - 3)]
= -81 if + 81 82 if
=- 8d I - 82 ) if
and at lag two by,
12 =E[(t;- 81 C1-1 - 82C1 - 2)(C1 - 2 - 81 C1-3 - 82C1 - 4 ) ]
= -82 if
and Yk = 0 for k > 2.
From the above equations we may calculate the autocorrelation function of an MA(2)
as,
-81(1- ( 2 )r1 =----
1+ 8i + 8 8
-82
'lQ =----
1+ 8i + 8 8
13 =0 k>2
From the autocovariance and ACF it is clear that the MA(2) process has a memory of
two periods so that the current observation of Yt is influenced only by the observations
in Y l - } and Yt -2. More generally it can be shown that an MA(q) process has a
memory of precisely q periods with an autocorrelation function such that,
-8k + 81 8k + 1 + , .. + 8q- k 8q
rk = I 82 82 82 k = I,. , , ,q+ 1+2+···+q
=0 k>q
so that the autocorrelation function cuts off at lag q. Indeed, the ACF can be a valuable
tool in the identification of the order of moving average processes, exhibiting
significant spikes for the first k autocorrelations on the correlogram. As in the MA( I)
case the PACF does not exhibit a 'cut-off but declines steadily to zero as k increases.
This systematic decline of MA processes is a general trait and will be portrayed by any
MA(q) process. See Appendix 1.
The restrictions that need to be imposed on the parameters of the MA(2) model to
ensure invertibility may be summarised as,
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81 + 82 < 1
82 - 81 < 1
-1 < 82 < 1
(VIII.7)
where the noise component £1 is assumed white noise, such that e, i.i.d.(O, 0-2 ) .
Assuming that J.1 is zero, (VIII.7) may be more succinctly expressed by,
¢(B)Y1 = £1
where ¢(B)Y1 is the autoregressive operator since (VIII.7) can be rearranged to give,
Y/ - ¢I Yl - I - C/>2 Yl - 2 - . . . - ¢p Yl - P = C1
(1- t/>t B - C/>2 B2 - ••• - ¢p BP) = C1
(b) Autoregressive Models
An alternative class of linear stochastic models is the autoregressive process in which
the current observation is dependent upon its past and a unknown noise term. In
general the autoregressive model of order p, AR(P) is given by,
Yl =J.1 + ¢I Yl - I + C/>2 Y/ - 2 + . . . + ¢p Y/ - P + C1
MA processes are always stationary but must satisfy conditions for invertibility,
whereas AR processes are always invertible but must fulfill conditions to ensure
stationarity. As with moving average processes it is seldom necessary to employ a high
order AR process to model an empirical series and consequently our discussion of
autoregressive processes is limited to second order processes.
(i)Autoregressive Processes ofOrder One: AR(1)
Here, the process generating Y1 is given as,
YI=O+t/>tYI - I+C1
and if stationary the mean of the process should be invariant to time so that,
E[Y/] = E[Y1- 1] = J.1
(VIII.8)
and thus,
o
J1=--1- 81
From (VIII.8) it can be inferred that when ¢I is positive, Y1 will evolve as a relatively
smooth series (compared to white noise) although this will not be the case where ¢I is
negative. From (VIII.8) it is also clear that a sufficient condition for stationarity is
simply that -1 < ¢1 < 1 for if I¢ 11 >1 the process would be explosive, exhibiting
trending over time.f The variance of this process isS,
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Yo = E[Y/] =E[(</>1 Yt - 1 +£,)2J
= E[ < / > r Y t t 1 + c} + 2</>1 Yt- 1E,J = </>f Yo + d-
d
1- </>r
The covariance at lag 1 of Yt about its mean is then,
Yl = E[ Yt - 1(</>1 Yt - 1 + E,)] = </>1 Yo
</>1 d
=
1- </>r
and at lag 2 is,
}2 = E[ Yt - 2 ( </>f Yt - 2 + </>1 e, + </>1 Ct-dJ= </>f Yo
</>r d
=--
1- </>r
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In a similar fashion it is easy to see that the k lag covariance of Y
t
is,
Yk = </>f Yo
</>f d
=--
1- </>f
and the autocorrelation function for the AR( I) process is thus,
Yk krk = - = </>1
Yo
and hence declines geometrically from unity: in a monotonic fashion if </> > 0 and in a
oscillatory manner if </> < O. Moreover, this implies that an AR( 1) process possesses
an infinite memory suggesting that the current value of Yt depends on all past values,
although the weight given to past observations declines geometrically. This can be
demonstrated directly by substitution of past values into (VIII.8), giving,
Yt = </>1 Yt - 1 + E,
= </>1 (</>1 Yt - 2 + E, - 1) + E,
= </>r Yt - 2 + </>1 e : 1 + e,
Repeated substitution for Yt in this manner yields,
Yt =£1 +</>1£1-1 + ... + </>fEr-k +</>k+1Yt_k _ 1 (VIII.9)
If this substitution is continued, then in the limit, the last term in (VIII.9) becomes
4
5
Note however that any autoregressive process is invertible.
Assuming 8 = 0, implies the process has a zero mean and simplifies the following derivation
although does not affect the outcome of the results
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negligible leaving,
00
Yt = L l/>f q-k
k=O
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which is an MA(00) process. Following this reasoning any stationary AR(l) process
has an infinite order moving average representation. More generally it can be shown
that for any stationary AR(P) process there exists an equivalent MA process of infinite
order. The converse is also true, in that any invertible MA(q) process has an equivalent
AR(oo) representation.P
Returning to the AR(l) process we may use equation (VIllA) to determine the partial
autocorrelation function for this process which yields,
¢kk = i 1 k = 1
= 0 k > I
implying that the PACF cuts-off after lag one.
(ii) Autoregressive Process of Order 2 : AR(2)
Here the process generating the data is given by,
Yt = 8+l/>1 Yt - 1+th Yt - 2 +q
and has a mean,
8
J1=----
1 -l/>1 - th
Assuming that d = 0 to simplify the derivation, the variance of this process is given
by,
Yo =E[Yt (<1>1 Yt - 1 + th Yt - 2 + ft)J
= <1>1 Yl + th Y2 + <f
and covariances,
Yl =E[Yt - 1 (<1>1 Yt - l + th Yt - 2 + ft )J
= <1>1 Yo + <f>2 Yl
Y2 = E[Yt - 2 (<1>1 Yt - 1 + <f>2 Yt - 2 + t1)J
= <1>1 Yl + <f>2 Yo
and in general, for k > 2,
Yk = E[Yt - k (<1>1 Yt - 1 + th Yt - 2 + t1)J
=<1>1 Yk - 1 + <l>k - 2 Yo
6 For further details and derivations of these statements see Box and Jenkins, (1970).
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Solving these equations simultaneously yields an expression for Yo purely in terms of
tP1' ¢2 and ()2, from which Y1 and then all other covariances may then be
determined. Dividing Yk by Yo reveals the k autocorrelations of the AR(2) process.
However, we may circumvent these derivations by noting that the autocorrelation
function can be determined directly from the Yule Walker equation,
't'k = ¢1 't'k- 1 + <h 't'k - 2
Putting k = 1 into this equation yields
't'1 = ¢I 10 + <h Ll
Noting from above that 't'o = 1, 't'l = 1>1 and the symmetry of the autocorrelation
coefficients such that 't'1 ='t'-l then,
't' - ¢1
1- 1- <h
For k = 2,
and in general the theoretical autocorrelation function takes the form,
t: - 1>1 k = 1
k: - 1-<h
= 4>1 't'k - 1 + <h 't'k - 2 k > 1
Using equation (VIllA) we may derive the partial autocorrelation function for the
AR(2) process, which assumes the form,
4>1
¢11='t'I=--
1- <h
_!Q.-rf
4>22 - ---
I- 't'l
¢kk =0 k > 2
which implies that there is a cut-off at lag 2 in the partial autocorrelation function of the
AR(2) process. Furthermore, this result holds for the general AR(P) case in that the
PACF cuts off at the pili lag and that the PACF can be a useful tool in determining the
Correctorder of an autoregressive process.
Stationarity in the AR(2) model, which must be achieved in order to obtain the results
outlined above may be summarised as,
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¢1 + cI>2 < 1
cI>2 - ¢1 < 1
-l<cI>2<l
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which are identical to the invertibility conditions imposed on the parameters of the
MA(2) process.
(c) Mixed Processes :ARMA(p,q)
In practice many of the series encountered in economics do not have either a pure
moving average nor pure autoregressive representation since they have both AR and
MA characteristics. In such circumstances it will be necessary to develop a mixed or
hybrid model, which captures these different characteristics; the ARMA process. In
cases where a large number of parameters are needed to estimate a pure MA or AR
model, a hybrid model of low order MA and AR processes frequently leads to a more
parsimonious representation. Parsimony is an advantage where data is scarce, since
fewer parameters have to be estimated from a given sample size, implying that those
estimates will be more efficient, (have lower variance).
Generally the mixed ARMA(p,q) processes assumes the form,
Y, =8+ ¢1 Y,- 1 + cI>2 Y,-2 + ... + ¢p Y,-p + £, - 81£'-1 - 82£'-2 - ... - 8qt1-q (VULlO)
Using the backward shift operator notation introduced earlier, the ARMA (p,q) may be
more succinctly written as,?
¢(B)Y, = 8(B)£,
8(B)y - C
I - ¢(B) '-f
so that the process Yt is the product of a ratio of the two polynomials and the white
noise that drives the process.f In practice, low order ARMA processes characterise
empirical time series sufficiently well to limit consideration to the processes where p,q
< 2. To begin, a few salient points will be made about the ARMA(p,q) process
followed by a look at the ARMA( 1,1) model.
In order for the ARMA(p,q) process to exhibit time invariant first and second moments
and yield a unique ACF and PACF it must be stationary and invertible; or rather the AR
part of the process must be stationary and the MA part of the process must be
7 Theconstant term present in (VIII.l0) is omitted here to ease exposition.
8 Alternatively, the process may be expressed as, £1=4>(B)8(Bt 1ft·
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to be stationary </>(B)-l must converge requiring the roots of the characteristic equation,
¢(B) = 0
= 1- </>1 B - ¢2 B2 - • • • - </>p BP = 0
must all lie outside the unit circle, i.e. the solutions B1, B2, ... Bp must all be
greater than one. In an analogous fashion, the MA part of the process must be invertible
so that the process can be inverted into a purely autoregressive representation,
Et = Yl ¢(B)8(Bf 1
This requires that the roots to the characteristic equation
8(B) =0
= 1- 81 B - 82 B2 - ••. - 8qBq =0
must all lie outside the unit circle, so that the solutions Bl' B2, ... Bq must all be
greater than one.
Returning to (VIII. 10) and taking expectations yields the mean of the ARMA process
given by,
8p=-------
1- </>1 - ¢2 . . . - </>P
Now, the variances, covariances and autocorrelation functions of ARMA(p,q)
processes are solutions to difference equations that cannot be readily solved by
inspection (see Box and Jenkins) although it is useful to note that,
n = </>1 Yk - 1 + ¢2 n-2 +. . . + </>P Yk -P k > q
which implies that,
't"k = ¢I 't"k - 1 + ¢2 't"k - 2 +. . . + ¢p 't"k - p k > q
Recalling that q is the memory of the MA part of the process it is therefore true that for
any ARMA(p,q) its ACF (and autocovariances) will eventually (i.eJor lags k > q -
p) follow the same pattern as that of a pure AR(P) process, being described by
combinations of damped exponentials and/or damped sine waves. This however is not
the case for the first q lags which are determined by the magnitudes of both the AR and
MA parameters.
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In an analogous fashion it can be shown that the PACF of any ARMA(p,q) process
eventually, (i.e .for lags k > p - q) behaves like that of a pure MA(q) process.
However, for k < p - q the PACF does not follow this pattern, it being a combination
of both the MA and AR parameters. The conditions for stationarity and invertibility in
mixed processes are those that apply to the appropriate order of pure AR and MA
processes.
(i) The ARMA (1,1) Process
This process is described by,
or alternatively,
and the process will be invertible (AR terms do not affect invertibility) and stationary
(MA term do not affect stationarity) when
so that the roots of ¢(B) and 8(B) lie outside the unit circle.
For this simple ARMA process we may calculate its mean, variance and autocovariance
relatively easily. The mean is given by,
8
j.1=1-</>I
Setting 8 = 0 for convenience (although the same results are achieved using deviations
from a non-zero mean), the variance is given as,
Yo = E[ (¢1 Yl - 1+ e; - 81e.: 1)]
=¢r Yo - 2¢1 81E[ Yl - 1Ct-1] + el- + e1 el-
and since E(Yt-1£t-1) = (J2, this gives,
IU (1 - ¢r) = d (1 + e1 - 2<1>1 81)
_ 1+ 81 - 2¢1 81el-
}U - 1- ¢r
The autocovariance at lag one is thus,
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Yl = E[ Yl - 1 (<PI Yl - 1 + E, - 81 C1- 1 ) ]
= <PI Yo - 81 d-
and on substitution for Yo yields,
= (1- <PI 8d(<Pl - 8d d-
1- <Pr
Similarly the autocovariance at lag two is,
Y2 =E[ Yl - 2 (<PI Yl - 1 + E, - 81 C1- dJ
= <PI Yl
and for all other autocovariances,
Yk=<PIYk-l k>l
The autocorrelation function can now be derived as,
I't (1- <PI 8d(<Pl - 8d
'rl =- =---------...:...
IU 1+ 8r - 2<pl 81
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and for displacement k greater than one,
't'k=<Pl'rk-l k>1
Focussing on the autocorrelation results for a moment the above results demonstrate
that the autocorrelation function begins at its starting value 'rl which is a function of
both the AR and MA parameters and then decays geometrically in contrast to the AR(I)
process which decays geometrically from roo This reflects the fact that the moving
average part of the ARMA(l, I) process only has a memory of one so that after the first
lag the process has an autocorrelation function exactly the same as a pure AR( 1)
process.
Having mentioned above that the PACF of an ARMA(p,q) is determined by the MA
part of the process at displacements k > p - q it is clear that in the ARMA( 1,1) case
the PACF behaves in exactly the same way as an MA(l) given that <P11 = r 1 so that
the PACF is dominated by a damped exponential whose form is determined by the sign
of ql'
(d) Modelling Non-Stationary Time Series
The previous treatment of the linear stochastic models discussed so far has been
restricted to stationary processes. As discussed in Chapters VI and VII such processes
are rare in economics but may be converted to stationarity by application of the
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appropriate transformation. In the series used here it was found that all series are
integrated processes of order one, 1(1) and therefore require differencing to achieve a
stationary mean. In addition the original series require a logarithmic transformation to
stabilize their respective variances for reasons explained in Chapter VI. In general, the
order of integration is included in the description of time series model, entailing the
general notation of a process: ARIMA (p,d,q), where d indicates the number of times
the series must be differenced to achieve stationarity. The series used here are
consequently ARIMA (p,I, q) processes. For convenience the following development
will be in terms of W t where w t = ~ d Y Y and d is the number of times the original
series Yt must be differenced to obtain stationarity.
VII.(iv) The Identification Process
Since Box and Jenkins' pioneering work on ARIMA modelling a number of attempts
have been made to automate and/or simplify the task of identifying the most appropriate
specification of an empirical time series. Indeed, using the 'Box-Jenkins approach' to
time series modelling requires a good deal of discretion and experience on behalf of the
analyst to interpret the ACF and PACF of a particular series especially in cases where
the series is not one of pure MA or AR. Even in circumstances where the data has been
generated artificially according to a known specification, identifying that specification
from the ACF and PACF alone requires considerable expertise and frequently few clear
signals emerge from the identification process, (see Appendix I). In light of this a
substantial amount of research has been undertaken to develop criteria to aid the analyst
in the identification of the most appropriate model for a time series. Shibata (1985) has
provided a survey of model selection criteria and two of the most popular statistics are
briefly reviewed here: the Akaike (1974) information criterion (AIC) and the BIC
developed independently by Rissanen (1978) and Schwarz (1978).
Akaike's AIC, was one of the earliest selection criteria developed and is defined as,
AIC(p, q) =10& + 2(p +q)T- 1
where f1 is the estimate of the error variance of the ARMA (p,q) fitted to a stationary
time series of length T. The BIC is defined as,
BIC(p, q) =10& + (p +q)T-1lnT
Notice that both criteria incorporate the estimated error variance plus an extra term to
penalise for the number of parameters relative to the size of sample and it is in this
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penalty that most model selection criteria differ. The aim is to find the ARMA (p,q)
model that minimises the value of the criterion so that a model with an AIC of -7.45
would be preferred to a rival model with an AIC of -7.29.
Clearly, the model with the lowest AIC or BIC cannot automatically be regarded as the
'true' model for the true model may not have been included in the set of models under
examination. Consequently, it is 'good practice' to estimate a number of models and
compare the diagnostic test statistics from each. In circumstances where two (or more)
selection criteria favour different model specifications Hannan (1980) has shown that if
the true orders (p.,q.) are contained within the set P,Q where P = {I,2, ... p}
and Q = (1,2, ... , q} then the orders of p and q chosen by each criterion (px,qx)
will never be smaller than the true orders (p.,q.), i.e. Px > p , and qx > q, as T
tends to infinity. However, because BIC is strongly consistent in that it determines the
true model asymptotically, it will give the true orders of p and q in large samples
whereas the AIC does not have this property. Both statistics are reported in the
empirical work because Hannan's results can be used to help infer the true orders of an
ARMA model. For example, if AIC and BIC select the same model then this suggests
the model should be preferred, although it still may be over-parameterised. If the AIC
selects a (say) ARMA(3,1) and the BIC selects an ARMA (2,1) the results taken
together are suggestive of an ARMA (2, I) model generating the data. In practice
however one would seldom base any decision on any single criterion but rather assess
the evidence from a wide range of sources such as ACF and PACF, information criteria
and ancillary diagnostic checks. Furthermore, given that the sample sizes used in the
empirical analysis are relatively small the principle of parsimony will also weigh quite
heavily in the final choice of model.
VIII.(v) Estimation of an ARIMA (p,d,q) Model
Having identified a plausible specification of the model (i.e. determined appropriate
values of p .d and q) the next task is to estimate the numerical values of the
autoregressive and moving average parameters of the unknown data generation process
( ~ ~ th ()" ()" e) using the sample data. Recalling that w, is the
'#'l , 'Y1., • • ., 'Yp , 1, 2,··' , q
stationary series of interest, we start with the model,
¢<B)w, = e ( B ) ) (VIlLI 1)
h ndom innovationsRearranging (VIII. I I ) in terms of its driving process, t e ra
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" "-1 "
e; = e (B)¢(B)w t (VIII.I2)
Box and Jenkins propose a maximum likelihood estimation routine that yields a vector
of AR parameters ¢ and a vector of MA parameters e that minimise the sum of the
squared errors,
" A-I ""
where e, = e (B)¢(B)w l (VIII.I3)
9
which is equivalent to choosing parameter values that minimise the sum of the squared
differences between the actual time series and the fitted values, i.e,(w l - ~ , ) )
The theoretical development of the estimation routine need not concern us although it
should be apparent that where MA parameters are present in (VIlLI I ) a non-linear
procedure is required since (VIILI3) is clearly non-linear in the parameters. The
estimation procedure begins by linearising (VIII.I2) around an initial guess of the
parameters of ¢ and {) and a linear regression is performed and least squares estimates
obtained. These estimates are then substituted back into (VIII.I2) and a new
linearisation is made around them. Another linear regression is then performed and a
second set of ~ and e are obtained. The process is repeated in an iterative fashion
until the estimates stabilise or converge on specific values in repeated iterations. When
convergence has been attained standard errors of the estimates are calculated from the
finallinearisation, from which t-statistics and an R2 can be derived. 10
Whilst it is not necessary to understand the mechanics of the estimation in detail an
appreciation of its iterative nature is important because there is no guarantee that the
estimates will converge. I I Furthermore, multiple solutions may exist in the 'parameter
space' so that convergence may only imply the discovery of a local and not 'global'
optimum. In either case a new set of initial values must be given to ensure convergence
and if multiple solutions are found to exist the set of parameters chosen should be those
corresponding to the solution that gives the smallest value of the sum of squared
Clearly, in order to conduct this rearrangement, ~ B B must be invertible.
10 It should be noted that r-statistics and R2 only have a limited meaning for they apply to the last
linearisation of the non-linear model, not to the non-linear model itself. Consequently, despite
obtaining a low R2 for the last linearisation the actual non-linear model may well possess
impressive predictive power.
11 Divergence of the parameter estimates after successive iterations is most likely where there are a
large number of AR and MA parameters to estimate with a relatively small data set.
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residuals. This discussion emphasises the need to provide starti al h Ing v ues t at are c ose
to the true parameter values - or rather those implied by a global optimum. If the
process is autoregressive then the Yule-Walker equations can provide a useful estimate
(the so-called Yule-Walker estimates) of the p autoregressive parameters. Recall from
Section (iii) above that the theoretical ACF for the AR(l) process at lag k is,
n k
't'k =- = ¢1
Yo
implying that the AR(1) model has an autoregressive coefficient equal to the
autocorrelation coefficient at lag one. Although the theoretical ACF is unknown in
practice, we may use i 1 from the sample ACF as a reasonable first estimate of ¢I .
For the AR(2) process the Yule-Walker equations may be solved for tPl and tP2
implying the theoretical relationship,
Again, substituting the sample estimates of the autocorrelation coefficients into the
above yields Yule-Walker estimates of the AR(2) process which can be used as an
initial guess in the estimation procedure. 12
If the time series contains a MA component then the Yule-Walker equations are non-
linear for the parameters of interest although for the simple MA( 1) process an easily
derived estimate may be inferred. For example the ACF of an MA(l) process is,
-81r ---
I - 1+ 821 (VIII. 14)
and zero for all other displacements. Substituting for i 1 and setting (VIII. 14) equal to
zero we may solve the resulting quadratic. Assuming i 1 = 0.4 the two roots of the
quadratic are -2 and -0.5. Since 181' < 1 for the process to be invertible then the later
value represents the initial value used in the estimation routine. Unfortunately the Yule -
Walker estimates for 8 in terms of the theoretical autocorrelation coefficients becomes
increasingly difficult for the MA(q) process requiring the solution of q simultaneous
non-linear equations.
12 Note that for higher order AR processes the Yule-Walker estimates become increasingly crude.
This reflects the use of the sample as opposed to the theoretical ACF and also becasuse the sample
ACF contains much less information than the actual time series. Note that if the process is one of
pure autoregression, then a simple linear regression will provide OLS estimates that may be used
as starting values. This however is not possible where MA terms are required.
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For more complicated ARMA(p,q) processes it becomes necessary to rely on trial and
error in practice, comparing the residual sum of squares of each set of initial guesses
obtained after convergence. Should convergence not be attained the most likely reason
to account for this is an incorrectly identified structure in which case a new structure
should be identified and the whole process repeated.
Vlll.Ivi) Diagnostic Checking
Having conducted the identification and estimation phases of the modelling process it is
common to obtain a number of rival specifications that appear to fit the data reasonably
well. Choosing between competing models is the next and arguably most important
stage in the modelling process and a number of tests and checks have been proposed in
the literature to facilitate informed choice. Given that the object of ARMA model
building is to transform a presumably autocorrelated observed series into a structureless
white noise process, checks of model adequacy revolve around testing whether the
residuals of the model,
A ",-I '"
t1 = 8 (B)¢(B)w 1
mimic the properties of the true data generation process,
£, = 8(Br l ¢(B)w 1
Consequently, the residuals of each rival specification should be checked to ascertain
whether:
(i) the mean is (approximately) zero
(ii) the variance is (approximately) constant and
(iii) individual errors are uncorrelated.
Feature (i) may be tested by comparing the estimated mean of the residuals (f )with its
standard error and (ii) may bechecked casually by visual inspection of a plot of squared
residuals. In practice, most attention focusses on testing for autocorrelation in the
residuals of the fitted model. 13 Box and Jenkins recommend as a first check for
randomness visual inspection of the ACF from the residuals. Each autocorrelation
coefficient of the residuals given by,
13 Another commonly used diagnostic check is that of overfilling, where a less parsimonious model
is tested under points (i), (ii) amd (iii) and the results compared with its parsimonious rival. Where
a number of rival specifications have been selected the overfitting method may well be performed
latently in the checking of these rivals.
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,;. _ 2:.:=k + 1 ( ( - t ) ( ~ - - - i)
~ - -
2:.:=1 ( ~ ~ €)2
can then be compared to its standard error under the null of independence (T-In) as
described earlier. However, because the UUe standard errors are often much smaller for
low values of k (see Mills 1990, pp.145) attention focuses on the construction of
various portmanteau tests which seek to test whether the first m residual
autocorrelations are jointly insignificantly different from zero. One such test developed
by Ljung and Box (1978) is defined as,
m
Q= T(T+2) L(T-kr1r;
k=1
where m begins at one and increases up to the usual limit of TI/2 . Again the
hypothesis tested here is that the first m autocorrelation coefficients are all
insignificantly different from zero, so that if the calculated Q statistic exceeds the
tabulated value of X2 on (m-p-q) degrees of freedom, the adequacy of the ARMA
(p,q) model that generated the residuals must be cast in doubt. Whilst Monte Carlo
experiments have shown that the Q statistic performs better than other portmanteau
tests, the power of this test may still be quite low - high values only being found in the
presence of severe misspecification. The low power of all portmanteau tests emanates
from the absence of explicit formulation of an alternative hypothesis. Whilst this
approach may be appropriate given that many different alternative specifications exist, it
results in a tendency to accept the null of the portmanteau tests more often than one
should. Indeed, a large q statistic indicative of model inadequacy may only occur with
a very poor model. As a consequence, it should be echoed that all tests should be
interpreted in conjunction with one another, so that it is the weight of evidence that
leads to adoption or rejection of any particular model rather than anyone piece of
evidence. 14
VIII.(vii) Forecasting
Having identified and estimated an ARIMA model and following checks for adequacy
of the chosen specification, it is then possible to embark on the object of the entire
14 Recently, LM tests have been developed (see inter alia Mills 1990 for a discussion) in the
literature which have much higher power than the portmanteau tests since they are conducted with
reference to an explicit alternative hypothesis. Nevertheless, they are labour intensive to compute
since a large number of alternative specifications require testing and arc not considered any further.
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exercise, that being the forecasting of future values of the series. The task of computing
forecasts for a given model is essentially quite mechanistic although a number of points
need to be bourne in mind before the forecasts are actually computed.
The aim of the preliminary stages of forecasting, namely, identification, estimation and
testing is to produce a model that that will be able to predict future values of the series
with as little error as possible. Supposing that the observed series (Y t,Y2, .. .,Yr )
is a realisation from the general ARIMA(p,d,q) process,
¢(B)w t = 8(B)c,
where W t = ~ d Y t t then the forecast of a future value of Yt l periods into the future
denoted YT+ 1 is given by15
00
YT +1 =¢(Bfl (1- Bfd8(B)c, = ljI(B)c, =I l/Ijc,-j
j=o (VIII. 15)
which is expressed entirely in terms of the random innovations. Noting that (VIII. 15)
may be written as,
00
YT+ I = ljIo CT+ I + ljII CT+ I - 1 + + If/L - 1 CT+ 1 + I l/IL +j £T - j
j=O (VIII. 16)
which divides the infinite sum of (VIII. 15) into two parts, the second part describing all
past and present information, and the first set of terms describing future events. As all
future innovations are unknown at period T their expected values are substituted in
(VIII. 16), in which case the forecast boils down to,
00
YT+ 1 = I If/L+jCT''-j =E(YT+1 IYT , ... ,Y1 )
j=O
since the conditional expectation of cr+i given the previous history of e, is 0 for i =
1,2, .. .1 and the expected values of (cr, £r-l' ...) are just the observed errors,
i.e. the residuals from the estimated model. Consequently, the l step ahead forecast is
simply the conditional expectation of Yt +1 given all past and current observations on
ft. Moreover, this can be shown to give the optimal forecast, i.e. that which
produces the minimum forecast error.
The I-step ahead forecast error from the origin T is hence,
cT+I = (YT+1-YT+d=CT+I+ljIl£T+I-I + ... +ljIl-If.[+1 (VIII.I?)
and implies that the forecast YT +1 is unbiased since the conditional expectation of
(VIII. I?) is clearly zero. The forecast error is thus a linear combination of the unknown
15 T is called the origin of the forecast and I as the lead time.
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future innovations. The variance of the forecast error is then,
E[cf+ / ] = <J2 (l + VII + ~ +. . . + '11- d
Using these results it is possible to demonstrate the general procedure for computing a
forecast, however the following points should be borne in mind. First the forecast error
variance depends on ljI(B) implying that different specifications of the ARIMA model
yield different forecast error variances. Second, from (VIII.I7) the one-step ahead
forecast error will be cT+ 1 with variance (J2 and that this will be the case for any
ARIMA specification. Thus the forecast error variance one period ahead is always the
variance of the error term. Third, these results are based on the assumption that the
parameters and structure of the underlying data generation process (¢1' .. .¢p and
81, .. •,Oq) are known with certainty. Clearly this will never be the case in practice
so that the actual forecast error variance will be much larger than the quantities
calculated using (VIlLI7). To determine how much larger, we must use the residuals
of the last linearization of the chosen ARIMA specification as an estimate of the true
variance (52. Even so this estimate must be used cautiously bearing in mind that it is
calculated from the finallinearisation of what may be a non-linear relationship. As such
the estimated variance and standard errors are not 'true' estimates of the actual
quantities and for this reason may be ignored in the calculation of the forecast error
variance: empirical researches preferring to use the formulation in (VIlLI7) despite the
fact it is an underestimate of the true value.
(a) Computing Forecasts
The procedure of actually computing a forecast is performed recursively, beginning
with the one-step ahead forecast which is substituted into the equation for the two-step
ahead forecast and so on until the I step ahead forecast is reached. To begin we write
the ARIMA (p,d,q) model including a constant for completeness as,
WI = l/>t W T + . . . + ¢p WI - P + £, - 01q - 1 - • • • - 8q£, - q + 8
where w, = ~ d y y To compute the forecast fT+ 1 the process begins by calculating
the forecast for w" WT+ 1 where wr-: is given as,
wT+1 =¢IWT+'" +¢pWT-p+l +CT+1-81cT-'" -8qCT-q+l +8 (VULI8)
Taking the conditional expectation of (VIII. 18) yields the one-step forecast,
WT+l = E(WT+l IWT, ... )
,.. 8 ,.. +8
= l/>t WT+ ... +¢pWT-p+l -81£T-'" - qCT-q+l
where (£T,£T-l' ... ) are the observed residuals and the expected value of £T+l = O.
This forecast is then used to form the forecast at time T of the series two periods
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ahead,
WT+2 =E(WT+2 IWT, )
= tPl WT+ 1 + l/>l WT + tPP WT-p+2 - 82 £T - •.. - 8q £T - q+2 + 8
This recursive procedure is continued until the Ith forecast has been made. Thus at each
stage, past expectations are replaced with known values of W t and e, and future
expectations are replaced with forecast values WI and zero.
Once the stationary series wt has been forecasted the forecast for the original series Yt
simply involves summing W t d times so that if W t is the first difference of Yt then
the I-period forecast of YT+1 is,
YT+1 = YT + W T + l +WT+2 + ... +WT+l
As noted in the introduction, the margin of error of a forecast is as important as the
forecast itself and thus it is necessary to calculate confidence intervals within which the
true value of the series I periods in the future is believed to lie. Due to the fact that in
practice we do not know the parameter values of the true data generating process
confidence intervals produced under the assumption that we have estimated the true
model will be over-optimistic. 16 Nevertheless, assuming we have identified the true
model then the confidence interval of Z standard deviations around a forecast I periods
ahead is given by,
(VIII. 19)
where &- is the variance from the chosen ARIMA model. Equation (VIll.19) indicates
that the interval gets larger as the lead time I gets larger and that the exact pattern
depends on the parameters in the ARIMA model chosen.
VIII.(viii) The Empirical Analysis - Identification and Estimation
In this section the results from the identification and estimation of the ARIMA models
of the three rent series and three land price series will be presented. The forecasts
themselves will be presented in the following section. All series are in real terms (1990
prices) and are expressed in logs to stabilise their variances.
16 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981) suggest a rule of thumb that this is likely Lo be important where the
t -statistics of parameters in the final linearization are less than 5. p.560.
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(a). The Average Rent series (1944-90) InRI
Recall from Chapter VI that the unit root tests conducted on the average rent series lnR
t
suggested that the series was a non-stationary AR(2) and was a stationary AR( 1) series
in first differences, i.e.
or
I:1lnRr = ¢l:1lnRr -1 + C1
The ACF of InRI' exhibits a slow linear decline indicative of the non-stationarity of
this series (and hence autoregressive nature of the process - as moving average
components are always stationary) and the PACF has two dominant spikes, pointing to
a AR(2) process, as suggested by the unit root tests.
In order to identify any moving average components a first step is to produce the ACF
and PACF of the first differenced series I:1lnR t . These functions are shown in Figures
VIII.3 and VIllA respectively and suggest that I:1lnR t is a stationary AR(l) process,
due to the visible decay of the ACF and a single significant spike at lag one in the
PACF, which appears to be randomly distributed thereafter.l?
Figure VIII.3 : ACF of InRI
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It would be prudent to compare the performance of the ARMA(I,O) model with some
. .. f h ACF d PACF are also consistent withalternatIve specifications. The patterns 0 t e an . .
an ARMA(2,1) process if the PACF is actually declining to zero in a systematic fashion
17 The horizontal lines represent approximate 95% confidence bands.
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rather than distributed randomly. Further, the dominant spike at lag one in the ACF
could imply an ARMA(O,I) model although the PACF does not appear to be declining
geometrically as required for this process, although with only twelve partial
autocorrelations this is difficult to discern. Nevertheless the ARMA(O, 1) process will
be estimated along with an ARMA( 1,1) model for the purpose of comparison between
the pure autoregressive and moving average models suggested above.
Figure VIllA: PACF of InRt
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1.0 . + - - , _ - - r - - - . . - - , . . . . . . . . - - - - , r - - - - , - ~ - _ _ r - _ y _ - " " T " ' " " - , _ _ . . . .
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
These four rival specifications are estimated and the diagnostic test statistics (discussed
earlier) are presented in Table VIII. 1. The Q statistic tests the null hypothesis that the
first 12 autocorrelation coefficients of the residuals from the estimated model are
empirical white noise (adjusted for the degrees of freedom).
Table VIlLI: Model Selection Criteria for the series ~ l n R R
Model Q(d.f.) R2 AIC BIC
ARMA (1,0) 6.4 (11) 0.31 -6.9194 -6.8784
ARMA (2,1) 6.6 (9) 0.28 -6.7937 -6.6709
ARMA (0,1) 10.0 (11) 0.28 -6.8087 -6.7677
ARMA (1,1) 6.0 (10) 0.30 -6.8524 -6.7705
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None of the Q statistics in Table VIlLI permit rejection of the null at the 5% level
although the other diagnostics indicate a preference for the ARMA( 1,0) model. 18Of
the candidate models in Table VIII. 1 the ARMA (0,1) compares least favourably and
may be disregarded on two counts, namely its low R2 and because the MA parameter in
the ARMA(1, 1) model is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that it is only
the AR component that is driving the ~ l n R R series. The remaining models are estimated
as,
~ 1 n R R = 1. 6 3 3 4 ~ 1 n R , _ _ - o. 6 6 0 0 2 ~ 1 n R , _ _ + O. 95417 ~ -I + tt
(15.66) (-6.83) (23.05)
~ 1 n R R =O. 6 4 2 5 2 ~ 1 n R R -I + £1
(5.53)
Notice that the MA parameter in the ARMA (2,1) model is close to unity. In fact it has a
standard error of 0.04140 implying the 95% confidence interval of,
0.87137 < e< 1.03697
so that we may reasonably expect the coefficient to be an estimate of unity. If this is the
case then it follows that the ARMA (2,1) specification is equivalent to an ARMA (1,0)
since we may write,
~ = (1 + (/» ~ - 1 - ¢Y1- 2 + E, - e : 1
Y1 - ~ - 1 - ¢Y1 - 1 + ¢Y1- 2 = tt - £1- 1
(1- L- ¢L+ ¢ L 2 ) ) = (1- L)tt
(1- L)(1 - ¢L)Y1 = (1 - L)tt
(1- ¢ L ) ) = E,
~ = ¢ ~ - - +£,
This result indicates the adoption of an ARMA( 1,0) model in preference to the
ARMA(2,1) model for .11nRt on the grounds of parsimony which also accounts for the
better AIC and BIC criteria since both diagnostics penalise over-parameterisation.
Analysis of the residuals from this model indicate that they are empirical white noise
with zero mean and constant variance, as would be expected if the ARMA process was
. . 19 Tha good approximation to the underlying process actually generating the senes. e
rent series in levels is consequently best modelled as a stationary ARIMA (1,1,0)
process confrrming the conclusion of the unit root tests.
18 Note that the AIC and BIC with the largest negative number indicates thepreferred model.
19· . . 09 dOl' tk ARMA (1 0) did not alter the finalUsing two different startmg values of . an . In tne ,
estimate of the AR parameter estimated by using an starting value of (0.60411) suggested by an
OLS autoregression.
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(b). The Newly Negotiated Rent Series (1944-1990) InR Nt
The unit root tests in Chapter VI suggested that this series exhibited similar behaviour
to InR t in that it was a nonstationary AR(2) in levels and stationary AR(l) process in
first differences. The ACF and PACF of the series in levels are almost identical to those
for InR t although a slightly different picture emerges when the series is differenced.
The ACF and PACF for !1lnRNt are shown in Figures VIII.5 and VIII.6 respectively.
Figure VIII.5 : ACF of t1InRNt
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Figure VIII.6 PACF of !1lnRN t
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Again the ACF and PACF suggest a number of rival specifications. The significant
spike in the ACF and a geometrically declining PACF are indicative of an ARMA (0,1)
process. Alternatively, the significant spike in the PACF and declining ACF signal that
an AR(1) process might be at work. If the second spike in the PACF is treated as
significant (although it is strictly inside the 95% confidence interval for white noise)
then the evidence is suggestive of an ARMA (2,1) model as well. For the purpose of
comparison an ARMA (1,1) model is also estimated. Diagnostic tests arising from the
estimation of these four rival models are presented in Table VIII.2. Pre-testing
suggested that a constant term is unnecessary in any of the specifications.
Table VIII.2 : Model Selection Criteria for the series MnRN/
Model
ARMA (1,0)
ARMA (2,1)
ARMA (0,1)
ARMA (1,1)
Q(d.f.)
16.8(11)
17.7(9)
9.0 (11)
7.4 (10)
R2
0.30
0.26
0.35
0.35
AIC
-6.4703
-6.3449
-6.5570
-6.5128
BIC
-6.4293
-6.2220
-6.5161
-6.4309
A quick glance at Table VIII.2 reveals that the ARMA (0,1) model is to be preferred, it
having a relatively high adjusted R2 and and smallest AIC and BIC values and a low Q
value, well inside the 5% critical value of 19.67. The ARMA (2,1) model has a Q
statistic that allows rejection of the null (that the residuals are white noise), and also has
a low adjusted R2 and high AIC and BIC statistics relative to the other models. In fact,
this model is also equivalent to the ARMA (1,0) specification since the 95% confidence
interval of the MA coefficient encompasses unity, as was demonstrated above. Whilst
the ARMA (1,1) and ARMA (0,1) model s perform well on the criteria produced in
Table VIII.2, as the following equations reveal, the AR coefficient is not statistically
different from zero at the 5% level implying that the ARMA (0,1) is the preferred model
- as was initially suggested.
SlnkN, =O.27442t1lnRN,- 1 +0.54769Er-l +£1
(1.33) (-3.08)
+ O. 72200Er - 1 + £1
(-7.04)
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Tests on the residuals of the preferred model also support the adoption of the ARMA
(0,1) model for !1lnRN t and therefore the series expressed in levels, InRNt is best
described by an ARIMA (0,1,1). Note that although this result contrasts with the
evidence from the unit root tests that implied !1lnRNt was an AR(l) process this is to
be expected since MA processes are always stationary and thus are not directly tested
for in such tests, and as mentioned above any MA (1) process has an autoregressive
representation. More interestingly, we have shown that the average rent and new rent
series appear to be described by two quite different processes.
(c) The Historical Average Rent Series (1871-1990) InR H t
The unit root tests implied that InR H twas nonstationary and its first difference
~ l n R H H was a stationary AR(1) process. The ACF and PACF of tilnRHt are
presented in Figures VIII.7 and VIII.8. The ACF has two significant spikes after which
it declines in a sine wave pattern towards zero. The PACF of this series has a single
dominant spike after which all coefficients are insignificant (the spike at the 14th lag
may reasonably be regarded as spurious). Whilst the presence of a pattern in the ACF is
clearly visible it is unclear whether the PACF declines after the first lag in a systematic
or random manner and this will require further testing.
Figure VIII.7 : ACF of !1lnRHt
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. . . I ike i the PACF it seems likelyDue to a sine wave decline In the ACF and a sing e SPI e in
that I1lnRH
t
is an ARMA (1,0) if it is reasonable to assume that the PACF is randomly
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distributed around zero. If this is not the case then a MA mod I f d .
., . . e a or er one or possibly
two IS implied given that the ACF has significant spikes at I dags one an two. These
~ h r e e rival s p ~ c i f i c a t i o n n will be estimated with an ARMA (1,2) and ARMA (1,1)
included to aid comparison. Diagnostic tests from the five estimated models are
presented in Table VII!.3.
Figure VIII.8: PACF of MnRHt
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Table VIII.3 : Model Selection Criteria for the series f1lnRH t
Model
ARMA (1,0)
ARMA (0,1)
ARMA (0,2)
ARMA (1,1)
ARMA (1,2)
Q(d.f.)
11.2 (11)
13.3(11)
10.8 (10)
11.5(10)
13.7 (9)
R2
0.11
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.07
AIC
-5.6984
-5.6718
-5.6725
-5.6759
-5.6220
BIC
-5.6748
-5.6482
-5.6302
-5.6287
-5.5512
Inspection of Table VIII.3 reveals that the residuals from all the models are empirical
white noise as implied by the Q statistics, although the other criteria suggest that the
simple ARMA( 1,0) model is to be preferred. The ARMA( 1,2) model performs worst of
all the models over all the criteria and may be reasonably dismissed as inadequate. The
second MA parameter in the ARMA (0,2) is statistically insignificant implying either an
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ARMA(1,O) or ARMA (0,1) model both of which have statistically significant
parameters. Estimation of an ARMA( 1,1) model yields an insignificant MA parameter,
implying that the ARMA( 1,0) model is to be preferred, a result that supports the
inference based solely on the diagnostic tests in the table. A simple t test on the
residuals from this model suggest they have zero mean with what appears to be
constant variance from casual inspection of the squared residuals.
The results indicate that tllnRHI is a stationary ARMA (l,0) process and thus the
series expressed in levels, InRHI is an ARIMA (1,1,0), this being the same as the
shorter average rent series InRI' It is worth noting however that the explanatory power
of the model for the historical series is considerably lower than that for the shorter
series on average rents. At least two reasons may be put forward to account for this;
namely, errors in data which are likely to be non-trivial in the early years of the series
(see the Data Appendix on the construction of this series) and also the presence of some
very large outlying observations that correspond to the free-fall in farm prices in the
early 1920s and the Great Depression in the 1930s. Whilst the errors in the data cannot
be rectified, the outlying observations may be filtered out of the data using intervention
analysis which will improve the fit and estimation of the ARMA( 1,0) model. Whilst it
would be possible to identify a new structure for this series in the absence of the
outliers, intuition would suggest that this is unlikely given that the first difference of the
shorter average rent series (tllnR l ) is also ARMA(1,O).
(d). Average Real Land Price (1944-1989) InP t
The ACF and PACF of this series corroborates the findings of the unit root tests since
the series has a persistent ACF (indicative of non-stationary) and the PACF has three
spikes. If the series in levels is a nonstationary AR(3) then its first difference ~ l n n t
should be a stationary AR(2) process, if indeed no MA terms are present. This
inference is supported by the ACF and PACF of ~ l n P P shown in Figures VIII.9 and
VIII.10.
A dampened sine wave is clearly visible in Figure VIII.9 suggesting a stationary AR
process and the two spikes followed by what appear to be random coefficients in the
. . alli f ARMAPACF suggest the AR process is of order two. Despite the clear SIgn mg 0 an
(2,0) process a number of low order models were estimated although the only adequate
specifications to emerge from this search were the ARMA (2,0) and the ARMA (1,2)
models, diagnostic tests for which are presented in Table 4.
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Figure VIII.9 : ACF of InPl
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Figure VIII.10 PACF of InP l
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Table VIII.5 : Model Selection Criteria for the series L1lnP20
t
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Model
ARMA (2,0)
ARMA (1,2)
Q(d.f.)
5.2 (10)
9.2 (9)
R2
0.27
0.17
AIC
-3.9542
-3.7408
BIC
-3.8523
-3.6180
The tests clearly favour the ARMA (2,0) model which is estimated as,
L 1 l n n = 0. 4 3 7 5 4 ~ l n ~ _ _ - 0. 5 3 9 4 9 L 1 1 1 _2
(3.78) (-4.14)
and therefore the land price series expressed in levels is ARIMA (2,1,0).
(e) Average Real Land Price for >20 hectares (1944-1989) InP20
t
The ACF and PACF of InP20t confirm the results of the unit root tests, in that the
series is a non-stationary AR(3) process since the ACF is persistent and the PACF has
three dominant spikes at lags one, two and three. If this inference is true then ~ n P 2 0 0
should be a stationary AR(2) process. The ACF and PACF are shown in Figures
VIII.11 and VIII. 12 respectively.
Figure VIII.ll : ACF of InP20t
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Taken together the evidence from the ACF and PACF tend to suggest an autoregressive
process of order two or possibly three, if the third coefficient in the PACF is treated as
significant. If however the decline of the PACF is viewed as having a cyclical decline
then the three spikes in the ACF might suggest a third order moving average process.
This seems unlikely given the cyclical decline of the ACF and estimation of various
moving average models confirmed that only AR parameters are required. Table VIlI.5
shows the diagnostic tests from various AR models.
The Q statistic for the AR( 1) model exceeds the 5% critical value and thus allows
rejection of the white noise residuals null. The AIC and BIC statistics favour adoption
of the AR(2) model although the adjusted R2 is marginally better for the AR(3) model.
Table VIII.5 : Model Selection Criteria for the series i1lnP20t
Model Q(d.f.) R2 AIC BIC
ARMA (1,0) 22.3 (11) 0.03 -3.6184 -3.5783
ARMA (2,0) 7.0(10) 0.25 -3.8353 -3.7550
ARMA (3,0) 3.2 (9) 0.26 -3.8004 -3.6799
However, a simple I test on the third AR parameter suggests that it is not significantly
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different from zero and hence the AR(2) is adopted for ~ l n P 2 0 0 The model is
estimated as,
f1lnP20, = O . 3 8 4 3 7 ~ 1 n P 2 0 ' _ _ - O . 5 0 7 0 9 ~ l n P 2 0 ' _ _
(2. 91) (- 3.77)
implying that the series expressed in levels, InP20
"
is ARIMA (2, I ,0) as was found
for the InPI series.
(f). The Oxford Institute Land Price Series (1859-1990) InPX t
As with the other two land price series the unit root tests suggest that the log of the
Oxford Institute series InPX, is a nonstationary AR(3) series and a stationary AR(2) in
first differences. The ACF and PACF of InPX, bear all the hallmarks of a non-
stationary AR(3) but to test for the existence of any MA components the ACF and
PACF of f:,.lnPX, are presented in Figures VIII.I3 and VIII.I4.
Figure VIII.I3 : ACF of ~ l n P X X
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The sine wave decay of the ACF does not suggest any MA terms and the random nature
of the coefficients of the PACF after the second lag strongly points to a AR(2) process.
Estimation of a number of low order models confirms that ~ l n n Xt is purely
. b d .bed by a second order model ofautoregressive in nature and as expected, IS est escn
the form,
f11nPXt =O.21219f11nPXt_1 - 0 . 3 2 6 4 5 ~ l n P X ' _ _
(2.52) (-3.88)
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and yields diagnostics that are presented in Table VIII.6.
Figure VIII.14 : PACF of ~ l n P P
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Table 6 Model Selection Criteria for the series ~ l n n X t
VIllA 1
Model
ARMA (2,0)
Q(d.f.)
3.1 (10)
R2
0.12
AIC
-4.2346
BIC
-4.1903
As with the rent series the explanatory power is considerably lower for the longer time
series than for the shorter series. Likely explanations follow similar lines as for the long
rent series, namely errors in the data towards the beginning of the series (although the
land price series should be better in this respect compared to the rent series) and the
presence of outliers, which are most significant in the sudden depression of the early
1920s and in the land price boom of the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, some comfort must
be derived for identifying a similar structure for all the land price series used, despite
their different samples and construction. This similarity of the time series properties of
the land price series reinforces the findings in the Data Appendix which indicated that
all the land price series appear to behave similarly.
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(g). Summary of the Results
Using the time series techniques developed in this chapter the Structures of the variables
used in this study may be summarized as follows.
Rent Series
InRt : ARIMA (1,1,0)
InRNt : ARIMA (0,1,1)
InRHt : ARIMA (1,1,0)
Land prices
InPt : ARIMA (2,1,0)
InP20t : ARlMA (2,1,0)
InPXt : ARIMA (2,1,0)
VIII.(ix). The Empirical Analysis - Forecasting
Armed with an estimate of the data generating process for each series we can now
present the forecasts from each model. All forecasts will be in 1990 price terms and will
be computed for a lead time of five years. Generally however, ARIMA forecasts are
used only for very short time horizons since forecasts converge to the mean value of the
series as the lead time increases, although the time taken to revert to the mean depends
upon the specification of the forecasting function. Typically, lead times tend not to be
set much longer than the sum of the parameters in the model, i.e. I - p + q. Due to
the low order of models estimated here only the one or two step ahead forecasts are of
any real meaning.
Forecasts are initially produced using forecasting functions developed for the stationary
processes identified in the previous section. Because these stationary series are
expressed in first differences of the log of the original series, appropriate
transformations have been conducted to show forecasts consistent with the original
series.20
20 It should be noted however that if the series forecasted is in log form then simply exponentiating
(anti-logging) the forescasts from this model does not give unbiased forecasts of the raw series. lt
can be shown that the I-step ahead forecast of the raw series is given by,
YT+1= exp(lnYT+1+ 0.5ar)where a1 is the variance of the forecast error. See Mills (1990)
pp.337-338 for further details. Forecasts of the raw series presented here have been adjusted in
accordance with this theoretical result
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(a) Forecasts for Average Farm Rents R,
Forecasts of R, five periods into the future using the ARIMA (1,1,0) model are
reproduced in Table VIII.7 with the associated 95% confidence interval.
Due to the fact that the forecasting model is autoregressive the process has infinite
memory so the reversion to the mean of the series is slow and has not been completely
achieved with a five period lead time although the tendency is clearly visible. The model
forecasts a general decline in the series from the origin (1990); the one step ahead
forecast being 3.050/0 below its previous value. The series is then predicted to fall very
slightly over the remainder of the forecasting horizon although given the parsimonious
specification of the model and the size of the confidence interval it would be foolhardy
to infer too much from the two or more step ahead forecasts.
Table VIII.7 ARIMA Forecasts of u, (1991-1995) £/ha.
Year Lower Forecast Upper
1991 86.27 91.63 97.23
1992 80.01 89.91 100.69
1993 74.88 88.93 104.84
1994 70.65 88.41 109.28
1995 67.11 88.19 113.82
(b) Forecasts for Newly Negotiated Farm Rents, RNt
Forecasts of RNt five periods into the future using the ARIMA (0,1,1) model are
reproduced in Table VIII.8 with the associated 95% confidence interval.
Table VIII.8 ARIMA Forecasts of RNt (1991-1995) £/ha.
Year Lower Forecast Upper
1991 90.86 97.63 104.76
1992 84.67 97.82 112,42
1993 80.89 98.01 117.67
1994 77.99 98.20 122.05
1995 75.58 98.39 125.93
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The forecasting model suggests that the one-step ahead forecast (at 1990 prices) is
some 1.140/0 lower than the 1990 value (of 98.76) although the forecasts rise slowly
from this value, so that in 1995 rents are only slightly below their 1990 level.
However, because forecasts are initially generated for the stationary series, !11nRN(
using an MA( 1) process the I step ahead forecast from this model will be the same as
the one step ahead forecast since an MA(l) model only has a memory of one period.
This implies that all the forecasts for the original series should also be the same as the
one-step ahead forecast. Accounting for the slow rise in the forecasts presented in
Table 8 is the adjustment that must be made to the forecasts in logs to obtain optimal
predictions of the raw series, as explained in footnote 20. For our purposes here
though, the only 'useful' forecast is the one-step ahead forecast given that we have an
MAO) process driving the forecast.
(c) Forecasts for the Historical Rent Series R H t
Forecasts of RHt five periods into the future using the ARIMA (l, 1,0) model are
reproduced in Table VIII.9 with the associated 95% confidence interval.
Table VIII.9 ARIMA Forecasts of RNt (1991-1995) £/ha.
Year Lower Forecast Upper
1991 83.09 93.05 103.86
1992 76.55 92.76 111.38
1993 71.79 92.88 118.25
1994 68.09 93.17 124.49
1995 65.07 93.50 130.21
The forecasting model suggests that the one step ahead forecast (at 1990 prices) is some
1.5% lower than the 1990 value (of 94.51) and that the rent series continues to fall into
1992 where it bottoms out and begins to rise slowly - although the forecast for 1995 is
still 1% below the 1990 level although such medium term forecasts should be treated
sceptically for the reasons explained above.
(d) Forecasts for the Average Land price series, P,
. . . h ARIMA (2 1 0) model areForecasts of P t five penods Into the future USIng t e , ,
reproduced in Table VIII. 10 with the associated 95% confidence interval. The date of
Forecasting
origin (the last available observation of the series) is 1989 for this series.
Table VULlO ARIMA Forecasts of r, (1990-1994) £/Ha.
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Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Lower
3500
2756
2598
2596
2516
Forecast
4580
4431
4568
4745
4786
Upper
5890
6759
7470
7988
8296
The one step ahead forecast from this model predicts a sharp drop in land price from the
origin, of some 7.1 %. The downward trend continues into 1991 which is 3.3% lower
than the forecast for 1990, however the model predicts an upturn in land prices in 1992
rising to a level of £4786 per hectare by 1994, although this is still 2.9% below the
1989 actual value of land in real terms.
(e) Forecasts for the 20 Hectare plus Average Land price series, P20 t
Forecasts of P, five periods into the future from a 1989 origin using the ARIMA
(2,1,0) model are reproduced in Table VIILII along with the associated 95%
confidence interval.
Table VIII.11 ARIMA Forecasts of P20 t (1990-1994) £/Ha.
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Lower
3255
2523
2384
2401
2330
Forecast
4315
4132
4260
4450
4495
Upper
5611
6396
7051
7569
7875
The results obtained from this model of P20t are similar to those from the previous
model of P; The one step ahead (1990) forecast of this series suggests a sharp drop in
land price of around 7.4% followed by another fall of some 4.2% in 1991. Thereafter
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the series turns up considerably, although the five-step ahead f "1orecast IS su 1 some
3.8% below the actual level in 1989.
(f) Forecasts for the Oxford Institute Average Land p . . PXrice series, t
Forecasts of PX t five periods into the future using the ARIMA (2 1 0) od 1" m e are
reproduced in Table 12 with the associated 95% confidence interval.
Table VIII.12 ARIMA Forecasts of PXt (1990-1994) £/Ha.
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Lower
5044
4451
4342
4197
3986
Forecast
6400
6508
6775
6839
6822
Upper
8007
9195
10091
10546
11325
Using 1989 as the origin of the forecast the model predicts a large fall in land prices of
some 9% in 1990. In the following year the model predicts a slight increase of 1.7% in
the series which continues until the end of the forecasting horizon in 1994 at which time
land prices are about 7.5% above their 1989 value in real terms.
VIII.(x) Conclusion
The object of this chapter has been to develop parsimonious ARIMA models primarily
for the purpose of generating forecasts of agricultural rents and land prices. Such
models solely comprise autoregressive and/or moving average components of the past
history of the series and consequently have greatest predictive power where the data is
characterised by repetitive cycles. By implication ARIMA models suffer from the
inability to pick up turning points in a series since the models do not incorporate an
explanatory structure that is rooted in economic behaviour. One other drawback of this
approach is that ARIMA models become increasingly impotent for the purposes of
prediction as the forecasting horizon lengthens. This stems from the 'backward-
looking' or adaptive nature of the models themselves, in that, such models base
forecasts solely on the historical evolution of the series up to that point. Because the
importance of contemporaneous information diminishes as we proceed further into the
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future, forecasts from ARIMA are by necessity short term predictions. Given the
parsimonious specifications identified here it is only the one and two step ahead
forecasts that can be considered in any way reliable and generally inferences have been
confined to this time horizon.
The findings that arise from this modelling are as follows. The forecasting models for
the three rent series give consistent predictions in that the one-step ahead forecast from
all the models suggests a fall in rent in real terms of the order of 1 to 3 per cent in 1990.
The forecasting models of the three land price series are also reasonably consistent
although predictions of the model forecasting the Oxford Institute land price series do
differ slightly to those from the other models. Whilst all the models predict a large fall
in land prices in 1990 (of 7 to 9%) the models of PI and P20 1 suggest that this is
followed by a further fall in 1991 of around 3 to 4 per cent after which an upturn is
predicted.U In slight contrast the Oxford forecasting model predicts that the upturn
occurs in 1991 rather than 1992.
However, the generation of forecasts is not the sole reason for the identification and
estimation of ARIMA models. It has already been noted that all the land price series are
characterised by outlying observations, such as those in the mid-1970s, that are
believed to have been caused by accession to the European Community and/or the rapid
inflation caused by the oil price shock, yet little formal analysis has been conducted on
the precise nature and dynamics of these outliers.
With the aid of an ARIMA model it is possible to investigate these aspects using an
intervention model and identify the dynamic response of land agents to the unusual
conditions that are alleged to have produced the outliers. Secondly, ARIMA models
may be combined with regression models that can be used for the purposes of
estimation and forecasting. The combination of both approaches into what are called
transfer function models is frequently superior to either pure regression or ARIMA
models. The advantage of combination arises from the complementarity of the two
approaches. The inclusion of explanatory variables into an ARIMA model allows the
transfer function model to more accurately track turning points in a series yet permits
21 Due to the fact that values for the Oxford institute series takes much less time to be published a
1990 value for the series is currently available, although this is not so with the satutory series.
Recall that the forecast for 1990 was a 9% fall in prices which estimates quite accurately the actual
fall which is observed as 9.7% in that year.
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more accurate forecasts than a pure regression model. Such areas of investigation are
acknowledged but are not within the scope of this present study and will be left for
future investigation.
Forecasting VIII.49
Appendix I : ARMA Model Simulation
In developing forecasting functions for the rent and land price series the properties of a
number of simple of linear stochastic processes were examined, namely the
ARMA( 1,0), ARMA(2,0), ARMA(O, 1), ARMA(0,2) and ARMA( 1,1). Here, each of
these of processes has been simulated according to a known data generation process
(which is stationary and/or invertible) and a randomly generated set of errors, denoted
£" characterised by zero mean and unit variance. Each of the following models has
been generated using this same set of random errors £r The sample size of each model
is 100.
The purpose of this Appendix is to illustrate the ACFs and PACFs of those simple
linear processes because an acquaintance with some stochastic ACFs and PACFs will
be useful before the empirical series on rents and land prices are identified. The
Appendix highlights the need for some experience when trying to identify ARMA
models using these descriptive tools and underscores the notion that identification may
be more of an art than a science. Even in the simple processes presented below the
identification is seldom as straightforward as the theoretical derivations of the ACF and
PACF suggest.
To aid identification standard error bands have been superimposed to represent the 95%
confidence limit for a set of random variables with mean zero. The limits are only
approximate and may be estimated more precisely using Barlett's (1946) formula
shown in the text.
l.ARMA (0,1)
DGP : Y, =£, + 0.75£'_1
The ACF in Figure A 1 is dominated by a significant spike at lag 1 and insignificant
coefficients thereafter indicative of an MA(l) process. The theoretical derivation of the
ACF for this process also implies that the first coefficient on the ACF should lie
between -0.5 and 0.5 and this is what we observe. The large spikes at lags 18 and 19
I" . bilit one in twentywould typically be ignored on the grounds of samp 109 vana 1 1 Y -
spikes being spuriously 'significant' on average anyway. The PACF should ~ l s s
, ., . di 1 bvi Moreover the first two spikesdecline to zero although this IS not imme late y 0 VlOUS. ,
dominate the PACF and may suggest, when taken by itself, an AR(2) process although
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when considered with the ACF this would be refuted. Consequently, the true model
would most probably have been identified in this instance although the evidence is not
as clear-cut as one might like.
Figure AI: A Realisation of a Typical MA(I) Process
3
2
o
-1
-2
-3
-4+-----,--------,r-----.----.--------,
o 20 40
Time
60 80 100
Figure A2: Autocorrelation Function of an MA(I) Process
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Figure A3: Partial Autocorrelation Function of an MA(l) Process
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2. ARMA (0,2)
DGP : Y, = £, + 0.6£,_1 -0.3£,_1
Figure A4: A Realisation of a Typical MA(2) Process
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Time4020
-3 ;-------.-----.........-------.----...........-----..,
o
The ACF in Figure A5 exhibits two clear spikes at lags one and two (all others, around
lag twenty could be legitimately disregarded) suggesting the process has a memory of
only two periods. The PACF declines to zero quite clearly and there seems little here to
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dispute the identification of an MA(2) model. The oscillatory nature of the PACF would
further imply that the MA parameters assume alternate signs, as indeed they do.
Figure AS: Autocorrelation Function of an MA(l) Process
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Figure A6: Partial Autocorrelation Function of an MA(l) Process
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3.ARMA (1,0)
DGP : Yt = O.8Yt_1 + ct
Figure A7: A Realisation of a Typical AR(l) Process
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The ACF in Figure A8 is strongly indicative of a process with long memory such as an
AR process. The PACF is dominated by a spike at lag one and would probably lead
immediately to the identification of the true structure of this process.
Figure AS: Autocorrelation Function of an AR(I) Process
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Given the slow linear decline of the ACF and the significant spike in the PACF it
would be appropriate to infer that that the AR parameter is positive and close to the
boundary of stationarity (unity). Indeed the parameter used to generate the process was
0.8.
Figure A9: Partial Autocorrelation Function of an AR(l) Process
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4.ARMA (2,0)
DGP : Yt = -O.7Yt_1 + O.8Yt _2 + ct
Figure AIO: A Realisation of a Typical AR(2) Process
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The ACF in Figure A 11 assumes a sine wave pattern indicating that the process is AR
of at least order two. The PACF actually gives a rather misleading picture in that there
appear to be three 'significant' spikes in this function. This would lead to the probable
adoption of an AR(3) model, although because the third spike on the PACF is close to
the 95% confidence level one would be well advised to carry an AR(2) model through
to the next stage of the Box-Jenkins process so that a comparison between the rival
specifications could be made.
Figure All: Autocorrelation Function of an AR(2) Process
Figure A12: Partial Autocorrelation Function of an AR(2) Process
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5. ARMA (1,1)
DGP : Yt = 0.8Yt_ 1 + 0.8£t_1 + £t
Figure A13: A Realisation of a Typical ARMA (1,1) Process
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The ACF of this process is clearly dominated by an autoregressive component and the
slow linear decline of the ACF suggests a positive and high AR parameter. The PACF
of an ARMA(l,I) should behave like a MA(q) process after p-q lags. Whilst this is
visible to some extent, in that the PACF does decline to zero, the very significant spike
at lag one may also suggest a simple AR(l) model.
Figure A14: Autocorrelation Function of an ARMA (1,1) Process
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IX.l
IX.(i) A Summary of Results
This thesis has attempted to develop logically deduced empirical models of land price
determination that satisfy the requirements of the statistical techniques used in their
estimation. In so doing, the investigation has explored the theoretical foundations of
asset price determination using present value methods. This approach provides a
tractable framework in which pricing equations may be derived and estimated
econometrically using time series data. The econometric methodology adopted serves
the dual purpose of providing more reliable estimates and giving a greater insight into
the economic rationale of econometric models. A number of new results emerge from
this investigation that are summarised as follows.
The economic theory of price determination of durable assets establishes a symmetry
between potential purchasers and current owners of land, in so far as the factors that
influence the demand for an asset will also influence its supply. In a situation where all
offer prices and reservation prices are known to the analyst in each period of time the
identification of supply and demand curves is feasible. Here, expressions for the
equilibrium price and number of transactions that will occur in such a setting have been
derived. However, since such information is unavailable in practice, the symmetry of
the market entails that the identification of separate demand and supply curves becomes
impossible and the analysis reaches an impasse. Nevertheless, if it can be assumed that
participants in the land market base their valuation of land on present value methods, a
single reduced form equation may be derived to determine the equilibrium price of land
for the entire market. Such an expression is consistent with the theory of asset pricing
since it recognises the independence of transactions in the process of price
determination and leads to specifications that may be estimated with published data.
Moreover, this reduced form representation allows a number of hypotheses to be tested
empirically, most importantly, those relating to the relationship between returns and
asset prices and the formation of expectations. This last issue was explored in Chapter
III where it was found that adaptive expectations were congruent with the data,
although the special case of naive expectations may be acceptable as a first
approximation. The version of rational expectations employed was refuted by the data.
Using the adaptive models, the required rate of discount on land ownership was
estimated to be around 3%, evidencing the widely held belief that discount rates on
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agricultural land are generally low. The possibility of disequi 11" bri . . Iurn pricing was a so
investigated, yet there was no statistical support for this notion, suggesting that
disequilibrium is not a permanent feature of the land market. Clearly, the use of
aggregate annual data clouds the equilibrium issue, but the evidence points to an
efficient market for land in England and Wales. Whilst disequilibrium will necessarily
occur at a more disaggregated level, it does not appear to be reflected in any permanent
way in the average price of farmland. Finally, the empirical analysis in Chapter III
suggests that the opportunity cost of capital, as defined by the Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation loan rate, does not have a systematic effect on real land prices. Whilst this
appears counter-intuitive, it may simply reflect a common belief among market
commentators, such as those writing in the Farmland Market, that land prices are
sticky with respect to the level of interest rates over much of the range in which interest
rates have fluctuated in the post-war era. The argument proposed to account for this
behaviour is that borrowed funds are generally only used to finance land purchased for
amalgamation. Since neighbouring land may only come on to the market once in an
individual's lifetime, the ruling rate of interest may be of limited importance,
particularly so since mortgage rates are variable and the repayment period extends for
some 25 years. This reasoning also suggests that the implicit use of a constant real rate
of discount in the present value equations may not be as restrictive as might be thought.
The evaluation of previous land price modelling, namely that by Bruce Traill, formed
the heart of Chapter V. The empirical model developed by Traill exhibits a number of
disquieting methodological features such as theoretical mis-specification, the use of net
farm income as a measure of the returns to land and the inclusion of variables in
nominal (not real) price terms. The mis-specification arose primarily from the use of
transactions as a determinant of price, which as was shown in Chapter III is
independent of price. In turn, this use of transactions arose from the demand orientated
nature of the study, and a mis-understanding of the concepts of stock and flow for a
durable asset. In essence, the two concepts were confused in the empirical specification
of the model and as a result the negative correlation observed between the number of
transactions and nominal land price was used as 'evidence' for a demand curve.
However, given that the number of transactions has been falling due to the effect of
institutional factors on the size of the tenanted sector, and that nominal land prices have
risen due to the effect of inflation, there are strong a priori grounds for believing the
observed correlation is spurious. Moreover, research by another author, Wollmer
(1988) has shown that the correlation is spurious, as implied by the theoretical model of
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Using an updated sample with variables measured at constant prices the model breaks
down, exhibiting structural change in the parameters, unstable dynamic behaviour, and
an insignificant coefficient on the farm income variable. The model exemplifies the
dangers of spurious regression that may arise through theoretical mis-specification and
the use of integrated variables. The examination of the model clearly signals that greater
attention needs to be paid to both the theoretical underpinnings and statistical content of
empirical models.
Building on the time series analysis of Chapter VI the investigation turned to an
examination of the opportunities that cointegration has to offer. Using two techniques
developed in the econometric literature to test for cointegration, it was demonstrated that
once account is taken of the demand for farmland as an inflation-hedge, the long run
evolution of land prices is primarily determined by agricultural earning potential as
measured by agricultural rents. This result has a number of interesting implications.
First, it acknowledges the investment dimension in land purchase, hitherto ignored in
empirical models of land prices. Farmland is thus not solely purchased for its income
bearing potential but as a secure form of investment in inflationary periods. The most
likely explanation for the movement of funds in to land relates to its relative
profitability coupled to the perceptions of investors in inflationary periods. Whilst the
real annual yield on farmland (real rent) is typically lower than the return on alternative
investments, land becomes more attractive in inflationary periods since this is typically
when the prospects for investment opportunities elsewhere in the economy are weakest.
Moreover, such transfers may initiate a prophetic cycle, in that, if land is perceived to
be a good hedge against inflation, investment demand for it rises, with the result that
land prices actually do rise. Intuition and anecdotal evidence suggest it is the capital
growth rather than annual return that motivates inflation-based acquisitions. In addition,
the modest size of the land market implies that even marginal shifts of investment
portfolios can have a discernible effect on land prices. Second, because cointegration
has been found between rents, inflation and land prices, the effect of all other
potentially important influences, such as interest rates, capital taxes and non-pecuniary
effects must be confined to the short run. Whilst this result is subject to the usual
caveats concerning statistical inference it does suggest that the land price model may
only be improved by the addition of explanatory variables which are 1(0) in linear
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combination with one another or are 1(0) processes themselves.
IX.4
Finally, the cointegrating vector that has been identified is unique and supports the
theoretical prediction of unit elasticity between returns and land prices. The discount
rate implied by the long run equilibrium relationship is estimated at 3.6% which is in
accordance with earlier estimates and a priori expectations. When substituted into an
error correction model the response of land prices to rents and inflation is such that land
prices tend to adjust immediately to changes in rents whereas land prices tend to over-
react to changes in inflation in the short run, the period to adjustment to the long run
equilibrium taking some three or four years.
IX.(ii) Limitations
In the introduction to this study a number of questions were posed that subsequent
Chapters have sought to answer. Inevitably, many of the explanations given are in
some way or another partial, or warrant further study. Consequently, there are some
limitations and potential weaknesses of the present analysis that require a retrospective
evaluation. The first of these concerns the empirical measure of returns to land.
Rents represent a bridge between the landowner and the cultivator. In a competitive
economy, rents may be expected to accurately reflect market forces, yet the highly
institutionalised nature of the rental market in England and Wales, may stifle rents in
practice. The fact that rents and land prices do not cointegrate may even be evidence of
this view. In addition, the use of rent as a return to land is frequently criticised owing
to the fact that a significant majority of farmers are owner-occupiers and thus do not
actually negotiate a rental payment. In this light, the use of rent as the return to
landownership in modern times may appear questionable. Whilst it is argued here that
such objections are fallacious, it is accepted that the use of rents does limit the analysis
in a policy context since the level of rent is not at the direct control of policy-makers. In
order to analyse the effect of variables over which policy-makers have direct control,
such as support prices and quotas for example a rent model is required. Since a model
of rent determination has not been developed here, the usefulness of the land price
model in a policy context is limited, although future research would correct this
deficiency.
In defence of the use of rents per se the following points may be noted. If we are
prepared to assume that tenanted land is farmed in a similar fashion to owner-occupied
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land then the objection to the use of rents on the grounds that most farmers do not
actually pay a rent becomes a question of sampling reliability. However, as detailed in
the Data Appendix the coverage of farms in the Rent Survey is sufficiently large not to
warrant criticism. If it is believed that tenanted land is fanned differently to owner-
occupied land, then clearly rents will not reflect profitability on the majority of farms,
although there seems little reason to believe that this is so. Furthermore, no matter how
intimate the relationship between landowner and farmer may be, the functions that each
performs are conceptually distinct. Whilst the owner-occupier supplants the landowner,
he does not remove the functions that the landowner performs, and thus the reward he
receives. Hence, part of the total return accruing to the owner-occupier must represent
a return to land, no matter how invisible it may be to an outsider.
Objection to the use of rent on the grounds that legislative controls may impede rents
seems more tenable, since one may argue that the volatility of the land price series
merely reflects the volatility of the return to farming; a volatility that is 'ironed out' in
the rent series by the institutional mechanisms that constrain the negotiation of market
rents in practice. The solution to this problem is an empirical one and to the extent that
the discrepancy between the land price and rent series is accounted for by a third
variable - inflation - the empirical results suggest that rents do reflect underlying market
forces adequately. This issue may nevertheless be investigated using a rent model. If,
as it has been assumed here, that rents reflect the underlying or 'long-run' profitability
of farming, then given sufficient data on the factors that determine this profitability,
such as technological change and the prices of farm inputs and outputs, it should be
possible to test this assumption using cointegration. If rents reflect the long term
changes in these factors then rents and these other determinants will cointegrate. If this
occurs, then in the long run rents and the determinants of farming profitability are tied
together, despite short run divergences, caused by weather, disease and so forth. This
issue will be discussed further below since it has important policy implications. The
validity of the use of rents as a measure of farming profitability is nevertheless
supported empirically.
Even if rents can be shown to embody the determinants of farming prosperity, a
number of other potentially important determinants of land prices have been omitted,
namely the non-pecuniary demand for farmland, speculation and institutional factors,
such as taxation and the effect of roll-over relief in the market. These factors have been
omitted since they are all particularly difficult to model empirically, though for different
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reasons. Whereas it is the complexity of tax law that precludes realistic measurement, it
is the psychological dimension that troubles the modelling of non-pecuniary motives
and also speculation. The presence of cointegration among the variables identified
however seems to suggest that such factors have only a short run effect, at least over
the post-war period. The speculative boom in the 1970s is a clear example however that
such short run influences may have a major, albeit transient impact on the price of land.
Credible models of speculative behaviour have eluded financial economists for some
time, although recent breakthroughs in this area undertaken by Bulow and Klemperer
(1991) throw a new light on this matter and may allow such effects to be incorporated
into an empirical model of land prices.
The discussion in Chapter II suggested that institutional factors, most notably taxation
and tenurial law, play an important role in the land market. Whilst such factors have
been a significant driving force in the shift to owner-occupation the empirical analysis
suggests that they have not been so influential on the price of land, at least during the
post-war period. However, the inconclusive evidence concerning cointegration using
the 120 year sample may well be partially explained by the omission of these factors
which have changed dramatically over the larger sample period. This deficiency is
acknowledged although there seems little that one may do to overcome it in a time series
framework, given the problems that one would encounter in actually measuring such
factors. However, research currently in train at Cambridge University seeks to establish
the effect of these factors in farmland purchase using questionaire data, although the
results of this exercise have not yet been published.
The influence of non-agricultural demand for farmland, such as residence and amenity,
has also been omitted from the empirical analysis due to the unavailability of the
necessary data. Whilst it is fair to say that this influence has exerted a non-trivial effect
at certain times (notably at the end of the 1980s) and in certain localities (such as the
Home Counties), it is in general swamped by the demand for land by commercial
agriculturalists. Here, this influence has been 'artificially reduced' by the exclusion of
land sold below 20 hectares from the land price series used. Again the omission is
acknowledged and points to the need for further analysis which will be discussed in the
following section.
Finally, it is important to underscore the limitations of the statistical techniques
employed, given that so many of the conclusions that have been reached rely on
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statistical inference. As discussed in Chapter VII, unit root testing and cointegration are
vulnerable to a number of criticisms and should be treated with the same degree of
caution as with any statistical procedure. At best, cointegration serves as a test of model
adequacy and thus the statistical results should be interpreted as providing evidence
rather than answers.
IX(iii) Avenues of future Research
As with any investigative exercise, the initial research throws up many new and
interesting issues that require further attention. Here, there are four main areas on
which future research could focus.
(i) It has been implicitly assumed in this investigation that cash rents provide a reliable
measure of the returns to land ownership. As such rents embody a number of
influences that determine the demand for and supply of farmland. Consequently, a
logical extension of this work would be to model rent determination itself. Coupled
with the land price model developed here there would be a number of interesting
policy implications of such a study. These derive from the fact that since rents are
not directly under State control the influence of price reform cannot be directly
quantified. Using a model of rent determination the effects of product price changes
could be traced through to land prices and estimates derived for the effect on farm
wealth and debt. This would represent a major study in itself and has not been
attempted here for that reason, although it is clearly an avenue of research that may
merit further attention, particularly in light of its pertinent policy implications.
(ii) The effect of non-agricultural demand has been excluded to all intents and purposes
by the exclusion of smallholdings from the empirical series. In Chapter II attention
was paid to the emergence of a two-tier land market. Whilst the effect of non-
agricultural demand reflects the buoyancy of the general economy more than any
other factor, and as such has only been of minor importance recently, there are
some interesting theoretical and empirical implications of a resurgence in non-
agricultural demand, particularly if this coincides with low agricultural demand for
land. Development of a theoretical model that includes both these sectors is
currently underway although an empirical model is likely to encounter limitations in
the data that is currently available.
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(iii)The use of cointegration and error correction models using the vector autoregressive
representation also warrants further analysis. As mentioned in Chapter VII
hypothesis testing was restricted due to the software currently available, although
the recent introduction of software capable of dealing with these techniques will
allow the investigation to proceed much further, particularly with respect to the
nature of short run influences of such factors as interest rates, non-agricultural
demand and possibly speculation. Whilst the presence of cointegration implies that
the long run influences on land price has been identified, as alluded to above it does
not deny a host of other influences contributing to price changes in the short run.
One important candidate for further investigation is the interest rate which has been
relegated in the previous Chapters simply because our main concern has been with
the long run. Further analysis is required to investigate this short run influence,
particularly so since the preliminary investigation in Chapter III hinted at a
discernible influence.
(iv) Like many agricultural markets, empirical measurement of underlying relationships
is often thwarted by the presence of outlying observations. The analysis of outliers
has surprisingly been neglected in the agricultural economics literature, despite the
development of techniques that facilitate their analysis. The outliers here represent
speculative influences that resulted from the macro-economic shocks of the early
1970s. Time series analysis of this phenomenon will uncover the dynamic response
and may be complementary to the development and application of models of
speculative behaviour. The forecasting models developed in Chapter VIII playa
crucial role in this examination and may be used subsequently in transfer function
models where elements of both structural economic models and forecasting models
are exploited in a hybrid model.
This outline of potential research topics is by no means definitive, but it does indicate
those areas in which future research may be most fruitful and above all, that much
research still remains. Only when armed with a richer understanding of the way in
which the land market operates and the means with which it can be modelled, can
economists provide insight into the likely consequences of agricultural policy, on the
owners and cultivators of farmland. However, policy issues have not been the principal
rationale for this present study, and as a result the contribution of this thesis to the
policy debate is accordingly modest. Motivating this research is the unstructured and
statistically spurious models of land prices that have been developed in the past. The
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questions posed in the introduction implied the need to develop models that are both
theoretically and statistically valid and the models developed here attempt to achieve that
dual aim. They are logically deduced and statistically congruent and as such are distinct
from their predecessors. The theoretical framework and econometrics techniques
applied here are necessary precursors to policy analysis and represent important steps
that signal the direction which future land market research may follow.
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A.(i) Agricultural Land Price series in England and Wales
(a) MAFF Series
Since the Finance Act of 1931 it has been a statutory obligation of the purchaser to
inform the Inland Revenue of a transaction in land or property. This information
(contained in 'particulars delivered' or PD forms) is analysed by the Inland Revenue,
where it undergoes a screening process to remove certain categories of sales (see
below) and to uphold the confidentiality of transactions.l These filtered data are
subsequently passed onto the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food who then
publish annual (and quarterly at present) summary reports.
The resulting series are based on all sales of agricultural land (bare land and land with
buildings) of five hectares (four hectares/lO acres prior to October 1978) and above.
Specifically, it includes,
(a) sales of agricultural land with some potential for development;
(b) any sales of land that may be regarded as being sold at prices below that ruling in
the open market, e.g. between family members;
(c) sales where the vendor retains rights over the land such as rights to fish and hunt;
(d) sales of agricultural land in which the value of the farm dwelling represents a
substantial part of the total i.e. small holdings;
but it excludes:
(e) sales of farmland designated for alternative use, such as development and gravel
workings;
(t) gifts and inheritances of land;
(g) transactions costs (legal fees and Stamp Duty); and
(h) areas of woodland sold as a complete entity for commercial exploitation.
A land price series based on the conditions outlined above was first published in
aggregate form dating from 1945 in annual ADAS Technical Reports commencing in
1969.2 The basic aggregates of area sold, total value and land price have
1 The confidentiality clause is invoked where there are fewer than five transactions in any particular
. . ificati not presented The' confidential
category, and entails that data in many regional classi icauons are '. ..
, h . be assured that details of individualdata' is however incorporated mto the aggregates were It can
sales cannot be identified or derived.
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subsequently been embelished at sporadic intervals to include dissaggregations by
region, tenure, size of holding, land quality, type of vendor/purchaser. Detailed
information as to the timing and precise nature of these revisions may be found in Lund
and Slater (1979) although the following points are worthy of note. In response to the
persistence of the premium payable on land sold with vacant possession, which had
emerged during the 1930s, land sales were classified by tenure, in 1969. In 1972
information from the statutory returns was presented quarterly and as of 1976 the
categories of spatial aggregation were switched from the 21 valuation office regions to
the eight MAFF administrative regions (although there exists one year in which both
were calculated). As of 1989 information on land sales in the England and Wales
aggregate ceased to be published, however, for the purposes of this study this type of
information was aggregated from the figures published for the two individual countries
in order to maintain a relatively long and consistent series for the England and Wales
aggregate.
Due to the statutory nature of the PD returns the MAFF series provides an authoritative
summary of land market trends, yet the comprehensive nature of the information is
achieved at the price of punctualilty; such that there is an approximate delay of 6 months
before statistics are published.I Moreoever, details of anyone particular transaction
are included in the year that the PD form is lodged with the Inland Revenue, and not the
time of actual sale. Consequently, information pertaining to a sale agreed in December,
may be registered with the Inland Revenue in the following September: Lund and Slater
(1979) suggest that the lag between the time of sale reporting to the Inland Revenue is
around nine months on average. This implies that sales reported to the Inland Revenue
2 The ADAS Technical Reports were superceded in 1978 by an ADAS booklet series, (SLP21,
SLP22, Booklets 2320(79), 2320(80), 2320(81), 2320(82), 2320(83),2320(84) and 2320(85)}
which continued until 1986. Land price data were then published annually by MAFF until 1989,
{73/97, 73/88} whereafter land prices in England and in Wales were published in separate
publications by MAFF {in, Stats 56/89, Stats 51/90 and Slats 61/91} and the Welsh Office (no
reference numbers given) respectively.
3 More punctual indicators of land prices are available ( such as the ADAS/AMC series and the CLA
series) and are based on sample data. The short historical duration of these, and other more recent
series, (such as that constructed by Strutt and Parker) and to a lesser degree their partial coverage
preclude their use in the statistical analyses of this study and will not be discussed further. See
Lund and Slater (1979) for details.
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in the administraive year ending on the 30 September in year t more accurately reflects
the sales that took place in the calendar year t-l, (increasing the overall delay to around
15 months). This heuristic convention has been used in this study: all data presented is
in a calendar year basis, having adjusted for the lag in reporting actual sales. This basic
data has been amended for the purposes of statistical analysis and a brief explanation of
the series follows.
(b) The Construction and Definitions of The Land Price Series
Table A.l presents a summary of all the average land price series for the England and
Wales aggregate in nominal terms that have been derived from the statutory returns.
Each price series, is an 'unweighted' average, in that no account is taken of the
composition of the sales included, and so the price is calculated by simply dividing the
total value of land sold by the area of the land traded. All the series are expressed in £
per hectare and are calculated on a calendar year basis. Referring to Table AI, we may
define:
'nom P'; the nominal average price of all sales of farmland of 5 hectares and
above sold in England and wales (subject to the excluded categories
outlined above) during calendar year 1.
'nom VP'; the nominal average price of all land sold with vacant possession of 5
hectares and above in England and wales (subject to the excluded
categories outlined above) during calendar year 1.
'nom WP'; the nominal average price of all land sold without possession (i.e.
tenanted land) of 5 hectares and above in England and wales (subject
to the excluded categories outlined above) during calendar year 1.
Table A.l also includes the variables 'nom P20', 'nom VP20' and 'nom WP20' which
differ from those defined above in that sales of land below 20 hectares have been
excluded. These adjusted series incorporate a crude attempt to exclude small-holdings
that may be purchased primarily for their amenity or recreational value and not their
agricultural value. Note that because land sales by size were not recorded prior to 1964
for the England and Wales all sales aggregate measure the 'nom P' and 'nom P20'
series are identical for earlier years, although the recreational demand for smallholclings
in the earlier period covered by the data was probably small in any case.
The nominal land price information of Table A.l and A.2 have been calculated from the
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size disaggregations for the all sales, vacant possession and without possession
farmland displayed in Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 respectively. Changes to the size
classifications in 1969 and 1978 require that some care should be exercised when
viewing the data. These tables also provide the figures for the England and Wales
aggregate on the number of sales concluded, and the area of land involved. It should be
noted that figures in bold type represent years in which the confidentiality clause
prohibits declaration of the actual totals, with the result that the bold figures will
represent a proxy based solely on sales in England for example, although the reader is
directed to the appropriate footnotes for the precise reason and nature of the change.
In the empirical Chapters, the MAFF series expressed in current prices are not used due
to the trending effect that inflation has on these series. In the empirics, all variables are
expressed at constant (1990) prices and have been deflated by the Gross Domestic
Product price index, (see later). All series expressed at constant prices have the 'nom'
prefix deleted from their names, so that P, P20, VP, VP20 WP, WP 20 are the
deflated counterparts of nom P, nom P20, nomVP, nom VP20, nomWP and
nomWP20.
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Figures in bold type represent information pertaining to England only, due to the confidentiality clause binding on without possession sales in England and Wales.
The number of transactions and area sold figures for 1970 relate to the 12 months ending 30 June 1970, and not to the calendar year.
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(c) Other Land Price Series
By far the longest time series of land prices in England and Wales is that prepared (until
recently) by the Institute of Agricultural Economics at Oxford University. This series is
currently published in The Farmland Market but originated in Britton (1949), where an
annual series was calculated for the period 1918-38.4 Ward (1958) backdated the
series so that at present a continuous series from 1857 is available. A number of factors
militate against its extensive use in this study, and these are now briefly discussed
although for a more detailed description of its construction see Lund and Slater (1979)
in addition to the articles cited above. The series is an annual weighted average of a
sample of 'farms' sold at auction of between five and 300 acres in size and thus
excludes all sales of land by private treaty and all sales of land not deemed to be
'farms', i.e. smallholdings of less than five acres, bare land, land with outline
planning permission, enterprises of a specialist nature, such as hop farms and market
gardens, and estates of more than one farm. In 1950 sales of land over 300 acres were
included in the calculation of the series. Prior to 1970 the weighting scheme was by
size of farm but switched thereafter to a weighting by region to overcome the criticism
that the series primarily reflected sales in the south and centre of England. Another
change in 1970 increased the 5 acre floor on eligability to 25 acres to reduce the value
of farmhouses in the aggregate farmland price.
Although Britton (1949) calculated annual averages over the 1918-39 period, in Ward's
(1958) study a five year rolling average was used so that the datum for 1859 represents
the average of the annual prices recorded for the five years 1857 to 1861 inclusive.
Ward (1958) used this rolling average to overcome annual price fluctuations that
occurred due to the small sample used and hence make the detection of broad trends
more identifiable for his descriptive analysis. Since 1938 the Oxford Institute series has
been calculated for vacant possession sales and tenanated sales only and due to the
changes in methodology incorporated in 1970 results in a discrete downward shift in
the series at that date.>
4 Since 1989 compilation of the series is performed by staff at Savills land agents. The series is now
known as the 'Oxford Institute/Savills' series.
5 The Oxford Institute series exhibits a 22% drop in vacant possession land prices between 1969 and
1970, compared to a 6% fall in the MAFF statutory series (for England and Wales) over the same
period.
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The size of sample used to calculate the series that comprise the Oxford Institute Series
has in the past led to some criticism. In Ward's (1958) study, 25,355 sales were used
over the century which the series spans, and hence the average number of farms used in
the derivation in land prices for anyone year is 253, although the variance is
considerable:the range being bounded by 15 sales in 1864 up to 1217 in 1918. The
average number of farm used in Britton's (1949) paper was a little higher at 289,
representing some 15,000 acres and in no year was the sample size allowed to fall
below 150.
Table A5 presents, in nominal (current price) terms the series produced by Ward,
Britton and the Oxford Institute continuation of the auction price series. In the final
column of Table A5 a hybrid time series has been constructed so to obtain a long
historical series of land prices in England and Wales. In it Ward's (1958) 'all farms'
series has been spliced with Britton's (1949) and the Oxford Institute/Savills 'vacant
possession' series. Whilst each series is derived from samples of auction sales only,
the caveats highlighted above regarding the reliability of the series should be bourne in
mind. Note however that the premium for vacant possession land was of minor
significance before the second world war and hence the switch from sales of all farms
to vacant possession does not give rise to concern - the sampling bias being probably
far more distortionary anyway.P
In the empirical analysis a constant (1990) price version of the hybrid series is used. As
with all the other series the deflator used is the Gross Domestic Product price index.
The constant price hybrid series is called, PX.
6 . . £68 r hectare compared to the price ofIn 1938 Britton's (1949) observation of all farms pnce IS pc
£65 recorded for vacant possession farms by the Oxford Instite/Savills series.
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Table A.S: The Oxford Institute/Savills and Related Land Price Series
(Nominal Terms) 1859- 1990
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Notes to Table A.5
In 1970 major changes to the construction of the Oxford Institute series took place, resulting in a
discrete downward shift in the series. See Maunder (1973) 'The Search for a More Accurate Average
Price forLand' The Farmland Market no.3.
Entries denoted "n.a." mean that insufficient sales were recorded in that year to presentan averageprice
without breaching the confidentiality of sales.
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In summary, whilst the Oxford Institute series has the definite advantage of longevity it
suffers from a number of drawbacks relating to the relatively small nature of the
sample: specifically, the biased composition of sales (by region and type of sale) and
the actual number of sales used in some years. Writing prior to the 1970 changes in
methodology, Harvey (1974) goes as far as suggesting that due to the non-random
nature and size of the sample the Oxford Institute series may not even present an
accurate reflection of the auction market for farmland let alone the market as a whole
(p.15), and dismisses the series as unreliable, despite concluding,
"... as far as trends and turning points are concerned, there is little to choose
between the Ministry and Oxford price series ... " (p.17)
(d) A Brief Comparison of the Oxford Institute/Savills and MAFF series
Let us now breifly assess the effects of these drawbacks by comparing the similarity of
the Oxford Institute and MAFF series over the period for which statistics on both series
are available'? Visual inspection of Figure A.I suggests that despite the criticisms
directed at the Oxford Institute series there is a very good correspondence between the
two series expressed in real terms. Whilst the Institute series is persistently higher,
trends and turning points are common to both series.f Furthermore, using a
logarithmic scale Figure A.2 suggests that proportional changes in the two series are
also similar. We may pursue this further by regressing the MAFF series on the Oxford
Institute series, over the period for which both series are available, 1945 - 89. Using
MAFF's average land price series P, ' and PXt yields the equation,
Pt = 240.33
(2.54)
+ 0.644PXt
(33.60)
R2 = 0.96
(t - ratios in parenthesis).
Calculating the elasticity at the mean values yields a coefficient of 0.92 implying that a
I% change in the Oxford Instiutre series is matched by a 0.92% change in the MAFF
series.
7
8
The MAFF series used here is that denoted by the land price series 'P20' on page A4.
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Figure A.l: The Oxford Institute /Savills, (PX t) and MAFF Land Price
Series for England and Wales at 1989 prices, (P
t
) (GDP Deflator)
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Figure A2: The Oxford Institute/Savills, (PX t ) and MAFF Land Price
Series for England and Wales at 1989 prices (P t ) using a log scale
(G DP Deflator)
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Clearly, where the elasticity is unity both series change in identical proportions,
implying that both series reflect movements in the land market equally well.
Transformation of the two series into logarithms allows us to test statistically the unit
elasticity hypothesis. Regressing the log of the MAFF series on the log of the Oxford
series yields,
10gPt = 0.557
(2.66)
+ 0.892 10gPXt
(35.43)
R2 = 0.97
(t - ratios in parenthesis)
where the coefficient 0.892 is an estimate of the elasticity between the Oxford and
MAFF series. Under the null hypothesis of unit elasticity we obtain a t ratio of - 4.29,
which leads us to reject the null at the 1% significance level. This result suggests that
the Oxford Institute series is more responsive than the statutory series in that the
proportionate change in the Oxford series is greater than portrayed in the MAFF series
in any time period. This result is interesting because it is actually what one may expect
a priori: not only do auction sales tend to respond more vigorously to speculative
expectations but they exclude sales by private treaty - some of which occur at prices
generally perceived to be below that ruling in the market, such as sales between
relatives.
The results from estimation of the elasticity coefficent by recursive methods is depicted
in Figure A.3. This time series plot of recursive elasticities suggests that after allowance
is made for the small sample size initially, the relationship between the two land price
series has remained stable, a result confirmed by a Chow test for parameter constancy.
This has important implications for it indicates that despite the non-random nature of the
Oxford Instiute sample of land sales it appears to be behaving in much the same way as
the Ministry's statutory series.
To summarise this comparison it can be stated that the Oxford Institute series is
persistently higher and is more volatile than the Ministry's statutory series during the
sample period. Because there is evidence to suggest that the relationship between the
two series has remained stable over time the non-random nature of the Oxford Institute
sample is only important in respect to the absolute level of average land prices and does
not imply that auction sales respond in a qualitatively different way to land sales in
general. Consequently, there appear to be no empirical grounds for dismissing the
Oxford Institute series on the basis of the reliability of the sample with the implication
Data Appendix
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that the choice of the most appropriate series rests solel hi h .y on w IC senes most
accurately reflects the 'true' absolute pricelevel of land sold in England and Wales and
the purpose to which the series is to be put.
Figure A.3 : Recursive Estimation of the Elasticity Coefficient Between
The Oxford Institute (PXt ) and MAFF Land Price Series (P t)
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Whilst the statutory series has traditionally been perceived as more representative of the
absolute level of farmland prices, clearly, a case could be argued to the contrary.
Recalling that the MAFF series includes sales by private treaty, some of which may
bear little relation to market forces, the series may well incorporate a significant
downward bias. In the final analysis neither series may be ideal, yet both are as good
as each other in depicting the state of the market for agricultural land.
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A.(ii) Agricultural Rent series in England and Wales
(a) Official Rent Series
The regular collection of comprehensive information on farm rents began in 1960 with
the first of the annual Rent Enquiries undertaken by MAFF (Economics Division) and
the Agricultural Land Service'' (ALS). Initially, summary information from each
annual enquiry was published by MAFF starting in 1961. However, in 1969 a separate
report of a detailed breakdown of the results was published and has continued in
various guises ever since.U' Prior to 1972, information on rents was recorded on an
estate basis but thereafter on a farm basis, which enabled a more informative
breakdown of basic data provided. The annual Rent Enquiry bases its figures on
information provided voluntarily by respondents, covering an area of one million
hectares, which represents about 25% of the total tenanted area in England and Wales
which itself is about one-third of the total agricultural area. Whilst the coverage in terms
of area has declined from 1.4 million hectares in 1959 to 900,000 hectares in 1989 the
proportion of the area tenanted has remained constant at around 25% due to a decline in
the area of tenanted farms over the period. Due to the unequal coverage of farms in the
sample, average rent figures are derived on a weighted basis according to the tenanted
area in each county and area size group indicated by the June census.
The Rent Enquiry's primary aim has been to establish the average rent of all farms in
the sample and also its annual rate of change. However, because of the historical
precedent of tri-annual rent changes (which has subsequently entered into tenure Law)
only one-third of farms sampled in any year will have had a rent change in that year.
9 In 1974 the ALS was replaced by the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS).
10 The summary information of Rent Enquiry results continued to be published in MAFFs journal
Agriculture until 1968. In 1969 this was superceded by detailed analyses of the rent data in a
series of annual Technical reports {19, 19/1, 19/2, 19/3, 19/4} published by the ALS. From 1974
the technical reports were produced by ADAS and continued until 1977 (as Technical Reports
19/5, 19/6, 19n and 19/8). From 1978 to 1986 ADAS continued to publish the farm enquiry
results in a booklet series (SFR21, SFR22, Booklets B2319(79), 2319(80), 2319(81), 2319(82),
2319(83),2319(84), 2319(85)} until 1986. In 1987 MAFF took over the publication of the annual
Rent Enquiry for England and Wales however in 1989 this became the responsibility of MAFF for
the English statistics and the Welsh Office for Welsh Statistics. This format continues to the
present, with the result that England and Wales combined statistics have not been published s i ~ c c
the 1987 Enquiry published in 1988. These have been derived to keep a long historical time senes,
as described in the text
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Consequently, two raw rents series exist; average rents for all farms in the sample and
average rents on the subset of farms which have had a rent increase in the last twelve
months. This allows a distinction to be made between the rate of change of rent levels
over the entire sample and that pertaining to the subset that has actually undergone a
rent change in the last year.
Due to fact that the composition of the sample is not constant over time, each
respondent is asked for the level of rent at October in year t and also for the rent
prevailing in October t-l. Consequently, the average rent recorded for, say 1990, will
represent the arithmetic mean of average rent in the 1990 sample and the average rent
recorded for October t-l in the 1991 sample. It should be noted however that due to
the large sample size the difference between the two estimates is negligible. Rents are
then put on a calendarised basis using a simple weighting scheme so that rent for the
calendar year 1990 is derived by taking 0.74 of the rent recorded for October 1989 and
0.26 of the rent recorded for October 1990. This interpolation procedure is based on
information on term dates collected in the 1975 Rent Enquiry and on the assumption
that rents are normally paid half yearly in arrears.
Although changes to the questionaire have taken place over the years, rents are recorded
by county, region and country, across size group and land quality, however due to the
changes in the local authority boundaries in 1972, use of dissagregated data is not
possible in time series analysis.
In 1987 the structure of the Enquiry was altered slighlty to improve the quality of
inference. Specifically, the category, 'farms with a rent change' was replaced by 'farm
due a rent review' thus account is taken of farms where a reivew has taken place but
which did not result in a change in the level of rent. Consequently, inferences based on
the information from this subgroup now more accurately reflect the state of the rental
market (particularly in recession) existing at a particular time; previously rental growth
being exaggerated in periods of recession.
In 1989 England and Wales aggregate statistics were no longer published, so that
MAFF produced the English results and all counties therein and the Welsh Office
. I h . A the tenus of reference for thispublished rents for Wales and the We s counties. s
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study is England and Wales combined, recent statistics for rents have been combined
from these two separate sources according to a weighting scheme estimated by OLS as,
REW =O.87RE + O.13Rw ·t t t
where RE W t is the average rent at mid-October in year t for England and Wales
combined; R E is the average rent at mid-October in England in year t and R thet W t
average rent at mid-October in Wales in year t.
As alluded to above however this average rent series does not convey the most pertinent
information regarding the state of the rental market as it includes farms for which rent
has not increased. Consequently, another series is constructed using only those farms
for which there has been a rent review in the last year (or rent increase prior to 1987).
For this series a similar weighting scheme to that shown above is applied to obtain a
calendar year based series however, estimates of rents for the England and Wales
aggregate from English and Welsh averages are based on a weighting scheme obtained
by OLS of the following form,
REWt = O.87REt + O.13Rwt
A summary of the nominal cash rent series for the England and Wales aggregate
derived from the annual Rent Enquiry is contained in Table A.6. The series in that table
are defined as follows:
R1 : Nominal average cash rents for tenanted farms in England and Wales at mid-
I
October of year t, (£/ha.). Each figure is the mean of the two sample
observations for rents in that year. From 1987 figures are estimated from
English and Welsh averages according to the weighting,
R1 = O.87RE + O.13R w ·Itt
R2t : Calendarised version of R1t using the weighting scheme,
R2 = O.74R 1 + O.26R J •I t-I t
R3 :Nominal average cash rents for tenanted farms in England and Wales at mid-t
October of year t. that have had a rent increase in the last year (£/ha.). Each
figure is the mean of the two sample observations for rents in that year. From
1987 figures are estimated from English and Welsh averages according to the
weighting, R11 =O.91R Et + O.10R w(
R
4t
: Calendarised version of R3t using the weighting scheme,
R4 = O.74R3 + O.26R3 .I 1-1 t
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Table A.6 : Nominal Average Rents in England and Wales 1960-1989
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A B C D E
1 Year Rl R2 R3 R4
2 1960 6.18 n.a. n.a. n.a
3 1961 6.92 6.37 n.a. n.a
4 1962 7.72 7.13 n.a. n.a
5 1963 8.52 7.93 n.a. n.a
6 1964 8.96 8.63 9.51 n.a.
7 1965 9.20 9.02 10.75 9.83
8 1966 10.07 9.43 11.74 11.01
9 1967 10.25 10.12 12.23 11.87
10 1968 11.00 10.45 12.97 12.42
11 1969 11.96 11.25 14.21 13.29
12 1970 13.20 12.28 15.10 14.44
13 1971 14.31 13.48 15.79 15.28
14 1972 15.22 14.54 17.22 16.16
15 1973 16.19 15.47 19.05 17.70
16 1974 18.31 16.74 20.31 19.38
17 1975 22.29 19.34 24.56 21.42
18 1976 28.32 23.86 30.71 26.16
19 1977 34.00 29.80 37.85 32.57
20 1978 41.49 35.95 46.55 40.11
21 1979 47.79 43.13 54.32 48.57
22 1980 53.37 49.24 60.10 55.82
23 1981 61.01 55.36 68.16 62.20
24 1982 68.67 63.00 77.05 70.47
25 1983 75.96 70.56 86.23 79.44
26 1984 84.88 78.28 91.10 87.50
27 1985 89.35 86.04 93.49 91.72
28 1986 90.98 89.78 93.56 93.51
29 1987 91.60 91.14 96.89 94.43
30 1988 92.12 91.73 96.89 96.89
31 1989 93.89 92.58 97.47 96.78
32 1990 96.26 94.51 102.43 98.76
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(b) Other Post War Cash Rent Series
Since the Second World War there have been a number of studies undertaken which
furnish estimates of cash rents. The Central Landowners Association (later the Country
Landowners Association) in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture conducted
an investigation into landowner expenses and rents along similar lines to the ALS Rent
Enquiry for the years 1947, 1950 and 1951 from a sample of around 300 estates
covering some 700,000 hectares. Denman and Stewart (1959) also report average rents
from a sample of landowners for the years 1945 - 1958. Both of these sources have
limited appeal for the purposes of time series analysis although a longer cash rent series
can be derived from the annual Farm Management Survey results. The FMS rent
figures cover both owner-occupied and tenanted farms; the rent for owner-occupied
farms being imputed on the basis of rents paid for tenated farms in the locality.
However, the sample is small, covering only some 0.02% of the total agricultural area
in England and Wales and is thus not ideal for statistical purposes. A more reliable
source of rents has been derived by Harvey (1974) using information from the ALS
Enquiries and a similar survey of agricultural landowners in Scotland. Although the
correspondence between the FMS series and this derived series is very close (see
Harvey (1974, p.208) the latter series is that chosen by Harvey (1974) in his empirical
analysis for the year 1946 to 1959 due to the fact that its coverage is larger. The series
measures rents prevailing at October in each year and will be spliced with the RJ1
series to give a time series on average rents on tenanted farms from 1946 to 1990. This
spliced series, RS1 is presented in Table A.7, with a calendarised version, R61 derived
using the same weighting scheme as used for the other calendar year series R21 and
R4 ·1
In order to extend the series of farms with a change in rent (R31 and R4 1) back to the
end of the Second World War, a series has been estimated from the relationship
between the average rent on all farms and the subset of farms with a rent change in the
previous year from the period in which both series are available, namely 1964 - 90.
Over that period OLS estimates a relationship of the form, R31 = 1.06RJt" Using this
relationship an estimate of rent on farms with a rent change may be produced for the
years 1946 to 1963, which is appended to the series R3( Whilst this expedient is not
wholly satisfactory, it is widely accepted that rents changed very slowly during most of
Data Appendix A.23
:Average rent paid on tenanted land in England and Wales (£/ha.) expressed at
constant 1990 prices for the calendar years 1946 to 1990.
:Average rent paid on tenanted farms that have undergone a rent increase in
the past year in England and Wales (£/ha.) expressed at
constant 1990 prices for the calendar years 1946 to 1990.
the 1946-63 period because the rent arbitration legislation in operation at this time (and
discussed in Chapter II) deterred landowners from negotiating market rents on land
with a sitting tenant. In 1958 a change in the legislation rectified this retardation of rents
although the response was distributed over a number of years due to the tri-annual
review procedure. Consequently, we do not expect that the use of estimates over this
period to adversely bias the accuracy of the series in a significant way. The resulting
series denoted, R7 is presented in Table A.7, with a calendarised version of it Rst t
being calculated using the same weighting scheme as the other calendar year based
senes.
In the emprical analysis the rent series are deflated by the Gross Domestic Product price
index. There are two constant price series for farm rents that are used in the emprical
analysis over the post World War II period. These are R, and RN t which correspond
to the nominal rent series R6t and RSt respectively.These two series are defined as
follows,
R t
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Table A.7 : Nominal Cash Rent Series 1946 - 1990
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A B C 0 E1 Year R5 R6 R7 R8
2 1946 3.52
- 3.73
-
3 1947 3.59 3.54 3.80 3.75 -
4 1948 3.74 3.63 3.96 3.85
5 1949 3.88 3.77 4.11 4.00
6 1950 4.02 3.92 4.26 4.15
7 1951 4.21 4.07 4.47 4.31
8 1952 4.39 4.26 4.65 4.51
9 1953 4.56 4.43 4.83 4.70
10 1954 4.72 4.60 5.00 4.88
11 1955 4.85 4.76 5.15 5.04
12 1956 5.03 4.90 5.33 5.20
13 1957 5.24 5.09 5.56 5.39
14 1958 5.50 5.31 5.83 5.63
15 1959 5.85 5.59 o ~ 2 2 5.93
16 1960 5.81 5.84 6.16 6.19
17 1961 6.55 6.00 6.94 6.36
18 1962 7.12 6.70 7.55 7.10
19 1963 7.73 7.28 8.19 7.72
20 1964 8.15 7.84 9.51 8.54
21 1965 8.77 8.31 10.75 9.83
22 1966 9.46 8.95 11.74 11.01
23 1967 10.25 9.67 12.23 11.87
24 1968 11.00 10.45 12.97 12.42
25 1969 11.96 11.25 14.21 13.29
26 1970 13.20 12.28 15.10 14.44
27 1971 14.31 13.48 15.79 15.28
28 1972 15.22 14.54 17.22 16.16
29 1973 16.19 15.47 19.05 17.70
30 1974 18.31 16.74 20.31 19.38
31 1975 22.32 19.35 24.56 21.42
32 1976 26.93 23.52 30.71 26.16
33 1977 32.18 28.30 37.85 32.57
34 1978 38.22 33.75 46.55 40.11
35 1979 45.39 40.08 54.32 48.57
36 1980 53.37 47.47 60.10 55.82
37 1981 61.01 55.36 68.16 62.20
38 1982 68.67 63.00 77.05 70.47
39 1983 75.96 70.56 86.23 79.44
40 1984 84.88 78.28 91.10 87.50
41 1985 89.35 86.04 9 3 ~ 4 4 91.72
42 1986 90.98 89.78 93.56 93.51
43 1987 91.60 91.14 96.89 94.43
44 1988 92.12 91.74 96.54 96.80
92.58 97.47 96.7845 1988 93.89
46 1988 96.26 94.51 102.43 98.76
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(c) Historical Rent Series
Whilst a single long and continuous rent source does not exist as it does for land price,
an index of rents has been derived by Rhee and published in the Central Landowners
Association (1949). The index is based on a large number of different surveys most of
which were conducted by private researchers. The area of land included in each survey
is generally very small indeed, often reflecting market conditions in a paritcular county
or Family Estate. Exceptions to this are notable, including the work of R.J. Thompson
(1907) spanning 1872-33 and the Royal Commission on Agriculture (1896) spanning
1872-1892. A detailed review of the construction of this index made be found in
Central Landowners Association (1949) however a few points deserve mention here as
the index will be converted into £/ha terms and used in statistical analysis later. Rhee
stresses a number of caveats to be borne in mind when interpreting the index, namely
that it includes gardens over 1 acre in size and that it is a measure of gross rent payable
under a lease and not the cash rent paid after the deduction of abatements and temporary
remissions. Furthermore, in addition to tenanted land the rent assessment in each year
includes a notional allowance for owner-occupied land. Consequently, the index
measures gross income accruing to landowners, and not the net pecuniary benfits of
ownership. Although this is consistent with more recent rent series the dramatic
changes in taxation over this period play an important distortionary role, not present to
such the same degree in later years. 11 Given that this index is the only measure of
rents avaliable prior to the more comprehensive and consistent series discussed earlier,
the usefulness of this series to this study remains an empirical question.
The base year in Rhee's study was 1872 in which average rent is estimated as £3.45
per hectare. From this base the index is converted into nominal monetary units over the
period 1870 to 1936 and calendarised using the weighting scheme described above.
This series is then appended with rents estimated from the Farm Management Survey
data for the years spanning 1937 to 1945 yielding a continuous rent series of 120
observations over the 1870 to 1989 period.This Series, denoted R91 is presented in
Table A.8. Using the Gross Domestic Product deflator R91is revalued at constant 1990
prices and it is this series that will be used in the empirical analysis
11 For example the standard rate of taxation over the period of Rhcc's study rose from 2.5% to 50%.
See page 52 of the Central Landowners Association (1949) for further details.
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Table A.8 : Calendar Year Average Rents in England and Wales in
Nominal Terms (1871.1990)
A 8 C 0 E F
1 Year R9 Year R9 Year R9
2 1871 3.29 1911 2.56 1951 4.07
3 1872 3.38 1912 2.57 1952 4.26
4 1873 3.64 1913 2.59 1953 4.43
5 1874 3.67 1914 2.57 1954 4.60
6 1875 3.68 1915 2.60 1955 4.76
7 1876 3.69 1916 2.63 1956 4.90
8 1877 3.68 1917 2.63 1957 5.09
9 1878 3.68 1918 2.65 1958 5.31
10 1879 3.54 1919 2.71 1959 5.59
11 1880 3.28 1920 2.76 1960 5.84
12 1881 3.23 1921 2.93 1961 6.00
13 1882 3.18 1922 3.16 1962 6.70
14 1883 3.30 1923 3.08 1963 7.28
15 1884 3.29 1924 3.08 1964 7.84
16 1885 3.14 1925 3.08 1965 8.31
17 1886 2.92 1926 3.08 1966 8.95
18 1887 2.91 1927 3.07 1967 9.67
19 1888 2.76 1928 3.02 1968 10.45
20 1889 2.85 1929 2.94 1969 11.25
21 1890 2.86 1930 2.93 1970 12.28
22 1891 2.84 1931 2.90 1971 13.48
23 1892 2.80 1932 2.84 1972 14.54
24 1893 2.71 1933 2.73 1973 15.47
25 1894 2.71 1934 2.42 1974 16.74
26 1895 2.63 1935 1.97 1975 19.35
27 1896 2.61 1936 2.35 1976 23.52
28 1897 2.56 1937 2.39 1977 28.30
29 1898 2.55 1938 2.55 1978 33.75
30 1899 2.51 1939 2.66 1979 40.08
- 2.66 1980 47.4731 1900 2.47 1940
32 1901 2.51 1941 2.65 1981 55.36
33 1902 2.54 1942 2.70 1982 63.00
34 1903 2.50 1943 2.77 1983 70.56
35 1904 2.51 1944 2.87 1984 78.28
36 1905 2.47 1945 2.99 1985 86.04
37 1906 2.53 1946 3.12 1986 89.78
38 1907 2.56 1947 3.54 1987 91.14 .
39 1908 2.56 1948 3.63 1988 91.74
40 1909 2.56 1949 3.77 1989 92.58
41 1910 2.56 1950 3.92 1990 94.51
A.26
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The series is defined as follows:
RH t :Average rent of agricultural land in England and Wales (£/ha.) expressed at
constant 1990 prices for the calendar years 1871 to 1990.
The series RNt and RH t are plotted in Figure AA.
Figure A.4 : Time Series of Real Rents (1990 prices) in England and
Wales
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A.(iii) The Price Deflator
In order to remove the effect of general price inflation from the value-based series used
here, all series are deflated by an index of the implied Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
deflator which is a 'Paasche' or current weighted index measured at factor cost using
the expenditure method. Inflation is calculated as,
GDFtc
GDFtk
expressed as a percentage change on the previous year, where, subscripts t, c, and k
represent the year, current prices and constant (base year) prices. This measure of
inflation has certain advantages over other deflators in that it may be calculated
consistently since 1856 and is more representative of the general price trend of all
goods and services rather than a relatively small basket of consumer items as is used to
construct the Retail Price Index. Table A.9 contains the percentage inflation rate
obtained using the GDP deflator from 1856 to 1989 and the index used to deflate the
value based series used here. See Table A.9 and the references or details of the sources
used to derive the GDP deflator.
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Table A.9: The Implied Gross Domestic Product Deflator and Index at 1990 prices
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Year Inflation ndex Year Inflation ndex Year Inflation Index Year Inflation ndex
2 1990 9.3 1- 1955 3.9 12.14 1920 20.5 18.43 1885 0 61.66
3 1989 7.2 1.09 1954 1.8 12.61 1919 17.7 22.21 1884 -3.6 61.66
4 1988 6.4 1.17 1953 3.3 12.84 1918 18.7 26.14 1883 -6.7 59.44
5 1987 5.2 1.25 1952 7.6 13.26 1917 26.4 31.03 1882 2.4 55.46
6 1986 2.6 1.31 1951 9.1 14.27 1916 14.1 39.22 1881 6.1 56.79
7 1985 5.9 1.35 1950 0.2 15.57 1915 10.8 44.75 1880 -7.3 60.26
8 1984 4.8 1.43 1949 2.9 15.60 1914 0.7 49.59 1879 3.8 55.86
9 1983 5.7 1.49 1948 7.1 16.05 1913 0.8 49.93 1878 -8.8 57.98
10 1982 7.1 1.58 1947 9 17.19 1912 3 50.33 1877 0.5 52.88
11 1981 10.1 1.69 1946 3.2 18.74 1911 1.5 51.84 1876 -1.5 53.14
12 1980 18.8 1.86 1945 3 19.33 1910 0.3 52.62 1875 -0.8 52.35
13 1979 12.8 2.21 1944 6 19.91 1909 -0.4 52.78 1874 -8.3 51.93
14 1978 12.1 2.49 1943 4.5 21.11 1908 0 52.57 1873 5.6 47.62
15 1977 12.3 2.80 1942 7.2 22.06 1907 1.9 52.57 1872 7.7 50.28
16 1976 14.4 3.14 1941 9 23.65 1906 0.5 53.57 1871 5.6 54.15
~
17 1975 27.4 3.59 1940 8.6 25.78 1905 0.6 53.83 1870 -0.8 57.19
18 1974 16.8 4.58 1939 2.5 27.99 1904 0 54.16 1869 1.2 56.73
19 1973 7.9 5.35 1938 2.7 28.69 1903 -0.3 54.16 1868 -3.3 57.41
20 1972 10.2 5.77 1937 3.8 29.47 1902 -1.9 53.99 1867 -1.8 55.52
21 1971 11 6.36 1936 0.5 30.59 1901 -0.7 52.97 1866 1.7 54.52
22 1970 7.7 7.06 1935 1 30.74 1900 6.6 52.60 1865 -1.1 55.44
23 1969 3.6 7.60 1934 -0.9 31.05 1899 -1.5 56.07 1864 1.8 54.83
24 1968 3.2 7.87 1933 -1.3 30.77 1898 -0.6 55.23 1863 -0.5 55.82
25 1967 2.8 8.12 1932 -3.6 30.37 1897 5.8 54.90 1862 2.3 55.54
26 1966 4.1 8.35 1931 -2.4 29.27 1896 -1.9 58.08 1861 0.8 56.82
27 1965 4.1 8.69 1930 -0.4 28.57 1895 0.6 56.98 1860 4.3 57.27
28 1964 3.1 9.05 1929 -0.4 28.46 1894 -0.9 57.32 1859 -2.8 59.74
29 1963 2 9.33 1928 -1 28.34 1893 2.6 56.80 1858 0.4 58.06
30 1962 3.2 9.52 1927 -2.4 28.06 1892 -2.5 58.28 1857 -3.2 58.30
31 1961 3.3 9.82 1926 -1.5 27.39 1891 -3.1 56.82 1856 0.3 56.43
32 1960 1.8 10.15 1925 0.3 26.98 1890 0 55.06 1855 56.60
33 1959 1.7 10.33 1924 -1.4 27.06 1889 0.7 55.06
34 1958 4.6 10.50 1923 -8 26.68 1888 4.5 55.45
35 1957 4.1 10.99 1922 -16 24.54 1887 6 57.94
36 1956 6.1 11.44 1921 -10.6 20.62 1886 0.4 61.42
Sources: For 1855-1900 see Mitchell (1988), 1901-1986 see Parkin and Bade, and 1987-1990 see
EconomicTrends.
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